Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GANNETT SATELLITE INFORMATION
NETWORK, LLC,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 22-cv-475 (BAH)
v. Judge Beryl A. Howell
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gannett Satellite Information Network, d/b/a USA Today, filed this lawsuit
against the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) challenging the agency’s response to plaintiff’s
request, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for data
regarding “individual-level information on the deaths of incarcerated people in the custody of
local jails, state prisons, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons,” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Cross-Mot.
for Summ. J. & Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 1, ECF No. 13-1, which
data is collected by a DOJ component in compliance with the Death in Custody Reporting Act of
2013 (“DCRA”), Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 34 U.S.C. and 14 U.S.C.).
After a search uncovered over 230,000 pages of documents potentially responsive to
plaintiff’s FOIA request, defendant invoked FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), to
withhold the release of all those materials under the confidentiality provision of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Crime Control Act”), 34 U.S.C. § 10231. As a
result, the key question in this dispute, one of first impression in this Circuit, is whether the text
of the Crime Control Act’s confidentiality provision exempts disclosure of the requested
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information under FOIA Exemption 3. In their cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties
offer divergent interpretations of the statute that favor their positions. For the reasons explained
below, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No.
13, is granted and defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
No. 12, is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual background and procedural history relevant to the pending motion are
described below.
A. Statutory Context
The DCRA was originally enacted in 2000 and, after expiration in 2006, reauthorized in
2014. See infra n.3. This law aims to “encourage States to report to the Attorney General
certain information regarding the deaths of individuals in the custody of law enforcement
agencies.” Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014). To fulfill that goal, the DCRA requires
certain states and federal law enforcement agencies to report to the Attorney General information
regarding the death of “any person who is detained, under arrest, or is in the process of being
arrested, is en route to be incarcerated, or is incarcerated” at a local or state jail, prison, boot
camp, contract facility, or other correctional facility, including juvenile facilities. See DCRA §
2(a), 128 Stat. at 2861 (outlining state reporting requirements); accord 34 U.S.C. 60105(a)
(codification of such state requirements); see also DCRA § 3(a), 128 Stat. at 2861 (outlining
federal law enforcement reporting requirements); 18 U.S.C. § 4001 note (codification of such
federal requirements). Both states and federal agencies must include “at a minimum” in their
disclosures “(1) the name, gender, race, ethnicity, and age of the deceased; (2) the date, time, and
location of death; (3) the law enforcement agency that detained, arrested, or was in the process of
arresting the deceased; and (4) a brief description of the circumstances surrounding the death.”
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DCRA § 2(b) (listing information required of states); 34 U.S.C. § 60105(b) (codifying such);
accord DCRA § 3(b) (explaining that information required for federal agency reporting is the
same as that outlined in § 2(b) for states).
Compliance with the DCRA is required of those states that receive federal funds under
Title 1 of the Crime Control Act, see DCRA § 2(a), (c)(2); 34 U.S.C. § 60105(a), (c)(2), and
failure to comply when required with the DCRA’s reporting requirements makes a state, “at the
discretion of the Attorney General, [] subject to not more than a 10-percent reduction of the
funds” otherwise allocated to them under Title I of the Crime Control Act, “whether
characterized as the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
Programs, the Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants Program, the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, or otherwise,” DCRA § 2(c)(2); 34 U.S.C. §
60105(c)(2). The Attorney General, through the Department of Justice and its Office of Justice
Programs (“OJP”), established the Mortality in Correctional Institutions (“MCI”) program to
collect the DCRA-mandated information. See Mortality in Correctional Institutions (MCI)
(Formerly Deaths in Custody Reporting Program (DCRP)), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS – BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-
collection/mortality-correctional-institutions-mci-formerly-deaths-custody-reporting-
program#methodology-0 (last visited Mar. 24, 2023).
The Crime Control Act, enacted in 1968 over thirty years earlier than the DCRA, sought
“[t]o assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of crime, to increase the
effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all
levels of government, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified
at 34 U.S.C. § 10151 et seq.). At issue in this dispute is Title I of the Act, named “Law
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Enforcement Assistance,” intended “to assist State and local governments in strengthening and
improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance.” Crime Control Act, tit. I, 82
Stat. at 198. Congress provides such national assistance through federal grant programs
available to state law enforcement agencies. See id., tit. I, §§ 201–405, 82 Stat. at 198–204.
Title I also authorizes DOJ to “request any Federal department or agency to supply such
statistics, data, program reports, and other material as [DOJ] deems necessary to carry out its
functions under this title.” Id., tit. I, § 513, 82 Stat. at 207.
