La Réunion Aérienne v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jarmahiriya

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LA RÉUNION AÉRIENNE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 05-1932 (RCL)
SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN
ARAB JARMAHIRIYA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff La RÁunion AÁrienne, a French partnership representing the interests of a group
of insurance companies, brings this action against six high-ranking Libyan government officials
in their personal capacities (collectively, the “individual defendants”).1 Plaintiff seeks to recover
payments it made to compensate victims’ estates and families for losses arising from the
explosion of Union des Transports Aeriens Flight 722 on September 19, 1989. Before the Court
is the United States’ Supplemental Statement of Interest [Dkt. # 58], which, in essence, asks the
Court to reconsider the ruling that plaintiff’s claims could proceed against the individual
defendants in their personal capacities. Upon consideration of the United States’ Supplemental
Statement of Interest, the opposition thereto, and the record of the case, the Court concludes that
the pending claims against the individual defendants sued in their personal capacities should be
dismissed.
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Plaintiff’s claims against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the
Libyan External Security Organization, Muammar Qadhafi in his official capacity as Libya’s
head of state, and the six Libyan government officials in their official capacities were previously
dismissed. See Order of July 2, 2009 [Dkt. # 57] at 2.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2008, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act was signed into law. It was
enacted in order to “provide fair compensation to all nationals of the United States who have
terrorism-related claims against Libya through a comprehensive settlement of claims by such
nationals pursuant to an international agreement between the United States and Libya as a part of
restoring normal relations between Libya and the United States.” Pub. L. No. 110-301, § 3, 122
Stat. 2999, 2999 (2008). As part of that settlement, the Act eliminates private causes of action
against Libya and its officials. See id. § 5(a)(1)(B), 122 Stat. at 3000–01.
On August 14, 2008, shortly after the passage of the Act, Libya and the United States
signed an agreement to “terminate permanently all pending suits . . . and . . . preclude any future
suits” in the courts of the United States or Libya arising from terrorist acts that occurred prior to
June 30, 2006. See Claims Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, art. I (Aug. 14, 2008). The Claims Settlement
Agreement terminates all suits against either country “or its agencies or instrumentalities, or
against officials, employees, or agents thereof (whether such officials, employees, or agents are
sued in an official and/or personal capacity).” Id.
After the United States government received the necessary settlement funds, President
George W. Bush signed an Executive Order stating that “[c]laims of United States nationals
within the terms of Article I . . . are settled according to the terms of the Claims Settlement
Agreement.” Exec. Order No. 13,477, § 1 (2008). The Order further declares that “[n]o United
States national may assert or maintain any claim within the terms of Article I in any forum,
domestic or foreign, except under the procedures provided for by the Secretary of State” and that
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“[a]ny pending suit in any court . . . by United States nationals . . . coming within the terms of
Article I shall be terminated.” Id. § 1(a)(i– ii).
On April 21, 2009, the United States filed a “Statement of Interest” [Dkt. # 54] in this
case arguing that the Libyan Claims Resolution Act eliminated this Court’s jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claims. In light of the United States’ submission, the Honorable Henry H. Kennedy,
Jr. ordered plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction [Dkt. # 55]. Plaintiff filed its response [Dkt. # 56], contending that the Act
did not require the Court to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants in their personal
capacities. On July 2, 2009, Judge Kennedy dismissed the claims against the Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Libyan External Security Organization, and the individual
defendants in their official capacities, but agreed with plaintiff that the Act did not require
dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. See Order
of July 2, 2009 [Dkt. # 57]. The United States now asks for reconsideration of that ruling.2
II. ANALYSIS
The United States makes two arguments as to why this Court should dismiss plaintiff’s
claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. First, it argues, as it did in
its original Statement of Interest, that the terms of the Act deprive plaintiff of a cause of action
against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. With regard to that argument, the
Court stands by the ruling that the Act does not, by itself, require dismissal of these claims. See
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Although the United States’s Supplemental Statement of Interest is not titled as a
motion, it requests reconsideration of the order of July 2, 2009. Accordingly, the Court will treat
the United States’ filing as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e).
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Order of July 2, 2009.
Next, the United States contends that the Claims Settlement Agreement and the
Executive Order mandate dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants in their
personal capacities. It points to the terms of the Claims Settlement Agreement, which expressly
contemplates the settlement of claims against Libyan officials sued in their personal capacities.
See Claims Settlement Agreement, art. I (terminating all lawsuits against Libya “or against
officials, employees, or agents thereof (whether such officials, employees, or agents are sued in
an official and/or personal capacity)”) (emphasis added)); see also Exec. Order No. 13,477, § 1
(“All claims within the terms of Article I of the Claims Settlement Agreement . . . are settled.”).
In response, plaintiff argues, in effect, that the President did not have the power to settle such
claims without explicit congressional authorization. This objection is unavailing.
It is “‘indisputable’” that “‘the President’s control of foreign relations includes the
settlement of claims.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (quoting United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 240 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Roeder v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The authority of the President to settle
claims of American nationals through executive agreements is clear.”). Although most of the
cases establishing this power have involved claims against foreign governments, see, e.g.,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679–83 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
230 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1937), the Supreme Court has said
that its claims-settlement cases endorse “the making of executive agreements to settle civil
claims between American citizens and . . . foreign nationals.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
531 (2008); see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415–16 (upholding the settlement of claims against
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foreign corporations). This is a sensible interpretation of well-established doctrine, because
“[w]hile a sharp line between public and private acts works for many purposes in the domestic
law, insisting on the same line in defining the legitimate scope of the Executive’s international
negotiations would hamstring the President in settling international controversies.” Garamendi,
539 U.S. at 416. The Court must therefore reject plaintiff’s argument that the President lacked
the authority to settle claims against Libyan officials in their personal capacities.
The purpose of the Claims Settlement Agreement was to “further the process of
normalization of relations” between the United States and Libya. See Claims Settlement
Agreement at 1; see also Exec. Order No. 13,477 (same). The agreement therefore fell squarely
within the President’s foreign relations powers, and President Bush had the authority to settle the
claims of American nationals against Libya and its officials without any authorization from
Congress. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679 (noting the “longstanding practice of settling []
claims by executive agreement” when such claims are “sources of friction” between two
sovereigns); Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (upholding the President’s prerogative to settle claims where
such claims posed an “obstacle” to the “rehabilitation of relations between this country and
another nation”). He did so. This Court must therefore dismiss the present action.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because the Claims Settlement Agreement and the Executive Order operate to terminate
suits against Libya’s “officials, employees, [and] agents . . . sued in [their] . . . personal
capacity,” the Court must dismiss the claims against the individual defendants in their personal
capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate order accompanies this
memorandum.
Royce C. Lamberth
Chief Judge
United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
Date: December 14, 2011
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