Richardson v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
EDWARD RICHARDSON, )
) Civil Action No. 14-1673 (RMC)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JANET L. YELLEN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Edward Richardson has filed suit pro se against his former employer, the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, and seven individual Defendants for a variety of constitutional
torts, common-law torts, and statutory violations that he alleges occurred during his employment
with the Board as a law enforcement officer. Defendants move to dismiss all claims except those
alleging disability discrimination. For the reasons stated below, the motion will be granted.
I. FACTS
The well-pleaded facts alleged in the operative complaint must be taken as true in
this procedural posture. Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court
also considers the arguments and allegations in Mr. Richardson’s opposition memorandum.
Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Richardson v.
United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Only a summary of the pleaded facts is necessary here, as the claims at issue fail
for various and purely legal reasons. That is to say, none of Mr. Richardson’s claims will be
dismissed for failure to muster sufficiently plausible facts.
1
A. The Facts Alleged
Edward Richardson was a military police officer in the United States Army.
While deployed to Iraq in 2003, he was repeatedly subjected to fumes and toxins emanating from
burning human waste. While in Iraq, he was diagnosed with “severe persistent
asthma/allergies,” which is “a life-threatening illness.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 14.
Between June 8, 2009 and June 7, 2010, Mr. Richardson worked for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) as an officer in the Law Enforcement Unit
(LEU). Before Mr. Richardson was hired, he told the Board about his medical condition. Four
months into his job, he requested “a reasonable accommodation.” Id. ¶ 10. He made a second
request one month later. Id. ¶ 13. Despite these requests, he was “subjected to inclement
weather, both hot and cold,” and “outdoor allergens” that “exacerbated the symptoms” of his
condition. Id. ¶ 16. It is alleged that at all relevant times, Defendants were aware of Mr.
Richardson’s requests and ignored them.
Between October 2009 (when Mr. Richardson made his first request) and June
2010 (when he was terminated) the Board allegedly refused to engage in the “interactive
process” prescribed by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA).
Id. ¶ 20.1 Mr. Richardson alleges that he further suffered “severe and hostile working
environment and derogatory name calling,” and that Defendants “failed to act when [he] reported
the behavior as offensive.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. Further, Mr. Richardson was accused of missing work
without medical justification, was denied a promotion, and was denied the opportunity to work
1
The term comes from the definitions section of the ADA’s implementing regulations. The full
regulation reads: “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary
for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3).
2
on the “hybrid shift.” Id. ¶ 33. Mr. Richardson was also made to work three different shifts each
week, unlike any other LEU officer, “as a form of punishment for requesting a reasonable
accommodation for [his] recorded disability.” Id. ¶ 39.2
Mr. Richardson alleges that he was subjected to “slanderous and libelous
defamation,” both before and after his June 2010 termination. E.g., id. ¶ 45. For example,
Defendants Albert Pleasant and Billy Sauls allegedly conspired against Mr. Richardson in a “cell
phone spoofing scandal” and Mr. Sauls is alleged to have “maliciously accused [Mr. Richardson]
of vandalizing the vehicles of two Board LEU officers.” Id. ¶¶ 47, 48. The latter caused a
Charles County Deputy Sheriff to visit Mr. Richardson’s home.
Certain Defendants—sometimes “engag[ing] in a conspiracy”—are also alleged
to have intentionally removed medical documents from Mr. Richardson’s file prior to
terminating him in June 2010. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.3 Mr. Richardson reported this “to [Larence] Dublin
and [Marvin] Jones” and also “to [Billy] Sauls.” Id. ¶ 29. The harassment by Robert Bakale,
LEU Sergeant, only worsened. For example, Mr. Bakale authorized his subordinate, Senior
2
In support of his employment-discrimination claims, Mr. Richardson offers four
“discriminatory comparators” in the form of other LEU officers. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶
145-77. David Galloway claimed that medical documents were removed from his file, leaving
his “call-offs” unjustified and forcing him to accept “a small severance package” and to waive
his rights against the Board. Id. ¶ 147. DeBora Burford was terminated because of Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity, and after she was allegedly framed for the “spoofing
scandal.” Id. ¶ 151. Sean Waye, who engaged in no EEO activity and suffered no disabilities,
was given only a “short suspension” after he was found to have charged $37,000 on the Board’s
credit card without authorization. Id. ¶¶ 159, 161. Shandra Love, who had no disability and no
EEO history, was merely reassigned to administrative duties after two convictions for speeding
and being charged with a hit-and-run. Id. ¶¶ 165-75. Troy Granger, who had neither a disability
nor prior EEO complaint, was similarly reassigned to administrative duties after being charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol, reckless driving, and related crimes. Id. ¶¶ 174-77.
