Cobb v. Astrue

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TERRI COBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Civil Action No. 09-00734 (BAH)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Terri Cobb, the plaintiff in this action, seeks a judgment reversing the denial of her claim
for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits by the Social Security Administration (the
“Administration”). Complaint ¶ 4. The plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of reversal and the
defendant’s motion for a judgment of affirmance are before the Court. After carefully
considering the plaintiff’s complaint, the administrative record, the parties’ motions, and all
memoranda of law and exhibits relating to those motions, the Court grants the plaintiff’s motion,
denies the defendant’s motion, and remands this case to the Administration for the reasons
explained below.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff is a 45-year-old woman with a high school education and additional training
as an electrician. Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 58, 343. She previously worked as an
electrician. Id. at 343. According to the plaintiff, on June 10, 2003, she was injured in a work-
related accident when she fell from a ladder. Id.; Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for J. of Reversal
(“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 2.
On June 6, 2005, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act.1 A.R. at 78. She alleged disability commencing
August 9, 2004 based on arthritis, back and neck pain, and depression. Id. at 19, 58-60, 122-23.
The plaintiff’s claim for disability was denied initially and denied again upon
reconsideration. Id. at 44-47, 50-53. Thereafter, she requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”), which was held on April 2, 2008. Id. at 19. The
plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. Id. at 16-26.
The ALJ denied the plaintiff’s request for benefits by decision dated July 14, 2008. Id.
The plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the decision of the ALJ, but, on
February 20, 2009, the Appeals Council determined that there was no basis for granting the
request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security. Id. at 5-8.
On April 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal or remand of the
Administration’s final decision denying her benefits. Her motion for judgment of reversal or
remand was filed on January 9, 2010. The plaintiff argues that the final decision of the
Administration “fails to be supported by substantial evidence, and is erroneous as a matter of
law.” Pl.’s Mem. at 1. Specifically, she contends the ALJ erroneously evaluated her residual
functional capacity, which is a mandatory assessment of the plaintiff’s capacity for work despite
any impairment she may have. See id. at 3-13.
1
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff filed applications for “Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and/or
Supplemental Security Income benefits.” Complaint ¶ 4. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits are
authorized under Title XVI of the Social Security Act and are distinct from, although similar to, disability insurance
benefits under Title II. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal refers only to claims for benefits under Title
II, see Pl.’s Mem. at 1, and the plaintiff apparently did not pursue SSI claims with the Administration. See, e.g.,
A.R. at 15, 58, 342. Accordingly, the Court will disregard the references to SSI in the complaint.
2
In response to the plaintiff’s motion, the defendant moved for judgment of affirmance,
arguing that the ALJ’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance
with applicable law. See generally Def.’s Mem. for J. of Affirmance and Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. for J. of Reversal (“Def.’s Mem.”).
Both parties’ motions are now before the Court.
II. Standard of Review
The Social Security Act gives federal district courts jurisdiction over civil cases that
challenge a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
reviewing court must uphold the decision of the Commissioner if it is based on substantial
evidence in the record and the correct application of the relevant legal standards. Id.; Butler v.
Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence “requires more than a
scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Butler,
353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 365-66 (D.C. Cir.
2003)). The Court does not review the decision de novo. Davis v. Heckler, 566 F. Supp. 1193,
1195 (D.D.C. 1983). Although the reviewing court “must carefully scrutinize the entire record,”
its role is “not to determine . . . whether [the plaintiff] is disabled,” but only to assess “whether
the ALJ’s finding that she is not is based on substantial evidence and a correct application of the
law.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 999.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, the
plaintiff must establish that she is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423. “Disability” means the “inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
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expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). “An
individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her] physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous
work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . .” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for assessing
a claimant’s alleged disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the burden of
proof on the first four steps. Butler, 353 F.3d. at 997. First, the claimant must demonstrate that
she is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful” work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, a
claimant must show that she has a “severe impairment” that “significantly limits [her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Third, if the claimant suffers from
an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to the Commissioner’s
regulations, she will be deemed disabled. Id. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant does not satisfy step
three, the inquiry will proceed to the fourth step, but the Commissioner must first assess the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520(e). This capacity reflects “what
an individual can still do despite his or her limitations.” Ross v. Astrue, 636 F. Supp. 2d 127,
132-33 (D.D.C. 2009). After the claimant’s RFC has been assessed, the fourth step requires the
claimant to show that she has an impairment that prevents her from performing her “past relevant
work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f). If the claimant has carried the burden on the first four steps, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner on step five to demonstrate that the claimant is able to
perform “other work” based on a consideration of her RFC, age, education and work experience.
