Kaufman v. Internal Revenue Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RICHARD PHILIP KAUFMAN and
MICHAEL NORLEY,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 10-cv-1610 (RLW)
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiffs Richard Philip Kaufman and Michael Norley have filed this “Complaint
on Contract and Promise on Value (Sweat Equity) Loaned” purportedly as relators on behalf of
“The People of the State of Pennsylvania.” Plaintiffs have named more than 60 Defendants,
including the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the Secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of
the Federal Reserve, the entire Pennsylvania state court system, Pennsylvania state judges,
federal judges and federal prosecutors. Plaintiffs make wholesale attacks on the legitimacy of
the IRS, the Federal Reserve Bank, the U.S. treasury and system of currency, some state and
federal courts, and other individuals or entities that Plaintiffs believe to be “acting as agents” for
the IRS.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1), (2), (5) and (6).
For the reasons set forth below, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs’
suit. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 4, 11, 52, 74, 75, & 76) are
1
granted. Moreover, because Plaintiffs have abused the litigation process through their numerous
improper filings, including signing and filing counterfeit orders as “common law magistrates” or
“private attorney generals,” Plaintiffs’ CM/ECF privileges are revoked and they are enjoined
from submitting any additional filings in this case without prior leave of the Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs’ Previous Federal and State Cases
Although Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, they are no strangers to the court system.
Residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs have between them filed at least 15
pro se suits in federal district and bankruptcy courts over the last ten years, almost all of which
have been dismissed. 1 Some of the federal cases, moreover, detail the numerous state cases they
have filed to attempt to prevent adverse action against them. It appears that, whenever Plaintiffs
are unhappy with the result of a case (including criminal prosecutions), they file a new lawsuit—
often in a different court—suing the judge, court staff, lawyers, and/or other government officials
involved in the previous case. Their strategy appears, at least in part, to challenge the authority
1
See In re Kaufman, No. 08-bk-11087 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 14, 2008); In re
Kaufman, No. 08-bk-13185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed May 15, 2008); Kaufman v. U.S., No. 6-mc-
146 (E.D. Pa filed Aug. 1, 2006); Norley, et al. v. Wolfe, et al., No. 09-cv-1129 (N.D. N.Y. filed
Sept. 20, 2009); Norley v. Landis, et al., No. 10-cv-5893 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 29, 2010); Norley v.
Platt, et al., No. 00-cv-3695 (E.D. Pa. filed July 21, 2000); Norley v. Welsh, et al., No. 03-cv-
5596 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 7, 2003); Norley v. State of Pennsylvania, et al., No. 03-cv-6039 (E.D.
Pa. filed Oct. 31, 2003); Norley v. State of Pennsylvania, et al., No. 05-cv-5311 (E.D. Pa. filed
Oct. 7, 2005); Norley v. East Bradford Township, No. 06-cv-2038 (E.D. Pa. filed May 12, 2006);
Norley v. Norley, et al., No. 06-cv-3016 (E.D. Pa. filed July 10, 2006); In re Norley, No. 03-
18613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed June 4, 2003); In re Norley, No. 04-33025 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed
Sept. 24, 2004); In re Norley, No. 09-18782 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2009); In re Norley, No.
10-10436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 21, 2010).
2
of those who have taken action against them. See Order at 3, n.1, Norley, et al. v. Wolfe, et al.,
No. 09-cv-1129 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010), ECF No. 3 (demanding credentials of clerk of court
and judges that had failed to enter judgment sought by plaintiffs; in dismissing case, Court stated
that “it is cases like this one that delay the resolution of other cases, and that contribute to this
District’s dubious distinction has having . . . one of the longest median times to disposition for
civil cases . . . .”); see also Complaint, Norley v. State of Pennsylvania, et al., No. 05-cv-5311
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2005) (suing and challenging authority of judges, sheriffs and other government
officials who had taken adverse action against Norley in previous cases).