3
At times Mr. Richardson identifies the alleged conspirators—e.g., Defendants Coble and
Bakale in Compl. ¶ 24 or Defendants Pleasant and Sauls in Compl. ¶ 47—and at other times he
does not, e.g. id. ¶ 64 (accusing Mr. Bakale of conspiring “with co-Defendants”).
3
Officer Bhatia, to call Mr. Richardson “sumo.” Id. ¶ 30. Defendant Kevin May is also alleged
to have removed Mr. Richardson’s “Board separation letter; [his] Board separation appeal letter,
and [Mr. May’s] EEO investigative affidavit” from Mr. Richardson’s personnel file. Id. ¶ 51.
Mr. May also allegedly removed a Report of Investigation (ROI) from the Board’s offices.
Defendant Albert Pleasant, “acting under color of state law,” is alleged to have
unlawfully accessed Mr. Richardson’s cell phone records by using Mr. Pleasant’s investigation
as a pretext. Id. ¶ 49. Mr. Pleasant and others are also alleged to have “submitted false
documentation to [four] separate law enforcement agencies,” which spurred a “malicious
prosecution process.” Id. ¶ 50.
Mr. Richardson alleges a host of “fabricated evidence” and “perjurious
testimony” by numerous individual Defendants and third parties. See generally id. ¶¶ 55-144.
The Court will not further parse these allegations because, as stated below, they fail as a matter
of law.
B. The Amended Complaint
Mr. Richardson’s Amended Complaint contains various claims. Count I alleges a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA), due
to the failure to accommodate Mr. Richardson’s “asthmatic/allergy disability.” Am. Compl. ¶
184. Mr. Richardson alleges here, as he does elsewhere, that this “violated [his] clearly
established constitutional rights to a reasonable accommodation, under Title I of the [ADA] and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Am. Compl. ¶ 187 (emphasis added).
Neither the Civil Rights Act nor the Constitution requires accommodations for disabled persons.
Miller v. Clinton, 687 F.3d 1332, 1339 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)). The Court will construe Count I as claiming a
4
violation of the ADA only.
Count II alleges “Disability Discrimination,” also due to Mr. Richardson’s
“asthmatic/allergy disability.” Id. ¶ 191. Again, Mr. Richardson conflates statutes and adds
constitutional flavoring. Id. ¶ 190 (“I allege that I am a ‘qualified individual,’ with a recorded
disability, protected under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964.”); id. ¶ 198 (“Defendants . . . violated my clearly established constitutional
rights under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”). Neither of the cited
statutes, nor the Constitution, prohibits disability-based discrimination against federal
employees; rather, “the Rehabilitation Act [of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791] is the exclusive remedy for
federal employees alleging disability discrimination.” Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F. Supp. 3d 212, 222
(D.D.C. 2015) (collecting cases). The Court will construe Count II as alleging disability
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, an allegation that Defendants do not move to
dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 17] (Mot.) at 1.4
Count III alleges “Wrongful Termination” insofar as Mr. Richardson’s
termination on June 7, 2010 was discriminatory and the Board’s stated reasons were pretextual.
Mr. Richardson alleges that instead of being terminated “due to a breach of security,” he was
terminated because of his medical condition. Am. Compl. ¶ 207. In his opposition
memorandum, Mr. Richardson alleges that he “was denied a promotion opportunity.” Opp’n at
2. Count III also contains the legally distinct allegation that Defendants “intentionally and
maliciously remov[ed] official medical documents from [Mr. Richardson’s] LEU file.” Am.
4
By “the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” Am. Compl. ¶ 190, Mr. Richardson presumably refers to
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Because he never claims membership in any class protected
by Title VII, nor alleges discrimination on the basis thereof, the Court will disregard Mr.
Richardson’s invocation of Title VII as misplaced.
5
Compl. ¶ 212. Mr. Richardson’s opposition argues that this action violated both the
Rehabilitation Act and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Opp’n at 5 (“The
confidentiality and protection of my disability medical documents are protected by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . and the Privacy Act of 1974 codified 5 U.S.C. § 552a.”)5; see
also, e.g., Am. Comp. ¶ 1b (“. . . official medical call-off documents had been intentionally
removed (5 U.S.C. §§ 552a and 2302) from my LEU file by co-Defendants.”).
