Crawford v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
JAMES CRAWFORD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-cv-0436 (KBJ)
)
JEH JOHNSON, Secretary, Department )
of Homeland Security, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James Crawford is an African-American employee of the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) who claims that DHS discriminated against him on the
basis of his race, subjected him to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against
him because of his engagement in protected activity, all in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. (See generally Compl., ECF
No. 1.) Crawford filed the instant complaint against Jeh Johnson, in his official
capacity as Secretary of DHS (“Defendant”), in March of 2014, alleging that DHS
employees intentionally targeted him with eleven discrete discriminatory and/or
retaliatory acts that have commission dates ranging from November of 2010 to
December of 2011. (See id. at 2–3.) 1 On February 9, 2015, this Court granted
Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Crawford’s complaint as conceded, and thereby
dismissed the complaint’s allegations with respect to eight of the eleven allegedly
1
Page numbers herein refer to those the Court’s electronic filing system automatically assigns.
1
discriminatory and/or retaliatory events, but the Court also ordered Defendant to answer
or otherwise respond to Crawford’s remaining contentions—i.e., his assertion that DHS
violated Title VII when it (1) issued an unwarranted negative annual performance
appraisal of him in October of 2011, (2) appointed a less-qualified individual to a
supervisory position above him in November of 2011, and (3) suspended him from work
without just cause in December of 2011. (See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 5, at 2.)
Before this Court at present is DHS’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for
summary judgment, with respect to these three allegedly discriminatory and/or
retaliatory acts of Defendant. (See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or[] in the Alternative[] for
Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 8.) DHS maintains that it is entitled to dismissal of
the complaint’s claims with respect to all three events because Crawford did not include
any of these allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory acts in his formal Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) pleading, and thus, Crawford failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (See id. at 10–11.) Alternatively, Defendant contends that the
complaint fails to state a retaliation claim with respect to the negative performance
appraisal because Crawford had not engaged in prior protected activity, and also that
summary judgment should be granted in Defendant’s favor because DHS had legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons to suspend Crawford. (See id. at 11–14.) In response,
Crawford asserts only that he attached certain exhibits to his initial EEO complaint that
touch upon the three events at issue here, and that this Court should treat these exhibits
as having been integrated into the EEO complaint for the purpose of its evaluation of
the exhaustion issue. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 11, at
4.)
2
Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the
record as a whole, this Court concludes that Crawford’s attachment of exhibits was
insufficient to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the three alleged
instances of discrimination or retaliation that remain at issue in the instant case.
Consequently, and as explained fully below, Defendant’s motion will be GRANTED.
A separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
James Crawford is a Special Security Officer (“SSO”) at DHS’s Special Security
Programs Division in Washington, D.C. (See Compl. at 4.) According to Crawford, on
eleven distinct occasions between November of 2010 and December of 2011, several
DHS management officials and supervisors retaliated and/or discriminated against him
on the basis of his race. (See id. at 2–3.) Crawford maintains, for example, that he was
unreasonably denied leave requests, that management officials conspired against him
and allegedly made false statements about his performance, and that unlike his white
male counterparts he did not receive additional assistance personnel when he requested
it from his superiors. (See id. at 2.) Crawford first contacted an EEO counselor on
October 25, 2011, to report eight incidents of discrimination that allegedly occurred in
the eight months between November of 2010 and July of 2011. (See id.) Crawford
alleges that three additional incidents happened in the months that followed—
specifically, that, on October 21, 2011, he received a negative annual performance
appraisal that was entirely unjustified; that an unknown, less-qualified individual was
3
appointed to a supervisory position above him on November 1, 2011; and that he was
suspended from work without just cause on December 12, 2011. (See id. at 3.)
Subsequent informal attempts to resolve Crawford’s claims proved unsuccessful,
and on February 7, 2012, Crawford filed a formal EEO complaint. (See id. at 2; Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2.) The body of the administrative complaint specifically alleged that
Crawford had been subjected to a hostile work environment and/or reprisal based on the
first eight allegedly discriminatory actions that Crawford had spoken to the EEO
counselor about in October of 2011. (See Compl. at 2.) Crawford also purportedly
attached exhibits that referenced at least two of the three additional incidents detailed
above. 2 (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Def.’s Mot. at 10, n.1.) Thereafter, the DHS’s EEO
office requested clarification of the scope of Crawford’s complaint (see Decl. of Oscar
Toledo, Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8-2, at 1), and informed Crawford that it had
identified for investigation only the eight incidents of alleged discrimination and/or
retaliation that were specifically referenced in the body of the EEO complaint. (See
Request for Clarification Email, Ex. 1 to Decl. of Oscar Toledo, ECF No. 8-2, at 3–5.)
