Welch-Bey v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL WELCH-BEY,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 18-cv-2671 (CRC)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Michael Welch-Bey is a District of Columbia parolee who has applied for a
writ of habeas corpus. In its renewed opposition, ECF No. 15, the government asserts that
Welch-Bey’s petition is time-barred. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 12 (dismissing on jurisdictional
grounds all but claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness). For the following reasons, the Court
agrees.
I. Background
In January 1993, a jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted
Welch-Bey of “two counts of rape while armed, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2801 and -3202
(1989 Repl.),” and “[h]e was sentenced to two consecutive terms of fifteen years to life in
prison.” Welch v. United States, 689 A.2d 1, 2 (D.C. 1996) (consolidated appeal of judgment of
conviction and order denying collateral relief under D.C. Code § 23-110).
The government documents that on September 26, 1996, the D.C. Court of Appeals
denied Welch-Bey’s petition for rehearing of the foregoing decision, Gov’t Ex. 4, and on
October 4, 1996, issued the mandate affirming his convictions. Opp’n 5 (citing DCCA Dockets
93-CF-355; 94-CO-1368). On December 29, 1997, Welch-Bey filed a motion to recall the
mandate, which was summarily denied on January 6, 1998. Id. at 8. Since then, Welch-Bey has
filed four unsuccessful post-conviction motions. See id. at 5-8 (recounting collateral proceedings
under D.C. Code § 23-110); see also Gov’t Ex. 14, U.S. v. Welch-Bey, No. 1990 FEL 11552
(D.C. Super. Ct. June 29, 2017) (comprehensive procedural history). On October 26, 2018, more
than three years after his release to parole, Welch-Bey filed this habeas action. See Opp’n at 7
(noting release date of March 27, 2015).
II. Analysis
As a “would-be federal habeas petitioner,” a District of Columbia prisoner must “comply
with the strictures” of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which sets
out “the federal court’s labyrinth collateral review procedure.” Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102,
106 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This includes filing a
federal habeas petition within one year from the date a conviction becomes final “either by
conclusion of direct review (i.e., denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court) or by expiration
of the time for seeking direct review.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (parenthesis in
original)). AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
As discussed above, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed Welch-Bey’s convictions on
June 25, 1996 and denied his petition for rehearing on September 26, 1996. Because Welch-Bey
did not petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, his convictions became final on
December 25, 1996. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches
when . . . the time for filing a certiorari petition expires,” running from the entry date of the final
judgment or order sought to be reviewed, “not the issuance date of the mandate”); Sup. Ct. R.
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13(1) (“[A] petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case . . . entered by a state
court of last resort . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after
entry of the judgment.”). Welch-Bey pursued no relief from his convictions within one year of
their finality to toll the limitation period. Moreover, the government argues convincingly that the
instant petition brought more than 20 years later is subject to neither a statutory exception under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) nor equitable tolling. See Opp’n 10-14. Despite the court’s warnings
that (1) the government’s unopposed assertions could “be accepted as true,” and (2) dismissal
could be “based solely on the government’s documented assertions in the opposition,” Order,
ECF No. 16 (emphasis supplied), Welch-Bey has not addressed his delay, much less offered an
excuse for it. See generally Reply, ECF No. 17.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the instant petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is barred under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, this case will
be dismissed by separate order.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: July 16, 2020
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