Bourdon v. Winter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
JONATHAN T. BOURDON and )
JEFFREY G. WALLS, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1229 (RBW)
)
RAY MABUS, 1 )
Secretary of the Navy, et. al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Jonathan Bourdon and Jeffrey Walls bring this action against various
defendants alleging violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12,
103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended at sections throughout 5 U.S.C.), several common law
torts, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), stemming from the termination of their employment with the
Department of Navy. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 4-11, 81-126. Among other
forms of relief, the plaintiffs seek reinstatement, retroactive promotions and benefits, $12 million
each in compensatory damages, and $40 million apiece in consequential damages. Id. at 24-25.
Currently before the Court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 filed by
Ray Mabus, O. Tom Crane, Harris Cummings, and Richard Gilbert (“federal defendants”). 2
1
The Court has substituted Ray Mabus for the originally named defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
2
In addition to these defendants, the plaintiffs also lodge claims against the following three individuals who are
affiliated with the city of York, Pennsylvania: William Wentz, an officer with the City of York police department,
Am. Comp. ¶ 8; Jason Rhoades, a firefighter and City Codes Inspector with the City of York; id. ¶ 9; and, Vickie
(continued . . .)
After carefully considering the amended complaint, the parties’ written submissions,3 and the
applicable legal authority, the Court concludes for the reasons explained below that it must grant
the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff Jonathan Bourdon
Jonathan Bourdon was employed as a Federal Police Officer with the Naval District of
Washington (“NDW”) from June 17, 1996 until May 26, 2007. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 32. In 1998,
2001, and 2005, he “applied for promotions and each time . . . was not selected.” Id. ¶ 21. In
April 2004, Bourdon also applied for one of six open Sergeant positions, but was not selected.
Id. ¶ 22. According to Bourdon, “only members of the local union bargaining committee were
selected” for the Sergeant position, including a female applicant with lower scores than him on
one aspect of the selection process. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. The unsuccessful effort to acquire the Sergeant
position led Bourdon to submit a formal complaint to the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 22, 2005. 4 Id. ¶ 25. “On or about February 6,
(. . . continued)
Washington, a York City Council member, id. ¶ 10. All of the defendants listed in the amended complaint are sued
in their official capacities. Id. ¶¶ 4-11. The amended complaint also asserts claims against Stanley Johnson, id. ¶
84, in his official capacity as the former Naval District of Washington Union Committee Chairman, id. ¶ 11. None
of these defendants have made appearances in this action, nor does the docket reflect proof of service of process
upon these defendants. Accordingly, the Court will contemporaneously issue an Order directing the plaintiffs to
furnish the Court with proof of service of process upon defendants Johnson, Wentz, Rhoades, and Washington.
3
The Court considered the following documents in reaching its decision: (1) Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
(“Defs.’ Mot.”); (2) Plaintiff Bourdon and Walls’ Opposition to the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Opp’n”); (3) the Federal Defendants’ Reply Brief (“Defs.’ Reply”);
(4) the Federal Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“Defs.’ Facts”); and (5) the
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts in Dispute. Where appropriate, the Court also considered the exhibits
attached to some of these filings.
4
Bourdon, who is Caucasian, also filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints in 1996 and 1997 in response
“to . . . racial taunts and discrimination . . . he encountered as a result of his relationship with Ms. [Angela] Parks,”
an African American female. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19-20.
2
2007, the EEOC dismissed Bourdon’s complaint with prejudice. Bourdon appealed this
dismissal and the decision was confirmed.” Id. ¶ 30.
Meanwhile, on or about November 30, 2006, Bourdon was involved in a verbal
altercation with a York, Pennsylvania off-duty firefighter. Id. ¶ 51; Defs.’ Mot., Exhibit (“Ex.”)
1 (Notice of Proposed Indefinite Suspension Without Pay) at 1. During this incident, which
occurred when Bourdon was off-duty, he allegedly “identified [himself] as a Federal Marshall[,]
. . . showed the firefighter [his] badge[,] and said in words to the effect that if [the firefighter]
messed with Tony he messed with you and that you had the federal government backing you.”
Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1 (Notice of Proposed Indefinite Suspension Without Pay) at 1. As a result of
this incident, the York Police Department issued an arrest warrant for Bourdon “based on the
charge of Official Oppression.” Id. Also following this purported incident, the Navy proposed
to suspend Bourdon indefinitely without pay for Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer. Id. The
proposed indefinite suspension was implemented on January 16, 2007. Am. Compl. ¶ 28; Defs.’
Mot., Ex. 2 (Decision on Proposed Indefinite Suspension) at 1-2.
On January 30, 2007, Bourdon appealed his indefinite suspension to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (“MSPB”). Am. Compl. ¶ 29. On March 26, 2007, the Navy informed
Bourdon of its intention to remove him from federal employment for “conduct unbecoming a
NDW police officer, providing false information to an investigator[,] and failure to cooperate in
an Agency Investigation.” Am. Compl. ¶ 31. The Navy acted on the proposed removal on May
4, 2007, Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 5 (Decision on Proposed Removal) at 2, and Bourdon’s employment
was terminated on May 26, 2007, Am. Compl. ¶ 32. On July 23, 2007, the MSPB dismissed
Bourdon’s appeal of his termination without prejudice. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 3 (Initial Decision) at 1-
2.
3
On November 13, 2007, the charges against Bourdon in York, Pennsylvania were
dismissed. Am. Compl. ¶ 55. On November 19, 2007, more than five months after his removal
from the Navy took effect, Bourdon filed an appeal with the MSPB requesting that the
termination of his employment by the Navy be stayed. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 6 (Order Denying Stay
Request) at 1. The basis for this request consisted solely of Bourdon’s allegation that he “had
previously [blown] the whistle for ‘faulty equipment.’” Id. The request for a stay was denied on
December 4, 2007. Id. In her Order denying the stay, MSPB Administrative Judge Sarah P.
Clement remarked that Bourdon “did not explain how his alleged disclosure about ‘faulty
equipment’ constituted whistleblowing[,] . . . gave no details concerning the contents or
circumstances of his disclosure, . . . [and] . . . thus failed to explain in even rudimentary fashion
how his removal could have been in reprisal for his whistleblowing.” Id. at 2. A few months
later, on March 18, 2008, Administrative Judge Clement dismissed Bourdon’s appeal of his
removal from federal service on the ground that it had been untimely filed. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 7
(Initial Decision).
Finally, at some point before December 23, 2009, Bourdon filed a complaint with the
United States Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) alleging violations of personnel practices
against management officials at the NDW. 5 See Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. E (December 23, 2009 Letter
from the OSC to Bourdon) at 1. Bourdon asserted that he was “reprised against because of [his]
whistleblowing activity between April 2004 and September 2006.” Id.; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶
38-43. By letter dated December 23, 2009, the OSC notified Bourdon that because of “the
absence of information to establish a connection between [his] indefinite suspension, the
termination action[,] and [his] protected activity, [the OSC had] no basis for further inquiry into
5
The plaintiffs’ initial complaint was filed in this Court on July 2, 2009.
4
[his] allegations.” Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. E (December 23, 2009 Letter from the OSC to Bourdon) at 3.
The letter also informed Bourdon that the OSC had “made a preliminary determination to close
[their] inquiry into [his] complaint,” and that “before [they] actually close[d] the file,” they
would give him thirteen days to submit a written response. Id. Bourdon was also advised that if
the OSC did not hear from him within that time, they “anticipate[d] closing the file and . . .
send[ing] [him] a letter terminating the investigation and advising [him] of any additional rights
[he] may have.” Id.
B. Plaintiff Jeffrey Walls
Jeffrey Walls was employed by the NDW from April 2001 until May 8, 2009, Am.
