Wesby v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
THEODORE WESBY, et al. :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 09-0501 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document Nos.: 90, 96
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs in this case are sixteen individuals who brought a civil rights suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia and five police officers after they were arrested
while attending a party. This Court granted Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion with respect to
Plaintiffs’ false arrest and unlawful entry claims against Officers Campanale, Parker, and the
District of Columbia. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. April 9,
2015). This Court also granted Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims
against the police officers in their official capacities. See id. At trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the sixteen Plaintiffs, awarding them $680,000 in compensatory damages against
Defendants Campanale, Parker, and the District of Columbia. See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 73.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs, which this Court
granted. See Order on Pls.’ Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs at 1, ECF No. 86. In calculating
Plaintiffs’ fee award of $246,896.25, this Court relied on the hourly rates set forth in the United
States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) Laffey Matrix. See id. Defendants appealed this fee award,
while Plaintiffs did not. See Defs.’ Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 88.
Defendants also appealed the district court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs summary judgment
on the false arrest and unlawful entry claims. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13
(D.C. Cir. 2015). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. See id. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental
motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking fees relating to the appeal. See Pls.’ Suppl. Mot. for Att’y Fees, ECF No. 90.
Defendants then moved for rehearing en banc on November 3, 2014. See Defs.’ Mem. P.
& A. Opp’n Pls.’ 2d Suppl. Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs at 1, ECF No. 101 [hereinafter “Defs.’
2d Mem. Opp’n”]. The Court of Appeals denied Defendants’ motion for rehearing on February
8, 2016. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (order denying
Defendants’ motion for rehearing en banc). Plaintiffs filed a second supplemental motion for
attorney’s fees for counsel’s work relating to the en banc proceedings. See Pls.’ 2d Suppl. Mot.
for Att’y Fees Re Appeal at 1, ECF No. 96.
In both motions for attorney’s fees, Plaintiffs request fees calculated using hourly rates
under the Enhanced Laffey Matrix. See Pls.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs
at 4, ECF No. 90 [hereinafter “Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp.”]; id. Ex. 3, ECF No. 90-3; Pls.’ Mem. P. &
A. Supp. Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs at 4, ECF No. 96 [hereinafter “Pls.’ 2d Mem. Supp.”]; id.
Ex. 3, ECF No. 96-3. Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted affidavits cataloguing the number of hours he
worked on this case. See Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp., Ex. 2, ECF No. 90-2; Pls.’ 2d Mem. Supp., Ex.
2, ECF No. 96-2. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ proposed fees on the grounds that they are
unreasonable, claiming: (1) that the Enhanced Laffey Matrix does not represent the prevailing
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market rates in the relevant community and (2) that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the time
expended working on the case was reasonable. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. for
Att’y Fees and Costs at 3–10, ECF No. 92 [hereinafter “Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n”]; Defs.’ 2d
Mem. Opp’n at 3–7, ECF No. 101. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part
and deny in part Plaintiffs’ motions for attorney’s fees relating to the appeal.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b). Plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties, and thus entitled to attorney’s fees, “if
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit.” Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F. Supp. 2d 47, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)). A litigant need not succeed at every step of the litigation in order to be a prevailing
party for the purpose of § 1988; indeed, “a litigant who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation
that was a necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney’s fees even for the
unsuccessful stage.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. F.A.A., 156 F.3d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing both their entitlement to attorney’s fees and the
reasonableness of the fees they seek. See Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 354 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
A plaintiff can satisfy this burden by submitting evidence of: “the attorneys’ billing practices; the
attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.” Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. Once the plaintiff has provided such information, a
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presumption arises that the hours billed are reasonable and the burden shifts to the defendant to
rebut the plaintiff’s showing. Id. at 1109–10.
In calculating a reasonable fee award, a district court must determine: (1) a reasonable
hourly rate (or “lodestar”) for the services rendered by the plaintiffs’ attorney, (2) the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and (3) whether plaintiffs have offered specific
evidence demonstrating that this is one of the rare cases where a lodestar enhancement or
multiplier is appropriate. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 832 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C.
