Gregory v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CURTIS J. GREGORY, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 21-cv-2115 (DLF)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action, plaintiff Curtis J. Gregory, Sr. challenges the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA’s) denial of his claims for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income Benefits. Before the Court are Gregory’s Motion for Judgment
of Reversal, Dkt. 15, and the Social Security Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance,
Dkt. 16. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion for Judgment of Reversal and
grant the Motion for Judgment of Affirmance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
“To qualify for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles
II and XVI of the [Social Security] Act, [a claimant] must establish that []he is ‘disabled.’” Butler
v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Act defines disability as an inability “to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); accord
20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The impairment must be severe and must render the individual unable to
perform both “previous work” and “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); accord 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process to determine whether a claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps. Butler, 353 F.3d
at 997. First, the claimant must show that he is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, he must demonstrate that he has a “severe
impairment” that “significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). Third, the claimant must show that his impairments or combination of
impairments “meets or equals” one of the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
See Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If they do, then the claimant is deemed disabled, and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step, which requires the ALJ to determine the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and consider whether, in light of that capacity, the claimant
can still perform work that he has done within the past 15 years (if the claimant has indeed done
such work). See Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.960(b)(1). Fifth, if the claimant’s capacity indicates
that he cannot engage in past work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the
claimant’s capacity, age, education, and past work experience indicate that he is able to perform
“other work” that exists in the national economy. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Butler, 353 F.3d at 997.
B. Factual Background
On September 27, 2019, Gregory filed an application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income with the Social Security Administration, alleging that since August
23, 2019, he has been disabled and unable to work. A.R. 24, Dkt. 12. Starting in 1992, Gregory
has been employed as an electrician and as a night cleaner. Id. at 35, 290. He stopped working in
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2019. Id. at 27. Gregory has a high school education, and as of the date of his application, he was
51 years old. Id. at 35.
C. Procedural History
On January 9, 2020, and again on April 15, 2020, upon reconsideration, the SSA denied
Gregory’s claim for benefits. Id at 24. Gregory then requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) in Washington, D.C., id., and on December 21, 2020, after holding a hearing,
the ALJ again denied Gregory’s application, id. at 37. At step one of the disability evaluation
process, the ALJ determined that Johnson had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since
August 23, 2019. Id. at 26. At step two, he found Gregory had the following severe impairments:
“osteoarthritis of the left knee, degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder, affective disorder,
anxiety disorder, and substance abuse disorder.” Id. at 27.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Gregory does not have a qualifying “impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926). The ALJ explained that Gregory’s physical
impairments did not meet the requirements for major dysfunction of a joint under Listings 1.02A
or 1.02B. Id. He noted that while medical evidence indicated “mild restriction of range of motion,
occasional mild weakness, and reports of tenderness” in Gregory’s left knee, “these findings do
not establish an inability to ambulate effectively as defined in [Listing] 1.02A.” Id. As to Listing
1.02B, he acknowledged that while the tear in Gregory’s left shoulder caused “mild range of
motion impairment, mildly limited motor strength, positive impingement testing,” and pain, these
symptoms did not “establish an inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively, as
defined in [Listing] 1.00B2(c).” Id. The ALJ found that Gregory’s mental impairments “singly
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and in combination[] [did] not meet[] or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04 and 12.06.”
Id. at 28. The ALJ determined that Gregory did not satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria because
despite several mild or moderate limitations, Gregory did not have “one extreme limitation or two
marked limitations.” Id. at 28–29. The ALJ also concluded that Gregory did not satisfy the
“paragraph C” criteria because Gregory has more than a “minimal capacity to adjust to changes in
his environment.” Id. at 29. The ALJ considered Gregory’s testimony that he “leave[s] his house
independently, interact[s] with others in his community, shop[s], and even teach[es] his nephews
how to perform basic electrician tasks.” Id.At step four, as to Gregory’s physical symptoms, the ALJ found that Gregory’s “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” but that
Gregory was not completely limited in his physical ability to work. Id. at 32. The ALJ considered
Gregory’s testimony, radiologist reports, imaging studies, and physical examinations and
concluded that Gregory had the “residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR [§§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except [he] can lift, carry, push and pull 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently”; “can sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and stand and
walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday”; “can only frequently push, pull, and reach with the left
arm”; “can only frequently push, pull, and operate foot controls with the left lower extremity”;
“can only frequently: climb ramps and stairs; balance; stoop; kneel; crouch; and crawl”; and “can
occasionally climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds.” Id. at 30. As for Gregory’s mental health, the
ALJ determined that Gregory is “limited to simple, routine tasks but not at a production pace”;
“can only occasionally interact with supervisors and the public”; “is limited to applying
commonsense understanding to carry out uninvolved written or oral instructions”; “is limited to
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dealing with problems involving few concrete variables in or from standardized situations”; and
“must be afforded normal work breaks.” Id.