Count IV alleges defamation of character, a tort at common law. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 214-23. It is alleged that Defendants’ lies about the number of “unexcused call-offs” Mr.
Richardson had, id. ¶ 218, and lies about whether he turned in required medical documents, id. ¶
221, caused “irreparable and permanent damage, to both [Mr. Richardson’s] professional and
personal characters,” id. ¶ 215.
Embedded within Count IV are sub-allegations of “telephone spoofing and
vehicle vandalism,” id. ¶¶ 224-34 and “prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a
and 2302,” id. ¶¶ 235-40. Defendant Billy Sauls, former LEU Chief, is alleged to have
5
See also Opp’n at 5 (“The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires federal agencies that obtain
medical information about applicants and employees to put this information on separate forms
and in separate medical files, and treat it as a ‘confidential medical record.’”) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.14(b)(l), (c)(l), and (d)(l)). Each of those provisions requires that “Information obtained
[there]under . . . shall be collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical
files and be treated as a confidential medical record.” E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1). Each
provision also provides the following exceptions:
(i) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on
the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations;
(ii) First aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, if the
disability might require emergency treatment; and
(iii) Government officials investigating compliance with this part shall be
provided relevant information on request.
E.g., id. § 1630.14(c)(1).
6
“knowingly and willingly provided an official law enforcement Agency with false information to
evade an investigation while providing slanderous statements” about Mr. Richardson. Id. ¶ 226.
It is also alleged that Defendant Albert Pleasant, LEU Senior Special Agent, “willingly and
intentionally defamed [Mr. Richardson’s] character to gain access to [his] cell phone records, by
claiming that [Mr. Richardson] was involved in a spoofing scandal against the Board.” Id. ¶ 230.
Defendant Pleasant is also alleged to have acted under color of state law, “accessing
[Richardson’s] cell phone records with malicious intent” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. ¶ 231. Defendant Pleasant allegedly further engaged in “entrapment and deception
techniques” in violation of Mr. Richardson’s Fifth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 233. Defendant
Kevin May, Employee Relations Specialist, is alleged to have engaged in the “prohibited
personnel practice[]” of knowingly removing certain documents from Mr. Richardson’s
personnel file: a separation letter; the denial of an appeal; and an investigative affidavit. Id. ¶¶
235-36. All Defendants are accused of “knowingly, willingly, and with malicious disregard for
established laws, falsified testimony under penalty of perjury, while knowingly defaming [Mr.
Richardson’s] character, with intentional malice, to support their cause that resulted in [his]
termination from Board employment.” Id. ¶ 238. Defendants’ actions allegedly resulted in Mr.
Richardson’s termination and in a criminal investigation of him, which impaired his subsequent
job search. Ultimately Mr. Richardson “had to seek emergency assistance for food and shelter.”
Id. ¶ 239.
Count V alleges “Whistleblower Retaliation,” in violation of 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8). Id. ¶¶ 241-54. Mr. Richardson asserts that he made a protected disclosure of
prohibited personnel activity to Defendants Dublin (LEU Lieutenant), Jones (LEU Deputy
Chief), Sauls (LEU Chief), and May (Employee Relations Specialist). As a result, Mr.
7
Richardson was “forced to work 3 different shifts weekly, until [his] June 7, 2010 termination.”
Id. ¶ 243. Defendants Bakale (LEU Sergeant) and Coble (Administrative Lieutenant) allegedly
retaliated further by removing medical documents from Mr. Richardson’s file so that he could be
terminated before his probationary period was over. Id. Mr. Richardson claims that he also
suffered retaliation through “intensified personnel actions,” such as denial of promotion, denial
of accommodation, and derogatory name calling. Id. ¶ 253.
Count VI alleges “Disparate Treatment” and “Disparate Impact,” which the Court
will construe as duplicative of Mr. Richardson’s Rehabilitation Act claim, his ADA claim, or
both. See id. ¶¶ 255-69. Mr. Richardson does not cite the statutory or common-law basis for
Count VI. He alleges membership in a “protected group” and that he was “treated less
favorably” than non-members by Defendants, who “displayed discriminatory intent.” Id. ¶¶ 256,
257. He alleges “workplace harassment” and the denial of a “reasonable accommodation.” Id. ¶
257. These allegations sound in employment discrimination, which is already alleged in Counts
II and I. The Court sees no allegation in Count VI that is not alleged elsewhere.