Id. § 404.1520(g); Butler, 353 F.3d. at 997. If the claimant cannot perform other work, she is
deemed disabled.
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IV. Discussion
The instant appeal primarily challenges the way in which the ALJ performed the residual
functional capacity assessment that is required prior to steps four and five of the five-step
inquiry. See Pl.’s Mem. at 3-14. The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to perform a proper
RFC assessment in several respects. First, she claims that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is a “naked
conclusion, devoid of analysis,” and that the ALJ “failed to perform a function-by-function
assessment of the Plaintiff’s abilities to perform work-related activities, and failed to set forth a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supported each conclusion.” Pl.’s Mem. at 5-6.
Second, she contends the ALJ’s assessment is “contradictory on its face” in that it does not
address the plaintiff’s depression, which the ALJ had determined to be a “severe impairment.”
Id. at 6-7. Third, the plaintiff contends the ALJ’s assessment erroneously failed to address the
plaintiff’s deficiencies in “concentration, persistence or pace,” which the ALJ had determined to
be “moderate.” Id. at 7. Relatedly, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to conduct a
sufficiently detailed mental RFC assessment in general. Id. at 10-13. Fourth, the plaintiff
objects that the ALJ failed to evaluate pertinent evidence of plaintiff’s limitations, including (1)
an evaluation indicating the plaintiff had borderline intellectual functioning, (2) an evaluation
indicating the plaintiff needed to avoid exposure to “extreme cold, humidity and vibration,” as
well as “fumes, odors, dusts, gases, [and] poor ventilation,” and (3) an evaluation indicating that
the plaintiff had moderate restrictions in the ability to stand, walk, and lift, carry, and handle
objects. Id. at 9-10, 13-14. Finally, the plaintiff contends that the RFC assessment’s conclusion
that the plaintiff had “limited” dominant hand usage was overly vague because it did not specify
the limitations. Id. at 13.
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In addition to her arguments based on the RFC assessment, the plaintiff also asserts that
the hypothetical questions the ALJ posed to the vocational expert at the hearing were flawed
because they did not include any reference to the plaintiff’s mental limitations. Id. at 7-8.
The Court agrees that the ALJ did not properly assess the plaintiff’s RFC. Accordingly,
the ALJ’s decision must be reversed and remanded to the Administration for further proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
A. The ALJ’s Five-Step Analysis
In this case, the ALJ began the five-step disability inquiry correctly by considering
whether the plaintiff was presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” The ALJ concluded
that she had not engaged in such activity since August 9, 2004. A.R. at 21. Thus, the plaintiff
satisfied the first step of the inquiry.
At the second step, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff “has the following severe
impairments: arthritis, back and neck pain, and depression.” Id. Apparently in support of this
finding, although without much explanation, the ALJ set forth an eight-paragraph factual
summary of the plaintiff’s medical history. Id. at 21-22. The medical evaluations summarized in
this section of the decision reflected reports from six different doctors and related both to
physical and mental conditions, including arthritis, back and neck conditions, and depression, as
well as other medical conditions. Id. Since the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had severe
physical and mental impairments, the second step of the inquiry was satisfied.
The third step requires the ALJ to decide whether the claimant has an impairment that
“meets or equals” the criteria for an impairment listed as disabling in Appendix 1 to the
Commissioner’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Despite having just concluded that the
plaintiff’s “severe impairments,” included “arthritis, back and neck pain, and depression,” the
6
ALJ’s decision only analyzed whether the plaintiff’s mental impairment – i.e., depression – met
the criteria for a listed impairment. A.R. at 23. The ALJ concluded that the claimant “does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the
listed impairments.” Id.This conclusion does not appear to reflect a proper application of the third step of the
inquiry, which requires the ALJ to perform a listing comparison for the relevant severe
impairments. The ALJ had concluded that the plaintiff’s severe impairments included not just
depression, but also arthritis and back and neck pain. Id. at 21. Arthritis, for example, may
satisfy the disability listing criteria under Listing 1.00, Musculoskeletal System, depending on
the evidence. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Thus, the ALJ should have assessed whether
that impairment satisfied a listing. See Wells v. Astrue, No. 02-1357, 2009 WL 2338047, at *7
n.5 (D.D.C. Jul. 30, 2009) (“When the evidence in the administrative record clearly generates an
issue as to a particular listing and the ALJ fails to properly identify the [l]isting considered and to
explain clearly the medical evidence of record supporting the conclusion reached[,] a remand can
be expected to result.”) (quoting Conway ex rel. Tolen v. Astrue, 554 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C.