2011); Covington, 75 F.3d at 1107.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs prevailed on appeal and are therefore entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. See
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are the
prevailing party, nor do Plaintiffs argue that they merit a lodestar enhancement or multiplier. See
Defs’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 1–10; Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp. at 1–5. Therefore, the Court will not
address these issues. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ requested fees are unreasonable because
the Enhanced Laffey Matrix does not represent prevailing market rates in the relevant community
and counsel’s time records are not contemporaneous and lack the requisite specificity to establish
a reasonable number of hours worked. The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate
Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees at hourly rates set forth in the
“Enhanced” or “Updated” Laffey Matrix [hereinafter “Enhanced Matrix”]. See Pls.’ 1st Mem.
Supp. at 4; id. Ex. 3 (listing Mr. Lattimer’s Enhanced Laffey rate ranging from $753 to $771 per
hour); Pls.’ 2d Mem. Supp. at 4; id. Ex. 3 (listing Mr. Lattimer’s Enhanced Laffey rate ranging
from $789 to $796 per hour). Courts in this District customarily apply the Laffey Matrix in
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determining the “lodestar” reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees. See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds en banc by Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel (SOCM), 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Harvey, 951 F. Supp. 2d at
54–5.
Two versions of the Laffey Matrix exist; the “standard” Laffey Matrix published by
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia [hereinafter “USAO Matrix”], and
the Enhanced Matrix calculated using the legal services component of the Consumer Price Index.
Defendants rightfully argue that the USAO Matrix is “commonly accepted by judges in this
Court.” See Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 2; see, e.g., Hall v. C.I.A., 115 F. Supp. 3d 24, 32 (D.D.C.
2015) (finding that the reasonable hourly rate is guided by the “historic” USAO Laffey Matrix);
Berke v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 942 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]he USAO matrix
more accurately reflects the prevailing market rates in the Washington, D.C. legal market.”);
Heller, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (using the “widely accepted USAO Matrix”); Am. Lands All. v.
Norton, 525 F. Supp. 2d 135, 150 (D.D.C. 2007) (referring to the USAO Matrix as the “standard
matrix” in this district). Indeed, Courts in this district have been reluctant to depart from the
USAO Matrix “absent a strong showing that such a departure is justified by the nature and
complexity of the litigation.” Am. Lands All., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
The law-of-the-case doctrine requires this Court to employ the USAO Matrix—not the
Enhanced Matrix—in calculating Plaintiffs’ fee award. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “the
same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same
result.” Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting LaShawn A. v.
Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Thus, “a legal decision made at one stage
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of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed, governs
future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the right to
challenge that decision at a later time.” Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (alterations omitted) (quoting Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic
Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 234, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). This Court previously employed the USAO
Matrix in calculating Plaintiffs’ fee award after Plaintiffs prevailed at trial. See Order on Pls.’
Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs at 1. Although Defendants appealed this award, Plaintiffs did not.
Plaintiffs argue in a footnote that the Court should now use the Enhanced Matrix, despite having
used the USAO Matrix at the trial level because “that was a much different situation.” Pls.’ 1st
Mem. Supp. at 5 n.2. However, beyond this conclusory statement, Plaintiffs provide no legal or
evidentiary support for deviating from the Court’s prior conclusion. Because Plaintiffs’ prior fee
award covered the same market rate determination in part at issue here, and Plaintiffs did not
further contest the use of the USAO Matrix in that instance, the law-of-the-case applies and
mandates the use of the USAO Matrix to the appellate and en banc proceedings.
Even if the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence
that would justify the Court to now depart from the standard USAO Matrix. Plaintiffs note that
the Enhanced Matrix “reasonably states the prevailing rates of attorneys of comparable
experience,” Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp. at 4, but this is not sufficient. Plaintiffs have not explained
why, if at all, the Enhanced Matrix is superior to the USAO Matrix in this instance. Even if
Plaintiffs had claimed that the Enhanced Matrix is more accurate, such a conclusory claim would
be insufficient to justify employing that matrix. See DL v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 239,
243 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying the USAO Matrix because “plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case have
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not justified the use of the enhanced Laffey matrix by showing the nature and complexity of the
work; they simply argue that the enhanced matrix is more accurate”).