Compl. ¶ 3, as a police officer, id. ¶ 74. In September 2006 and 2007, Walls informed Colonel
Larry Graves that several supervisors at the NDW were abusing their authority by
misrepresenting the number of hours they worked and improperly receiving bonuses. Id. ¶¶ 59,
61. Walls states that Colonel Graves failed to pursue his allegations. Id.
On June 6, 2008, Colonel Graves proposed to suspend Walls for thirty days as a result of
inappropriate conduct and negligent behavior that occurred on May 25, 2008. Id. ¶ 62. The
conduct in question concerned Walls’ response to a situation involving an intoxicated motorist
who had “flagged [him] down” while he was on patrol in his car. See Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 8
(Proposed Suspension for Thirty (30) Calendar Days) at 1-2. Walls submitted a written reply
regarding the events, but the Navy upheld his suspension on June 26, 2008. See Defs.’ Mot., Ex.
9 (Decision to Effect Your 30-Day Calendar Suspension). On July 24, 2008, Walls filed an
appeal of his thirty-day suspension with the MSPB. Am. Compl. ¶ 65. The suspension was
upheld on November 26, 2008. Id. ¶ 66.
5
Meanwhile, on July 19, 2008, Walls “was obliged to take leave as a result of an injury to
his left knee that occurred while on duty.” Id. ¶ 64. As a result of “his injury Walls was
prescribed a daily medication to assuage his pain, required to wear knee braces . . . [,] and placed
in physical therapy based on the recommendation made by his [Veterans Administration]
physiciain.” Id. Walls made requests to accommodate his disability, including “several requests
to obtain . . . access to a Sport Utility Vehicle.” Id. ¶ 68. These requests were unsuccessful, and
Walls sustained another injury to his left knee in September 2008. Id. Walls was scheduled to
return to duty on January 13, 2009, but was unable to do so because of complications with his
knee and other family circumstances. Id. ¶ 69. Walls then submitted two requests for continued
leave in February 2009, however, both were denied. Id. ¶ 70
On March 30, 2009, the Navy proposed to terminate Walls for Extensive Unauthorized
Absence. Id. ¶ 72; Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 11 (Proposed Removal) at 1. In its termination proposal, the
Navy noted that Walls had been absent without leave for 428 hours and explained how Walls
was previously “informed . . . that [he] needed to submit appropriate medical documentation to
justify [his] continued absence.” Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 11 (Proposed Removal) at 1. On May 5, 2009,
the Navy upheld Walls’ proposed removal. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 12 (Decision Concerning Your
Proposed Removal). The Navy noted that Walls’ “unauthorized absence totals 77 days or 648
duty hours” and that this “excessive unauthorized absence . . . warrant[ed his] removal from the
Federal service.” Id. at 2. The termination became effective on May 9, 2009. Id. at 8.
On August 5, 2009, Walls filed a formal complaint of employment discrimination against
the Navy, alleging that his “separation from Federal Service effective May 9, 2009 violated [his]
6
rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and CFR provisions.” 6 Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 13 (Formal
Complaint of Employment Discrimination) at 1. On May 5, 2010, the Navy issued a final
decision regarding Walls’ employment discrimination complaint. Id., Ex. 16 (May 5, 2010
Letter to Walls) at 1. In its decision, the Navy concluded that Walls was not discriminated
against on the basis of a physical disability when he was removed from federal service in May
2009. Id. The decision also stated that Walls’ claims constituted a “mixed case,” which was
appealable to the MSPB as well as to the appropriate federal district court. See id. at 1-4.
On November 23, 2009, Walls filed an appeal with the MSPB, alleging that his
termination from the Navy was in retaliation for his whistleblowing activity. See id., Ex 14
(MSPB Form 185-1). In his appeal, Walls identified several instances of his participation in
whistleblowing activity from between 2006 and 2009. See id. at 6-13; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶
59, 61, 67, 71. On January 5, 2010, MSPB Administrative Judge Raphael Ben-Ami dismissed
Walls’ appeal without prejudice, citing Walls’ pending case in this Court. See id., Ex. 15 (Initial
Decision) at 1-2. Five months later, on June 11, 2010, Walls filed an appeal with the MSPB in
response to the Navy’s final decision. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 17 (Appearance to Contest
Jurisdiction/Notice of Appeal). On June 29, 2010, Administrative Judge Ben-Ami issued an
initial decision dismissing Walls’ appeal without prejudice. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 18 (Initial
Decision). As of November 2010, Walls’ claim with the MSPB remained pending. Defs.’ Facts
¶ 21.