2008)). The failure to conduct a listing comparison may be either harmless or reversible error,
depending on the circumstances, but the Court does not need to decide that issue here because
the Court must remand this case on other grounds, as discussed below.2 See id.Since the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria of any
listed impairment, he continued with the inquiry by determining the plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity. The ALJ concluded the plaintiff had “the residual functional capacity to
perform light unskilled work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except with a sit/stand option
and limited dominant hand usage.” A.R. at 23.
2
In addition, the plaintiff has not challenged this aspect of the ALJ’s decision in her appeal.
7
At step four, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant
work as an electrician because “[i]n her past relevant work . . . the claimant was required to lift
and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently.” Id. at 25. Accordingly, the ALJ
proceeded to the fifth and final step.
At step five, the ALJ, relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, determined that
there are jobs that exist “for an individual with the claimant’s age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity,” such as sales greeter, router, and office helper. Id. at 26.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled.
B. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity
The plaintiff has challenged the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment.
The RFC assessment is a “function-by-function inquiry based on all of the relevant
evidence of a claimant’s ability to do work and must contain a narrative discussion identifying
the evidence that supports each conclusion.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “In performing the RFC assessment, the ALJ must explain how he considered and
resolved any material inconsistencies or ambiguities evident in the record, as well as the reasons
for rejecting medical opinions in conflict with the ultimate RFC determination.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The ALJ must build a “logical bridge” from the evidence to his
conclusion about the claimant’s RFC. Banks v. Astrue, 537 F. Supp. 2d 75, 84 (D.D.C. 2008);
see also Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2006) (remanding case where
ALJ merely listed all the evidence without explaining which evidence led him to his conclusion
or why he discounted contrary pieces of evidence).
In assessing the RFC, the ALJ must follow the framework set forth by the Administration
in SSR 96-8p, Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims (the “SSA RFC
8
Ruling”). 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996); Ross, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33; Butler, 353
F.3d at 1000-03 (finding reversible error in ALJ’s conclusions where the ALJ did not, inter alia,
make the determinations required by the SSA RFC Ruling). Among other requirements, the SSA
RFC Ruling directs the ALJ to consider the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545, which include physical abilities (such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying,
pushing, pulling, or other physical functions like reaching, handling, stooping or crouching),
mental abilities (such as understanding, remembering, carrying out instructions, and responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work pressures), and other abilities affected by
impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; SSA RFC Ruling at, *1. In cases involving allegations of
medical symptoms, the RFC assessment should contain “thorough discussion and analysis of the
objective medical and other evidence.” SSA RFC Ruling, at *7. In cases involving mental
impairments, the ruling requires a “more detailed” assessment of the claimant’s particular mental
abilities than that required at step three, which is focused on broad categories designed to assess
a mental impairment’s severity. Id. at *4.
In this case, the ALJ concluded that “the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light unskilled work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except with a sit/stand option
and limited dominant hand usage.” A.R. at 23. The ALJ failed, however, to provide a logical
explanation for this conclusion and did not conduct the type of analysis required by the SSA
RFC Ruling. See id. at 23-25. Instead, the ALJ’s RFC assessment consists of extremely generic
and abstract declarations. See id. The assessment does not contain analysis or citations of
specific facts in the record that relate to claimant’s functional abilities. Indeed, the assessment
does not specifically mention any of the plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, evaluating doctors, or
9
medical conditions. Nor does the decision distinguish in any way between the plaintiff’s mental
and physical impairments or capacities.