At step five, after consulting an independent vocational expert, the ALJ determined that
Gregory could perform his past work as a night cleaner, as well as other jobs in the national
economy, including as a housekeeping cleaner, marker, and stuffer. Id. at 35–36. Those
occupations all required “GED reasoning level 2 or below” and had between 45,000 and 365,000
positions available nationally. Id.
The Appeals Council denied Gregory’s request for a review on June 25, 2021. Id. at 1. On
August 5, Gregory filed his complaint, Dkt. 1, in this Court for review of his denial of benefits.
Now before the Court are Gregory’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and the Commissioner’s
Motion for Judgment of Affirmance.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“In a disability proceeding, the ALJ ‘has the power and the duty to investigate fully all
matters in issue, and to develop the comprehensive record required for a fair determination of
disability.’” Simms v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 1047, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Diabo v. Sec’y of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 627 F.2d 278, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Once an ALJ issues a decision,
the claimant may seek review by the Administration’s Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1467. If
the Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision becomes the final decision of the Administration’s
Commissioner. See id. § 416.1481.
The Social Security Act gives federal district courts review over the Commissioner’s final
decisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, see id. § 405(g), and if it correctly applied the
relevant legal standards, Butler, 353 F.3d at 999. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Richardson
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v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be
satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v.
FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial-
evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder.” Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue,
529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On review, the “plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the Commissioner’s decision [was] not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal
standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin, 121 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting
Muldrow v. Astrue, No. 11-1385, 2012 WL 2877697, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2012)). Further, the
reviewing court may not replace the ALJ’s judgment “concerning the credibility of the evidence
with its own.” Goodman v. Colvin, 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, “[t]he credibility determination is solely within the realm of the ALJ.”
Grant v. Astrue, 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2012).
Finally, the Social Security Administration guides its ALJs to provide a “narrative
discussion” connecting the medical evidence to the ALJ’s conclusions about the claimant’s
capacity. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI:
Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims (July 2, 1996), available at 1996 WL
374184, at *7.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Listing 1.02
Gregory first challenges the ALJ’s determination that his knee and shoulder impairments
did not meet the requirements of Listing 1.02. See Mot. for J. of Reversal at 14–18. As of the
time of the ALJ’s decision, Listing 1.02 required either (A) a “hip, knee, or ankle” injury that
resulted in an “inability to ambulate effectively,” or (B) a “shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand” injury
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that resulted in an “inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.02 (2020).1 As to both his knee and shoulder injuries, Gregory argues that the
case should be remanded because the ALJ neglected to consider certain evidence supporting the
existence of a Listing 1.02 impairment. See Mot. for J. of Reversal at 14–15 (citing Turner v.
Astrue, 710 F. Supp. 2d 95, 105 (D.D.C. 2010)).
The Court disagrees. A “reviewing court may neither reweigh the evidence presented to it
nor replace the Commissioner’s judgment concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.
Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether the ALJ has analyzed all evidence and has
sufficiently explained that weight he or she has given to obviously probative exhibits.” Goodman,
233 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (cleaned up). As to Paragraph A of Listing 1.02, Gregory contends the
ALJ ignored evidence of his arthritis, his limited range of motion, and his functional limitations,
as well as testimony that Gregory requires a cane and information in Gregory’s treatment notes.
But the ALJ explicitly considered Gregory’s “mild meniscal tearing and degenerative changes of
the left knee[,] . . . mild restriction of range of motion, occasional mild weakness, and reports of
tenderness upon palpation,” along with Gregory’s “testimony alleging the occasional use of a
cane.” A.R. 27. The ALJ did not “ignore[] this evidence without discussion,” Mot. for J. of
Reversal at 16 (citing Turner, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 105); he concluded that, notwithstanding these
limitations, nothing in the record showed lack of function amounting to “an inability to ambulate
effectively.” A.R. 27 (citing Listings 1.02A, 1.00B2b). That determination was supported by
substantial evidence, including evidence of Gregory’s normal gait and a review of Gregory’s
physical examinations. Id.; see, e.g., id. at 426, 442 (normal gait); id. at 398, 402 (imaging results);
1
Listing 1.02 has since been supplanted by more recent rules, see 85 Fed. Reg. 78164 (Dec. 3,
2020), but Gregory agrees that the then-current version governs his challenge in this Court, see
Mot. for J. of Reversal at 15 n.5.