6
Neither the Amended Complaint nor the plaintiffs’ opposition brief make any reference to a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.
7
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold
challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction,” and thus “the Court is obligated to determine whether it
has subject-matter jurisdiction in the first instance.” Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32
(D.D.C. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). Under Rule 12(b)(1), “it is presumed that a cause lies outside
[the federal courts’] limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994), unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Court possesses jurisdiction, see, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Duff, 444 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.D.C.
2006). Therefore, the “plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer
scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13-14 (D.D.C.
2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in determining whether it
has jurisdiction over the case, the Court “may consider materials outside of the pleadings.”
Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
B. Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the
plaintiff has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Woodruff v. DiMario,
197 F.R.D. 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2000). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it need
only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
8
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds on which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). “Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief, a plaintiff must
furnish more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Hinson ex rel. N.H. v. Merritt Educ. Ctr., 521 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). As the
Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint alleging facts which are “‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (brackets
omitted). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he complaint must be liberally construed in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged,” Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), and the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the
complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint, and matters of
which [the Court] may take judicial notice,” E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117
F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted).
9
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
As noted at the outset of this opinion, the plaintiffs bring their claims under the
Whistleblower Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also based on a number of common law
torts. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 81-126. The federal defendants argue that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over both the Whistleblower Protection Act and the tort claims because the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to those claims. Defs.’ Mot. at 10-15.
The federal defendants also maintain that the section 1983 claim should be dismissed because it
fails to state a claim. Id. at 15-16. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
A. The Whistleblower Protection Act Claim
Count I alleges violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81-101.
That statute “provides most federal agency employees with protection against agency reprisals
for whistleblowing activity, such as disclosing illegal conduct.” Greenhouse v. Geren, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2008). It is a “prohibited personnel practice” for a government agency
to take a “personnel action” against an employee because of his disclosure of certain types of
conduct. Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Under Title 5 of the United States Code, an employee who believes that he is the victim
of an unlawful reprisal in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act must first bring his claim
to the OSC, which is required to investigate the complaint. Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1214). In the event the OSC finds that a prohibited personnel
action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 was committed, it reports its findings to the MSPB,
and can petition the MSPB on the employee’s behalf. Id. If the OSC finds no agency
wrongdoing, then the employee may bring an action before the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221,
1214(a)(3). The MSPB’s decision is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the
10
Federal Circuit, 5 U.S.C. § 7703, which reviews the claim on the administrative record under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, id. § 7701(c), 7703(b)(1). “Under no circumstances does the
[Whistleblower Protection Act] grant [a] District Court jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower
cause of action brought directly before it in the first instance.” Stella, 284 F.3d at 142; see also
Weber, 209 F.3d at 758 (“An employee who believes he has been the victim of a prohibited
personnel practice must first complain to the OSC . . . .”).
Applying that framework here, it is clear that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. According to the amended complaint, see Am. Compl. ¶ 81-101
(“Count I Violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989”), 7 the plaintiffs were required
to bring their Whistleblower Protection Act claims to the OSC in the first instance. Stella, 284
F.3d at 142. They did not do so. Walls does not even allege that he filed a complaint with the
OSC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-80; Pl.’s Opp’n at 12-13. Neither does Bourdon. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-
58. While Bourdon contends that the December 23, 2009 letter he received from the OSC
establishes that he exhausted his administrative remedies, Pls.’ Opp’n at 12-13, that theory is
unavailing. For one thing, Bourdon filed his initial complaint in this Court on July 2, 2009, more
than five months before the date of that letter. Moreover, the December 23, 2009 letter makes
7
In their opposition, the plaintiffs surmise that they present a “mixed case” claim and therefore exhausted their
administrative remedies under the framework applicable to those types of claims. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 7-8, 12-13, 19-
20. A mixed case claim under 5 U.S.C. § 7702 is an adverse personnel action subject to appeal to the MSPB
coupled with a claim that the action was motivated by discrimination. Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634, 638 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also Taylor v. Mabus, 685 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussing the framework for mixed
case claims). To be clear, the amended complaint does not assert a mixed case claim. Thus, in order to evaluate
Count I under that theory, the Court would need to treat the plaintiffs’ opposition as an amendment to the complaint.