Plaintiffs have both been reprimanded for successive bankruptcy filings in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to, among other things, stop
the foreclosure and sheriff’s sales of their properties. Kaufman has already been ordered not to
file any further bankruptcy cases without prior leave of that court. See Order, In re Kaufman,
No. 08-13185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2008), ECF No. 38. In Plaintiff Norley’s most recent
bankruptcy filing, Norley “repeatedly” admitted that the sole reason he filed that case and “all
but one of his prior bankruptcy cases was to prevent the [local municipality] from moving
forward with the Sheriff’s Sale of his real property or to stop other actions by [that
municipality].” See Order at 7-8, In re Norley, No. 10-10436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2010),
ECF No. 33. After holding an evidentiary hearing at which Norley was present, the Court
ultimately found Norley had filed his bankruptcy case in bad faith, dismissed his case, and
enjoined any future bankruptcy filings without leave of the court “to prevent [Norley’s]
continued abuse of the bankruptcy process.” Id. at 7-10.
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B. The Complaint and Filings in this Case
In August 2010, Plaintiff Kaufman was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for, among other things, failure to file tax returns in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7203, attempt to obstruct lawful function of Internal Revenue Service in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7212(a), and making false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. See Indictment,
United States v. Kaufman, No. 10-cr-553 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010), ECF No. 1. Approximately
one month after he was indicted, Kaufman, along with Norley, filed this suit against the IRS and
other Defendants “acting as agents” for the IRS.
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, particularly the IRS, have fraudulently
induced Plaintiffs into “involuntary servitude” (¶¶ 21, 30). Plaintiffs allege, among other things,
that: 1) the IRS operates in the United States without disclosing that it is a “private” or “foreign
usury” debt collector, and an “offshore trust maintained in Puerto Rico” that fraudulently
operates in the “secret collection of usury” (¶¶ 11-12; 23-4); 2) the Internal Revenue Code is
applicable only to “those who elect to volunteer to submit” to it (¶ 23(k)); and 3) that the IRS
and other Defendants have “converted Plaintiffs’ value sweat equity to private money for
enrichment of Defendants” (¶¶ 30-2). Plaintiffs appear to allege that they are immune from the
power of the IRS to impose and collect taxes (¶ 59).
Plaintiffs allege a wide conspiracy, including the IRS and the other Defendants, who have
“routinely aided and abetted” the IRS (¶¶ 23(o), 30, 53). In addition to the IRS, the alleged
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conspiracy includes: 2 1) Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner; 2) Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Benjamin Bernanke; 3) the Depository Trust Company; 4) the Delaware County,
Pennsylvania court in which criminal charges for attempted homicide and aggravated assault are
currently pending against Norley and Kaufman (Magisterial District Court 32-2-49); 3 5) the
arresting officer on those state criminal charges (Erjon Mollaj); 6) federal prosecutors
representing the United States in the pending federal criminal tax case against Kaufman (Zane
David Memeger and Joan E. Burnes); 7) the IRS special agents investigating Kaufman (Jeffrey
S. Brown and Joseph C. Keiper); 8) federal judges who have presided over Kaufman’s criminal
prosecution and a previous civil case Norley filed (Judges Eduardo C. Robreno, Jr., M. Faith
Angell, J. Curtis Joyner ); and 9) the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (Michael E. Kunz). 4
2
Although Plaintiffs did not always specify what role some of the Defendants have had in
their prior cases, their identities are revealed through review of the dockets of Plaintiffs’ previous
cases or through Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
3
See Comm. v. Kaufman, No. CP-23-CR-0001977-2011 & Comm. v. Norley, No. CP-23-
CR-0001978-2011 currently pending in the Delaware County, PA Court of Common Pleas.
4
After they filed their initial Complaint, Plaintiffs sought pursuant to Rule 19(a) to add at least
40 new defendants through “Notices of Joinder” filed on November 19, 2010 (Docket No. 73),
February 4, 2011 (Docket No. 91), and April 7, 2011 (Docket No. 112). The new defendants sought to
be added through these notices include: 1) all of the Pennsylvania state courts; 2) a state judge who had
presided over Norley’s previous criminal trial and whom Norley had previously sued (William
Mahon); 3) the judge presiding over Kaufman’s current federal criminal case (Juan Sanchez); and 4)
the United States District Courts and Courts of Appeal.
Construing Plaintiffs’ “Notices of Joinder” as Motions for Joinder under Rule 19(a), this Court
finds that the defendants’ presence is unnecessary to the resolution of this suit. See FED. R. CIV. P.
19(a); Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“When a
party to a federal lawsuit moves to join a nonparty resisting joinder, the district court must answer three
5
Although Plaintiffs cite many constitutional and statutory provisions, it is often unclear
which claims Plaintiffs are asserting and what authority justifies the relief they seek. Because
Plaintiffs’ pro se Complaint must be construed liberally, this Court has carefully read Plaintiffs’
Complaint and attempted to decipher the claims therein. The Court assumes that Plaintiffs are
attempting to assert: 1) breach of contract; 2) fraud; 3) constitutional claims under the Fifth
Amendment for improper takings (¶¶ 23(o), 28(b), 54); 4) a claim under the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (referred to as simply a
“conspiracy” in Plaintiffs’ complaint) (¶ 53); 5) claims for declaratory relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (2006); and 6) claims for injunctive relief.
At its core, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a challenge to IRS’ right to assess and collect taxes
against them. It is also clear from the ultimate relief sought by Plaintiffs that one of—if not
the—main purposes of Plaintiffs’ suit is to frustrate the government’s collection of taxes and to
enjoin any criminal and civil prosecutions against them. Plaintiffs demand, inter alia, that: 1)
Defendants “provide a full independent audit and accounting” of the IRS, DTC, DTCC, and
Magisterial District Court to account for, among other things, “all books and records relating to legal
questions: Should the absentee be joined? If the absentee should be joined, can the absentee be joined?
If the absentee cannot be joined, should the lawsuit proceed without her nonetheless?”); see also 7
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1604 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that “the
real purpose of this rule is to bring before the court all persons whose joinder would be desirable for a
just adjudication of the action . . . .”). Accordingly, all such Motions for Joinder are denied and all
motions to dismiss filed by any of the defendants sought to be added through Plaintiffs’ “Notices of
Joinder” will be denied as moot. (Docket Nos. 85, 89 and 137).
Even assuming Plaintiffs had sought to amend their Complaint under Rule 15, such
amendments would have been denied as futile for the reasons set forth in this Opinion. See James
Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that Court may deny a motion to
amend a complaint as futile if the proposed complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss).
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fiction taxpayer accounts hypothecated from Plaintiffs’ equity and credit, the origin of and authority for
hypothecating the said accounts”; 2) a protective order be issued to immunize Plaintiffs from process
from U.S. agencies, particularly the IRS; 3) all civil and criminal actions and legal action be enjoined
against Plaintiffs; and 4) Defendants be ordered to “subscribe” to and certify as true Plaintiffs’ “Bill of
Particulars,” a number of questions seeking to have Defendants admit many of Plaintiffs’ claims and
theories. (Compl. at 24-25).
