Wood v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TARCHA WOOD, as parent and guardian of the
minor child, D.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 13-00769
DAR
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs bring this action to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in administrative
proceedings conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Complaint (“Complaint”) (Document No. 1). Pending for determination
by the undersigned are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 10) and
Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 14). Upon consideration of
the motions, the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto (Document Nos. 13, 15,
16, 18) , and the entire record herein, the undersigned will grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part, and
deny Defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are Tarcha Wood, the parent of D.W., and D.W., a minor child residing in the
District of Columbia who is eligible for special education services. Plaintiff Wood, on behalf of
her minor child, through counsel, filed an administrative due process complaint notice on
October 16, 2012, in which she alleged that District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”)
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 2
denied D.W. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by its failure (1) to provide a special
education placement from April 2010 to the date of the notice; (2) to ensure the parent’s
participation in the April 10, 2012 IEP meeting and failing to develop an appropriate IEP; (3) to
develop an appropriate IEP on May 30, 2012; and (4) to evaluate D.W. in all areas of suspected
disabilities and at the request of parent and school staff. See Administrative Due Process
Complaint Notice (Document No. 10-8) at 11-12.
On November 20 and November 27, 2012, a pre-hearing conference was conducted. The
hearing officer, at the pre-hearing conference, certified these claims. Hearing Officer’s
Determination (“HOD”) (Document No. 10-2) at 4. However, following the conference,
Plaintiff Wood withdrew her claims of compensatory education as a remedy for denial of a
FAPE, and the inappropriate goals in the May 30, 2012 IEP; that DCPS failed to take necessary
steps to allow parent’s participation in the April 10, 2012 IEP meeting, and amended her claim
with respect to DCPS’ evaluation of D.W. seeking vision assessment. Id.
The hearing officer ultimately found in favor of Plaintiff with respect to the claims that
DCPS denied D.W. a FAPE: by failing to comprehensively evaluate D.W. in May 2012; by
failing to conduct physical therapy, audiological, vision, and assistive technology assessments;
failing to determine how D.W. could receive education in light of physical disabilities and the
bullying and harassment of which Plaintiff voiced her complaints; failing to determine the
psychological effects of bullying and harassment on D.W.; and failing to provide appropriate
homebound services for D.W. from November 2010 to March 2012. HOD (Document No. 10-2)
at 20-21. However, the hearing officer found in favor of DCPS with respect to the claims that
Plaintiff “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [D.W.] needs 30 minutes of
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 3
speech and language services per week; that D.W. “would be vulnerable to inordinate regression
due to a summer break or that it would take an inordinate amount of time for [D.W.] to recoup
learning lost during the summer break[ ]”; “claims prior to November, 2010, for failure to
provide homebound services are barred by the statute of limitations[.]” HOD (Document No. 10-
2) at 21.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
$59,885.25.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiffs were represented by Carolyn Houck, Esq. and Michelle Kotler, Esq. during the
administrative proceedings. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 7. Following the hearing officer
determination, counsel for Plaintiffs submitted an invoice to Defendant, seeking $59,725.50 in
attorneys’ fees and $159.75 in costs for a total amount of $59,885.25. See Plaintiffs’
Memorandum, Exhibit 10-3 at 2. Ms. Houck and Ms. Kotler billed at an hourly rate of $435 for
services rendered from June 15, 2012 through April 27, 2013. Id.
Plaintiffs aver that they are the prevailing parties, and that they have “establish[ed] a
prima facie case that their requested award [for attorneys’ fees and costs] is reasonable.”
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 7. Plaintiffs submit that they have met their burden of demonstrating
the reasonableness of their requested attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs contend that the hourly
rates of their counsel are reasonable because they are based on the “customary rate” as set forth
in the Laffey Matrix “utilized by” some of the judges of this court.1 Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs further
1
The Laffey Matrix is “a schedule of charges based on years of experience developed in Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 [] (1985).” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (footnote
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 4
contend that due to the “novel” “issue of bullying as a denial of FAPE[,]” as one issue that has
not been presented in “due process hearings in D.C.,” counsel was “required” to conduct
“extensive research in order to make the legal argument” before the hearing officer. Id. at 6-7.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that counsel “billed only for the hours spent developing and pursuing the
due process claim and assisting in implementing the HOD once it was issued.” Id. at 8.
Defendant seemingly concedes that Plaintiffs were prevailing parties in the underlying
administrative proceeding. In opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion and in support of its cross-motion,
Defendant relies on decisions of judges of this court awarding three-fourths of the Laffey rates or
less in IDEA cases, and an administrative order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
setting an hourly rate of $90 an hour for appointed attorneys “litigating IDEA cases on the
administrative level,” in support of its argument that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs are
unreasonable. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Memorandum”) (Document Nos. 13, 14) at 2, 6-8.
With respect to “Plaintiffs’ contentions that his matter was ‘novel[,]’” Defendant contends that
“Plaintiffs have not substantiated that the IDEA dispute in this HOD is an any way more
complicated than the claims generally made by parents in these cases, entitling their counsel to
Laffey rates.” Id. at 7. (footnote omitted). Defendant challenges the rates requested by Plaintiffs
for Ms. Houck and Ms. Kotler at $435 per hour because they “have not demonstrated that they
are entitled” to this rate for this matter. Id. at 8-9. Specifically, Defendant argues that Ms.
Houck with 15 years of “Federal litigation experience” and Ms. Kotler with only one to three
years of “Federal litigation experience,” are “at most” a more “appropriate hourly rate” of three-
omitted). The Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia updates and
maintains a Laffey Matrix, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey_Matrix 2014.pdf.
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 5
quarters of the Laffey rate at $337.75 per hour and $183.75 per hour, respectively, “for the
Federal action.” Id.
Plaintiffs submit that the underlying administrative proceedings were sufficiently
complex to warrant full Laffey rates. Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”) (Document Nos. 15, 16) at 3-4.
Plaintiffs state that “counsel were required to have knowledge of the psychological and academic
issues involved in each minor Plaintiff’s disabilities, understand the procedural rules and
substantive legal issues, and . . . have the ability to present all of this information in a cohesive
and logical manner, including submitting a 31-page written closing brief.” Id. at 3. With respect
to the reasonableness of the requested rate, Plaintiffs argue that “counsels’ charges are
commensurate with those prevailing in the community” and that the “requested hourly rate of
$435/hour reflects . . . counsel’s [Ms. Houck’s] vast experience gained over the course of
representing hundreds of clients in more than 1500 special education cases since 1997.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs further argue that as to Ms. Kotler, “Defendant refuses to acknowledge [her]
experience[]” namely that she “has practiced special education law exclusively since 2001 and
obtained a masters degree in special education[,]” and that she is “well-versed in identifying
symptoms of previously ignored disabilities in her clients, and has accurately referred students
for evaluations that have uncovered seizure disorders, significant vision impairments, and even
profound deafness, that were previously missed by other service providers.” Id. at 5, 9-12.
Defendant, in its reply, maintains that Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence that
the fees requested are reasonable. Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 6
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Reply”) at 1. Defendant further maintains
that “Plaintiffs have given no indication of a market rate, other than an affidavit from the founder
of her law firm that essentially declares ‘this is the market rate.’” Id. at 2-3. Defendant submits
that it has “duty to protect public funds” and it would “violate the public trust by simply paying
invoices without questioning the legal sufficiency thereof.” Id. at 7.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Request for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to the IDEA
In actions for attorneys’ fees that are brought pursuant to the IDEA, “the court, in its
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to the prevailing party. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). In evaluating such a request for attorneys’ fees, the court must first
determine “whether the party seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party,” and if so, the court
must then evaluate whether the requested fees are reasonable. Staton ex rel. Staton v. Dist. of
Columbia, No. 13-773, 2014 WL 2700894, at *3 (D.D.C. June 11, 2014); Douglas v. Dist. of
Columbia, No. 13-1758, 2014 WL 4359192, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2014); see also Jackson v.
Dist. of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted). The traditional
summary judgment standard is not applicable to the parties’ motions, although they are
captioned as motions for summary judgment. See Gardill v. Dist. of Columbia, 930 F. Supp. 2d
35, 37 n.1 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Although the plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees in a motion for summary
judgment, the typical summary judgment standard is inapplicable here . . . .”); Parks v. Dist. of
Columbia, 895 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2012) (citations omitted) (“The IDEA authorizes a
court to award fees ‘in its discretion’ and to base the award on ‘rates prevailing in the
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 7
community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services
furnished.’) (citations omitted).
The “most useful starting point” for the determination of a reasonable award is generally
“the number of hours reasonably expended” multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The party
requesting fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours expended, and
“may satisfy this burden by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit the
District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are
justified.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The party requesting fees “also bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the
hourly rate sought,” and in doing so, “must submit evidence on at least three fronts: the
attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.” Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re
North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107
(D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 13-1006, 2014
WL 3702853, at *3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2014). If the party requesting fees satisfies its burden,
“there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are reasonable,” and
“the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut” this presumption. Id. (citations omitted)
(quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
It appears that Defendant does not dispute Plaintiffs’ status as a prevailing party, but
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 8
instead, challenges the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates, and the costs incurred.2
However, the undersigned will discuss in greater detail Plaintiffs’ assertion of their status as
prevailing parties and the effect of their status for not being successful on all issues they
presented at the due process hearing. Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether the fees
Plaintiffs seek are reasonable after obtaining partial success of their claims during the
administrative proceedings.
Reasonableness of hourly rates
The statute provides that fees “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in
which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(C). Judges of this court have adopted varying approaches to determining the
prevailing market rate for attorneys’ fees in IDEA actions. “While some judges of this court
have applied the full Laffey rates in IDEA cases, others, including the undersigned, have applied
a rate equal to three-fourths of the Laffey Matrix rate . . . where the underlying administrative
proceedings did not involve particularly complex matters.” Haywood v. Dist. of Columbia, No.
12-1722, 2013 WL 5211437, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013) (citations omitted); see Gardill v.
Dist. of Columbia, 930 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted) (“Some courts find
that the Laffey rate is presumptively reasonable . . . . Other courts treat the Laffey Matrix as
providing ‘the highest rates that will be presumed to be reasonable when a court reviews a
petition for statutory attorneys’ fees’ . . . [and] impose lower rates where ‘the defendant shows
that the proceedings for which compensation is sought were straightforward or otherwise not
2
The total amount Plaintiffs seek is $59,885.25, of which $159.75 is attributed to costs. See Plaintiffs’
Memorandum, Exhibit 10-4 at 2. Defendant does not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for costs; thus, the request for costs
will be treated as conceded.
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 9
demanding of counsel’s skills and experience.’”).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that their requested hourly rates of $435 for Ms. Houck and Ms.
Kotler are reasonable based upon their billing practices which have “been detailed and recorded
in either the billing software program ‘Timeslips’ or, . . . the software provided by DCPS”; their
years of experience and training and practice in special education law; and the “prevailing
market rates in the District of Columbia special education community, as determined by several
judges of this Court[.]” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 4-5, 7. Defendant opposes any award of fees
at the requested rates sought by Plaintiffs as unreasonable. More specifically, Defendant
contends that “Laffey rates are not presumptively appropriate[,]” and that Plaintiffs’ “reference
to them does not render lower rates per se reasonable.” Defendant’s Opposition at 6.
Additionally, Defendant contends that most of the proceedings addressed “the same run-of-the
mill issues common to IDEA matters, including proper placement decisions, parental
participation in meetings, and development of an appropriate IEP.” Defendant’s Opposition at 8.
Finally, Defendant submits that “Plaintiffs’ analysis about the prevailing rate in the community
also disregards the District of Columbia Superior Court’s determination that an appropriate
hourly rate for appointed attorneys providing legal representation in special education matters is
$90/hour.” Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiffs explain in great detail in their reply that due to Ms. Kotler’s education and
experience in special education law as an attorney and her experience in special education
research, publications, and awards, Laffey rates at $435 for her are warranted. Plaintiffs’ Reply
to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 10
(“Plaintiffs’ Reply”) at 5-12, Sworn Declaration of Michelle Kotler, Esq. (Document No. 15-3)
at 2. Plaintiffs also reiterate that Ms. Houck’s “requested hourly rate of $435/hour reflects [her]
vast experience gained over the course of representing hundreds of clients in more than 1500
special education cases since 1997[ ]” is “reasonable.” Plaintiffs’ Reply at 4.
Determining complexity in IDEA cases and the issue of bullying and harassment as
“novel” to warrant full Laffey rates
In making such a determination, “‘[d]ecisions from this Circuit have identified a number
of indicia of complexity, such as (1) the length of the administrative hearing; (2) the number of
documents and witnesses presented at the administrative hearing; (3) the amount of discovery
required; (4) the presence of novel legal issues; (5) the quantity of briefing required; and (6) the
use of expert testimony.’” Gardill, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Dist. of Columbia,
908 F. Supp. 2d 233, 247 (D.D.C. 2012)).
During the pre-hearing conferences, Plaintiffs contend that a complex issue was raised by
Plaintiffs of whether Defendant denied D.W. a FAPE by allowing bullying and harassment in
violation of IDEA. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 6-7, HOD (Document No. 10-10) at 4-7. The
hearing officer acknowledged that “allowing bullying and harassment of a disabled student can
violate IDEA, courts have not set forth a legal theory through which to analyze bullying and
harassment claims.” Id. at 4-5.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions that this issue was a “novel” issue, the hearing officer
determined that “a better legal theory through which to analyze the [Plaintiff’s] claims” “were
not presented at the pre[-]hearing conference”, and therefore, the hearing officer would not
analyze the Plaintiffs’ claims on the theory of an inappropriate placement or failure to implement
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 11
claim. Id.
A judge (Koller-Kotelly J.) of this court, in a recent opinion, addressed the same issue
and noted that neither the D.C. Circuit nor judges of this court have developed jurisprudence
with respect to this issue: “This jurisdiction has not addressed the issue of whether bullying may
be a basis for finding a violation of the IDEA and a denial of a FAPE. Four other circuits have
addressed this issue, however, a common framework under which to analyze the issue has not
emerged.” S.S. ex rel. Street v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 13-557, 2014 WL 4650885, at *8
(D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2014) (footnote omitted); T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Ed., 779 F. Supp. 2d
298, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). “Of the circuits that have developed a test for analyzing bullying
claims, the Ninth Circuit asks ‘whether a teacher was deliberately indifferent to bullying and the
abuse so severe that a child can derive no educational benefit.’” Id. (Citing T.K., 779 F. Supp.
2d at 312) (emphasis in original). “The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York has derived another test: ‘whether school personnel was deliberately indifferent to, or
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent bullying that substantially restricted a child with
learning disabilities in her educational opportunities.’” Id. (Citing T.K., 779 F. Supp. 2d at 316).
During the due process hearing the hearing officer pointed to counsel’s inability to
precisely present the “nature of [Plaintiff’s] claim” because a “number of issues were
tangentially touched upon in the [due process] complaint, and a number of legal theories under
which [Plaintiff] could have brought her claims against [DCPS]. However, in two prehearing
conferences, the [hearing officer] specifically requested and ordered [Plaintiffs] to state the
issues for the hearing with particularity and clarify the legal theories under which [Plaintiffs]
were bringing their complaint against [DCPS].” HOD (Document No. 10-2) at 4. The
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 12
undersigned finds and agrees with the Defendant that the Hearing Officer’s focus was not on the
issue of bullying but rather the affect of bullying on D.W.’s safety. Specifically, the Hearing
Officer determined that “[DCPS] failed to comprehensively evaluate [D.W.] by failing to
determine how [D.W.] could be safely educated in light of her physical disabilities and the
bullying and harassment of which [Plaintiff] had repeatedly complained,” and he also determined
that “[DCPS] failed to determined [D.W.’s] educational need for safety in failing to determine
how bullying affected [D.W.’s] safety.” HOD at 20.
Prevailing Rates
“Section 1415(i)(3)(C) of IDEA provides that hourly rates “shall be based on rates
prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of
services furnished.” In this jurisdiction, the commonly accepted benchmark for prevailing market
rates for attorneys’ fees in complex federal court litigation comes from the Laffey Matrix, which
were first established in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1983), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir.1984), modified by Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc); Capital City
Pub. Charter Sch. v. Gambale, No. 13-253, 2014 WL 1100366, at *15 (D.D. C. Mar. 20, 2014);
Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (collecting cases and finding that
“numerous judges in this district have applied Laffey rates in the context of fee awards arising
out of IDEA administrative proceedings”), appeal dismissed, No. 10–7050, 2010 WL 2574191
(D.C. Cir. June 2, 2010).
“The prevailing market rate provides merely a starting point for determining the
reasonableness of a billing rate . . . . The fee applicant should also submit evidence, including
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 13
affidavits, regarding her counsel’s general billing practices, skill, experience and reputation.”
Baker v. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Sch., 815 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Counsel for Plaintiffs represents that
their work “is to be valued at a rate that reflects the customary fee for similarly complex work
and the experience, reputation, and ability of the individual attorney[,]” and that “an attorney
with the extensive experience of [counsel in this matter], the prevailing market rate according to
the USAO Laffey Matrix” is $445 an hour.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 4; see also Clay v. Dist.
of Columbia, No. 09-1612, 2014 WL 322017, at *6 n.5 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2014) (citations
omitted) (“Plaintiffs failed to submit evidence of their counsel’s actual billing rates.”). However,
Plaintiffs also represent that “the requested hourly rate of $435/hour reflects . . . counsel’s vast
experience gained over the course of representing hundreds of clients in more than 1500 special
education cases since 1997.” Id.
In support of Plaintiffs’ request, counsel submitted declarations in which they described
their skill, experience, reputation, and billing practices in detail. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum
(Document No. 10-6) at 2-3, (Document No. 10-13) at 2-4. Ms. Houck avers that the “sole area
of [her] practice since 1997 has been special education law, representing parents.” Plaintiffs’
Memorandum (Document No. 10-6) at 2. She was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1997, and the
District of Columbia bar in 1998. Id. Ms. Kotler avers that the “sole area of [her] practice since
2001 has been special education law, representing parents.” Id. Document No. 10-13 at 2. She
was admitted to the Maryland bar in 2001, and the District of Columbia bar in 2012. Id. Their
requested hourly rate is equal to the 2012-2013 Laffey Matrix rate for an attorney with eleven to
nineteen years of experience. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum (Document No. 10-7) at 2.
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 14
Defendant raises a number of arguments that the court has previously determined to be
without merit. First, the undersigned has rejected Defendant’s contention that counsel’s hourly
rate should be calculated according to years of federal litigation experience. Defendant’s Reply
to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s
Reply”) at 3. See Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *5. Moreover, judges of this court, including the
undersigned, have found Defendant’s reliance on the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia’s $90 rate for appointed attorneys in family court unpersuasive. See id. at *6 (citing
Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, 999 F. Supp. 2d 137, 157 n.9 (D.D.C. 2013)). In any event, although
Defendant avers that $333.75 and $183.75 are appropriate hourly rates for work performed by
Ms. Houck and Ms. Kotler in this “Federal action” and that $90 is an appropriate hourly rate for
“attorneys litigating IDEA cases on the a administrative level,” see Defendant’s Memorandum at
8-9, Plaintiffs’ current fee request reflects work performed at the administrative level and for
fees incurred in this action. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 9. (Plaintiffs also seek attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in bringing this action).
Prevailing Party Status
In determining whether a party is the “prevailing party,” the D.C. Circuit has interpreted
Buchannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600
(2001) as requiring a three part test: “(1) there must be a court-ordered change in the legal
relationship of the parties; (2) the judgment must be in favor of the party seeking the fees; and
(3) the judicial pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief.” Robinson ex rel.
Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 13-1006, 2014 WL 3702853, at *3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2014);
Green Aviation Mgmt. Co. LLC v. FAA, 676 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 15
“This ‘prevailing party’ test applies generally to federal attorneys’ fee-shifting statutes, including
the IDEA.” Robinson, 2014 WL 3702853, at *3; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Straus, 590 F.3d
898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying three-part test to IDEA case).
“Determining the reasonable attorneys’ fees to which a prevailing party is entitled entails
a three-part analysis: “(1) determination of the number of hours reasonably expanded [sic] in
litigation; (2) determination of a reasonable hourly rate or ‘lodestar’; and (3) the use of
multipliers as merited.” Robinson, 2014 WL 3702853, at *3 (citing Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“SOCM”) (citation omitted).
“Thus, in IDEA attorneys’ fees cases, the party seeking fees must show she is a prevailing party
entitled to an award, and the SOCM test to show the reasonableness of the hours expended and
the hourly billing rate.” Robinson, 2014 WL 3702853, at *3.
Partial Success
“The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry,” as the
court can “adjust” the fee award based on the “results obtained.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 434 (1983). Consideration of the “results obtained” is “particularly crucial where a plaintiff
is deemed ‘prevailing’ even though he succeed on only some of his claims for relief.” Id.; see
also Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989). In
determining whether a reduction is necessary to account for the degree of success, courts must
exercise discretion, as “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. “[T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained,” and “[a]
reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 436, 440.
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 16
Plaintiffs claim to have prevailed as to each of the issues presented in the due process
complaint but the Hearing Officer ruled against Plaintiff as to three of the issues:
The undersigned finds that Parent did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Student needs 30 minutes of
speech and language services per week.
The undersigned finds that Parent did not provide by a
preponderance of the evidence that Student needs ESY to obtain
FAPE. Specifically, the undersigned finds that Parent did not provide
that Student would be vulnerable to inordinate regression due to a
summer break or that it would take an inordinate amount of time for
Student to recoup learning lost during the summer break.
The undersigned finds that the District denied Student FAPE
by failing to provide appropriate homebound services from
November, 2010, to March, 2012. The undersigned finds that claims
prior to November, 2010, for failure to provide homebound services
are barred by the statute of limitations, and that there is no equitable
or statutory reason to toll the statute of limitations.
HOD (Document No. 10-2) at 21.
The undersigned notes that two findings were adverse to Plaintiffs, so Plaintiffs did not
entirely prevail; and that as to the third finding, those claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Plaintiffs aver to an offer of settlement in their complaint but rejected the offer
because the offer was significantly lower than the invoiced amount. Defendant, on the other
hand, conceded this issue by not providing a response.
Upon review of the administrative record, there is no evidence that the issues before the
Hearing Officer were complex. Plaintiffs pled four claims in a 12-page due process complaint,
and the claims were heard during two days of hearings in which Plaintiffs called seven
witnesses, four of whom were experts, and the Defendant called two witnesses. See Plaintiffs’
Memorandum at 6, Document No. 10-2 at 2. During the due process hearing, testimony was
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 17
elicited from Plaintiff with respect to D.W.’s disability; from a psychologist regarding D.W.’s
cognitive and physical disabilities; verbal harassment and bullying D.W. experienced at various
District public schools; inadequate assessments and evaluations that failed to address “aspects of
[D.W.’s] medical fraility” that needed accommodation in order to protect D.W.’s “physical
safety”; facts related to D.W.’s special education and related services; and location of services
and placement. HOD at 5-13.
The undersigned acknowledges that Plaintiffs may have spent a significant amount of
time researching the relevant case law in crafting a plausible legal theory that was rejected by the
hearing officer, and notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertion that this matter was “novel” and
involved a complex issue of bullying, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
sufficient complexity of the underlying administrative proceedings such that full Laffey rates are
justified. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 2-8, HOD (Document No. 10-2) at 4-5; Plaintiffs’
Reply at 3. The undersigned concludes that this is a routine IDEA matter. Therefore, this action
do not justify the full Laffey rates for counsel because the issues were not sufficiently complex
and that Plaintiffs did not prevail in all of the claims presented at the due process hearing. See
Gardill, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 43; McLam v. Dist. of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (D.D.C.
2011); Cox v. Dist. of Columbia, 754 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75-76 (D.D.C. 2010). Accordingly, the
Court will award attorneys’ fees at three-fourths of the Laffey rates to Plaintiffs at the hourly rate
of $326.25 for Ms. Houck and Ms. Kotler in the amount of $44,794.12, plus costs in the amount
of $159.75 for a total award of $44,953.87.
CONCLUSION
For the reason set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No.
W ood, et al. v. District of Columbia 18
10) will be granted in part, and Defendant District of Columbia’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment (Document No. 14) will be denied by order filed contemporaneously herewith.
/s/
DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge
October 27, 2014