Counts VII and VIII allege “Mental Anguish and Psychological Trauma” and
“Undue Pain and Suffering (Severe Economic Hardship),” respectively, which the Court
construes as some combination of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress—both
torts at common law. Mr. Richardson claims “mental distress due to embarrassment and
repeated episodes of intentional harassment, and humiliation.” Id. ¶ 271. He “wake[s] up at
night in cold sweats . . . constantly look[s] out of [his] windows to make sure that [he is] safe
from the Defendants,” and now has “a fear of all law enforcement officials because of the harm
caused to me by the defendants.” Id. ¶ 272. Economically, Mr. Richardson is “on the verge of
homelessness and ha[s] had to seek financial assistance from various agencies for food and
8
shelter.” Id. ¶ 275. Defendants “continue to blackball [him] from employment,” causing
“prospective employers [to] deny [him] employment opportunities as a result.” Id.
In the end, Mr. Richardson sues Defendants for (1) common-law torts; (2)
constitutional torts; (3) violating the ADA; (4) violating the Privacy Act; and (5) violating the
Rehabilitation Act. Because he does not state whether his claims run against the Agency6 or the
seven individual Defendants, the Court will assume that Mr. Richardson advances all five claims
against all eight Defendants.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A complaint must be sufficient “to give a defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff=s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must treat the
complaint=s factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Id. at 555. But a court need
not accept as true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the
6
Mr. Richardson sues Janet Yellen “in [her] official capacity” as Chair of the Federal Reserve’s
Board of Governors. Am. Compl. at 1. That is the functional equivalent of suing the agency
itself. See Jones v. Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2013); Brown v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 603 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2009); Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.
Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.D.C. 2009); Jenkins v. Jackson, 538 F. Supp. 2d 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2008).
9
complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and
matters about which the court may take judicial notice. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d
1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants do not move to dismiss Mr. Richardson’s “disability discrimination
claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” Mot. at 1-2. As noted above, Mr.
Richardson claims that the Rehabilitation Act was violated both by Defendant’s disability-based
discrimination and by their intentional removal of his medical records. Because Defendants do
not parse those separate alleged violations, all claims by Mr. Richardson under the Rehabilitation
Act shall proceed. For the following reasons, Mr. Richardson’s other claims will be dismissed.
A. Mr. Richardson’s Tort Claims
1. Claims and defendants
The analysis must begin by orienting on the proper claims and Defendants. While
neither the Amended Complaint nor Mr. Richardson’s opposition memorandum is pellucidly
clear, the Court is confident of what wrongs, and against whom, Mr. Richardson is alleging.
a. Common-law tort claims
Mr. Richardson maintains in his Opposition that the “claims presented in the
‘Amended Complaint’ are all associated with claims of disability discrimination in employment
and intentional misconduct, not tort claims under the [Federal Tort Claims Act] FTCA.” Opp’n
at 7 (emphasis in original). His argument is hard to square with the Amended Complaint itself,
which alleges “Defamation of Character” (Count IV, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 214-40); “Mental Anguish
and Psychological Trauma” (Count VII, id. ¶¶ 270-73); and “Undue Pain and Suffering” (Count
VIII, id. ¶¶ 274-78), all of which are tort claims.
As a layman, Mr. Richardson may not understand that all of these allegations
10
sound in tort. Defamation is indisputably a tort. See F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1452
(2012); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 450 (2011). So is the intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Doe v.
Bernabei & Wachtel, PLLC, 116 A.3d 1262, 1268-69 (D.C. 2015). It is also well established
that common-law tort claims may not be pursued against the United States or its agencies absent
a waiver of sovereign immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Block v. North
Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). The only waiver of
sovereign immunity for torts by government employees lies in the FTCA. Meshal v.
Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2015).7 Because several of Mr. Richardson’s
claims allege torts, he is bound by the FTCA’s timing and procedural requirements.
Mr. Richardson argues that he is suing individuals, not the government. But
where the sued individuals are government employees, the Attorney General can substitute the
United States as defendant when “the defendant employee[s] w[ere] acting within the scope of
[their] office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d)(1). The Attorney General has filed such a certification here. See Mot., Ex. A [Dkt.
17-1] (Certification). Although a scope-of-employment certification is reviewable by the Court
upon a plaintiff’s objection, Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995), Mr.
Richardson has not suggested any disagreement with the Attorney General’s certification.8 This
7
This limitation does not apply to ‘constitutional torts,’ as addressed below. Id. (citing 27
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A)).
8
Far from objecting, Mr. Richardson embraces the certification:
Normally the burden of establishing if an employee was acting within the scope of
his office would rest with the plaintiff. I am relieved of this burden in light of
certification having been provided by Counsels’ that each Defendant in his
individual capacity was, in fact, acting within the scope of his office.
11
case therefore “shall be deemed an action against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
Remaining are Mr. Richardson’s allegations against Janet Yellen, sued in her
official capacity as Chair of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. Under the FTCA, the
complaint must name the United States, not one of its agencies. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476. Mr.
Richardson’s common-law tort claims against Ms. Yellen must also be dismissed.
In sum, Mr. Richardson cannot pursue his tort claims against the individually
named Defendants or against the Federal Reserve through its Chair. He must instead make out a
claim against the United States under the FTCA.
b. Constitutional tort claims
Mr. Richardson appears to allege constitutional violations against certain
Defendants. E.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 187 (“Defendants . . . violated my clearly established
constitutional rights to a reasonable accommodation, under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 1(h) (“I allege that,
Defendant Pleasant, accessed, examined, and displayed the contents of, my cell phone records,
from April of year 2010 to January of year 2011 (Fourth Amendment, Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures)[.]”) (emphasis in original).
To the extent brought against the United States or one of its agencies, these claims
fail as a matter of law. A plaintiff cannot seek money damages in tort from the United States
because “the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts.” Epps v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 575 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477-78; Clark v.
Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102-104 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
The conclusion here is thus the opposite from the common-law torts. Mr.
Opp’n at 4.
12
Richardson cannot proceed against the United States, but must instead state a claim against the
individual defendants.
* * *
What remains to assess, therefore, is (1) whether Mr. Richardson has adequately
pleaded a claim against the United States under the FTCA; and (2) whether Mr. Richardson has
adequately pleaded a constitutional tort claim against any of the individual Defendants.
2. Mr. Richardson fails to state an FTCA claim against the United States
The United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA is limited in
several respects. First and foremost, it requires a putative plaintiff to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit in court. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). Second, the
United States does not waive immunity as to several kinds of torts, including “libel [and]
slander.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Mr. Richardson never exhausted FTCA claims at the administrative level. In fact,
he admits it: “I have not reported or submitted, to the Board, any claim of personal injury . . . .
In this regard, the FTCA has no jurisdiction in the instant matter.” Opp’n at 6. Mr. Richardson
is confused about the FTCA’s operation; he argues that because he did not exhaust his
administrative FTCA remedies, this cannot be a suit under the FTCA (and Defendants’
arguments are therefore inapposite). His misunderstanding of the law has resulted in an honest
concession that unravels his case: it is precisely because he did not exhaust his remedies that his
FTCA claims against the United States must be dismissed. And because the FTCA is the
exclusive remedy for torts committed by the United States or its employees, Mr. Richardson is
left without a common-law tort claim.
Alternatively, Mr. Richardson’s defamation claim (Count IV) would nonetheless
13
fail because immunity from libel or slander suits was not waived by the United States in the
FTCA. See Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming the
dismissal of defamation claims because they are not actionable under the FTCA); Loumiet v.
United States, 106 F. Supp. 3d 219, 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (equating defamation with libel and
slander for FTCA purposes and dismissing defamation claims for that reason).
3. Mr. Richardson fails to state a constitutional tort claim against the
individual Defendants
To the extent that Mr. Richardson alleges constitutional torts against individual
defendants, the claims are untimely. So-called Bivens claims are subject to, at best, a three-year
statute of limitations under D.C. Code §§ 12-301(4), (8).9 “When a federal action contains no
statute of limitations, courts will ordinarily look to analogous provisions in state law as a source
of a federal limitations period.” Hampton v. Comey, No. 14-cv-1607 (ABJ), 2016 WL 471277,
at *13 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (quoting Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)). In the context of a Bivens action claiming the deprivation of constitutional rights,
the D.C. Circuit has instructed that D.C. Code § 12-301 provides the relevant limitations periods.