The RFC assessment in its current form impedes effective judicial review. See Butler,
353 F.3d at 1002. For example, the RFC assessment generically asserts that “[a]lthough the
claimant has received treatment for the allegedly disabling impairment(s), that treatment has
been essentially routine and/or conservative in nature.” A.R. at 24. The ALJ does not provide
any further details about the treatments or impairments being referenced in this conclusion. The
ALJ notes that “[t]he doctor apparently relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms
and limitations provided by the claimant, and seemed to uncritically accept as true most, if not
all, of what the claimant reported.” Id. at 25. Yet the ALJ inexplicably does not identify the
particular doctor, symptoms, or limitations being referenced in that conclusion. As noted above,
the ALJ’s decision had previously cited medical reports from six different doctors. Id. at 21-22.
Similarly, the ALJ states, “As for the opinion evidence, the doctor’s opinion is without
substantial support from the other evidence of record, which obviously renders it less
persuasive.” Id. at 25. Again, the ALJ does not identify the doctor, opinion, or condition being
referenced. Such abstract conclusions that lack any indication of the evidence to which they
pertain fail to provide the necessary “logical bridge,” Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67, and
“thorough discussion and analysis,” SSA RFC Ruling, at *7, that the RFC assessment must
include.
The ALJ’s conclusions about the plaintiff’s testimony are also inscrutable. The ALJ
stated that “[t]he description of the symptoms and limitations which the claimant has provided
throughout the record has generally been inconsistent and unpersuasive.” A.R. at 24. Yet the
ALJ does not explain or identify the inconsistencies he observed. The Court notes that the
10
plaintiff’s claims in the record actually appear to be relatively consistent, at least at a general
level. For example, in a visit to Dr. Chester A. DiLallo on July 8, 2003, the plaintiff complained,
inter alia, of injury to her neck, shoulders, and back as a result of her work accident. Id. at 316.
In a medical report prepared by Dr. Chee-Hahn Hung on August 18, 2005, that doctor also noted
the plaintiff’s claims of pain in her shoulder, back, and neck. Id. at 225. “[T]he ALJ must
explain how he considered and resolved any ‘material inconsistencies or ambiguities’ evident in
the record . . . .” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000 (quoting the SSA RFC Ruling at *7). The ALJ also
justified his RFC conclusion by citing “the claimant’s generally unpersuasive appearance and
demeanor while testifying at the hearing,” A.R. at 24, without providing any further elaboration.
The D.C. Circuit has explained that an ALJ’s credibility evaluation of a claimant’s complaints of
painful symptoms “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the
evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and
reasons for that weight.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1005 (quoting SSR 96-7p, Evaluation of Symptoms
in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of An Individual’s Statements, 1996 WL 374186,
at *2 (SSA July 2, 1996)).
The plaintiff has asserted that the RFC assessment is “contradictory on its face” because
it does not address the plaintiff’s depression, which the ALJ had determined to be a “severe
impairment.” Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7. In fact, it is hard to tell which impairments – mental or physical
– the RFC assessment addressed at all because it does not mention any symptoms or impairments
in particular. In one paragraph, the ALJ addresses, in an abstract way, limitations on the
claimant’s “daily activities,” concluding that these unspecified limitations are “considered to be
outweighed by the other factors discussed in this decision.” A.R. at 24. Perhaps this paragraph
11
is intended to relate to the plaintiff’s depression since restrictions on activities of daily living are
one factor to be considered in evaluating whether a claimant meets the listing for depression; the
Court cannot be certain. If the discussion of “daily activities” is indeed intended to relate the
plaintiff’s mental RFC, it is hard to understand why the ALJ’s assessment did not also address
the plaintiff’s deficiencies in “concentration, persistence or pace.” See Pl.’s Mem. at 7. In
considering whether the plaintiff met the listing for depression, the ALJ had specifically
determined that the plaintiff had “moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace,”
but only “mild restriction” in activities of daily living. See id.; A.R. at 23. Thus, the plaintiff’s
confusion is well founded. Since it is unclear to what extent the RFC assessment addressed the
plaintiff’s mental impairments at all, the assessment also plainly fails to provide the “more
detailed” analysis of the plaintiff’s mental abilities required by the SSA RFC ruling. SSA RFC
Ruling, at *4.
