Franklin-Mason v. Dalton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________
)
ROXANN J. FRANKLIN-MASON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 96-2505 (RWR)(JMF)
)
B.J. PENN, )
Secretary of the Navy, )
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Roxann J. Franklin-Mason filed a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement reached in her 1996 Title VII
discrimination suit against the Secretary of the Navy,1 her
former employer, seeking damages for the Secretary’s breach of
the agreement. A magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed,
that the defendant was liable for only nominal damages for
failing to place Franklin-Mason in the specific job position
called for in the settlement agreement, and that the defendant
did not otherwise violate the settlement agreement. Franklin-
Mason filed objections to findings made on the merits.2 Because
1
B.J. Penn is substituted as the defendant under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d).
2
She did not object to a finding against her claim that the
defendant inadequately funded a restored Thrift Savings Account
that the settlement agreement called for.
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this court lacks jurisdiction over Franklin-Mason’s claim for
damages exceeding $10,000, the case will be transferred to the
United States Court of Federal Claims.
BACKGROUND
The history and background of this case and the underlying
motions at issue are discussed in Franklin-Mason v. Johnson,
Civil Action No. 96-2505 (RWR)(JMF), 2006 WL 825416 (D.D.C.
Mar. 21, 2006). Briefly, Franklin-Mason, an African American
woman, brought the original Title VII action against her then
former employer, the United States Navy, alleging that the
defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of race and
gender by failing to promote her to a position that she had
applied for. The parties ultimately filed a settlement agreement
and stipulation of dismissal which required the Navy to appoint
Franklin-Mason as a Senior Financial Analyst/Advisor, and not
assign her to be supervised or evaluated by certain named
individuals and others in the Comptroller’s Office. The
agreement also stated that a party could seek from the court
enforcement of the agreement and monetary damages should a breach
of the agreement occur.
Franklin-Mason was re-employed but resigned from her GS-13
position in June 2004 because, she says, the defendant was not
abiding by the settlement agreement. Franklin-Mason, 2006 WL
825418 at *7. (See Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions of Law, at 58-59.) In her motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, Franklin-Mason argues that the defendant
violated the agreement by 1) failing to appoint her to the
promised Senior Financial Analyst/Advisor position; 2) failing to
assign her duties and responsibilities commensurate with that
position; and 3) failing to ensure that she would not be required
to work directly for or be supervised by allegedly discriminatory
officials, or that she would not be involved in any way with
people employed by the Office of the Comptroller. (See Pl.’s
Objections to Report and Recommendation (“Pl.’s Objections”) at
1-2.) Franklin-Mason does not seek specific performance of the
settlement agreement; instead, she seeks over $900,000 in damages
and attorney’s fees. (See Feb. 3, 2005 Hr’g Tr. 86:8-89:6, 91:5-
91:18, 101:9-101:16; Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, at 48, 57, 58 n.1, 59-61.) See also
Franklin-Mason, 2006 WL 825418 at *14.
A magistrate judge issued a report recommending awarding
Franklin-Mason at best nominal damages for the Navy’s failure to
appoint her to the promised position, in breach of the settlement
agreement.3 As an initial matter, the report concluded the
3
Regarding Franklin-Mason’s first two bases for claiming a
breach of the settlement agreement, the report determined that
the defendant violated the settlement agreement by not giving
Franklin-Mason the position described in the settlement
agreement, and that her assignments were not “perfectly
consistent” with the position that was described in the
agreement. Franklin-Mason, 2006 WL 825418 at *13-14. However,
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parties intended and did expressly stipulate that this court
would retain jurisdiction to hear any motion to enforce the
settlement agreement and award damages for a breach of it. It
reasoned that
[a] claim for breach of a Title VII settlement
agreement is a contract claim within the Tucker Act and
belongs in the Court of Federal Claims unless this
court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, retains
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement that
resolved the Title VII action. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994); Rochon v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing
Hansson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
and Brown v. United States, 389 F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)).
Franklin-Mason, 2006 WL 825418 at *1-2.
Franklin-Mason objects to the report’s failure to find a
material breach of the settlement agreement and to recommend the
damages she sought and attorney fees. (Pl.’s Objections at 3,
12.)
DISCUSSION
The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is reviewed
de novo. LCvR 72.3(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Ames v.
Yellow Cab of D.C., Inc., Civil Action No. 00-3116 (RWR), 2006 WL
2711546, at *4 (D.D.C. September 21, 2006).
the report and recommendation concluded that Franklin-Mason was
entitled “at best, to nominal damages.” Id. at *15. Regarding
Franklin-Mason’s third basis, the report found no breach,
explaining that the plain language of the settlement agreement
did not require a “complete separation between the staff of
[Franklin-Mason’s] office and the staff of the Office of the
Comptroller.” Id. at *11-12.