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id. at 409 (examination summary); id. at 416 (discussion of x-ray). As to Paragraph B, Gregory
asserts that the ALJ failed to consider evidence regarding the severity of his left shoulder injury,
namely evidence of impingement syndrome, limited range of motion, and reports of pain. To the
contrary, the ALJ explicitly considered “mild range of motion impairment, mildly limited motor
strength, positive impingement testing, and reports of pain,” before concluding this did not
establish “an inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively.” A.R. 27. The ALJ’s
reasoning, along with his citations to specific exhibits in the record, constitutes sufficient
explanation and does not “le[ave] [the Court] guessing as to how the ALJ evaluated probative
material.” Turner, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 105. Nor could no reasonable adjudicator reach the ALJ’s
conclusion based on the evidence he incorporated into his decision, including physical
examinations and Gregory’s own testimony of daily activities and capacity to perform light lifting.
See A.R. 27; Butler, 353 F.3d at 999; see, e.g., A.R. 402 (imaging results); id. at 417 (physical
examination showing ability to lift and carry 25 pounds frequently); id. at 73 (testimony about
helping with grocery shopping).
B. Listings 12.04 and 12.06
Gregory next argues that the ALJ applied the incorrect criteria to evaluate whether his
mental impairments met or equaled the requirements of Listings 12.04 and 12.06. See Mot. for J.
of Reversal at 18–20. To fall within the coverage of those listings, a claimant must meet either
“paragraph B” or “paragraph C” criteria. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, pp. 1, §§ 12.04(B)–(C),
12.06(B)–(C). The ALJ determined that Gregory satisfied neither, and Gregory now contends that
the ALJ erred in assessing the criteria for paragraph C.2
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Gregory does not challenge the ALJ’s determination with respect to paragraph B.
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Both of Gregory’s arguments on this point are meritless. First, Gregory faults the ALJ for
failing to “explain his reasoning for how . . . the capacity to interact with others [was] relevant to
whether . . . Gregory’s mental impairments are serious and persistent.” Mot. for J. of Reversal at
19–20. But the ALJ specifically explained that this evidence—Gregory’s “capacity to leave his
house independently, interact with others in his community, shop, and even teach his nephews how
to perform basic electrician tasks”—showed that Gregory’s condition, despite “affect[ing] his
functioning,” did not severely change his capacity to engage independently in various life tasks.
A.R. 29. Thus, the ALJ concluded, with substantial evidence, that Gregory had more than a
“minimal capacity to adapt to changes in his environment or to demands not already part of his
daily life,” id., and so did not meet Paragraph C’s prerequisite to finding a condition to be severe
and persistent. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1, §§ 12.04(C)(2), 12.06(C)(2); see also id.
§ 12.00(G)(2)(C) (“We will consider that you have achieved only marginal adjustment when . . .
for example, you have become unable to function outside of your home . . . without substantial
psychosocial supports.”). Second, Gregory says that the ALJ “did not consider whether Mr.
Gregory had a documented history of his mental conditions over a period of at least two years.”
Mot. for J. of Reversal at 20. But the ALJ repeatedly recognized Gregory’s mental health treatment
throughout his decision, including when evaluating Paragraph C. See, e.g., A.R. 28–30
(referencing Gregory’s “mental health records”), and since marginal adjustment is a requirement
to obtain relief under paragraph C, the ALJ had completed determining that Gregory was ineligible
upon determining that he did not have only marginal adjustment.3
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Gregory also suggests that the ALJ did not discuss his medical records showing his mental health-
related symptoms. But the ALJ had just discussed those records in evaluating the paragraph B
criteria, A.R. 28, and he determined that although the records suggested an effect on Gregory’s
functioning, they did not, in combination with the evidence of Gregory’s regular daily activities,
show marginal adjustment, id. at 29.
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C. Residual Functional Capacity
Gregory also objects to the ALJ’s evaluation of his residual functional capacity (RFC).
Mot. for J. of Reversal at 21–27. An ALJ need only provide a logical connection between the
evidence and his conclusion, see Thomas v. Astrue, 677 F. Supp. 2d 300, 306 (D.D.C. 2010), not
an articulation of each function and its implication on the ALJ’s overall conclusion of the
claimant’s residual capacity, see Kim M. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2072-GMH, 2021 WL 4033060,
at *7 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021). A narrative discussion is sufficient explanation. Davis v. Berryhill,
272 F. Supp. 3d 154, 172 (D.D.C. 2017). An ALJ’s conclusion is sufficient so long as it is
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1499
(D.C. Cir. 1993). The ALJ must “consider[ ] the record as a whole and discuss[ ] which evidence
he found credible and why.” Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 112.
Here, first, Gregory argues that the ALJ incorrectly weighed the record evidence of his
physical limitations. In particular, he contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of
Gregory’s “long-time care provider” Ikechukwu Nwosu, N.P., because it identified no clinical
findings, while nevertheless relying on the opinion of another clinician, Lisa Venkataraman, M.D.,
even though it also relied on no clinical findings. Id. at 23. For social security claims, like
Gregory’s, that are filed after March 27, 2017, the ALJ does “not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion[].” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a). Rather, an ALJ must “articulate . . . how persuasive [he] find[s] all of the medical
opinions,” id. § 404.1520c(b), according to five factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) the
medical source’s relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) “other factors that tend
to support or contradict a medical opinion.” Id. § 404.1520c(c). Supportability and consistency
“are the most important factors,” so federal regulations require an ALJ to “explain how [he]
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considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions.”
Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is defined as the “relevan[ce] [of] the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source . . . to his or her medical
opinion(s).” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency is the “consisten[cy] [of] a medical opinion[] . . .
with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id.
§ 404.1520c(c)(2).
Gregory’s argument is unfounded because it mischaracterizes the nature of the ALJ’s
rejection of Nwosu’s conclusions. True, the ALJ noted that Nwosu “identified no specific clinical
findings,” but only after explaining that Nwosu’s conclusions “appear[ed] inconsistent with the
full range of motion of the knees noted in Ms. Nwosu’s [own] records,” A.R. at 34; see, e.g., id. at
426, 429, 433—a ground Gregory does not mention. The ALJ also discredited Nwosu’s account
because she stated that Gregory had no mental limitation, despite evidence of substantial mental
health treatment. Id. at 34. The ALJ adequately explained why Nwosu’s opinion was outweighed
by the other testimonial and medical evidence in the record, including Gregory’s daily activities
and Dr. Venkataraman’s opinions, and thus called for limitations on Gregory’s capacity, although
short of what Nwosu recommended. Gregory also asserts that the ALJ concluded he could “only
frequently . . . balance, stoop, kneel, [or] crouch” without providing any evidentiary basis, Mot.
for J. of Reversal at 23 (quoting A.R. 30), and that the ALJ concluded without explanation that
Gregory could only frequently reach with his left arm. That too is incorrect. The ALJ reviewed a
range of evidence to support his determination that Gregory “remain[ed] able to perform a range
of light exertional activity,” including imaging studies and physical examinations. A.R. 32. And
the ALJ qualified these remarks by recognizing that Gregory had “reduced range of motion of the
shoulder and the knee, findings that support postural and manipulative limitations.” Id. These
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determinations both relied on a reasonable weighing of the record and are supported by substantial
evidence.
Second, Gregory takes issue with the RFC’s limitation to “simple, routine tasks,” Mot. for
J. of Reversal at 25 (quoting A.R. 31), without further accounting for Gregory’s limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace. Citing authority that this RFC language “will not sufficiently
capture a claimant’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace,” id. at 25 (quoting
Davis, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 172 ) (emphasis omitted), Gregory argues that the ALJ failed to
sufficiently take these limitations into account in the RFC. It is true that in discussing whether
Gregory met the criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06, the ALJ found that “in the light most
favorable to the claimant . . . the claimant’s psychiatric conditions cause more than ‘mild’ but less
than ‘marked’ impairment in the claimant’s ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace,” and
so the ALJ found a “moderate limitation” in this area. Id. at 29. But even assuming that this would
make a “simple, routine tasks” instruction insufficient, that is not the only limitation the ALJ
imposed. Rather, the ALJ included in the RFC that Gregory “is limited to applying commonsense
understanding to carry out uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “dealing with problems
involving few concrete variables in or from standardized situations,” along with “normal work
breaks” and a condition that the tasks not be “at a production pace.” Id. at 30. The ALJ thus both
considered Gregory’s limitations with respect to concentration, persistence, and pace and
integrated them into the RFC, and the Court is not, contrary to Gregory’s suggestion, “left to guess
how the ALJ” reached this conclusion. Mot for J. of Reversal at 26 (citation omitted).
Third, Gregory criticizes the ALJ for failing to explain the term “not at a production pace.”
Id. at 27. The Court, however, can readily discern the meaning of the term as work requiring an
employee to keep a particular pace of production. See Johnson v. Saul, 19-cv-3929-RCL, 2021
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WL 411202, at 6 n.5 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2021) (rejecting a contention that “this phrase is unclear” and
noting that the ALJ phrased the same limitation as “no production rate for pace of work” at the
hearing (alteration omitted)); see also A.R. 83–84 (hearing transcript reflecting similar discussion).
There is no basis for remand.
D. Subjective Statements
Gregory next argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective testimony when
determining the severity of his symptoms with regard to his ability to walk, stand, and sit. In
particular, Gregory says that the ALJ rejected his statements “solely because the objective medical
evidence [did] not substantiate the degree of impairment-related symptoms alleged by the
individual,” in violation of SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5. Mot. for J. of Reversal at 31.
For this reason, Gregory says, the ALJ disregarded other evidence in the record and failed to
logically explain his reasons for not fully accepting Gregory’s account. Id. at 31–32.
This misconstrues the record. The ALJ did not reach his findings about symptom severity,
and reject Gregory’s self-reports, solely on the basis of imaging results and physical examinations.
The ALJ determined that Gregory’s alleged symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.”
A.R. 32 (emphasis added). While the ALJ then focused on characterizing the “objective medical
evidence,” he also referred to Gregory’s normal gait and only voluntary, occasional use of a cane.
Id.; see id. at 27. He further noted that Gregory’s claimed “difficulty with personal care” due to
physical limitations appeared inconsistent with Gregory’s other testimony that “he can go out
every day and that he travels on foot and on public transportation” and that “he regularly goes to
medical appointments, goes to church, and visits family.” Id. at 31. He also noted Gregory’s
testimony that he instructs his nephews how “to perform electrical work, such as installing outlets,”
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and “assist[s] his mother with groceries and carr[ying] her grocery bags.” Id. at 32. When
assessing the credibility of a claimant’s statements about the severity of his symptoms, an ALJ
may consider, among other factors, the claimant’s daily activities. Porter v. Colvin, 951 F. Supp.
2d 125, 136 (D.D.C. 2013); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ clearly did not discount
Gregory’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms based on lack of objective evidence alone.
He cited other evidence in the record, including Gregory’s own account. Gregory complains that
the ALJ gave too much weight to the evidence he relied on, and not enough to his treatment such
as pain medications and physical therapy, but the Court may not “reweigh the evidence presented
to it nor replace the Commissioner’s judgment concerning the credibility of the evidence with its
own.” Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (cleaned up).
E. Reasoning Level
Finally, Gregory argues that the ALJ improperly determined that he could hold certain jobs
that required a GED reasoning level 2, despite limiting Gregory to simple, routine tasks, which is
consistent with reasoning level 1. The ALJ, however, adhered to the regulatory scheme in relying
on a specific vocational preparation (SVP) level, rather than a GED reasoning level. See SSR 00-
4p, 2000 WL 1898704. An SVP level of 2, which is what the ALJ assigned, is consistent with
unskilled work. Id.; see A.R. 34. And there is no inherent conflict between reasoning level 2 jobs
and a limitation to simple, routine tasks. See Cox v. Saul, 18-cv-2389, 2020 WL 9439356, at *19
(D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted in full sub nom.
Cox v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 178953 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2022).4
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Gregory also repeatedly suggests that the Commissioner has conceded several of Gregory’s
arguments by failing to address them in her brief, see Gregory’s Reply Br. at 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17,
23, Dkt. 18, but the Commissioner clearly defended the adequacy of the ALJ’s reasoning on each
issue Gregory mentions—whether Gregory met the requirements of Listings 1.02, 12.04, and
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion for Judgment of Reversal and grants
the Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. A separate order consistent with this decision
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
October 12, 2022
12.06; the proper weight to give to Nwosu’s and Dr. Venkataraman’s testimony; and the RFC’s
incorporation of Gregory’s concentration limitations.
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