Crawford was silent regarding the three additional events that purportedly were
revealed in the attachments to his complaint, and ultimately, the EEO office dismissed
Crawford’s formal complaint for technical reasons unrelated to the instant action. 3 (See
Compl. at 4–6.)
2
Crawford has not furnished the exhibits to his EEO complaint for this Court’s review, and has not
specified what they entail or what incidents they refer to. But Defendant concedes that, at a minimum,
Crawford attached a copy of his annual performance appraisal and the notification letter regarding his
suspension. (See Def.’s Mot. at 10, n.1.)
3
Specifically, the EEO office of DHS dismissed the complaint as untimely on August 7, 2012, and the
EEO Commission itself affirmed that dismissal on December 13, 2013. (See Compl. at 4–6.)
4
B. Procedural History
Crawford filed the instant lawsuit on March 18, 2014, claiming that DHS had
committed eleven separate acts—the eight events that were referenced specifically in
the body of the EEO complaint plus the additional three that allegedly occurred between
October and December of 2011—that were discriminatory and/or retaliatory in violation
of Title VII. (See id. at 1–3.) On June 2, 2014, DHS filed a motion to dismiss
Crawford’s action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but its motion was
directed only at Crawford’s claims regarding the eight initial events (i.e., those that
took place between November of 2010 and July of 2011) and did not address the three
events that allegedly occurred in the fall of 2011. (See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 3, at 8.) Upon receipt of Defendant’s partial motion, this Court advised Crawford
(who was proceeding pro se at that time) of his obligation under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to respond by July 21, 2014, and
warned him that if he did not respond, the Court might render Defendant’s motion
conceded. (See Order, ECF No. 4, at 1.) Crawford failed to file a timely opposition
despite this warning, however; and on February 9, 2015, this Court granted Defendant’s
motion and dismissed the complaint’s allegations regarding the eight challenged claims.
(See Mem. Op. & Order, at 2.)
Notably, at that same time, the Court also ordered DHS to answer or otherwise
respond to the three remaining allegations of discrimination/retaliation in Crawford’s
complaint. (See id.) Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, or in the alternative
for summary judgment, on March 9, 2015. In the motion, Defendant primarily argues
that Crawford failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the
remaining allegations because he did not include them in his EEO complaint. (See
5
Def.’s Mot. at 10–11.) Crawford has responded (see generally Pl.’s Opp’n), and the
motion is now ripe for this Court’s review.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies As A Prerequisite To Filing
Suit In Federal Court Under Title VII
A federal employee who seeks to file a civil action against his employer under
Title VII in federal district court generally must first exhaust available administrative
remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see also Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 543
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he required recourse to administrative review has special
prominence with respect to the . . . claims of federal employees[.]”). Whereas
discrimination claims against private employers are filed directly with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claims against a federal agency must
initially be brought before the agency’s EEO office itself. See Kizas, 707 F.2d at 543–
44. “The exhaustion requirement gives the charged agency notice of the claim,
provides a chance to narrow the issues for prompt adjudication, creates an opportunity
to resolve the matter internally [,] and [avoids] unnecessarily burdening the courts.”
Cheatham v. Holder, 935 F. Supp. 2d 225, 234 (D.D.C. 2013) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The regulatory framework that applies to federal employees navigating the
process of administrative exhaustion is laid out in Part 1614 of Title 29 in the Code of
Federal Regulations. See 29 C.F.R. Part 1614. To fulfill Title VII’s exhaustion
requirements under these regulations, the employee must first contact the agency’s EEO
counselor within 45 days of the alleged violation, and then file a formal administrative
complaint with the agency’s EEO office, allowing the agency to have an opportunity to
6
investigate the allegations and render a final decision. See Dick v. Holder, 80 F. Supp.
