Wilson v. Geithner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
FRANK H. WILSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 12-1605 (EGS)
)
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Frank H. Wilson, proceeding pro se, has filed a
complaint against eight Defendants: Timothy F. Geithner, the
former Secretary of the Treasury; the Office of the Inspector
General of the Department of the Treasury; John Boehner, Speaker
of the House of Representatives; Harry Reid, the Senate Majority
Leader; John Campbell, a Representative for the 48th
congressional district of California in the House of
Representatives; the U.S. Attorney; the U.S. Attorney General;
and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. Although it
is difficult to discern the precise claims in his complaint, Mr.
Wilson seeks $7,000,000, plus punitive damages and injunctive
relief, for events concerning the Freedman’s Savings Bank and
Trust Company (“Freedman’s Savings Bank” or “Bank”), all of
which allegedly took place in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
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Mr. Wilson implies in his complaint that he is the heir of a
depositor of the Bank and that he is owed dividends that were
declared between 1873 and 1883 after the bank collapsed and its
liquidated assets were held by the U.S. Treasury. See Compl. ¶¶
3-4; id. Ex. A (Abby L. Gilbert, The Comptroller of Currency and
the Freedman’s Savings Bank, 57 J. of Negro Hist. 2, Apr. 1972
at 132). Plaintiff does not specify how any of the defendants
are responsible for the purported losses of his ancestors. Mr.
Wilson alleges that the actions of the federal government, and
presumably the federal defendants listed in his complaint,
violated his constitutional and statutory rights, and purports
to be bringing claims pursuant to the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Pending before the Court are Motions to Dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by
seven of the Defendants as well as several miscellaneous motions
filed by Mr. Wilson. Upon consideration of the motions,
Plaintiff’s oppositions and other submissions to the Court, the
applicable law, and the record as a whole, the Court grants
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Additionally, because Mr.
Wilson’s claims are frivolous, the Court dismisses this action
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against Harry Reid, the only defendant who has not responded,
sua sponte.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
A federal district court may only hear a claim over which
is has subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court’s
jurisdiction. On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the Court has jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In evaluating the motion, the Court
must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and give the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that
can be drawn from the facts alleged. See Thomas v. Principi,
394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
However, the Court is “not required to . . . accept inferences
unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are
cast as factual allegations.” Cartwright Int’l Van Lines, Inc.
v. Doan, 525 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d
235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In order to be viable, a complaint
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must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff
need not plead all of the elements of a prima facie case in the
complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14
(2002), nor must the plaintiff plead facts or law that match
every element of a legal theory. Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d
134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
However, despite these liberal pleading standards, to
survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. A claim is facially plausible when
the facts pled in the complaint allow the Court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). While this standard does not amount to a
“probability requirement,” it does require more than a “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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“[W]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss, a judge must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672,
681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007)). The court must also give the plaintiff “the benefit
of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”
Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1994). Nevertheless, a court need not “accept inferences drawn
by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts
set out in the complaint. Id. Further, “[t]hreadbare recitals
of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” are not sufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949. Although a pro se complaint “must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), it too “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’”
Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681-82.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
Article III restricts the power of federal courts to the
adjudication of actual “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984). “In order to establish the existence of a case or
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controversy within the meaning of Article III, [a] party must
meet certain constitutional minima,” including a “requirement
that the party must demonstrate that it has standing to bring
the action.” Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir.
2002). To establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of
standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things: (1)
“injury in fact,” which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent; (2) that there is a causal connection
between the complained of conduct and the injury alleged that is
fairly traceable to the defendant; and (3) that it is likely,
and not merely speculative, that a favorable decision will serve
to redress the injury alleged. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where, as
here, a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief,
allegations of past harm alone are insufficient. See, e.g.,
Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Rather, a
plaintiff seeking declarative or injunctive relief “must show he
is suffering an ongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of
injury.” Id.To demonstrate an injury in fact, “a prospective plaintiff
must show that [he] has suffered a concrete and particularized
injury in order to convince the court that [he] is sufficiently
involved in the current legal dispute to have a defined and
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.” Florida
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Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
The plaintiff must “show that [he] personally ha[s] been
injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,
unidentified members of the class to which [he] belong[s].”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
Mr. Wilson has failed to show that he has suffered the type
of concrete and particularized injury sufficient to confer
Article III standing. He has not alleged that he had an account
at the Freedman’s Savings Bank, nor could he, as the bank closed
in July 1874. See Compl., Ex. A (Abby L. Gilbert, The
Comptroller of Currency and the Freedman’s Savings Bank, 57 J.
of Negro Hist. 2, Apr. 1972 at 131). In one of his oppositions
to defendants’ motions to dismiss, Mr. Wilson claims that Jack
Wilson and Virginia Henry are his grandparents, but provides no
support for this claim except a purported Pedigree Chart
prepared in November 2009 by “Lineages, Inc.” See Compl., Ex.
C. at 1. Even if the Court accepts Mr. Wilson’s representation,
he still cannot establish standing because according to his own
evidence, his grandparents were both born after the Freedman’s
Savings Bank had already collapsed. See id. (stating that Jack
Wilson was born on March 22, 1876 and Virginia Henry was born on
March 1, 1887). He provides information regarding individuals
with the surnames “Henry” and “Ely” who had accounts at the
Bank, who were related to his grandparents, but fails to
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establish that he is entitled to the dividend payments from
their accounts if funds were available. See generally Compl.,
Ex. C. As far as the Court can discern, Mr. Wilson’s injury is
that his ancestors were harmed, which is not a cognizable injury
for the purposes of Article III standing. See Warth, 422 U.S.
at 502.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if Mr. Wilson had standing, his complaint would fail
because it plainly fails to state a claim. Mr. Wilson’s
complaint is comprised entirely of direct quotations from the
United States Constitution and various federal statutes. He
offers no factual allegations whatsoever to support his claims.
Plaintiff does not mention any defendant in the body of his
complaint; they are named only in the caption. And, he in no
way links any of the quoted constitutional and statutory
language to any defendant. Moreover, Mr. Wilson does not even
set forth the elements of any cause of action he seeks to
assert. The fact that the Freedman’s Savings Bank collapsed in
1874, and that some people lost money as a result, does not
entitle Mr. Wilson to any relief. Because the complaint fails
to provide notice of the basis of his claim or the grounds upon
which it rests, Mr. Wilson has not, as a matter of law, stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
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C. Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Motions
Plaintiff filed several motions for leave to file
additional information during the pendency of this action, all
of which contain direct quotations from the Constitution or
federal statutes. See ECF No. 10, Motion for Leave to File add
more information; ECF No. 14, Motion for Order to add more
information; and ECF No. 15, Motion for more information. It is
unclear to the Court what relief Plaintiff seeks in these
motions; therefore, the Court will treat them as motions to
amend his complaint. “[T]he grant or denial of leave to amend
is committed to a district court’s discretion.” Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While leave to
amend should be freely granted where justice so requires, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the Court may deny a motion for leave
to amend if such amendment would be futile. James Madison Ltd.
by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “An
amended complaint would be futile if it merely restates the same
facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a
claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a
legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.
2002) (internal citations omitted). Mr. Wilson’s amendments to
his complaint are futile and would fail for the same reason that
his complaint fails; therefore, his motions are denied.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motions
for leave to file amendments to his complaint. An appropriate
order accompanies the Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
September 28, 2013
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