Plaintiffs also claim the power to “issue orders to process this suit” (¶ 47). Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have taken it upon themselves to issue orders in this case as “common law magistrates”
and “private attorney generals.” Plaintiffs have flooded this case with numerous such filings,
such as a bond which Plaintiffs have filed in the amount of “One Trillion, Three Hundred Billion
Dollars” as “consideration” apparently to dismiss the state criminal prosecutions against
Plaintiffs and as “DEMAND TO CLOSE THE PUBLIC DEBT DOLLAR FOR DOLLAR [sic]”
(Docket No. 109). 5
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This Court is obligated to dismiss an action, and may do so sua sponte, if it determines
“at any time” that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). In deciding a
5
This is not the first time Kaufman has been accused of this practice. In one of Kaufman’s
bankruptcy cases, the trustee claimed that Kaufman attempted to send him a “bonded promissory
note” in the amount of $5 million directing the trustee to pay all his creditors in a bankruptcy
case. See Chapter 13 Standing Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice at 1-11, In re
Kaufman, No. 08-13185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 21, 2008), ECF No. 22. Moreover, in Kaufman’s
pending federal criminal tax case, the Indictment details how Kaufman submitted false and
fraudulent documents entitled “Registered Bond for Discharge of Debt” and “bonded promissory
notes” to the IRS attempting to discharge his debt. See Indictment at 3-6, United States v.
Kaufman, No. 10-cr-553 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010), ECF No. 1.
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motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may consider materials
outside the pleadings. See Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249,
1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Despite the favorable inferences a plaintiff receives on a motion to
dismiss, “[u]nder Rule 12(b)(1), it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the federal court’s
limited jurisdiction unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Court possesses jurisdiction.” Ramer v. United States, 620 F.Supp.2d 90, 95-6 (D.D.C. 2009)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]hile the complaint is to be
construed liberally, the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those
inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept
plaintiffs’ legal conclusions.” See Speelman v. United States, 461 F.Supp.2d 71, 73 (D.D.C.
2006). “Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a
12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Wightman-
Cervantes v. Mueller, 750 F.Supp.2d 76, 78 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Although a pro se Plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, this does not give a pro se plaintiff license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not
want to assert. See Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933
(D.C.Cir. 1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237,
239 (D.D.C. 1987). Moreover, although pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard,
“even a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter
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jurisdiction.” Curran v. Holder, 626 F.Supp.2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
B. Lack of Jurisdiction for Patently Insubstantial Claims
As this Circuit has recently held, a “complaint may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds
when it is patently insubstantial presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” See Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1994)); see also Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to
entertain claims within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous . . . .”). Dismissal is appropriate,
therefore, when the claims are “flimsier than doubtful or questionable . . . essentially fictitious.”
Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009 (internal quotation marks omitted). Patently insubstantial claims include
those which are “‘essentially fictitious’ or advance ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,’ ‘fantastic government
manipulation of [one’s] will or mind’ or some type of ‘supernatural intervention.’” Wightman-
Cervantes, 750 F.Supp.2d at 79 (quoting Best, 39 F.3d at 330-31).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege a wide conspiracy between the IRS and Defendants (many of
whom are judges, law enforcement or other government officials who have been involved in Plaintiffs’
Pennsylvania cases), stating that Defendants “have converted Plaintiffs’ value sweat equity to private
money by secretly issuing and trading bonds and similar private instruments hypothecated against
Plaintiffs’ future labor for enrichment of Defendants, thereby subjecting Plaintiffs to involuntary
servitude.” (¶ 30). Plaintiffs also allege that:
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• The IRS “is not registered as a foreign corporation or otherwise to do business in or with the
District of Columbia, the State of Pennsylvania, the Secretary of State of any of the States of the
Union, the United States of America perpetual Union, or with the United State [sic] Securities
and Exchange Commission.” (¶ 36);
• The IRS “as principal money trafficker” for Defendants “has enticed and continues to entice the
One People into condemning themselves to eternal purgatory by coercing and deluding them
into electing to volunteer to be U.S. subjects that are required to pray to the United States
judiciary in violation of the law of Nature’s God.” (¶ 35);
• The IRS “as a collector of a fictitious debt under public policy” “has served as the primary
funding arm for global terrorism waged for generations against the One People, converting
honorable sweat equity and future such value into sustained economic warfare to maintain the
private credit money monopoly.” (¶ 34);
• “Defendants jointly and severally present a clear and often lethal danger to the One People.” (¶
34); and
• Defendants acting “in agency to foreign usury debt collector Defendant IRS” “are engaged in
an ongoing racketeering enterprise with intent to entice, deceive and force under color of law
the One People, Relators in particular, to elect to use Defendants’ private money system of
currency and corporate regulation for the ultimate enrichment of Defendants . . . .” (¶ 53).
