Wilson v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia

FILED
7/29/2020
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Columbia
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAMES WILSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-01479 (UNA)
)
)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
FOR THE DISTRICT OF )
COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner designated to Wabash County Correctional Facility, located in
Carlisle, Indiana, filed a pro se complaint and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) on June 1, 2020. On June 16, 2020, the court issued an order advising plaintiff that his
IFP application was insufficient because he had failed to provide a certified copy of his trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent), including the supporting ledger sheets, for the six
month period immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, obtained from the appropriate
official of each prison at which plaintiff is or was confined. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). The court
granted plaintiff 30 days to submit the required financial information. Plaintiff has now filed an
adequate certified copy of his trust account statement with an accompanying memorandum in
support of his IFP application. The court will grant the IFP application and now turn to address
the complaint.
Plaintiff appears to sue this court, the Indiana Supreme Court, the state of Indiana, and
other “Indiana municipalities.” The complaint is far from a model in clarity, but it seems that
plaintiff seeks credit for time served, arguing that the Indiana state probation department
intentionally miscalculated his time spent in pre-trial incarceration. He alleges that he is a
“tortfeasor” and that the aforementioned actions constitute fraud. He seeks undefined declaratory
relief and monetary damages.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth
generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available
only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts
that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such
facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff has failed to establish
diversity jurisdiction or to state a federal question.
First, even if this court could be sued, which it cannot in this circumstance, see Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court precedents have
found that judges and the judiciary are immune from suit), any plausible connection between this
court and plaintiff’s state court proceedings is entirely ambiguous. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) (both mandating dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted).
Second, the doctrine of judicial immunity is equally applicable to the Indiana Supreme
Court, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978), and further, the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution immunizes state bodies from suit in federal court, unless
immunity is waived. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 675–76 (1999); Keenan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 643 F.
Supp. 324, 327–28 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing cases).
Third, as a general rule, applicable here, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions
of state courts. See Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995)); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (extending
prohibition of federal court interference to ongoing state criminal matters, due to “the fundamental
policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions”).
For all of the aforementioned reasons, plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter
jurisdiction and has failed to state a claim. As a result, this case is dismissed. A separate order of
dismissal accompanies this memorandum opinion.
__________/s/_____________
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
DATE: July 29, 2020