Graham v. FCC Coleman Usp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________________
)
DAVID GRAHAM, JR., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. )
) Civ. Action No. 14-1567 (ABJ)
FCC COLEMAN USP II WARDEN, )
)
Respondent. )
_____________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner David Graham, Jr., has brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his 2006 murder conviction in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. Pet. [Dkt. # 1]. Petitioner claims that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The United States contends that the petition should be
denied because (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim based on trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness, and (2) the claim based on appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness is procedurally
barred. United States’ Opp’n to Pet’r’s Pet. for Writ of Habeas at 1 [Dkt. # 10]. The Court
agrees with both points. Accordingly, the petition will be denied for the reasons explained below.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2006, a Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of first-degree murder while
armed, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and carrying a pistol without a license.
Petitioner was sentenced on August 1, 2006 to a prison term of 600 months. Pet. at 1. The
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conviction arose from the shooting death of Kamau Walker on December 12, 2001, at his
residence. See Graham v. United States, 12 A.3d 1159, 1162 (D.C. 2011). The D.C. Court of
Appeals (“DCCA”) affirmed petitioner’s conviction on February 10, 2011. The DCCA
subsequently affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of petitioner’s collateral motion under D.C.
Code § 23-110, and it later denied petitioner’s motion to recall the mandate affirming the
convictions. See Pet. at 4-5.
A. Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as
the shooter, particularly the eyewitness testimony of his friend Derrick McCray. Petitioner
argued, among other things, that McCray’s testimony was unreliable because he “changed his
account of events and was influenced by a plea agreement with the government.” Graham, 12
A.3d at 1163. Petitioner also challenged the admission of another government witness’s
statement identifying him to the police on the night of the shooting, and he challenged the trial
court’s use of a flight instruction as unsupported by the evidence, unduly prejudicial, and flawed.
See id. at 1164-68. The DCCA rejected each challenge and affirmed the convictions. In doing
so, the court held that since McCray’s testimony was not “inherently incredible,” his testimony
alone was sufficient to convict petitioner notwithstanding other contradictory testimony. Id. at
1163-64.
B. Collateral Motion
On October 25, 2010, while the direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed his D.C. Code
§ 23-110 motion in the trial court. He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing,
among other things, “to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation . . ., request[] a Franks hearing .
. ., and object to the voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.” United States v. Graham, No. F
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5576-03, Order at 4 (Super. Ct. June 6, 2011) [Dkt. # 1-1, ECF pp. 20-28]. Petitioner also alleged
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Order at 4. 1 In its
decision issued after the direct appeal had concluded, the trial court noted that the DCCA had
“considered and rejected many of the claims that Graham makes in his motion,” and it found
petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective to be “vague, conclusory, and unsupported in
the record.” Id. at 9. The trial court further noted that petitioner had “failed to establish how [the
alleged] omissions – should they exist – prejudiced him to the extent that he was denied a fair
trial.” Id. n.5. The court also denied petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim as vague,
conclusory and unsupported, and it denied his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
as unavailable under a § 23-110 motion. Id. at 8.
C. Recall Motion
On April 6, 2012, petitioner filed a motion in the DCCA to recall the mandate, in which he
raised ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner faulted appellate counsel for failing
to raise as error the trial court’s giving of a “seriously flawed” voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Resp’t’s Ex. A, Mot. to Recall Mandate at 3-7 [Dkt. # 10-1]. In addition, petitioner claimed that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to hold the appeal in abeyance and file a § 23-110
motion based on trial counsel’s failure allegedly “to perform a reasonable factual and legal
investigation of the case” on four critical issues set out in the motion. Id. at 7-8. Finally,
petitioner renewed his prosecutorial misconduct claim by suggesting that the plea agreement under
which McCray testified in exchange for a reduced sentence constituted a corrupt bargain that
1
Unless indicated by an “ECF” page designation, the court will cite the actual page number in
the respective document.
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violated criminal law. See id. at 9-10. The DCCA denied petitioner’s recall motion on August
20, 2013 and declared:
The issues raised in appellant's motion to recall the mandate have been
addressed and rejected by this court in Appeal No. 11-CO-7722; therefore,
there is no basis to recall the mandate. Diamen v. United States, 725 A.2d
501, 509 (D.C. 1999) (stating that “[i]t is well-settled that where an appellate
court has disposed of an issue on appeal, [that issue] will not be considered
afresh on collateral attack in a trial court of the same judicial system, absent
special circumstances. We are also bound by the related rule that one
division of the court cannot overrule the decision of a prior division”
(citation omitted)).