As described before, Plaintiffs have gone so far as to submit a bond in the amount of “one
trillion dollars” to persuade the Court to discharge debt or issue judgments in Plaintiffs’ favor. The
Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiffs’ Complaint and is satisfied that this case represents the type of
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“bizarre conspiracy theories,” “frivolous,” and “essentially fictitious” claims that are patently
insubstantial and present no federal question suitable for decision.” Wightman-Cervantes, 750
F.Supp.2d at 79-80; see also Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009-10; Curran, 626 F.Supp.2d at 33-34. As such,
this Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rules 12(h)(3) and 12(b)(1).6
C. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Grant Plaintiffs the Relief They Seek
For the reasons already stated, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
patently insubstantial Complaint. Even assuming (as this Court will do given Plaintiffs’ pro se
status), however, that Plaintiffs’ claims were not subject to dismissal for being patently
insubstantial, dismissal would still be appropriate because this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek.
Plaintiffs seek extraordinary injunctive and declaratory relief based on their claims that
they are not subject to federal taxes. Plaintiffs demand, inter alia, that: 1) Defendants “provide a
full independent audit and accounting” of the IRS, DTC, DTCC, and Magisterial District Court;
2) a protective order be issued to immunize Plaintiffs from process from U.S. agencies, particularly the
IRS; 3) all civil and criminal actions and legal action be enjoined against Plaintiffs; and 4) Defendants
6
The Court need not reach the many other bases for dismissal that Defendants have
advanced, but will point out that, even assuming that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction
over this case, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the “plausibility” standard set forth to survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint is plausible
on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
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be ordered to “subscribe” to and certify as true Plaintiffs’ “Bill of Particulars,” a number of questions
seeking to have Defendants admit many of Plaintiffs’ claims and theories. (Compl. at 24-25).
First, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek it, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
grant any declaratory relief. The power to grant declaratory relief in federal courts is governed
by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with
respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section
7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 . . . any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). 7 Given the clear language of the Act, this Court lacks
authority to grant Plaintiffs any declaratory relief “with respect to federal taxes.” Id.; see Dye v.
United States, 516 F.Supp.2d 61, 73 (D.D.C. 2007); Falck v. Internal Revenue Service, 2007 WL
1723675, at *3 (D.D.C. 2007); Speelman, 461 F.Supp.2d at 75. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs
seek judgment declaring them immune or exempt from the assessment or collection of federal
taxes, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant that relief and those claims would be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are also fruitless. Under the Tax Code’s Anti-
Injunction Act, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against
7
Section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply here.
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whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421; Foodservice & Lodging Institute, Inc. v.
Reagan, 809 F.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 8 The purpose of this provision is to “withdraw
jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the
collection of federal taxes.” Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5
(1962). 9 “It extends not only to the assessment or collection of taxes, but also the entire process
involved in enforcing the revenue laws.” Justin v. United States, 607 F.Supp.2d 73, 77 (D.D.C.
2009) (internal citation omitted). Courts should construe the Act broadly to protect the
government’s “need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of
pre-enforcement interference.” Keese v. United States, 632 F.Supp. 85, 89 (S.D. Tex. 1985)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have brought
this suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection” of federal taxes, this Court
is without jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff any of the injunctive relief it seeks. This includes
Plaintiffs’ requests for an audit and accounting of their “equity” and also their request to enjoin
“process” against them from the United States and IRS. See Shannon v. United States, 521 F.2d
56, 58 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976) (holding that Anti-Injunction Act not
only prohibits suits to restrain the collection or assessment of taxes, but also prevents courts from
granting such equitable relief); Music Deli & Groceries, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 781
F.Supp. 992, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (district court lacked authority to order IRS to perform
8
Although there are some exceptions to the rule set out in Section 7421 allowing the Court
to take certain limited action, Plaintiffs have neither relied on any of those narrow exceptions nor
pled facts which would allow this Court to determine whether any of those exceptions apply.
