Givens v. Bowser

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EVA MAE GIVENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 20-307
MURIEL BOWSER, in her official (EGS/ZMF)
capacity as Mayor, Washington,
D.C., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Movants Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser, and
Anthony D. Givens (collectively, “Movants”) submit this motion
asking the Court to reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Order
adopting Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s Report and
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) and granting Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48.1 Upon careful
consideration of the motion, opposition, and reply thereto, the
applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court hereby
DENIES Movants’ motion.
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
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II. Background
A. Factual
The background of this dispute was set forth in the Court’s
prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Givens v.
Bowser, No. CV 20-307 (EGS/ZMF), 2022 WL 4598576 (D.D.C. Sept.
30, 2022). In short, Eva Mae Givens (“Ms. Givens” or
“Plaintiff”) was a nursing home resident who applied for
Medicaid benefits on February 26, 2019 to pay for her medical
expenses, including her nursing home care. Am. Compl., ECF No.
16 ¶¶ 1, 24. Along with her application, she submitted copies of
unpaid medical bills totaling $40,184 and argued that these
unpaid bills qualified for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 25.
On May 17, 2019, the District of Columbia (the “District”)
determined that Ms. Givens was eligible for Medicaid benefits
but did not provide an appropriate PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 26.
Consequently, beginning February 1, 2019, she was required to
pay $2,044 per month for her nursing home care, and she was
unable to use that money to pay off the $40,183.93 in unpaid
bills. Id.
On June 6, 2019, Ms. Givens filed a request with the
District’s Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) for a fair
hearing to address the District’s failure to approve her request
for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 28. OAH called the hearing nine
months after Ms. Givens filed her request and eventually
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dismissed the case with prejudice in December 2020. See Notice
of Suppl. Authority, ECF No. 24-1 at 3.
B. Procedural
Ms. Givens filed this Section 1983 suit against Defendants
on February 5, 2020, see generally Compl., ECF No. 1; and
amended her Complaint on June 3, 2020, see generally Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 16. On July 1, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot.
Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 18. Ms. Givens filed her
opposition, see Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am.
Compl., ECF No. 20; and Defendants filed a reply thereto, see
Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 22. The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge
Faruqui for full case management, see Minute Order (Oct. 13,
2020); who, on May 3, 2021, issued his R. & R. recommending that
the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see R. & R., ECF
No. 28 at 15.
Before Magistrate Judge Faruqui issued his R. & R., Ms.
Givens died. See Suggestion of Death, ECF No. 26. On May 16,
2021, Ms. Givens’ three children—Movants here—moved to be
substituted as plaintiffs, to file a second amended complaint,
and to object to the R. & R. See generally ECF No. 29.
Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to substitute as
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plaintiffs for the limited purpose of objecting to the R. & R.
See Minute Order (June 16, 2021).
Movants raised several objections to the R. & R, see
generally Objs. by Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and
Anthony D. Givens to Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s May 3.
2021 R. & R., ECF No. 33; to which Defendants responded, see
Defs.’ Resp. Objs. Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s R. & R.,
ECF No. 36. The Court then issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
adopting the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
See Givens, 2022 WL 4598576, at *8; Order, ECF No. 46.
On October 28, 2022, Movants filed this Motion for
Reconsideration. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48; Eugene
P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Mem. of
Law in Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Mot.”), ECF No. 48-1.
Defendants filed their opposition on November 17, 2022, see
Defs.’ Opp’n Movants’ Mot. Recons. (“Defs.’ Opp’n), ECF No. 50;
and Movants replied on November 25, 2022, see Eugene P. Givens,
Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Reply Mem. of Law
in Further Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Reply”), ECF No. 51.
The motion is now ripe and ready for adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
A. Motion for Reconsideration
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly
address motions for reconsideration. See Sieverding v. U.S.
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Dep’t of Just., No. CV 09-562 (JDB), 2010 WL 11667910, at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2010) (citing Lance v. United Mine Workers of
Am. 1974 Pension Tr., 400 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2005)).