The Circuit has described four factors to consider in making this determination. See Richardson v. United States,
193 F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Three of those factors weigh heavily against the plaintiffs here: (1) they are
represented by counsel, who signed the amended complaint and presumably could have drafted the document to
assert a mixed case claim; (2) they could not have amended the amended complaint as a matter of right at the time
they filed their opposition; and (3) they have not evinced any intent to change the amended complaint to allege a
mixed case claim. As to the fourth factor, perhaps the federal defendants may not be unduly prejudiced given the
fact that they addressed the mixed case issue in their reply. Defs.’ Reply at 4-8. But that is at best one factor in
favor of the plaintiffs, and will not carry the day. Accordingly, in its discretion, the Court refuses to consider the
plaintiffs’ opposition to constitute an amendment to their amended complaint.
11
clear that the OSC had reached only a “preliminary determination” to close their inquiry into
Bourdon’s allegations. See Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. E (December 23, 2009 Letter from the OSC to
Bourdon) at 3. Although the letter alludes to Bourdon’s prior experiences with the OSC, id. at 1,
the federal defendants correctly point out that the letter specifically concerns Bourdon’s
allegations of whistleblowing and removal from federal service, allegations that are at issue in
this case. Defs.’ Reply at 3-4. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain the plaintiffs’ Whistleblower Protection Act claims. Stella, 284 F.3d at 142.
B. Counts II Through VI
Counts II through VI assert a number of claims including Conspiracy to Violate Civil
Rights (Count II), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102-106; Violation of Civil Rights (Count III), id. ¶¶ 107-113;
Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count IV), id. ¶¶ 114-120; Abuse of Administrative Power (Count V),
id. ¶¶ 121-23; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI), id. ¶¶ 124-126. It is
not entirely clear which defendants the plaintiffs are seeking to sue, as the descriptions in these
counts allege wrongdoing committed by individuals, such as “Graves and Merrit,” who are not
identified as parties in the amended complaint. Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 108, with id. ¶¶ 2-11.
Based on their opposition, Pls.’s Opp’n at 20-21, 8 it appears that the plaintiffs’ intent through the
counts of their amended complaint is to impose liability upon the United States under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h), a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) that permits the United States to
be held liable for certain intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers of the United
States government who were acting within the scope of their employment. See also 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b). The plaintiffs’ theory seems to be that federal defendants Richard Gilbert and Harris
8
See Pegram v. Herdric, 530 U.S. 211, 230 n.10 (2000) (“[W]e may use [the parties’] brief to clarify allegations in
[their] complaint whose meaning is unclear.” (citing Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1364 (1990))).
12
Cummings, 9 along with several other individuals who are also not listed as parties in the
amended complaint, “conspired, aided and abetted[,] or acted in concert to facilitate Bourdon’s
false arrest as well as to effectuate the malicious prosecution of Bourdon,” in York,
Pennsylvania. Pls.’ Opp’n at 23. For their part, the federal defendants argue that these claims
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the United States is the proper
defendant. Defs.’ Mot. at 14. The Court agrees.
The Westfall Act “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort
claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties.” Osborn v. Haley,
549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). Although the federal defendants have
not taken a position on whether Richard Gilbert and Harris Cummings were acting in the course
of their official duties, the plaintiffs readily admit that this was the case. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 23
(“At the time of the events noted above, Detectives Gilbert [and] Harris . . . were law
enforcement officials for the United States Government acting within the scope of their
employment . . . . ) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Richard Gilbert and Harris Cummings are
immune from suit, and the FTCA is the appropriate vehicle to assert these claims. E.g., Lee v.