See Zhao v. Unknown Agent of CIA, 411 F. App’x 336, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding Bivens
claims “barred by the applicable statute of limitations” and citing D.C. Code § 12-301); see also
Doe, 753 F.2d at 1114-15 (applying one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions set out
in D.C. Code § 12-301(4) to Bivens claim based on allegations of dissemination of false and
defamatory statements). D.C. Code Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period
for actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed.” Three years is
9
Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), plaintiffs can allege
constitutional torts directly against individual federal employees. The doctrine is limited in
several other respects, none of which needs elaboration here because Mr. Richardson’s claims
are untimely.
14
therefore the longest period that could apply to Mr. Richardson’s Bivens claims.
The alleged constitutional trespasses took place between late 2009 and 2011. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7-31, 144. The Amended Complaint—which was the first to name any
individual defendant—was filed on March 20, 2015, which was more than three years later. See
Am. Compl. [Dkt. 8].10 The claims are therefore untimely on their face.
Mr. Richardson’s counterarguments are unavailing. He invokes the residual
federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), but the D.C. Circuit has held that “[w]hen a
federal action contains no statute of limitations, courts will ordinarily look to analogous
provisions in state law as a source of a federal limitations period.” Doe, 753 F.2d at 1114. Cf.
Weaver v. Bratt, 421 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2006) (same). Mr. Richardson is also incorrect
that his EEOC proceedings tolled the statute of limitations on his Bivens claims. Instead, “[t]he
Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations continues to run on a claim that requires no
administrative exhaustion even while the plaintiff pursues administrative remedies on a separate
claim that requires exhaustion.” Proctor v. District of Columbia, 74 F. Supp. 3d 436, 458 n.11
(D.D.C. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1975)). Mr.
Richardson’s common-law tort claims required exhaustion; his constitutional tort claims did not.
The latter are not tolled while he exhausts the former.
Because they are untimely even on the facts alleged by Mr. Richardson, his
Bivens claims against the individual Defendants will be dismissed.
B. Mr. Richardson’s Statutory Claims
1. The Whistleblower Protection Act claim fails as a matter of law
10
The original Complaint, Dkt. 1, would have suffered the same fate; it was not filed until
October 8, 2014.
15
Count V of the Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the federal
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (WPA). That Act does not apply to all
federal agencies, however. The Federal Reserve Act provides that “employment, compensation,
leave and expenses” of Federal Reserve employees “shall be governed solely by the provisions of
this chapter.” 12 U.S.C. § 244 (emphasis added). The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
has held that this specific provision trumps the more general provisions in the Whistleblower
Protection Act (WPA) and, thus, that the Board is not covered by that statute. Carney v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., No. DC-1221-94-0279-W-1, 1994 WL 539299 (M.S.P.B. Sept.
30, 1994). No subsequent MSPB decision appears to have followed suit and Defendants do not
offer—nor can the Court find—any federal case law in support of the proposition.
Whether the Board is exempt from the Whistleblower Protection Act is ultimately
immaterial because claims under that statute must first be brought to the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC). Mr. Richardson alleges that “[OSC] was hereby [sic] notified of all Defendants
[sic] behaviors using forms OSC 11 an [sic] OSC 12,” Am. Compl. ¶ 252, but he does not show
that he exhausted the administrative process. As the D.C. Circuit has explained:
Under the procedures set forth in Title 5 of the U.S. Code, an
employee who believes she is the victim of an unlawful reprisal must
first bring her claim to the OSC, which investigates the complaint.
Id. § 1214; Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 758 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (describing whistleblower protection procedures under Title
5). If the OSC finds that there was a prohibited personnel action as
defined by § 2302, it reports its findings to the MSPB, and it can
petition the MSPB on the employee’s behalf. Weber, 209 F.3d at
758. If the OSC finds no agency wrongdoing, then the employee
herself may bring an action before the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221;
1214(a)(3); Weber, 209 F.3d at 758. The MSPB’s decision is
appealable to the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. § 7703; Weber, 209 F.3d
at 758. Under no circumstances does the WPA grant the District
Court jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower cause of action
brought directly before it in the first instance.
See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Because the Board
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may be exempted from the WPA altogether, and because Mr. Richardson’s claim was not
exhausted, Count V will be dismissed.
Even the most liberal construction of Mr. Richardson’s claim does not save it.