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) permits district courts to construe
motions for reconsideration as motions to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e). See Emory v. Sec’y of Navy, 819 F.2d
291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (explaining that “[s]uch
treatment is appropriate even though the movant does not specify
under which rule relief is sought”).
Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or
amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are
“discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court
finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law,
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76
F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). These motions are
“disfavored,” and the moving party bears the burden of
establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief
from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151
F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) does not provide a
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vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry
of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5
(2008) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
B. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party
may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has
entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A
district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition.” Id. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)
(“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.”). A district court “must determine de novo
any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been
properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however,
the party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply
reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the [R. &
R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d
86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). “Under the clearly
erroneous standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled
to great deference and is clearly erroneous only if on the
entire evidence the court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of
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Columbia, No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 12, 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the
proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made
and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections
which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the
magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore
not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 F. Supp.
2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court reviewed Movants’ objections de novo.
IV. Analysis
A. Movants Have Standing to Move for Reconsideration of the
Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
Courts have routinely held that only parties have standing
to bring motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). See,
e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 184 F.R.D. 506,
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that non-party had no standing to
bring Rule 59(e) motion after having been denied intervention).
The parties do not dispute this principle. See generally Defs.’
Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 8-9; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 2-3.
Instead, they disagree whether Movants are parties within the
meaning of the rule.
Defendants assert that Movants are non-parties because: (1)
Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to be substituted
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as plaintiffs only “‘for the limited purpose of objecting to the
[R. & R.],’ and nothing else”; and (2) Movants never moved to
intervene in the case pursuant to Rule 24. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.
50 at 9 (quoting Minute Order (June 16, 2021)). In reply,
Movants argue that Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s Minute Order
permitting them to be substituted as plaintiffs for the purpose
of objecting to the R. & R. “plainly encompasses” a motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s ruling on those objections.
Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 3. They further contend that
Defendants are too late to object to the Minute Order, id.(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)); and that their failure to move
to intervene “is irrelevant,” id.The Court is persuaded that Movants are parties for
purposes of this motion. In the Minute Order at issue,
Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted Movants’ motion to be
substituted as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of objecting
to the [R. & R.].” Minute Order (June 16, 2021). In other words,
with respect to their objections to the R. & R., Movants are
plaintiffs in the case. There is no reason why Movants should
lose that status now because they ask the Court to take a second
look at their objections to the R. & R. See Cobell v. Jewell, 29
F. Supp. 3d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that “the typical
motion for reconsideration . . . asks a court to take a second
look at an issue that was previously raised and ruled upon”),
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aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Court therefore concludes that Movants are parties for
purposes of this Motion for Reconsideration and have standing to
file a Rule 59(e) motion.
B. The Court Will Not Amend Its Prior Memorandum Opinion or
Order
Movants argue that the Court’s Memorandum Opinion adopting
the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be
amended for two reasons. See Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 4-6.
First, they argue that it was “clear error” to dismiss the case
with prejudice and “ignore[]” their pending motion for leave to
file a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 5. Second, they assert
that “reconsideration is necessary to prevent the manifest
injustice” of Defendants’ continuing failure to make timely
decisions following Medicaid hearings. Id. at 6. For the reasons
below, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion for Reconsideration.
1. The Court Did Not Clearly Err in Dismissing the First
Amended Complaint with Prejudice
Movants first argue that the Memorandum Opinion is clearly
erroneous because it dismissed the First Amended Complaint with
prejudice despite the pending motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. See id. at 4-6. For support, they cite D.C.
Circuit authority that “dismissal with prejudice is warranted
only when a trial court determines that the allegation of other
facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly
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cure the deficiency.” Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209). They
contend that their proposed second amended complaint “contain[s]
allegations that clearly allege that Defendants have a pattern
or practice of failing to decide Medicaid Fair Hearings within
the required time frames” and “therefore satisf[ies] the
inherently transitory exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id.
at 5. Moreover, they continue, they did not unduly delay in
moving for leave to file the new complaint and have not
“‘repeatedly failed’ to cure deficiencies.” Id.