Resp’t’s Ex. B, Graham v. United States, No. 06-CF-995 (D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (per curiam) [Dkt.
# 10-2].
D. The Current Habeas Petition
In this action, petitioner contends that he is asserting “a straight forward issue that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, where his appellant [sic]
counsel failed to challenge the denial [of] his probable cause hearing that he preserved in pre-trial
proceedings in the District of Columbia Superior Court held on October 6, 2003.” Pet’r’s Supp.’g
Mem. at 9 [Dkt. # 1, ECF No. 15-31]. Petitioner alleges that during his probable cause hearing,
the government “knowingly . . . provided materially false statements and prejudicial testimony . . .
in acquiring an arrest warrant and the criminal indictment through the grand jury process.”
Petitioner seems to argue that the trial court’s refusal to conduct a hearing was contrary to Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and that appellate counsel therefore was ineffective for failing
to raise the issue on direct appeal. See Pet’r’s Supp’g Mem. at 9-15, citing Franks, 438 U.S. at2
Appeal No. 11-CO-772 was assigned petitioner’s appeal of the denial of his § 23-110 motion.
See Pet. at 4 ¶ 11(b). Although neither party has supplied the DCCA’s unpublished decision, it is
undisputed that the trial court’s decision was affirmed on August 21, 2012. See Resp’t’s Opp’n. at
3.
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155-56 (“where the [criminal] defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the
affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request”).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel and Trial Error
This Court is only authorized to entertain a D.C. prisoner’s claim of trial court error or
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in limited circumstances. Blount v. United States, 69 F.
Supp. 3d 242, 245 (D.D.C. 2014), citing Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
This is because D.C. Code § 23-110(g) “entirely divest[s] the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus petitions by prisoners who had a [§] 23-110 remedy available to them, unless the
petitioner could show that the [§] 23-110 remedy was ‘inadequate or ineffective.’” Blount, 69 F.
Supp. 3d at 245, quoting Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (brackets in
original).
A “motion to vacate sentence under [§] 23-110 is the standard means of raising a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Garmon v. United States, 684 A.2d 327, 329 n.3 (D.C.
1996); see accord Reyes v. Rios, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006). In addition, a claim “arising
from alleged prosecutorial misconduct” may be raised under § 23-110. Saunders v. United
States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 105, 109 (D.D.C. 2014). The record establishes petitioner’s pursuit of that
remedy; the mere fact that he was not successful in the D.C. courts does not render it inadequate or
ineffective. Plummer v. Fenty, 321 Fed. Appx. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam), citing Garris v.
Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see accord Richardson v. United
States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2013). So, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim that
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trial counsel was ineffective, as well as the claim of prosecutorial misconduct advanced in
petitioner’s “Amended/Supplemental Motion to the Above Civil Action” [Dkt. # 15]. 3
B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
The government contends that the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective is barred
because it is predicated solely on the new Franks issue, see Pet. ¶ 12, which was not included in the
recall motion and thus not exhausted at the state level, see Resp’t’s Opp’n at 7. Section 2254
provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the applicant.
Id. § 2254(b)(1). 4
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to “give the state courts [a fair] opportunity to
act on [a state prisoner’s constitutional] claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in
a habeas petition,” and to “provide any necessary relief.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
3
To the extent that petitioner asserts that his actual innocence claim compels federal court
review, see Pet’r’s Traverse at 1-4 [Dkt. # 12], he is mistaken since such claims are cognizable
under D.C. Code § 23-110. See Earle v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2013),
quoting Ibrahim v. United States, 661 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding jurisdiction
lacking to consider claim of actual innocence “whether asserted as a ‘gateway’ claim to federal
court review or as a ‘stand-alone’ claim—because ‘either claim’ is available under D.C. Code §
23-110”).
4
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 “recognizes that a court of the
District is a state court.” Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 106 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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842, 844 (1999). In order to obtain federal court review, then, a petitioner typically must “have
presented to the state court ‘both the factual and legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal
court.’” Pulinario v. Goord, 291 F. Supp. 2d 154, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 118 Fed. App’x
554 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
And he cannot advance one theory in state court and a completely different theory in federal court.
See, e.g., Turentine v. Miller, 80 F.3d 222, 225-26 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding habeas review of Fourth
Amendment claims precluded where “Turentine emphasize[d] [in federal court] the warrantless
entry into the home and the subsequent search. But before the Indiana Court of Appeals his
argument concentrated almost exclusively on his arrest without probable cause”).
