Adams v. Department of Mental Health of the District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALBERT ADAMS, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-2459 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 23
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF UPON RECONSIDERATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for relief upon reconsideration of
this court’s previous order, granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. The plaintiff argues that the court erred in dismissing his claim brought pursuant to the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., as well as
his claim of disparate treatment brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation
Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794. Because the claims were properly dismissed for the reasons articulated
in the court’s previous Memorandum Opinion, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for relief
upon reconsideration.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 1
The plaintiff, a Technology Specialist for the District of Columbia Department of Mental
Health (“the Department”), suffered a stroke in May 2005. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 14. After
1
The court more thoroughly articulated the factual background of this case in its prior
Memorandum Opinion. See generally Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010).
spending two months at a rehabilitation center, the plaintiff requested to work from home. Id. ¶¶
14, 18.
By September 2005, no arrangements had been made to satisfy the plaintiff’s request,
prompting the plaintiff to initiate the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint
process. Id. ¶ 25. On February 5, 2006, the Department’s EEO manager issued the plaintiff a
notice of right to file a discrimination complaint, stating that defendant was “unable to grant the
accommodation request.” Id. ¶¶ 32-33. On February 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed a formal
complaint of discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”)
and cross-filed it with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. ¶ 34; Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. A.
Although the plaintiff and the Department were engaged in ongoing mediation at this
point, the plaintiff elected to move forward with the DCOHR complaint process. 2d Am. Compl.
¶¶ 44-52. On January 1, 2008, the DCOHR issued a letter of determination stating that there was
probable cause to believe that the Department failed to provide the plaintiff with a reasonable
accommodation for his disability. Id. ¶ 53. The DCOHR mediation division continued to
facilitate negotiation discussions until August 2008, at which point the mediation division issued
a notice regarding the parties’ failure to reach an agreement. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 9-
10.
After a hearing before a DCOHR independent examiner, the plaintiff requested that his
case be transferred to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Id. at 10. Noting that the
DCOHR does not transfer cases, the DCOHR administratively dismissed the case with prejudice
on October 20, 2009. Id., Ex. 3.
2
B. Procedural History
On November 9, 2009, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia against the Department. See Notice of Removal; Am. Compl. ¶ 8. The plaintiff
amended the complaint and the defendants removed the case to this court the following month.
See Notice of Removal. The plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint for a second time,
asserting claims against the District of Columbia instead of the Mayor and Attorney General for
the District of Columbia. See generally 2d Am. Compl. The plaintiff sought relief for claimed
violations of the DCHRA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. See generally 2d Am. Compl.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s second amended
complaint, see generally Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied in
part, see generally Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010). More specifically, the court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiff’s ADA claims and his hostile work
environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 1. The court,
however, granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiff’s DCHRA claim and his
disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.In dismissing the plaintiff’s DCHRA claim, the court explained that the plaintiff was
barred from seeking judicial relief because he failed to withdraw his pending administrative
complaint with the DCOHR prior to the determination of probable cause. Id. at 24-26. In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’
decision in Anderson v. U.S. Safe Deposit Co., 552 A.2d 859 (D.C. 1989). See id. With respect
to the plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims, the court determined that the plaintiff was not
required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a judicial complaint. Id. at 8-14.
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The statute of limitations, therefore, did not toll during the administrative process, making the
plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act untimely under the statute of
limitations. 2 Id. at 8-14.
The plaintiff has now filed a motion for relief upon reconsideration arguing that the court
misapplied Anderson, and that equity requires that the statute of limitations be tolled for his
disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Recons.
(“Pl.’s Mot.”). With the plaintiff’s motion ripe for review, the court turns to the parties’
arguments and the applicable legal standards.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for a Motion for Relief Upon Reconsideration of a Final Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of the judgment at issue. FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(e). While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the
reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an unusual measure. Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d
1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 59(e) motions “need not be granted unless the district court
finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ciralsky v. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208).
Moreover, “[a] Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and
theories upon which a court has already ruled,” New York v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38
2
The court determined that the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under the Rehabilitation
Act survived under a theory that the defendant committed a “continuing violation.” See Mem.
Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 15-16.
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(D.D.C. 1995), or a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced
earlier, Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993); W.C. & A.N. Miller
Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997).
B. The Court Denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief Upon Reconsideration
1. The Court Declines to Reconsider its Decision Dismissing
the Plaintiff’s DCHRA Claim
The plaintiff argues that the court misread Anderson v. U.S. Safe Deposit Co. in analyzing
his DCHRA claim. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Under a proper reading of Anderson, the plaintiff maintains,
the court should conclude that his election to file an administrative complaint does not foreclose
his right to pursue a judicial remedy. Id. The defendant responds that the court’s interpretation
of Anderson was correct. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. at 7.
As noted in the court’s prior ruling, see Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 24-25, a plaintiff
asserting a DCHRA claim is required to “choose between an administrative or a judicial forum in
which to pursue his or her claims,” Carter v. District of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1223 (D.C.
2009) (explaining that “[t]he jurisdiction of the court and OHR are mutually exclusive in the first
instance” (quoting Brown v. Capitol Hill Club, 425 A.2d 1309, 1311 (D.C. 1981))). A plaintiff,
however, may commence an action in court, notwithstanding his or her prior filing of a
complaint with the DCOHR, if either: (1) the plaintiff withdraws the DCOHR complaint before
the DCOHR renders a judgment on it; or (2) the DCOHR dismisses the complaint for
“administrative convenience.” Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 2-1403.16(a)). In order to successfully
withdraw a complaint before the DCOHR, and thus preserve the right to bring the same claim in
court, a complainant must request withdrawal “prior to completion of the [DCOHR’s]
investigation and findings.” D.C. CODE § 2-1403.04. More specifically, a plaintiff is required to
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withdraw his request prior to the DCOHR’s determination of whether probable cause exists. See
Anderson, 552 A.2d at 863.