In 1979, Congress amended Title I by adding a confidentiality provision—the
interpretation of which is the central question in this case. The provision, as originally enacted,
states:
Except as provided by Federal law other than this title, no officer or
employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of assistance
under the provisions of this title shall use or reveal any research or
statistical information furnished under this title by any person and
identifiable to any specific private person for any purpose other than
the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance with this
title. Such information and copies thereof shall be immune from
legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the person
furnishing such information, be admitted as evidence or used for any
purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial, legislative, or
administrative proceedings.
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. I, § 812(a), formally § 818, as added Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 2, 93 Stat.
1167, 1213 (1979) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10231(a)) (emphasis supplied). 1
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Title I’s confidentiality provision was amended in 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1115(c), 119 Stat. 2960(2006), editing the above language by striking the first clause. The currently codified provision reads as follows:
No officer or employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of assistance
under the provisions of this chapter shall use or reveal any research or statistical
information furnished under this chapter by any person and identifiable to any
specific private person for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was
obtained in accordance with this chapter. Such information and copies thereof
shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the
person furnishing such information, be admitted as evidence or used for any
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Currently, OJP administers Title I grant programs under the Attorney General’s authority.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 603(a), 98 Stat. 2078. A division of OJP, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (“BJS”), is DOJ’s “primary statistical agency” and “collects, analyzes, publishes, and
disseminates information on crime, criminal offenders, crime victims, and criminal justice
operations.” Offices – Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE – OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.ojp.gov/about/offices/bureau-justice-statistics-
bjs. One of the grant programs Title I created and facilitates is the Edward Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance Grant Program, the grant program subject to the 10% reduction upon a state’s
failure to comply with the requirements of the DCRA.
B. Factual Background
On April 9, 2021, plaintiff submitted a two-part FOIA request to the DOJ’s Office of
Justice Programs, seeking:
1. [A]ll information submitted to BJS under the Mortality in
Correctional Institutions program. This includes information
contained in submissions of BJS Forms CJ-9 and CJ-10 and any
other data elements states are required to provide under 34 USC
60105, from 2010 through the date on which my request is
processed. If this information is stored in a tabular database format,
please provide a copy to me in tabular, sortable form such as
comma-separated values (CSV). If the information exists ONLY as
a paper or PDF form submission, please provide PDF copies. To be
clear, I am requesting data on the deaths of individual inmates, not
the summaries of inmate deaths published on the BJS website.
2. [A] copy of any data dictionary, record layout or other
documentation that describes elements contained in the electronic
database requested above.
purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceedings.
34 U.S.C. § 10231(a).
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Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl.’s Statement of Facts”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 13-3;
Def.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue (“Def.’s Statement of
Facts”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 12-3.
On April 13, 2021, OJP notified plaintiff about receipt of the latter’s FOIA request and
that 236,568 pages of potentially responsive documents had been located, but were exempt from
disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3, 3 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), because the confidentiality provision
of the Crime Control Act prohibited such disclosure. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 2; Def.’s
Statement of Facts ¶¶ 2–4. On April 14, 2021, plaintiff appealed OJP’s decision to DOJ’s Office
of Information Policy, see Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 3; Def.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 5, which
subsequently affirmed OJP’s Exemption 3 withholding decision, see Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 4;
Def.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 6.
C. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint, on February 23, 2022, alleging that “[d]efendant
refused to release non-exempt information under Exemption 3” and Title I of the Crime Control
Act, in violation of FOIA. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendant answered the complaint,
reasserting its invocation of Exemption 3. See Def.’s Answer, Defenses ¶ 1, ECF No. 7. After
more than a month of dormancy in litigation, in violation of the Standing Order issued in this
case, see Standing Order, ECF No. 4, plaintiff was directed to show cause why this case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute because the parties had yet to file a meet and confer
statement within 14 days of the filing of defendant’s answer, as required by Standing Order ¶
3.b.i. See Min. Order (May 10, 2022). In response to that directive, the parties subsequently
filed a Joint Status Report stating that, after conferral, they agreed to seek resolution of the
Exemption 3 issue before litigating any other issues in this dispute, including whether other
FOIA exemptions might apply. See Joint Status Report at 1–2, ECF No. 10. The Court granted
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that joint request, see Min. Order (May 31, 2022), and the parties subsequently briefed the
propriety of withholding responsive DCRA records under FOIA’s Exemption 3, see generally
Def.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Cross-Mot. The matter is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment
only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as
a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805
(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “In FOIA cases, ‘summary judgment may be
granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather
than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory
evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Aguiar v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 865
F.3d 730, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d
208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Most FOIA cases “can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton
v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
FOIA was enacted “to promote the ‘broad disclosure of Government records’ by
generally requiring federal agencies to make their records available to the public on request.”
DiBacco v. U.S. Army (“DiBacco I”), 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Dep’t of
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988)). Agencies are therefore statutorily mandated to “make . .
. records promptly available to any person” who submits a request that “reasonably describes
such records” and “is made in accordance with [the agency’s] published rules.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(3)(A). To balance the public’s interest in governmental transparency and “legitimate
governmental and private interests [that] could be harmed by release of certain types of
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information,” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 913 F.3d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982)), FOIA contains nine exemptions, set forth
in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which “are ‘explicitly made exclusive’ and must be ‘narrowly construed,’”
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011) (first quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79
(1973); and then quoting Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“CREW I”), 746 F.3d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “[T]hese
limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant
objective of the Act.” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
FOIA authorizes federal courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records
and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). When an agency invokes an exemption to disclosure, district courts must
“determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The statute “places the burden ‘on the
agency to sustain its action,’ and the agency therefore bears the burden of proving that it has not
‘improperly’ withheld the requested records.” CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“CREW II”), 922
F.3d 480, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); and then quoting U.S.
Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993) (“The Government bears the burden of establishing that the
exemption applies.”); DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of Army (“DiBacco II”), 926 F.3d 827, 834 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (“‘An agency withholding responsive documents from a FOIA release bears the
burden of proving the applicability of claimed exemptions,’ typically through affidavit or
declaration.” (quoting DiBacco I, 795 F.3d at 195)). This burden does not shift even when the
requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment because the agency ultimately “bears the
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burden to establish the applicability of a claimed exemption to any records or portions of records
it seeks to withhold,” Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 830 F.3d 667, 673
(D.C. Cir. 2016), while “[t]he burden upon the requester is merely ‘to establish the absence of
material factual issues before a summary disposition of the case could permissibly occur,’” Pub.
Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
FOIA Exemption 3 applies to matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”
if that statute either (1) “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as
to leave no discretion on the issue,” or (2) “establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). The D.C.
Circuit has explained that “Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its
applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue
for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the
statute’s coverage.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Ass’n of
Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, the
defendant “need only show that the statute claimed is one of exemption as contemplated by
Exemption 3 and that the withheld material falls within the statute.” Larson v. Dep’t of State,
565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 761–62 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
III. DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute that the Crime Control Act’s Title I confidentiality provision is
an exemption that qualifies for withholding under FOIA’s Exemption 3—rightfully so, because it
undoubtedly is. Thus, the dispositive question, which no court has apparently yet encountered, is
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whether the requested records submitted to DOJ, as required by the DCRA, are covered by the
Title I confidentiality provision, i.e., whether those requested records are “furnished under” Title
I of the Crime Control Act.
Plaintiff argues that the requested information was “furnished under” the DCRA to DOJ,
not under Title I of the Crime Control Act, and so the confidentiality provision is inapplicable to
exempt categorically a response to plaintiff’s FOIA request, as defendant has justified the
withholdings in this case. See Pl.’s Mem. at 7–19. Conversely, DOJ defends the use of
Exemption 3 because “States are required to furnish [the requested information] only be virtue of
their voluntary participation in a Title I program, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance
Grant program” and because states “furnish[]” that information to a Title I entity, BJS, the
relevant data is “furnished under” Title I of the Crime Control Act and so the confidentiality
provision applies. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 10,
ECF No. 12-1. Defendant’s reading of the statute is far too strained. The confidentiality
provision’s plain text applies to information and data “furnished under” Title I and because the
requested information was “furnished under” or “pursuant to” the DCRA, the confidentiality
provision is inapplicable to the requested data and thus defendant may not withhold the DCRA
documents under Exemption 3.
In interpreting a statute, a court “begins ‘with the language of the statute itself’ and, if
necessary, ‘may turn to other customary statutory interpretation tools, including structure,
purpose, and legislative history.’” In re: Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. - MDL No.
1869, 34 F.4th 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citing Genus Med. Techs. LLC v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., 994 F.3d 631, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). The following analysis proceeds in that fashion.
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A. Statutory Text
Starting with the text, the key language of Title I’s confidentiality provision is as follows:
“[N]o officer or employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of assistance under the
provisions of this title shall use or reveal any research or statistical information furnished under
this title by any person and identifiable to any specific private person for any purpose other than
the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance with this title.” Crime Control Act §
818(a), 93 Stat. at 1213. “Of this title” most clearly refers to Title I, so the plain text of the
provision states that its confidentiality requirement only applies to information “furnished under”
Title I. Taking into account that a statute’s words are interpreted according to their “ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning,” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356,
2362 (2019), the plain and ordinary meanings of “furnish” and “under” are instructive.