9
Plaintiffs have neither pled nor fall into any of the narrow judicial exceptions to this
categorical rule. See Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7; Dye, 516 F.Supp.2d at 74, n.7.
13
accounting despite allegation that IRS illegally seized owner’s business records); Latch v. United
States, 842 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that there is “no statute that gives federal
district courts jurisdiction over suits for tax accounting.”). Because the Court has no subject
matter jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief plaintiffs seek, those claims would also be
subject to dismissal.
Finally, Plaintiffs ask that this Court enjoin all civil and criminal actions against Plaintiffs
pending this lawsuit. This Court, however, is a court of limited jurisdiction and does not have the
authority to review other federal district courts or state courts or stay any and all cases pending against
Plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (general jurisdiction provisions); § 2283 (“A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments.”); Fleming v. United States, 847 F.Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1150 (1995); Leitner v. United States, 725 F.Supp.2d 36, 43 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that court lacks
jurisdiction to grant injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin Plaintiff’s criminal tax proceedings or
vacate Plaintiff’s indictment in another district). Plaintiffs’ claim, therefore, falls outside of this Court’s
limited jurisdiction.
D. Plaintiffs’ Abuse of the Litigation Process
On November 22, 2010, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for CM/ECF accounts and
passwords. Since that time, Plaintiffs have flooded this docket with numerous improper and
unintelligible filings. As described briefly above, these include: 1) purported judgments, notices
or “decree[s]” which Plaintiffs appear to be trying to pass off as binding Orders, having signed
14
some of them as “magistrate,” “common law magistrate” or “private attorney general” (Docket
Nos. 110, 111, 117, 118, 123, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131, 136); and 2) notices, including Plaintiffs’
submission of a “One Trillion Dollar” bond. With these improper filings, in which Plaintiffs
attempt to pay debts, deposit bonds, curry favor with the Court or direct this Court to settle
Plaintiffs’ debts or return rulings favorable to Plaintiffs. (Docket Nos. 86, 93, 109, 113, 114, 119,
120, 121, 126, 127, 132, 133, 134).
It is well settled that this Court “may employ injunctive remedies to protect the integrity of
courts and the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.” Urban v. United Nations, 768
F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Having considered Plaintiffs’ conduct in this case and the
entire record, it is apparent that, through their improper filings, Plaintiffs are impeding the
administration of justice and abusing their electronic filing privileges. Plaintiffs are admonished
that only this Court—and not Plaintiffs—has the authority to issue orders in this case.
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to immediately revoke Plaintiffs’ CM/ECF
accounts and passwords so that the Clerk may inspect any future submissions prior to entering
them on the docket. Moreover, the improper filings described above shall be stricken from the
record. (Docket Nos. 86, 93, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126-
134, 136).
Finally, Plaintiffs are hereby enjoined from filing further submissions in this case without
leave of Court. The Clerk shall not accept for filing any subsequent submissions (other than
Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal, if any) that do not include a separate motion for leave to file.
Plaintiffs are admonished not to file any additional impertinent, improper, or frivolous
15
submissions lest they be subjected to additional sanctions, including further restrictions on their
filing privileges in this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED, Plaintiffs’ CM/ECF
passwords are revoked and they are enjoined from making any further filings in this case without
leave of the Court. Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed, Plaintiffs’ pending motions,
located at Docket Nos. 34, 35, 45, 56, 57, 81, 88, 90 and 92, are denied as moot. An Order
accompanies this Memorandum.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May 26, 2011 /s/
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States District Judge
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