3d 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105, 1614.106, 1614.108,
1614.407). Filing an individual formal complaint of discrimination typically involves
completing a standard DHS form and describing the circumstances surrounding the
allegedly discriminatory actions, the relevant dates, names of individuals responsible
for the action, and the resulting harm upon claimant. (See, e.g., EEO Compl., Ex. 1 to
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3-1, at 3.) The agency’s EEO office reviews the
employee’s complaint and identifies for investigation any claims sufficiently described
in the complaint that were previously discussed in pre-complaint counseling. See 29
C.F.R. §§ 1614.106(c), 1614.105(b)(1). The agency then informs the complainant of
the claims identified for investigation and of his right to modify the agency’s
interpretation. See EEOC, Mgmt. Directive 110, ch. 5, Agency Processing of Formal
Complaints (2011), 2011 WL 10843310 (outlining the agency’s obligation to send an
“acceptance letter” to inform the complainant of “the claim(s) asserted and to be
investigated[,]” and the employee’s opportunity to “submit a statement to the agency
concerning the agency’s articulation of the claim, which shall become a part of the
complaint file”).
Once a formal administrative complaint is filed and the agency has a chance to
conduct its own investigation and make a determination about the charges, the
employee may subsequently file a civil action in federal district court, but he or she
must do so within 90 days of receipt of the agency’s final decision “or after a complaint
has been pending for at least 180 days.” Koch v. Walter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 143, 149
(D.D.C. 2013). Because contacting an EEO counselor is a prerequisite to filing a
7
formal EEO complaint, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d)—which, in turn, is a prerequisite to
administrative exhaustion, see id. § 1614.407—a plaintiff must both timely discuss a
claim with an EEO counselor and file a formal EEO complaint with regard to that
particular claim in order to be able to raise the allegation in the subsequent civil
lawsuit. In other words, to exhaust an issue raised informally during pre-complaint
counseling fully, an employee must proceed to include the issue in the formal EEO
complaint that is filed with the agency. See Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1350
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that the informal presentation of a claim to an EEO counselor
was insufficient to establish administrative exhaustion of that claim, where plaintiff
later failed to ensure that the claim was included in the body of the formal EEO
complaint). It is well established that a plaintiff who files suit under Title VII may only
bring “those allegations that were contained in the EEO complaint” or claims “like or
reasonably related” to the allegations in a timely-filed EEO complaint. Bell v. Donley,
724 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted); accord Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Moreover, each discrete incident of
discrimination or retaliation constitutes a separate actionable “unlawful employment
practice” for which a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies or lose the
ability to recover for it in the context of the civil action. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–
15.
Notably, although Title VII’s exhaustion requirements are not jurisdictional in
nature, exhaustion is a mandatory element of a Title VII claim that is akin to a statute
of limitations. See Artis v. Bernanke, 630 F.3d 1031, 1034 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
also Bell, 724 F. Supp. at 6 (quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 556 n.4 (D.C.
8
Cir. 2009)). As such, failure to exhaust will ordinarily bar a judicial remedy. See
Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
B. Motions To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment, For
Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies
“[M]otions to dismiss Title VII claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies are [typically] analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
Mount v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp.3d 74, 80 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Mahoney v. Donovan,
824 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(explaining that “a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted is the appropriate vehicle to challenge an alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under Title VII[,]” in contrast to a motion brought under Rule
12(b)(1)). However, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies[,]”
Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263, 276 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Bowden v.
United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997)), and if materials outside the
pleadings that are submitted to satisfy this burden or otherwise address the exhaustion
issue are relied upon by the court, the court should treat the motion as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). In this case,
the record includes materials that are not clearly referenced or relied upon in the
complaint to establish exhaustion (see, e.g., Suspension Letters Attach. to EEO Compl.,
Exs. 2 & 3 to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3-1, at 9–18; Performance Appraisal
Attach. to EEO Compl., Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8-1), and Crawford’s sole
9
argument in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion
for summary judgment is that he did, in fact, attach certain exhibits to his EEO charge
(see Pl.’s Opp’n, at 4.) Under these circumstances, this Court finds that it must
consider these materials in order to evaluate the validity of Defendant’s contention that
Crawford failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore, it will treat
Defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Lane v.