In short, the RFC assessment does not make clear the logical basis for the ALJ’s
conclusion that “the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light unskilled work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except with a sit/stand option and limited dominant hand
usage.” A.R. at 23. See Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (requiring a “logical bridge” to the
ALJ’s conclusions). In addition to providing an inadequate rationale for his conclusion, the
wording of the ALJ’s decision is also too generic to enable the Court to determine what evidence
was credited and what evidence was rejected. See id. (“While the ALJ need not articulate his
reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence, he must at least minimally discuss a claimant’s
evidence that contradicts the Commissioner’s position.”) (quoting Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d
803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000)). The D.C. Circuit’s comments in Butler v. Barnhart apply here:
The ALJ’s reasoning is not simply ‘spare’ . . . it is missing. . . .The judiciary can
scarcely perform its assigned review function, limited though it is, without some
12
indication not only of what evidence was credited, but also whether other
evidence was rejected rather than simply ignored.
Butler, 353 F.3d at 1002 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
Unlike the ALJ’s decision, the defendant’s motion for judgment of affirmance does
provide an analysis of the medical evidence relating to the plaintiff’s conditions, with specific
reference to particular doctors, treatments, symptoms, and conclusions about the plaintiff’s
functional capacities. See generally Def.’s Mem. The defendant argues that the facts in the
record, as recited in the defendant’s legal memorandum, indicate that there was “substantial
evidence” supporting the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 15-16. The
function of this Court, however, “is to review the determinations actually made by the ALJ, not
to engage in these determinations for him.” Ross, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (citing SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); see also Butler, 353 F.3d at 1002 n.5. Further, the ALJ’s
decision must not only be supported by substantial evidence, it must also rest on a correct
application of the law. See Butler, 353 F.3d at 999. Here, the law requires the Administration to
comply with the process set forth in the SSA RFC Ruling. Ross, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 132; see also
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (authorizing reviewing court to assess compliance with the relevant
Administration regulations).
While the Court must defer to the ALJ’s determination of facts supported by substantial
evidence, the Court cannot understand the basis for the ALJ’s conclusions based on the decision
in its current form. Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 68. “While the court need not remand in
search of a perfectly drafted opinion, where the ALJ’s decision leaves the reviewing court with
reservations as to whether an issue was fully addressed, the court should reverse.” Id. (quoting
Samuel v. Barnhart, 316 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Wis. 2004)). The current form of the ALJ’s
decision precludes effective judicial review and does not indicate that the ALJ followed the
13
analytical framework set forth by the Administration in the SSA RFC Ruling. Accordingly, the
Court must remand this case to the Administration.3
C. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony
The plaintiff also argues that, at step five, the ALJ improperly relied on the vocational
expert’s testimony to establish that the plaintiff could perform other work. The plaintiff
contends the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the expert were deficient because they failed to
include any reference to the plaintiff’s mental limitations, such as her moderate difficulties in
concentration, persistence, or pace. Pl.’s Mem. at 7. Since the Court has already determined that
the ALJ improperly assessed the plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ’s findings at step five necessarily must
be reversed as well. See Ray v. Astrue, 718 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77 (D.D.C. 2010). Therefore, the
Court need not consider whether the alleged deficiencies in the ALJ’s hypothetical questions
here would amount to an independent reversible error. Even so, to provide guidance on remand,
the Court notes that the D.C. Circuit has instructed that “[d]eficiencies in the ALJ’s description
of the claimant’s condition ‘undermine the foundation for the expert’s ultimate conclusion that
there are alternative jobs’ that the claimant is capable of performing.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1006(quoting Simms v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, the Court
advises that, on remand, the ALJ should include relevant limitations found to be supported by
record evidence in any hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert.
3
The Court need not reach the plaintiff’s more specific objections about the RFC assessment’s consideration of
particular record evidence since it is remanding this case based on the ALJ’s failure to provide an adequate rationale
for the RFC assessment. As explained above, the general rule is that “the ALJ must explain how he considered and
resolved any material inconsistencies or ambiguities evident in the record, as well as the reasons for rejecting
medical opinions in conflict with the ultimate RFC determination.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “While the ALJ need not articulate his reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence, he must at
least minimally discuss a claimant’s evidence that contradicts the Commissioner’s position.” Lane-Rauth, 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 67.
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V. Conclusion
The Court grants the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of reversal, denies the defendant’s
motion for a judgment of affirmance, and remands this case to the Administration for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion because the ALJ did not articulate an
adequate basis for his conclusions regarding the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
Date: March 17, 2011
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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