Collins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BILAL ABDUL WADUD COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01385 (CJN)
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
Bilal Abdul Wadud Collins sued his employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (“WMATA”), under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination
and failure to accommodate. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Collins suffers from a sleep disorder that makes
it difficult for him to work night shifts. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17. Despite his request for an
accommodation, WMATA assigned Collins to a midnight shift, and shortly thereafter Collins
sustained an injury to his lower back. Id. ¶ 25. He attributes the injury to WMATA’s alleged
failure to accommodate his disability.
WMATA moves to dismiss on two grounds. First, WMATA argues that Virginia law
provides the exclusive remedy for Collins’s injury—relief from the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission—and that Collins has already received an award from the
Commission. Second, and related, WMATA contends that this suit is barred by claim preclusion.
The Court disagrees on both scores and will thus deny WMATA’s motion to dismiss.
Before considering WMATA’s arguments, the Court first addresses jurisdiction. “[W]hen
Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia created WMATA, they conferred their sovereign
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immunity upon it.” Slack v. WMATA, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2019). Accordingly, the Court
lacks jurisdiction to enter judgment against WMATA unless its sovereign immunity has been
waived. Watters v. WMATA, 295 F.3d 36, 39–40 (D.C. Cir. 2002). This suit arises under the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Court of Appeals has held that “WMATA waived its immunity from
suit under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal transportation funds.” Barbour v. WMATA,
374 F.3d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (“A State shall not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court
for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”). The Court therefore has subject
matter jurisdiction in this case.
Turning to WMATA’s first argument for dismissal, the rights and remedies conferred by
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (“VWCA”) “exclude all other rights and remedies.” VA
Code Ann. § 65.2-307(A). This statute, like many other workers’ compensation laws, “prohibit[s]
tort recovery for on-the-job injuries.” Workagegnehu v. WMATA, 980 F.3d 874, 875 (D.C. Cir.
2020); Demetres v. E. W. Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 273 (4th Cir. 2015) (“An injured employee
who is covered by the VWCA is barred from suing his employer in tort for injuries arising out of
and in the course of the injured employee’s employment.” (quotations omitted)).
But this is not a tort suit. Collins has instead sued WMATA under federal anti-
discrimination law. And while a state statute can preclude a cause of action arising under state
law, it cannot deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action afforded by federal law. See U.S. Const., Art.
VI; see also Smith v. Lake City Nursing Home, 771 F. Supp. 985, 987 (D. Minn. 1991) (observing
that “[s]everal courts have held that the exclusive remedy clauses of state workers compensation
statutes cannot bar claims under federal civil rights laws” and that “Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act creates a supplemental remedy for disability discrimination”); Worthington v.
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City of New Haven, Civ. A. No. 3:94-609 (EBB), 1999 WL 958627, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1999)
(“A state law making recovery under a worker’s compensation statute the exclusive remedy for
work-related injuries cannot bar an employee from seeking relief for employment discrimination
under the ADA or Section 504 in light of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
Constitution.”).
WMATA makes no argument to the contrary. Indeed, the cases that WMATA cites all
concern whether the VWCA precludes claims based on Virginia tort law (which it plainly does).
See, e.g., Workagegnehu, 980 F.3d at 875 (assault claim); Demetres, 776 F.3d at 272 (personal
injury claim); Miller v. Washington Workplace, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims). But WMATA offers no authority for the
proposition that the VWCA (or any other state workers’ compensation statute) can foreclose a
cause of action arising under federal law. 1
As for WMATA’s contention that claim preclusion bars this suit, WMATA is correct that
Virginia law applies res judicata in workers’ compensation cases involving the Commission. See
Brock v. Voith Siemens Hydro Power Generation, 59 Va. App. 39, 47, 716 S.E. 2d 485, 488 (Va.
Ct. App. 2011). And WMATA is also correct that res judicata bars claims that could have been
raised in the earlier suit, even if they were not in fact raised. See Starbucks Coffee Co. v. Shy, 61
Va. App. 229, 241, 734 S.E. 2d 683, 689 (Va. Ct. App. 2012). But the key phrase here is could
have been raised, for “when the underlying conduct, transaction, or occurrence produces multiple
legal claims, not all of which can be asserted at the time of the initial litigation, claim preclusion
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The Court holds only that the exclusivity provision of the VWCA does not foreclose a cause of
action arising under the Rehabilitation Act. At this stage, the Court takes no position on what
types of damages are available in this case.
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will not prohibit the previously unmaintainable claims from being raised in subsequent litigation.”
D’Ambrosio v. Wolf, 295 Va. 48, 54, 809 S.E. 2d 625, 628 (Va. 2018).
WMATA points to no authority—and the Court finds none—that would have allowed
Collins to assert his Rehabilitation Act claim before the Commission. In fact, the case law implies
just the opposite. Cf. Whetzel v. Waster Mgmt. of Va. Blue Ridge, No. 0352-99-3, 1999 WL
1133530, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1999) (holding that the Commission has jurisdiction to
determine questions arising under the VWCA and therefore “did not have jurisdiction to consider
claimant’s assertion that he was discriminated against under the ADA”). Because Collins could
not have raised his federal claim before the Commission, that claim is not barred by principles of
preclusion.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, is DENIED.
DATE: March 15, 2023
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
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