Tschetter, 05-cv-1414, 2007 WL 2007493, at *2 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (noting that
“summary judgment rather than dismissal is the appropriate procedural device for
analyzing whether there was timely administrative exhaustion”).
A court may grant summary judgment under Rule 56 when “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is
capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a genuine issue is one in which the “evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party[,]” id. In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the court regards the non-movant’s statements as true
and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. See id. at 255. Merely “colorable” or
insignificantly probative evidence, however, is not enough to preclude summary
judgment; instead, the non-movant must support his position beyond the pleadings and
point to specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions on file that raise genuine issues for trial. See id. at 249–50; see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
10
III. ANALYSIS
Crawford claims that DHS discriminated and/or retaliated against him between
October and December of 2011, when it (1) gave him a negative performance
evaluation, (2) promoted a less-qualified individual to be his superior, and (3)
suspended him without justification. DHS argues that Crawford failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to these alleged violations of Title VII because he
neither asserted allegations related to these events in his EEO complaint nor included
them in his response to the EEO office’s request for clarification. (See Def.’s Mot. at
10–11.) Crawford’s response to this assertion consists of a single contention: that, after
“the EEO counselor did not fully understand the exact nature of [his] concerns or
claims[,]” he proceeded to “file[] a[n EEO] complaint which in its body sited examples
of harassment but were referenced in attachments[,]” and the “examples of harassment
[in] the attachments should have been viewed and integrated into the complaint as
evidence of the sited harassment.” 4 (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.)
Unfortunately for Crawford, the precedents in this district establish that the
inclusion of specific instances of discrimination solely in attachments to an EEO
complaint (without referencing those events in the body of the complaint itself or
objecting to the agency’s omission) is insufficient to establish exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as explained below. Moreover, Crawford failed to amend his
EEO complaint to include the specific allegations that he says were reflected in the
4
Notably, Crawford does not argue that the three incidents were “like or reasonably related” to the
eight incidents that were included in the EEO complaint, nor does he dispute DHS’s assertion that the
administrative complaint itself was not timely filed. See Pearsall v. Holder, 610 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 n.9
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s unfiled claims were outside the scope of the civil lawsuit, even
if “like or related to” his administrative claims, because his formal EEO complaint was neither timely
asserted nor exhausted).
11
attachments, even after it became clear that the EEO office had not considered those
events in its adjudication of Crawford’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Thus,
this Court agrees with Defendant that Crawford failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to these three alleged Title VII violations.
A. Crawford’s Formal EEO Complaint Did Not Include The Three
Instances Of Alleged Discrimination And/Or Retaliation Challenged
Here, Despite The Attachments
Title VII states that the formal charge of discrimination that an aggrieved
employee submits to an agency in order to fulfill the exhaustion obligation must “be in
writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such
form as the [EEO] Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b). Under EEOC
regulations, a formal complaint “must contain a signed statement” that is “sufficiently
precise to identify the aggrieved individual and the agency and to describe generally
the action(s) or practice(s) that form the basis of the complaint[,]” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.106(c) (emphasis added), and while a plaintiff need not use precise “magic
words[,]” he cannot merely rely on “vague or circumscribed” charges—in other words,
the EEO complaint must sufficiently “alert the EEOC and the [agency] with the nature
of the alleged wrongdoing.” Maryland v. Sodexho, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162
(D.D.C. 2007).
Crawford clearly failed to satisfy these requirements with respect to the three
events in question here. First of all, it is undisputed that Crawford did not specifically
reference the negative performance appraisal, the unknown individual’s appointment to
a supervisory position, or the work suspension incident in the body of his formal EEO
complaint, and the agency did not identify these three alleged incidents for
investigation. (See Compl. at 2.) Nor can Crawford rely upon the fact that he allegedly
12
informally communicated these three incidents to the EEO officer prior to his filing of
the formal complaint (see id. at 3); even so, he manifestly failed to list those events in
the formal charges that he subsequently filed with the agency, and it is well established
that a plaintiff “cannot rely on the EEO counseling report to establish exhaustion of a
claim that he failed to include in his formal complaint[,]” Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1350;
see also Pintro v. Wheeler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 47, 55 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that the filing
of an informal complaint is insufficient for Title VII exhaustion).