United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The FTCA was designed to make civil
actions against the United States the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal employees
within the scope of their employment, conferring absolute immunity on the employee.”). Yet the
amended complaint does not mention the FTCA or identify the United States as a defendant.
Thus, because the plaintiffs elected to sue Richard Gilbert and Harris Cummings in their official
9
The plaintiffs’ opposition refers to a “Detective[] . . . Harris,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 23, but it is unclear whether this is the
same person as federal defendant Harris Cummings, who is identified in the amended complaint as an investigator
for the NDW. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Because there are no other individuals in this action named Harris, the Court
assumes that the plaintiffs are indeed referring to federal defendant Harris Cummings.
13
capacities rather than the United States, Counts II through VI must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Cox v. Sec’y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1990).
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983The plaintiffs also invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Am.
Compl. ¶ 1, but do not specifically assert a claim alleging a violation of this statute. Like the
situation with their FTCA claims, however, the plaintiffs’ opposition indicates that Bourdon
alleges a section 1983 claim on the theory that “[v]arious officials and agents acting on behalf of
[the] NDW aided and abetted or conspired with state officials in York, Pennsylvania to facilitate
a false prosecution and to effectuate a false arrest of Bourdon for the purposes of a malicious
prosecution.” 10 Pls.’ Opp’n at 27. The federal defendants move to dismiss Bourdon’s claim for
failure to state a claim, arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to them. Defs.’ Mot. at 15-
16; Defs.’ Reply at 10-11. The federal defendants’ position is well taken, but the Court believes
that their arguments also implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court
will consider Bourdon’s section 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(1).
As the Court previously observed, supra n.2, the federal defendants are sued in their
official capacities. E.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 4. A suit against a government official in his official
capacity “generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent,” such that “an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than
name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66
(1985). Thus, the Court proceeds as if Bourdon’s § 1983 claim against the federal defendants
was brought against the United States itself. See Partovi v. Matuszewski, 647 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17
(D.D.C. 2009) (construing a § 1983 claim against Immigration and Customs Enforcement
10
Walls does not appear to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pls.’ Opp’n at 24-27.
14
employees in their official capacities as one brought directly against the United States), aff’d,
2010 WL 3521597 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2010).
“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the
existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
212 (1983). Such consent must be “unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992). The doctrine of sovereign immunity, then, bars suits against the
United States unless immunity is specifically waived by statute. United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941). Sovereign immunity extends to government agencies and to their
employees where such employees are sued in their official capacities. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 483-86 (1994); see Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“Sovereign immunity . . . bar[s] suits for money damages against officials in their official
capacity absent a specific waiver by the government.”).
Here, Bourdon has not identified any authority from which a waiver of sovereign
immunity may be found with respect to his claim that the federal defendants “aided and abetted
or conspired with state officials in York, Pennsylvania” to effectuate a false arrest and facilitate a
malicious prosecution against him. Pl.’s Opp’n at 27. Thus, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Bourdon’s claims for money damages against the United States and its
agencies. Accordingly, to the extent that Bourdon asserts a claim against the federal defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim will be dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See Partovi, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (relying on sovereign immunity as the basis to dismiss § 1983
claims brought against two employees of the Department of Homeland Security who were sued
in their official capacities); Johnson v. Williams, 699 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165-66 (D.D.C. 2010)
(Walton, J.) (concluding that sovereign immunity barred § 1983 claims against a federal agency
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and several of its employees who were sued in their official capacities); see also Dye v. United
States, 516 F. Supp. 2d 61, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing statutory damages claims against the
United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not
“authorize suits challenging actions taken under color of federal law nor waive the United States’
sovereign immunity”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Count I will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Similarly,
Counts II through VI will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because federal
defendants Richard Gilbert and Harris Cummings are immune from suit. Finally, insofar as
Bourdon asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the federal defendants, that claim will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because that claim is barred under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
SO ORDERED this 28th day of September, 2011. 11
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
11
An appropriate order will be issued contemporaneously with this memorandum opinion.
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