The Board is covered by another whistleblower-protection statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, and the
Court could construe Mr. Richardson’s claim as being brought under that provision. But such
claims must be brought within two years. See id. § 1831j(b). The latest possible date of
retaliation by the Board would be June 7, 2010, when it terminated Mr. Richardson, see Am.
Compl. ¶ 5; this case was not brought until October 8, 2014. See generally Compl. [Dkt. 1].
Thus, the Board-specific whistleblower law would not save the Complaint.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act claim fails as a matter of law
Count I alleges a violation of Title I of the ADA on the basis that the Board failed
to accommodate Mr. Richardson’s “asthmatic/allergy disability.” Am. Compl. ¶ 184. More
specifically, he alleges that he is a “qualified individual” under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and that the
Board is a “covered entity” under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). Mr. Richardson is incorrect. “[T]he
ADA, enacted in 1990, explicitly excludes the federal government from coverage.” Pinkerton v.
Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 517 & n.18 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)); see also
Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although
Congress generally included governmental employers in Title I, it exempted the federal
government from that Title.”) (citing the same provision). While Mr. Richardson may pursue his
disability-discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, which expressly borrows the
ADA’s standards, he may not proceed directly under the ADA. Count I must be dismissed.
3. The Privacy Act claim fails as a matter of law
Mr. Richardson alludes several times to the Privacy Act of 1974. See Opp’n at 5
(“The confidentiality and protection of my disability medical documents are protected by the
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . and the Privacy Act of 1974 codified 5 U.S.C. § 552a.”); Am.
Comp. ¶ 1b (“. . . official medical call-off documents had been intentionally removed (5 U.S.C.
§§ 552a[]) from my LEU file by co-Defendants.”). But the Privacy Act’s two-year statute of
limitations bars any claim in this suit, which was filed on October 8, 2014. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(5); Compl. [Dkt. 1]. Mr. Richardson alleges no Privacy Act violation as recent as
October 2012, and any Privacy Act claim must therefore be dismissed.
G. Additional Matters
1. Mr. Richardson cannot state disability discrimination claims against
anyone but Defendant Yellen, in her official capacity
Mr. Richardson alleges disability discrimination, a claim that need not be
explicated here because Defendants do not move to dismiss it. Mot. at 1 n.1. The Court notes,
however, that such a claim may only be brought against Ms. Yellen in her official capacity. It is
well known that “the Rehabilitation Act is the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging
disability discrimination.” Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F. Supp. 3d 212, 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing
Paegle v. Dep’t of Interior, 813 F. Supp. 61, 66-67 (D.D.C. 1993); Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d
1188, 1191 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Equally limited are the possible defendants under the
Rehabilitation Act: only the heads of federal agencies in their official capacity may be sued, not
their individual employees. Norris v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing
Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 81 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Since the Rehabilitation Act draws
from the procedures of Title VII, the only proper defendant is the head of the department,
agency, or unit.”)); see also Di Lella v. Univ. of D.C. David A. Clarke Sch. of Law, 570 F. Supp.
2d 1, 7 n.8 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]here is no individual liability under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act.”) (collecting cases).
The Court must dismiss Mr. Richardson’s disability-discrimination claims to the
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extent they are brought against any Defendant other than Ms. Yellen, sued in her official
capacity as the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
2. Mr. Richardson’s claims based on false testimony fail
Mr. Richardson bases some of his claims on the sworn testimony of individual
Defendants. Indeed, he devotes the bulk of his Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 55-144, to recounting
that testimony. Although these claims have been converted into claims against the United States,
they fail because witnesses generally enjoy absolute immunity from such claims. See Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983). This immunity attaches to testimony given by affidavit or
deposition. E.g., Partington v. Norris, 28 F.3d 107 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Briscoe, 460 U.S.
325). And importantly for these purposes, it attaches to administrative proceedings. E.g., Pratts
v. Sujan, 176 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334).
Because it is unclear how, and to what extent, the allegedly false testimony
undergirds Mr. Richardson’s various claims, it helps here to point out that the witnesses are
absolutely immune from suit for any of it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in toto. The challenged claims fail
for various legal reasons explained above. Mr. Richardson’s remaining claims under the
Rehabilitation Act must be brought against Defendant Yellen in her official capacity. Those
claims, so construed, will proceed to discovery.
A memorializing Order accompanies this Opinion.
Date: March 8, 2016 /s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
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