Bridgeport Hospital v. Sebelius

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1344 (RWR)
)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiffs Bridgeport Hospital and Yale-New Haven Hospital
bring this action against Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for judicial review
of a final adverse agency decision on Medicare reimbursement for
costs incurred by the hospitals’ approved residency training
programs between 1998 and 2001. The Secretary refused to
reimburse the plaintiffs for graduate medical education and
indirect medical education costs relating to discharges of
Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in Medical Managed Care
plans on the ground that the hospitals were late in furnishing
claims to the Secretary’s fiscal intermediary. (See Def.’s Mot.
for Stay or for Ext. of Time (“Def.’s Mot.”) at ¶ 3.)
In light of the district court’s remands to the Secretary of
her decisions in Cottage Health System v. Sebelius, 631 F. Supp.
2d 80 (D.D.C. 2009), and Hosp. of Univ. of Pa. v. Sebelius, 634
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2009) (“HUP”), the Secretary has moved to
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stay proceedings in this case, pending the final resolution of
Cottage Health Systems and HUP. (Def.’s Mot. at ¶ 12.) The
Secretary argues that the legal issues in the remanded cases
overlap extensively with the legal issues in this case.
Specifically, the plaintiffs in both this case and the remanded
cases argue that time limits set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 424.30 et
seq. applied to their disputed claims, and the plaintiffs in both
cases assert that the Secretary’s denial of their claims violated
the public protection provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act
(“PRA”), 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a). (Def.’s Mot. at 4-5.) Cottage
Health Systems and HUP were remanded for further explanation of
how and why the Secretary applied the time limits and for an
analysis of the PRA claims. The Secretary argues that a stay to
permit resolution of the remanded cases would aid in resolving
this action and promote judicial economy.
“A trial court has broad discretion to stay all proceedings
in an action pending the resolution of independent proceedings
elsewhere.” Marsh v. Johnson, 263 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C.
2003) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). A
court deciding a contested motion to stay “must weigh competing
interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S.
at 254-55. A party may be required “to submit to delay not
immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if
. . . convenience will thereby be promoted.” Id. at 256.
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“Indeed, ‘[a] trial court may, with propriety, find it is
efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the
parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending
resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.’”
IBT/HERE Empl. Representatives’ Council v. Gate Gourmet Div.
Ams., 402 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Leyva v.
Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir.
1979)).
The plaintiffs oppose the defendant’s motion, arguing that a
stay of proceedings in this case would harm their interests but
would not promote efficiency or conserve judicial resources
because there is a factual dispute in this case that is absent
from the remanded cases that make it unlikely that the
Secretary’s response to the questions presented by the court on
remand would be useful in resolving this case. (Pls.’ Opp’n
at 4, 9-13.) However, a stay of the proceedings in one case is
justifiable even where the parallel proceedings “may not settle
every question of fact and law,” but would settle some
outstanding issues and simplify others. Landis, 299 U.S. at 256.
As the Secretary points out, determining whether these plaintiffs
filed their claims within the applicable time limits could be
aided by the Secretary’s further explanation in the remanded
cases of her interpretation of the exception clause in 42 C.F.R.
§ 424.30. Therefore, it is hereby
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ORDERED that the defendant’s motion [11] for a stay pending
final resolution of post-remand proceedings in Cottage Health
System v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 08-98 (JDB) and Hospital of
the University of Pennsylvania v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 08-
1665 (JDB) be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part. This case is
STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending resolution in the
district court of the PRA and time limits issues in the remanded
cases. It is further
ORDERED that the parties be, and hereby are, DIRECTED to
file a joint status report and proposed order within 30 days of
the resolution in the district court of the PRA and time limits
issues in the remanded cases. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion [#16] to expedite be, and
hereby is, DENIED as moot.
SIGNED this 10th day of March, 2011.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge