Gavin v. Prudential Office of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Company, Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
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PATRICIA GAVIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 14-730 (EGS)
)
PRUDENTIAL OFFICE OF )
SERVICEMEN’S GRP. LIFE )
INS. CO., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Patricia Gavin has filed a Complaint
against six defendants: Prudential Life Insurance Company’s
Office of Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance; the estate of her
former spouse, decedent Lt. Col. Christopher Edward Gavin; and
four alleged beneficiaries to the decedent’s life insurance
policy—Christopher Patrick Gavin, Katherine Gavin, Laura Pate as
conservator for Tyler Davis, and Markana Davis. Pending before
the Court is defendant Prudential’s motion to dismiss, or
alternatively for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the
motion, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law,
and the record as a whole, Prudential’s motion to dismiss the
Complaint is GRANTED as to all defendants for the following
reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2012, Lt. Col. Gavin (the decedent) and his wife,
Tamara Gavin, were found dead in their Louisiana home. Compl.,
ECF No. 1, at 1. Plaintiff is Lt. Col. Gavin’s ex-wife. Id.
Although it is difficult to discern the precise claims from her
Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege she is being defrauded
out of certain life insurance benefits stemming from her ex-
husband’s death. Id. ¶¶ 1–5. Ms. Gavin offers several assertions
of fraud in her Complaint, including that Tamara Gavin and
Tamara’s mother forged a waiver of survivor benefits in order to
profit from Lt. Col. Gavin’s death. Id. ¶ 3. Ms. Gavin also
alleges Tamara Gavin attempted to murder Lt. Col. Gavin in March
2012 after blackmailing him regarding Plaintiff’s identity
theft. Id. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff seeks relief from the Court on the theory that
the defendant beneficiaries are the parties perpetrating the
fraud she describes. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. Ms. Gavin does not appear to
claim to be a beneficiary of the life insurance policy. See
generally id. The Complaint does not specify which particular
beneficiaries are responsible for which conduct, but claims that
through “the criminal actions of beneficiaries” and others, her
identity was stolen and her livelihood was obstructed. Id. ¶¶ 3–
10. For relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to stop distribution of
the life insurance funds, to attach the funds for the alleged
2
fraud, and to award damages for her emotional stress and loss of
income. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12.
A. The Policy
The decedent Lt. Col. Gavin appears to have been an active
service member of the U.S. Air Force. Id. As such, he was
enrolled in the Servicemember’s Group Life Insurance Policy
(“SGLI” or “the Policy”), which is issued by Prudential to the
Department of Veterans Affairs. Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss (“MTD Mem.”), ECF No. 15-1, at 1. This Policy appears to
be the only life insurance policy at issue in this case.1
Death benefits under the Policy are paid out according to
statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970. The priority beneficiary paid
under the statute is a person, or set of persons, designated by
the insured and alive at the time of the insured’s death. 38
U.S.C. § 1970(a). If there is no such living beneficiary, the
widow or widower of the insured receives the benefits. Id. If
there is no living widow or widower, the insured’s children (or
those children’s offspring, if any of the insured’s children are
deceased) receive the benefits. Id. If no such children exist,
the parents of the insured receive the benefits. Id. If the
1
Prudential notes in its motion to dismiss that Tamara Gavin was
covered under a separate life insurance policy for family
members of a serviceperson. MTD Mem. at 4 n.1. As Ms. Gavin
would not qualify as a beneficiary to Tamara’s life insurance
policy, and has not pleaded otherwise, the Court need not
discuss that policy further.
3
insured has no beneficiary, widow or widower, children, or
living parents, the executor of the insured’s estate receives
the benefits. Id. Finally, if none of these parties exists or is
living, the insured’s next of kin receives the benefit under the
laws of domicile where the insured was living when he died. Id.
In addition to identifying the contingent beneficiaries who
can receive Policy benefits, the statute also limits who cannot
receive benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(g) proscribes taxation of
Policy payments, and creditors may not make claims to the
benefits. Congress also expressly prohibited “attachment, levy,
or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever,
either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.” Id.
Payments of Policy benefits are also limited by the so-
called “Slayer Rule.” 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e)(2) explains a person
may not receive Policy benefits if he or she is found through a
criminal or civil proceeding to have intentionally and
wrongfully killed the decedent, or to have assisted in the
killing. 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e)(2)(i)–(ii). In addition, such a
convicted person’s family members are barred from receiving SGLI
benefits unless those family members are blood, marriage, or
adoptive relatives of the decedent. 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e)(2)(iii).
In short, the regulation codifies the “principle that no person
shall be permitted to benefit from the consequences of his or
her wrongdoing” by disqualifying murderers and their families
4
from inheriting from their victims through a life insurance
policy. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. V. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475–
76 (7th Cir. 1999).
B. The Motion to Dismiss
Prudential moves to dismiss the Complaint. Prudential
argues Ms. Gavin has no standing to challenge the disbursement
of Policy payments, or to attach the payments. MTD Mem. at 1–2.
Prudential claims Ms. Gavin has failed to allege she was a named
beneficiary to the proceeds, nor has she claimed to be a
beneficiary under the statutory order of beneficiary precedence
under § 1970(a). Id. at 9–10. Accordingly, Prudential concludes,
Ms. Gavin lacks standing to sue and fails to state a claim. Id.
at 6–10. Prudential also challenges sufficiency of service. Id.
at 10–11. Prudential alternatively moves for summary judgment,
arguing Plaintiff’s claims are barred by law, and no amount of
discovery will change that fact. Id. at 11–12. Prudential
attaches to its motion, among other things, the Policy, the
death certificates of Tamara and Lt. Col. Gavin, and the Policy
beneficiary election, which names Tamara Gavin as the sole
beneficiary. McCoy Decl., ECF No. 15-3, at Exs. A–D.
Ms. Gavin opposes the motion to dismiss.2 Pl.’s Resp. and
Objs. To Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23 (“Opp’n”). She
2
Ms. Gavin initially responded to the motion to dismiss with a
request for a stay while she addresses alleged identity theft of
5
clarifies that she seeks to stop distribution of the funds to
Tamara Gavin’s children, not to attach the life insurance
benefits as a creditor of the estate, but filed the Complaint to
prevent distribution of funds to the fraudster defendants. Opp’n
¶¶ 15–16. While her opposition mentions a variety of
unsubstantiated instances of fraud, Ms. Gavin reiterated her
argument that the life insurance benefits should not be
disbursed to the beneficiaries, who perpetrated the fraud that
led to the decedent’s death. Id. at ¶ 37. She further seems to
claim that both a waiver of survivor benefits and a beneficiary
list had been forged, id. at ¶¶ 38–39, and Plaintiff’s children
concealed the decedent’s death in order to hide her Native
American status from her, id. at ¶ 48.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The pleadings of pro se parties are “to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
her purported Native American benefits. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19. Plaintiff generically asserts fraud
on the part of the beneficiaries regarding her Native American
status. Id. at 1–2. While the Court is puzzled how Ms. Gavin’her
children could somehow conceal Ms. Gavin’s own Native American
heritage, the issues raised in this response are irrelevant to
the allegations in the Complaint. Ms. Gavin’s request for a stay
was denied. See Sept. 15, 2014 Order, ECF No. 17.
6
“although a court will read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint
liberally,” a pro se complaint, no less than any other
complaint, “must present a claim on which the Court can grant
relief.” Chandler v. Roche, 215 F. Supp. 2d 166, 168 (D.D.C.
2002) (citing Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1981)). A complaint that is a “confused and rambling narrative
of charges and conclusions” or an “untidy assortment of claims
that are neither plainly nor concisely stated” must be
dismissed. Poblete v. Goldberg, 680 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C.
2009) (quotation marks omitted).
Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and “possess only that power conferred by [the] Constitution and
[by] statute.” Logan v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 357 F. Supp.
2d 149, 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “There is a
presumption against federal court jurisdiction and the burden is
on the party asserting the jurisdiction, the plaintiff in this
case, to establish that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action.” Id. at 153 (citing McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936));
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). Pro se litigants are not relieved of the burden of
pleading an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims.
7
Atwal v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Sec. LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d 323,
325 (D.D.C. 2011).
Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the Court’s
power to hear a claim, the Court must give the plaintiff’s
factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule
12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a motion for failure
to state a claim. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69
(D.C. Cir. 2003). Where necessary, the Court may consider
materials outside the pleadings in order to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts. Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d
192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is considered a
challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim. Little v. Fenty, 689 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 n.3 (D.D.C.
2010). To meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing,” a plaintiff must establish three elements. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560. A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he or she has
suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is traceable to the
defendant’s conduct; and (3) a federal court decision is likely
to redress the injury. See Ne. Fl. Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663–64 (1993).
III. ANALYSIS
Even construing the Complaint’s allegations in a light
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes she lacks standing
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to bring her claims. As best the Court can ascertain, Ms. Gavin
fails to allege a cognizable injury because she has no claim to
the decedent’s Policy benefits.
First, Ms. Gavin has no direct claim to the Policy benefits
as a beneficiary. The statutory order of precedence for SGLI
benefits is clear, and nothing in the Complaint supports a claim
that Ms. Gavin would be entitled to beneficiary status. Ms.
Gavin does not allege that she is a named beneficiary of the
decedent’s Policy. Given that she is not the named beneficiary,
Ms. Gavin does not identify how she could possibly claim a right
to the Policy benefits when Lt. Col. Gavin’s children are
living. Absent a named beneficiary or a living spouse, § 1970(a)
expressly identifies a decedent’s children as Policy
beneficiaries. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a). The only arguable
possibility for Ms. Gavin to collect under Lt. Col. Gavin’s
Policy would be as a beneficiary to the decedent’s estate. But
even in that case—in the hypothetical event where Lt. Col.
Gavin’s children and parents were disqualified as Policy
beneficiaries—Ms. Gavin’s claim would still be inappropriate
here because she was not the estate executor.3 Id. Any claim to
the Policy benefits in that unlikely scenario would be with Lt.
Col. Gavin’s estate, not with the disbursement of Policy
3
Plaintiff asserts defendant Christopher Patrick Gavin is Lt.
Col. Gavin’s estate executor. Compl. ¶ 6.
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benefits. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 59 (1981)
(reversing injunction of SGLI policy benefits disbursement as
barred by statutory anti-attachment provision and noting, “[a]s
the trial court intimated, respondents may have a claim against
the insured’s estate for” breach of contract) (emphasis added).
Second, Ms. Gavin fails to articulate any colorable theory
that she is entitled to the Policy benefits through the Slayer
Rule. Policy benefits disbursement to the children of the
decedent and his wife may change somewhat in the event a
beneficiary was found to have murdered Lt. Col. Gavin. See MTD
Mem. at 4–5 n.1. But that is not what has been alleged; Ms.
Gavin has not asserted Tamara Gavin or her estate has been held
civilly or criminally responsible for the death of Lt. Col.
Gavin, as required for the Slayer Rule to apply. See 38 C.F.R. §
9.5 Ms. Gavin’s fanciful suggestions that Tamara Gavin murdered
her husband are entirely unsupported.4 In any event, Ms. Gavin
still would not be a beneficiary to the decedent’s Policy
because children or parents of Lt. Col Gavin and/or Tamara Gavin
would receive Policy benefits—not Plaintiff, Lt. Col. Gavin’s
ex-wife. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a); 38 C.F.R. § 9.5. There seems
to be no circumstance in which Plaintiff could receive Policy
4
If anything, the death certificates indicate stabbing as the
cause of death for Tamara Gavin, not Lt. Col. Gavin. See McCoy
Decl., ECF No. 15-3, at Exs. C, D; compare id. (identifying Lt.
Col. Gavin’s cause of death as asphyxiation) with Compl. ¶ 3
(suggesting decedent stabbed).
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benefits; thus, “Plaintiff ‘lacks the requisite stake in the
proceedings.’” Morris v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 12-
1946, 2013 WL 2370513 (D. Md. May 30, 2013) (dismissing
complaint for lack of standing where decedent’s mother sought to
enjoin SGLI policy payments to named beneficiaries) (quoting
Prudential v. Flanigan, 204 F.3d 1117, 1117 (5th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing SGLI appeal for lack of standing where appellant was
not a named beneficiary to policy)).
Third, Ms. Gavin’s claims as a creditor to the decedent’s
estate are also barred by statute. Section 1970(g) protects the
Policy benefits from any legal or equitable claim, before or
after receipt by the beneficiary, including creditor’s claims or
attachments to the benefit payments. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(g). In
discussing disbursement of benefits under SGLI, the Supreme
Court specifically has noted, “Congress has spoken with force
and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named
beneficiary and no other.” Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 56 (quoting
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950)). As the Court
noted in Ridgway, any claim Ms. Gavin believes she has is more
properly before Lt. Col. Gavin’s estate, id. at 59, a claim
Plaintiff appears to be pursuing already. See Opp’n ¶ 1 (noting
Plaintiff already brought a claim against the estate for fraud
and identity theft, but was advised “the life insurance proceeds
were handled separately from Probate Court . . . .”).
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Because she is not an eligible beneficiary to the Policy at
issue here, Plaintiff cannot suffer an injury from the
disbursement of Policy benefits. Similarly, Ms. Gavin’s claims
to attach to the proceeds are statutorily foreclosed.
Consequently, Ms. Gavin lacks standing to prevent the
disbursement of, or attachment to, the Policy benefits.5 Because
Plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the Complaint is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART
defendant Prudential’s motion to dismiss the Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all
defendants. Having found sufficient grounds to grant the motion
on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds, the Court does not reach Prudential’s
other arguments. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
November 5, 2014
5
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for much the same reasons the
Court has found she lacks standing. The D.C. Circuit has not had
occasion to apply 38 U.S.C. § 1970, but other courts differ in
their treatment of SGLI benefits cases. Some are resolved on
12(b)(1) grounds, as here, and others for failure to state a
claim or on summary judgment. See, e.g., Mills v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Colo. 2012)
(dismissing plaintiff’s challenge to SGLI beneficiaries on
12(b)(6) grounds); Dachtler v. Anderson, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1301
(D. Nev. 2011) (dismissing negligence and constructive trust
claims on 12(b)(6) grounds). Ms. Gavin’s claims alternatively
are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as to all defendants.
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