Moreover, in advocating in favor of the Enhanced Matrix, Plaintiffs rely on case law
applying the USAO Matrix, not the Enhanced Matrix. See Covington v. District of Columbia,
839 F. Supp. 894, 898 (D.D.C. 1993). Covington approved the use of the Laffey Matrix, and the
Enhanced Matrix was not applied until years later. And when this Court has applied the
Enhanced Matrix, for example in Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58
(D.D.C. 2015), it only did so after plaintiffs had submitted “a great deal of evidence regarding
prevailing market rates for complex federal litigation,” including an affidavit from the economist
who developed the Enhanced Matrix, billing rate tables demonstrating the difference between
average national law firm rates and both the USAO and Enhanced Matrix rates, and a 2012
National Law Journal Rates Survey. See 809 F.3d at 64–65. Unlike the plaintiffs in Salazar,
Plaintiffs in this case have not submitted any evidence showing that the Enhanced Matrix more
accurately reflects the market rate for their counsel’s work in this case. Therefore, the Court will
continue to award Plaintiffs attorney’s fees based on the widely accepted USAO Matrix.
B. Reasonableness of Hours Worked
This district requires attorneys seeking fees to “maintain contemporaneous, complete and
standardized time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney.” See Heller,
832 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d
1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided sufficiently detailed
contemporaneous records. This Court previously awarded Plaintiffs fees for their trial-level
work, amounting to $246,896.25, after concluding that Plaintiffs’ records were sufficient. No
time was discounted. See Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 93. Compare
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Pls.’ Am. Mot. for Att’y Fees and Costs, Ex. 1, ECF No. 77-1 (timekeeping records from trial
work), with Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp., Ex. 2 (timekeeping records from appellate work), and Pls.’ 2d
Mem. Supp., Ex. 2 (timekeeping records from en banc work). In his current motions, Plaintiffs’
counsel has provided similarly detailed and standardized time records, which again suffice to
support an award of attorney’s fees.
Additionally, the Court concludes that the number of hours Plaintiffs’ counsel devoted to
work on the appellate and en banc matters was reasonable. For example, Defendants’ appellate
brief cited to fifty-three cases, twelve statutes, one municipal regulation, and one federal rule—
all of which Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed. See Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 5.
Defendants argue that the hours Plaintiffs’ counsel spent drafting a motion for summary
affirmance should be discounted because Plaintiffs’ motion was ultimately unsuccessful. See
Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 7. However, Plaintiffs’ motion is not properly viewed as a separate
claim, but rather as an initial procedural skirmish that ultimately contributed to Plaintiffs’ victory
on appeal. The research conducted for the motion for summary affirmance contributed to
Plaintiffs’ successful appellate brief, as evidenced by the overlap between the two. See id. at 8.
Because Plaintiffs’ motion for summary affirmance was “a necessary step” to their ultimate
victory, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees even for the work performed on the unsuccessful
motion. Air Transp. Ass’n of Can., 156 F.3d at 1335. Finally, Defendants argue that the amount
of time Plaintiffs’ counsel spent working on his appellate brief and his opposition to Defendants’
motion for rehearing en banc were unreasonable in light of the sparse descriptions Plaintiffs’
counsel has provided in his time records. See Defs.’ 1st Mem. Opp’n at 9; Defs.’ 2d Mem.
Opp’n at 7. Those records include descriptions such as: “Drafted Appellees’ Brief” and
“Researched and drafted Response to Petition.” Pls.’ 1st Mem. Supp., Ex. 2; Pls.’ 2d Mem.
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Supp., Ex. 2. The Court finds, however, that Plaintiffs’ descriptions are sufficient in these
circumstances, and will not further dissect Plaintiffs’ hours. Defendants have litigated this case
aggressively—including by filing an en banc petition and anticipated, forthcoming petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court. Defendants should not be surprised that Plaintiffs’ counsel, a
solo-practitioner, has spent a substantial amount of time responding.
C. Plaintiffs Should Be Awarded Fees of $103,778.80
Based on the USAO Laffey Matrix and the reasonable number of hours Plaintiffs’ counsel
has worked on this case, Plaintiffs will be awarded attorney’s fees of $103,778.80. 1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
and Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs shall be GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: May 23, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
1
This fee amount was calculated using the USAO Laffey rates as follows: $7,373 for Mr.
Lattimer’s legal work between June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013 (14.6 hours at $505 per hour);
plus $54,825 for Mr. Lattimer’s legal work between June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014 (107.5 hours
at $510 per hour); plus $28,886 for Mr. Lattimer’s legal work between June 1, 2014 and May 31,
2015 (55.55 hours at $520 per hour); plus $12,694.80 for Mr. Lattimer’s legal work between
June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2016 (22.35 hours at $568 per hour). Those values yield a total fee
award of $103,779.
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