What is more, persuasive authorities in this district have squarely rejected the
contention that information revealed only in exhibits attached to an EEO complaint
should be treated as having been incorporated into the final complaint for exhaustion
purposes. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) The plaintiff in Dick v. Holder, 80 F. Supp. 3d 103
(D.D.C. 2015), for example, asserted that the “package containing his formal EEO
charge” had included a copy of a letter that he had previously sent to an EEO counselor,
which described additional claims that were not raised in the EEO complaint itself, and
that these additional claims should have been identified by the agency and incorporated
into his formal EEO complaint. Id. at 112–13. In its analysis, the Dick court explained
that, although “[a]n agency may not unreasonably omit claims from investigations[] in
hopes that a complainant’s tardy realization of the omission will constitute a failure to
exhaust[,]” id. at 114, where “the formal EEO charge neither explicitly incorporated the
[exhibit] nor . . . made any mention” of the discrete additional claims, the agency
cannot be said to have acted unreasonably in failing to identify the claims as part of the
formal EEO complaint. Id.
13
So it is here. Even if this Court accepts as true Crawford’s statement that he
included “attachments” to his EEO complaint “as evidence of the sited harassment”
(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4), it is clear on the face of the administrative pleading that Crawford
did not reference or specifically incorporate those exhibits into the body of his EEO
complaint (see EEO Compl. at 2–6), and given this failure, DHS’s omission of the three
additional claims that were buried in Crawford’s exhibits was entirely reasonable. See
Dick, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 114; see also Cook v. McHugh, No. 14-cv-00058-LTB-CBS,
2015 WL 4100423, at *7 (D. Colo. May 26, 2015) (finding that the agency’s omission
of a claim not clearly alleged or factually described in the EEO complaint was not
unreasonable); Mendoza v. Reno, No. EP–00–CA–008–DB, 2001 WL 681297, at *4
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2001) (“The Court finds that those thirty or so words, buried deep
within six pages of stories . . . do not sufficiently set forth a national origin claim[.]”).
Thus, Crawford’s argument that his EEO complaint should be construed as having
included allegations with respect to the three incidents by virtue of his having attached
exhibits is unavailing.
C. Crawford Did Not Seek To Amend The Formal EEO Complaint To
Include The Three Remaining Claims
It is also clear based on the instant record that Crawford failed entirely to take
specific steps to ensure that the three omitted contentions were actually incorporated
into the formal complaint, even though he had the opportunity to do so. (See Decl. of
Oscar Toledo at 1–2.) To be sure, Crawford alleges that he requested that the three
claims be added to his EEO complaint at some unspecified time (see Compl. at 2);
however, there is no allegation or evidence that he sought to amend his EEO complaint
“prior to the conclusion of the investigation” in order to ensure that the three remaining
14
claims were included, much less that he successfully accomplished any such an
amendment, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(d) (“A complainant may amend a complaint at
any time prior to the conclusion of the investigation to include issues or claims like or
related to those raised in the complaint.”). And it is clear beyond cavil that, “where an
agency reasonably fails to identify for investigation a[n employment discrimination]
claim indirectly asserted in a plaintiff’s administrative charge, and where the plaintiff
does not timely object to this omission before the agency, the plaintiff cannot show that
he has exhausted administrative remedies as to this claim.” Dick, 80 F. Supp. 3d at
114–15; accord McKeithan v. Boarman, 803 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (“[F]ailure to respond to the [agency’s] framing
of the issue supports a finding that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to those claims not approved by the EEO.”).
Thus, given the absence of any allegation that Crawford either timely filed a
formal EEO complaint addressing the three remaining issues, or, at the very least, filed
a timely objection to the EEO’s failure to include those issues, this Court cannot
conclude that Crawford has exhausted all available administrative remedies, and
Defendant’s motion must be sustained.
IV. CONCLUSION
With respect to the three allegedly discriminatory and/or retaliatory acts
remaining in Crawford’s complaint, the record is such that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Crawford’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as
Title VII requires. Therefore, as set forth in the accompanying order, Defendant’s
15
motion is GRANTED, and summary judgment will be entered in its favor regarding the
remaining claims.
DATE: February 26, 2016 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
16