“In the District of Columbia, challenges to the effectiveness of appellate counsel are
properly raised through a motion to recall the Court of Appeals’ mandate” affirming the
conviction. Reyes, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (citing Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1060
(D.C. 1987) (en banc); D.C. App. R. 41(c)). Such motions are the recognized route to obtaining
federal court review of challenges to appellate counsel’s performance. Williams, 586 F. 3d at
1000 (noting that “D.C. prisoners who challenge the effectiveness of appellate counsel through a
motion to recall the mandate in the D.C. Court of Appeals will get a second bite at the apple in
federal court”).
Petitioner insists that he raised the Franks issue “prior to trial and at every post-conviction
proceeding since.” Pet’r’s Traverse at 1. He points to two specific arguments in the recall
motion -- Points One and Two -- but neither supports his position. Both arguments fell under the
heading, “Other Issues of Ineffectiveness.” Recall Mot. at 7-10. Point One was based on
appellate counsel’s failure to file a § 23-110 motion based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate
the facts that supposedly would have placed petitioner elsewhere at the time of the crime and
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supported his innocence. 5 Id. at 8-9. And Point Two related to petitioner’s contention that the
government’s main witness “changed his stories overtime, and did so in order [to] come from
under a life sentence himself.” Id. at 9.
In other words, petitioner has not pointed to anything in the recall motion that hints of a
Franks violation. There is no citation or reference of any kind to Franks, and there is no mention
of the Fourth amendment. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155 (“This case presents an important and
longstanding issue of Fourth Amendment law.”); cf. Turentine, 80 F.3d at 225, citing Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (finding “threshold requirement of clearly presenting . . . Fourth
Amendment claims to the state courts [not satisfied where petitioner] did not even cite Payton” in
his brief to the Indiana Court of Appeals). Since petitioner failed to put this aspect of his appellate
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness before the DCCA, the Court agrees that this ground for relief was
not exhausted and is procedurally barred. 6
5
On collateral review, the trial court noted that petitioner had provided no corroborating
evidence, e.g., cell phone records or taxicab records, to show that he was not at the crime scene “at
the time of the murder.” The court found that petitioner’s admission that he was in the area but
left before the incident did not “alone . . . contradict testimony from three eyewitnesses that the
defendant was at the scene . . . two hours after he claims that he departed in a taxicab. Indeed, the
testimony suggests that Graham had an earlier altercation with Walker, and that the shooting took
place minutes after he arrived at the decedent’s residence.” June 6, 2011 Order at 4-5 [Dkt. #
1-1].
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On collateral review, the trial court explained the Franks claim as follows:
Graham asserts that counsel should have requested a Franks hearing to
challenge the validity of the information which supported the arrest warrant.
He maintains that the testimony which Detective Voysest provided at the
preliminary hearing establishes that the government paid McCray for false
information. Detective Voysest testified that the arrest warrant was based in
part on information that McCray provided and that McCray was under a
cooperation agreement. However, he never testified that McCray provided
false information or suggested that police reliance on the information
recklessly disregarded the truth. In fact, the arrest warrant was also based on
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s claims predicated on trial counsel’s performance and trial errors are barred by
D.C. Code § 23-110(g), and petitioner failed to exhaust his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel by presenting the underlying issue to the state court. Accordingly, the petition
will be denied. An order will issue separately.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
DATE: May 20, 2016 United States District Judge
other evidence which corroborated McCray’s account and which was
presented at trial. In summary, the record does not support the claim that trial
counsel was deficient for failing to request a hearing under Franks. As a
result, this argument does not substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and fails to provide a basis for relief.
June 6, 2011 Order at 6-7, applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The trial
court’s rejection of petitioner’s trial counsel ineffectiveness claim and the DCCA’s affirmance of
that decision undermine any notion that this Court could find for petitioner on the merits of the
appellate counsel claim under § 2254’s deferential standard of review. See Woods v. Etherton,
___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (“When the claim at issue is one for
ineffective assistance of counsel . . . [§ 2254] review is doubly deferential . . . . In such
circumstances, federal courts are to afford both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit
of the doubt.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 288 (2000) (noting that since appellate counsel “may select from among [nonfrivolous
claims] in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal,” it is difficult to demonstrate
deficient performance under Strickland where, as here, counsel filed a merits brief but failed to
raise a particular claim).
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