Defendants respond by distinguishing D.C. Circuit
precedent. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 9-11. First, they
clarify the holding in Belizan, explaining that the Belizan
court held that dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate
because the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs’
motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at 10 (citing
Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583). Defendants argue that Belizan does
not control the outcome here because Movants are not plaintiffs
and cannot be plaintiffs unless and until the Court grants their
motion to be substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 10-11. For
additional support, they cite other D.C. Circuit precedent
holding that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate “[w]hen a
plaintiff fails to seek leave from the District Court to amend
its complaint.” City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver,
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589 F.3d 1292, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Gov’t of Guam v.
Am. President Lines, 28 F.3d 142, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Drake
v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF
No. 50 at 10.
The Court is persuaded that it did not clearly err in
dismissing the First Amended Complaint with prejudice. D.C.
Circuit authority makes clear that dismissal with prejudice is
inappropriate when: (1) the plaintiff has moved for leave to
amend her complaint; and (2) the court “determines that the
allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Belizan, 434
F.3d at 583. Movants have not satisfied the first prong. They
are not plaintiffs, cf. Minute Order (June 16, 2021) (granting
motion to substitute as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of
objecting to the [R. & R.]”); and only a party may move to amend
the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Movants argue that
they did “everything possible” to be substituted as plaintiffs
and to amend the First Amended Complaint. Movants’ Reply, ECF
No. 51 at 4. However, this argument ignores Movants’ failure to
object to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s order granting their
substitution motion in part, staying briefing on their motion
for leave to amend the complaint, and withholding consideration
of their substitution motion for all other purposes. See Docket
for Civ. Action No. 20-307; see also LCvR 72.2(b) (requiring
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that parties object to rulings by a magistrate judge within 14
days). Thus, because no plaintiff had a pending motion to amend
the complaint at the time of dismissal, the Court did not
clearly err in dismissing the First Amended Complaint with
prejudice.2
2. Reconsideration is Not Necessary to Prevent Manifest
Injustice
Movants also argue that “reconsideration is necessary to
prevent the manifest injustice of the Defendants’ continuing
pattern of violations of the [timeline] requirements.” Movants’
Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not expand on this statement in
either their opening memorandum or reply brief. See generally
id. at 1-6; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 1-13.
In their opposition briefing, Defendants concede that
“‘courts have not precisely defined what constitutes manifest
injustice.’” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 12 (quoting Piper v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 312 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2004), as
amended (May 13, 2004)). Even so, they contend that Movants’
argument is insufficient, reasoning that the manifest injustice
standard would be met in every case if a movant could simply
argue that she did not receive the relief she sought. Id.2
Because Movants are not plaintiffs with a pending motion to
amend their complaint, the Court need not address their
remaining arguments that their proposed second amended complaint
cures the deficiencies of the First Amended Complaint. See
Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 5-6.
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Although the caselaw does not define the term, courts
regularly make clear that “manifest injustice is an
exceptionally narrow concept in the context of a Rule 59(e)
motion.” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d
48, 78 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,
782 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[A] manifest injustice does not
result merely because a harm may go unremedied.” Slate v. Am.
Broad. Companies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State.
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983)). Rather,
manifest injustice “must entail a clear and certain prejudice to
the moving party” and “also a result that is fundamentally
unfair in light of governing law.” Id. at 35-36.
The Court concludes that Movants have not met this high
bar. They argue that manifest injustice will result because they
cannot maintain their class fair hearing claim. See Movants’
Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not explain how dismissal here
prejudices them, nor do they account for how dismissal “is
fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate, 12 F.
Supp. 3d at 35-36. Stated differently, Movants have not met
their burden to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” that
warrant relief. Niedermeier, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Accordingly,
the Court does not need to amend its earlier Memorandum Opinion
and Order to prevent manifest injustice.
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V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion
for Reconsideration, ECF No. 48.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 26, 2023
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