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Jurisdiction is an independent, preliminary issue that is
resolved before analyzing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.
Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83, 94-95 (1998), and Kidwell v. Department of the Army, Board
for Correction of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir.
1995)). The Tucker Act states that “[t]he United States Court of
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any
express or implied contract4 with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also Greenhill, 482 F.3d
at 572. The Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction is exclusive
when such a claim “explicitly or in essence seeks money damages
in excess of $10,000[.]” Greenhill, 482 F.3d at 572 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a); Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523
(D.C. Cir. 1986)) (determining that because plaintiff sought
$210,000 in damages from the federal government in her attempt to
enforce an agreement that settled complaints of age and race
discrimination, the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive
jurisdiction); see also Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297 (remanding matter
4
“Settlement agreements are in the nature of contracts[,]”
and “[t]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals treats
settlement agreements as contracts.” Makins v. Dist. of
Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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to the district court to dismiss without prejudice action against
United States to enforce a Title VII settlement agreement because
claim for damages exceeding $10,000 for breach of agreement fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims); Murthy v. Schafer, 579 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113-114 (D.D.C.
2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims seeking over $10,000 against
the USDA for breach of a Title VII settlement agreement as
belonging in the Court of Federal Claims); Baccus v. U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture, Civil Action No. 08-0012 (ESH), 2007 WL 4616291at *1 (D.D.C. November 27, 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint against the USDA without prejudice where exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction rested with the Court of Federal
Claims because the plaintiff sought enforcement of a settlement
agreement and an award upwards of $50,000); Holmes v. Dep’t of
Navy, 583 F. Supp. 2d 431, 433-434 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff’s claim
against the Navy for $70 million in damages caused by a purported
breach of a settlement agreement since any such claim would lie
with the Court of Federal Claims).
The report and recommendation based its conclusion that this
court has jurisdiction to hear this claim on the opinions in
Kokkonen and Rochon. In Kokkonen, none of the parties was the
United States or a federal government entity. They agreed on a
settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint.
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When the petitioner supposedly breached the agreement, the
respondent life insurance company sought enforcement of the
agreement in district court. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-77. The
Supreme Court held that the district court lacked authority to
enforce the agreement because, in part, the dismissal order did
not include any provision retaining jurisdiction over the
agreement. Id. at 381. Unlike in Kokkonen, the Court of Federal
Claims is granted exclusive jurisdiction over Franklin-Mason’s
attempt to enforce the settlement agreement against the
government, and nothing in the language of Kokkonen indicates
that parties can create jurisdiction over a claim for which
jurisdiction is expressly reserved for a different body. Parties
cannot by settlement agreement confer jurisdiction on a court
over a claim that is exclusively the province of another court.
See Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (stating that “no action of the parties can confer subject-
matter jurisdiction upon a federal court”).
Nor did Rochon hold otherwise. In Rochon, the district
court had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and
discrimination brought as violations of both Title VII and a
1990 settlement agreement. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1213. The court
of appeals reversed and reinstated the Title VII claim because
the district court applied an improperly stringent pleading
standard in dismissing that claim. The court of appeals also
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directed the district court to determine whether the primary
thrust of Rochon’s claim of breach was a contract or tort claim
for Tucker Act purposes, and whether the court had ancillary
jurisdiction over that claim if it did lie in contract. Id.
at 1215.
Franklin-Mason argues that this court should exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over her claim to enforce the settlement
agreement. Rochon, though, did not purport to recognize district
court jurisdiction over free-standing breach claims that
otherwise fall within the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive
jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction should be exercised only
“to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in
varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,” or “to
enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees.” Dailey v. Park, 468 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (D.D.C. 2007)
(quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-380; and Foretich v. Am.
Broad. Co., Inc., 198 F.3d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Here,
Franklin-Mason has filed a complaint in a separate action
alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII
based on her attempt to enforce the settlement agreement,
Franklin-Mason v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 03-945 (RWR), which
encompasses actions that occurred after she attempted to enforce
the settlement agreement in this case. This court has no need to
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exercise ancillary jurisdiction over her breach claim to
vindicate its authority or effectuate its decrees.
CONCLUSION
Because this court lacks jurisdiction over Franklin-Mason’s
claim to enforce the settlement agreement, her motion to enforce
the settlement agreement will be transferred to the United States
Court of Federal Claims. An appropriate order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SIGNED this 22nd day of May, 2009.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge