Jackson v. Donovan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Ronald Jackson, :
:
Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 11-1213 (CKK)
:
Shaun Donovan et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident of the James Apartments, filed this lawsuit
against Leonard Dixon, President of the James Apartment Resident Council (“JARC”), and other
individuals who have since been dismissed.1 See generally Mem. Op. (Feb. 23, 2012) [Doc. #
48]. As previously noted, the amended complaint [Doc. # 8] is difficult to follow but plaintiff,
proceeding pro se, claims that defendants “denied [him] civil rights and privileges afforded an
up-to-par resident council.” Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff purports to assert claims under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985(3)
and 1986.2 Id. at 2. In addition, plaintiff claims that defendants have deprived him of the
“freedom of assembly, . . . to vote . . . of association . . . to participate . . . of movement . . . of
1
The James Apartments are managed by the District of Columbia Housing Authority
(“DCHA”). In addition to Dixon, Plaintiff sued HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan, DCHA
Executive Director Adrianne Todman, DCHA Director of Office of Resident Services Brenda
Redding, and Scott Haapala. The Court dismissed the complaint against Haapala because of
failed attempts to serve him with process, see Order (Dec. 20, 2011) [Doc. # 42], and dismissed
the complaint against Donovan, Todman and Redding on February 23, 2012. See Order (Feb. 23
2012) [Doc. # 47] (granting defendants’ motions to dismiss).
2
Although plaintiff invokes the APA, he is not challenging the final action of any agency
but particularly that of a federal agency subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 704.
privacy . . . to enjoy[,] [and] of choice.” Id. at 5. He seeks equitable relief and at least
$1,000,000 in monetary damages. Id. at 20-23.
In what remains of this action, Dixon moves to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Upon consideration of the motion, plaintiff’s opposition, and
Dixon’s reply, the Court will grant Dixon’s motion and dismiss the case.
BACKGROUND
In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Dixon violated his “Constitutionally
protected rights to procedural and substantive due process” by in essence ruling the JARC “by
fear.” Am Compl. at 8. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Dixon deprived him of his “rights and
privileges to function” as a JARC council member by “continuing to operate in renegade council
status . . . as a one man show with the help of the co-conspirators in this matter before the Court.”
Id. at 9. In his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff accuses Dixon of engaging
in a conspiracy. Specifically,
Plaintiff is alleging civil and criminal conspiracy against a combination of
federal and local defendants where the harms done had to occur from
agreement and willfulness between the offending parties across
administrations. The harms experienced by the plaintiff are a fixed election
which denied freedom of choice; the agreement to stonewall complaints which
denied freedom of expression; and all defendants acting in concert to funnel
federal monies to [Dixon] through the . . . JARC resident council while it did
not meet minimum standards as required by statute. Plaintiff asserts the acts
have been unlawful, and the methodology used to circumvent the statute meet
the standard for civil and criminal conspiracy.
Pl.’s Opp’n to Defendant Leonard Dixon’s Mot. to Dismiss Amended Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”)
2
[Doc. # 28] at 4.3 Plaintiff also accuses Dixon of winning elections “by fraud with [the] help of
named co-conspirators[,]” thereby depriving “plaintiff and fellow residents of their choice.” Id.
at 6.
DISCUSSION
Review Standard
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a), “in
order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests,’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Rule 12(b)(6) provides a vehicle for parties to challenge the sufficiency of a
complaint on the ground that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.
R. Civ P. 12(b)(6). When presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
district court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint.
Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, –– U.S. –––,
130 S. Ct. 2064 (2010). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff
must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A complaint that contains “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’
” will not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
3Because plaintiff’s opposition contains duplicate page numbers, the Court will cite the
page numbers assigned by the electronic docket.
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1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s claim of a criminal conspiracy fails because “18 U.S.C. § 241 is a criminal
statute that provides no basis for an individual to bring a private, civil action.” Alexander v.
Wash. Gas Light Co., 481 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D.D.C. 2006). Under District of Columbia law, a
“[c]ivil conspiracy is not an independent tort but only a means for establishing vicarious liability
for an underlying tort.” Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 334 (D.C. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 611 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“[C]ivil conspiracy is not in and of itself a civil wrong, giving an independent cause of
action.”). That is, like respondeat superior, civil conspiracy “is a theory of liability, not a separate
cause of action that demands its own count.” Baird v. Holway, 539 F. Supp. 2d 79, 91 (D.D.C.
2008); accord Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 3 n.2 (D.D.C.1996).
Plaintiff’s claims against Dixon fail for the following reasons. First, at best, plaintiff
alleges that Dixon conspired with others to conduct a fraudulent election but he has not “state[d]
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .”4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Even if he
4
Plaintiff does not question his “apparent election in 2011 to the position of Treasurer”
of JARC. Mem. Op. [Doc. # 48] at 2.
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had, this Court would lack original jurisdiction over the claim and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1367(c), would decline to entertain the claim under its supplemental jurisdiction.
Second, plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing that Dixon deprived him of rights
protected by the U.S. Constitution or federal law and, therefore, has stated no claim under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 because those statutes provide a remedy only for the
deprivation of federally protected rights. See Alexander, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (“There can be no
recovery under § 1985(3) absent a violation of a substantive federal right.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Mazloum v. District of Columbia, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“Since plaintiff's cover-up allegations fail to implicate a constitutional right, a conspiracy that
has as its purpose the very same non-cognizable cover-up also fails to state a legal claim” under §
1985(3).”) (citations omitted); see also Nelson v. Williams, 750 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 n.4 (D.D.C.
2010) (citing cases finding civil conspiracy claim factually insufficient). Furthermore,
§ 1983 applies only to “person[s] who [act] under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . or the District of Columbia,” i.e., state actors, which the
allegations against Dixon fail to establish, and plaintiff has not pleaded facts to satisfy the
pleading requirement of § 1985(3) “that the conspiracy was motivated by ‘racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” Mazloum, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 11 n. 5
(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Since § 1986 imposes liability
upon a person who “neglects or refuses” to prevent a wrong under § 1985, plaintiff’s § 1986
claim also fails.
Third, and most dispositive, plaintiff’s conclusory allegations against Dixon are the very
type of “naked assertions” the Supreme Court found incapable of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6)
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motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will
grant defendant Dixon’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). A separate, final Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
__________s/s__________________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
DATE: April 20, 2012 United States District Judge
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