Juddv. U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEITH JUDD,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:19-cv-02620 (TNM)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
More than 20 years ago, Plaintiff Keith Judd was found guilty by a jury of two
counts of “mailing a threatening communication with the intent to extort money or
something of value.” See United States v. Judd, 252 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam). The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced him to 210
months in prison and three years of supervised release. Id. Since then, he has filed
hundreds of motions and petitions in federal courts across the country asking them to
invalidate his conviction. See Judd v. Furgeson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 442, 443 n.1 (D.N.J.
2002) (noting that, as of 2002, Judd had “filed well over 200 civil actions and appeals in
district and appellate courts all over the United States”).
Judd is no longer in prison, but he continues to attack his conviction. He filed this
action pro se requesting that the Court declare that he is “innocent of the charges” in his
conviction and that his conviction is “void for lack of jurisdiction,” presumably by
issuing a writ of error coram nobis. Compl. 1, 4, ECF No. 1 (capitalization altered). He
also asks, under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A), that the Court order
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Defendants—the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—to
“correct the record, where ever it exists” to “show that he is innocent” and that his
conviction is “void for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 7 (capitalization altered). Finally, he
seeks $20 million in damages, again presumably under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(1)(C). Id. at 7.
I.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must establish
jurisdiction. See Knapp Med. Ctr. v. Hargan, 875 F.3d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
When ruling on this motion, a court must “assume the truth of all material factual
allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). If a court determines that it
lacks jurisdiction for any claim, it must dismiss that claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
12(h)(3).
Even if a court has jurisdiction, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant
the plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” L.
Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
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II.
The Government urges dismissal because Judd lacks a cause of action to bring his
claims. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 7–8, ECF No. 6; Defs.’ Reply 1–2, ECF No. 9. The
Court agrees.
A.
Judd asks this Court to declare his innocence and void his conviction. See Compl.
at 2–4. Normally, a post-conviction challenge “to the validity of any confinement or to
particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus[.]” Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). But because Judd has served his full sentence before
filing this case, he can no longer petition for habeas corpus. See Qassim v. Bush, 466
F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Under the “jurisdiction” section of his Complaint, Judd cites the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651. So the Court infers that he means to seek declaratory and injunctive relief
through a writ of error coram nobis. See United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1134 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to collaterally
attack a criminal conviction for a person . . . who is no longer ‘in custody’ and therefore
cannot seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241.” (quoting Chaidez v. United
States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 n.1 (2013) (alterations in original)).
It is well-established that “a petitioner must move for the writ in the sentencing
court, rather than any convenient federal court.” Rawlins v. Kansas, 714 F.3d 1189, 1197
(10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); see United States v. Hansen, 906 F. Supp. 688, 692
(D.D.C. 1995) (“Through a writ of error coram nobis, the federal judge who imposed a
sentence has the discretionary power to set aside an underlying conviction and sentence
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which, for a valid reason, should never have been entered.”). Judd was convicted in the
Western District of Texas, not here. See Compl. at 1. So this Court lacks jurisdiction
over Counts I and II of Judd’s Complaint.
B.
Under the Privacy Act, Judd asks both for damages and for the Court to order
Defendants to “correct the record, where ever it exists” to “show that he is innocent.”
Compl. at 7. Judd lacks a cause of action here as well.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court determined that a state prisoner could
not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless the plaintiff proved
that the conviction or sentence had been reversed or vacated. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87
(1994). District courts are thus barred from considering § 1983 claims when “a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence” that has not been overturned. Id. at 487.
The D.C. Circuit has expanded Heck’s holding to encompass suits under the
Privacy Act. An inmate cannot seek damages under the Privacy Act while his conviction
still stands. See White v. U.S. Prob. Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(requiring dismissal of an inmate’s claim for damages under the Privacy Act because “a
judgment in favor of White on his challenge to the legal conclusions in his presentence
report would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, which has not been
invalidated in a prior proceeding”). Nor may he use the Privacy Act to amend his records
without his conviction being vacated. See Brown v. BOP, 498 F. Supp. 2d. 298, 303–04
(D.D.C. 2007) (“The Privacy Act is not the proper means by which a prisoner may
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collaterally attack his sentence absent a showing that his sentence has been invalidated in
a prior proceeding.”).
Judd suggests that Heck and, by extension, White, no longer apply to him because
those cases involved inmates, while he is no longer in custody. Pl.’s Opp’n 2, ECF No. 8.
Indeed, certain courts of appeals—relying on concurring and dissenting opinions in
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)—have split over whether Heck continues to bar
former inmates’ § 1983 suits. See Molina-Aviles v. District of Columbia, 797 F. Supp. 2d
1, 5 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting cases). But neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C.
Circuit have so held. So the Court finds itself bound by Heck. See Figueroa v. Rivera,
147 F.3d 77, 81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Heck to former inmates and “leave[ing] to
the Court ‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions’” (quoting Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
But even among the courts that have declined to extend Heck to some former
inmates, most only offer a narrow exception to Heck. For instance, the Fourth Circuit
permits a former state inmate to sue for damages under § 1983 “only if he lacked access
to federal habeas corpus while in custody.” Griffin v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 804 F.3d 692,
696 (4th Cir. 2015). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit only offers a plaintiff relief from Heck’s
bar if the inmate “could not seek habeas relief only because of the shortness of his prison
sentence.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006).
Even if the Court were to agree with these exceptions to Heck, Judd does not fit
within them. Judd’s long prison sentence offered him ample opportunity to seek habeas
review. And he fails to explain how he “lacked access to federal habeas corpus while in
custody.” Griffin, 804 F.3d at 696. Heck and White thus continue to govern Judd’s case.
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These cases require dismissal of Judd’s Complaint since resolution of his Privacy
Act claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, which has not been
invalidated in a prior proceeding.” White, 148 F.3d at 1126. Judd makes no secret of his
intent that the Court to not only imply but determine that his sentence and conviction
were invalid. See Compl. at 7 (insisting that he “has a right to have the record corrected
to show that he is innocent” and requesting damages for “this miscarriage of justice”
(capitalization altered)). And his Complaint makes no showing that his prior conviction
has been vacated. Rather, by petitioning the Court to declare him innocent and void his
conviction, Judd pleads that his conviction remains in place. See Compl. at 1–6. This
Court cannot grant the relief that Judd seeks pursuant to the Privacy Act under these
circumstances.
III.
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. A separate Order
will issue.
2020.04.17
15:26:29 -04'00'
Dated: April 17, 2020 TREVOR N. McFADDEN
United States District Judge
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