In Anderson, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the DCOHR alleging
that his employer engaged in discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 859. After the
DCOHR determined that probable cause existed to support the plaintiff’s allegations, the
plaintiff withdrew her administrative complaint and filed suit in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia. Id. at 860. The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss that action arguing that
the plaintiff was barred from bringing a judicial claim because she had chosen to pursue an
administrative procedure for relief and had not withdrawn that administrative claim in a timely
fashion before commencing her judicial action. See id. at 859. Alternatively, the defendant
contended that the plaintiff was barred from bringing suit due to the statute of limitations. Id.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the defendant’s motion without
elaborating on the basis for its decision. Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed
after determining that both of the arguments presented by the defendant – the plaintiff’s failure to
adequately withdraw her administrative claim and the untimeliness of the judicial action under
statutory limitations – were “valid ground[s] for dismissal.” Id. The Court of Appeals explained
that, “[t]he code and regulations make clear that to preserve the right to bring the same action in
court, withdrawal [of an administrative complaint] must occur prior to the [DCOHR’s]
disposition,” which required the plaintiff to withdraw her administrative complaint prior to
receiving a notice of a probable cause determination. Id. at 860 (quoting Brown v. Capitol Hill
Club, 425 A.2d 1309, 1312 (1981)).
Here, as in Anderson, the plaintiff had already received a probable cause determination at
the time he withdrew his administrative complaint. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 6-7; see also Mem. Op.
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(Sept. 28, 2010) at 3. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s DCHRA claim
under Anderson. Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 24.
The plaintiff further suggests that the court erred in following Anderson because it is
contrary to other decisions of this court. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. As a threshold matter, all three cases
cited by the plaintiff were decided prior to the Anderson decision which was issued in 1989. See
Jones v. Mgmt. P’ship, Inc., 1983 WL 143571 (D.D.C. July 22, 1983); Blake v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 608 F. Supp. 1239 (D.D.C. 1985); Weaver v. Gross, 1986 WL
7553 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1986). More importantly, however, “the D.C. Court of Appeals is of
course the controlling authority for interpretation of D.C. law.” Companhia Brasileira
Carbureto de Calicio v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 2011 WL 1437632, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 15, 2011). Indeed, other members of this court have deferred to Anderson in adjudicating
DCHRA claims. See Weiss v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 729 F. Supp. 144, 146 n.2 (D.D.C.
1990) (explaining that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is the controlling authority as
to HRA interpretation). The court, therefore, did not err in considering Anderson
notwithstanding the pre-Anderson holdings by other members of this court. As such, the court
denies the plaintiff’s motion for relief upon reconsideration with respect to his DCHRA claims.
2. The Court Declines to Reconsider its Decision Dismissing the Plaintiff’s
Disparate Treatment Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act
Next, the plaintiff challenges the court’s determination that the plaintiff was not required
to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a judicial complaint for his disparate
treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Pl.’s Mot. at 3; Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 8.
Because no exhaustion was required, the court also held that the statute of limitations did not toll
during the administrative process and the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim under the
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Rehabilitation Act was time-barred. Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 13-14. The plaintiff urges the
court to reconsider its holding, arguing that he reasonably believed that he was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies in light of the split among courts in this jurisdiction
regarding the exhaustion requirements for Rehabilitation Act claims. Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Thus, the
plaintiff argues, he should not be “retroactively punished,” and the court should determine that
his Rehabilitation Act claim was timely filed within the statute of limitations. Id. The defendant
responds that this court properly determined the plaintiff was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled. Def.’s Opp’n at 9.
As described above, see supra Part.III.A, a Rule 59(e) motion “need not be granted
unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671 (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Although manifest
injustice is frequently considered a vague standard, see Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 414, 422 (D.D.C. 2005), a lack of clarity in the law does not amount to manifest
injustice, Qwest Serv.’s Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n., 509 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding the petitioner’s reliance on a law that was neither settled nor well-established did not
amount to manifest injustice).
The plaintiff does not argue in his motion that there has been any intervening change of
controlling law or that new evidence has become available. See generally Pl.’s Mot. Rather, the
plaintiff contends that he relied upon the contrary holding by courts within this jurisdiction that
have determined exhaustion to be necessary and therefore exhausted his administrative remedies
accordingly. Id. at 3. In deciding to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss with regards to the
plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim, this court carefully reviewed all of the relevant case law,
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including the authority cited by the plaintiff in his motion for relief upon reconsideration. Mem.
Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 9-10. Although it is an unsettled question of law as to whether a plaintiff
must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating a judicial action, compare Ellis v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 631 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) with Stewart v. District of
Columbia, 2006 WL 626921, at *9-11 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006), the court considered both
approaches and ultimately concluded that no exhaustion was necessary, Mem. Op. (Sept. 28,
2010) at 9-12. Because reliance on an unsettled area of law does not amount to manifest
injustice, see Qwest Serv.’s Corp., 509 F.3d at 540, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for
relief upon reconsideration with respect to his disparate treatment claim brought under the
Rehabilitation Act. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for relief upon
reconsideration. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 27th day of June, 2011.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
3
To the extent the plaintiff is arguing that the court committed a clear legal error, the court is not
persuaded. This court’s lengthy discussion regarding the exhaustion requirement, demonstrates
that the law itself is not clear. See Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2010) at 8-12.
9