“Furnish” means “provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or desirable,” “equip,”
“accomplish, complete, fulfil,” or “bring about, ensure,” Furnish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/furnish (last
visited Mar. 22, 2023); Furnish, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/75677?rskey=6iAKkb&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last
visited Mar 22, 2023), while “under” means “in or into a condition of subjection, regulation, or
subordination” or “in a subordinate or inferior position,” Under, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/under (last
visited Mar. 22, 2023); Under, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/211394?rskey=FlKjsQ&result=4#eid (last visited Mar 22,
2023). Read together, “furnished under” in the context of Title I is understood to mean that
information “provided or equipped subject to” Title I must adhere to the confidentiality
requirement. Otherwise phrased, “furnished under” is equivalent to the phrase “pursuant to.”
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The statistics plaintiff requests are “furnished under” the DCRA because they were
provided by state and federal law enforcement agencies subject to the requirements of that
statute. The DCRA mandated the submission of such death-in-custody information to DOJ, the
timeframe for such submissions, the specific details necessary for reporting, and the penalty for
states’ failure to comply with the DCRA’s requirements. Information provided to DOJ is thus
subject to the DCRA’s requirements. Those reporting requirements were not enacted as an
amendment to the Crime Control Act but as stand-alone legislation and thus are not even
codified as part of Title I, and so the sought-after information is not provided pursuant to Title I.
Accord Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 134–37 (1991) (interpreting the statutory phrase
regarding proceedings brought “under section 554” in the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)
to mean proceedings brought subject to the EAJA’s specific category of proceedings mentioned
in section 554, not proceedings brought under other statutes).
DOJ’s reading of the statute—explained only in its opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion
and not in defendant’s motion itself, see Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. &
Reply in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def’s Opp’n”) at 2–6, ECF No. 17—is unsupported by
the confidentiality provision’s plain text. The definitions defendant provides do not differ
greatly from those provided by plaintiff. Compare Def.’s Opp’n at 2–3, with Pl.’s Mem. at 7–9.
Their key point of divergence is their interpretation of “under” in the context of the
confidentiality provision. Defined by defendant as “subject to,” as did plaintiff, defendant seizes
on the DCRA’s enforcement mechanism to argue that “[s]tates are subject to the reporting
requirement of DCRA only because of their participation in, and the requirements of, the Byrne
Grant program.” See Def.’s Opp’n at 3. Yet, Congress’s choice of the DCRA’s enforcement
mechanism does not do the work defendant wishes with the result of overlaying the rest of the
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Crime Control Act’s Title I on the DCRA. Such a reading is simply neither apparent nor
supported by the confidentiality provision’s clear text.
Nothing in Title I, let alone in its confidentiality provision, requires reporting on the
specific type of data the DCRA mandates, and so that information is furnished under or subject
only to the DCRA’s requirements. As noted, the DCRA’s reference to Title I funds merely
piggy-backs on this funding source as an enforcement scheme Congress crafted for states that
fail to comply with the DCRA reporting requirements. Furthermore, defendant draws a false
distinction between the U.S. Code version and the Statutes at Large version of the confidentiality
provision, with the former codification substituting “chapter” for “title,” when that substitution
does not change the substantive effect of the statute. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods.
Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957) (“For it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and
consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect, unless such intention is clearly
expressed.”); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006) (quoting that
language from Fourco); United States v. Spears, 449 F.2d 946, 952 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The
Revised Statutes were not generally intended to work a change in existing law.”).
Defendant’s only other argument somewhat related to the statute’s text is to compare
Title I’s language with the statutory text of a wholly different statute discussed in Seymour v.
Barabba, 559 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but that comparison is inapt. In Seymour, the D.C.
Circuit held that a provision in the Census Act prohibiting the “use [of] the information furnished
under the provisions of this Title for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it
is supplied” applied to prevent disclosure of requested census information under Exemption 3.
559 F.2d at 807–08. The Circuit interpreted “furnished” to mean “gathered” and reasoned that
the requested information was “gathered by the Census Bureau; . . . categorized and assembled
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for the Census Bureau purposes[;]” and “is sufficiently related to the statistical data which the
firms eventually are called upon to report” such that the information “were gathered for the
Bureau’s statistical purposes under the provisions of this Title” and thus were protected by the
confidentiality provision. Id. at 808–09.
The holding in Seymour does not dictate a similar outcome in this case. First, Seymour’s
dispute involved the interpretation of “furnished” but not “furnished under,” as is critical here.
Seymour did not address the instant occurrence in which information is gathered under a statute
separate from Title I and that title’s confidentiality provision, and without a similar
confidentiality provision of its own. The Circuit noted that the requested information in Seymour
was gathered under the provisions of the title that included the confidentiality provision—all
falling under the purview of the Census Act’s mandates both to collect the data and protect it
from disclosure. See 559 F.2d at 808–09. Here, the Crime Control Act does not mandate the
death-in-custody reporting requirements; rather the DCRA does. Second, as discussed infra in
Section III.C, the purpose of the Census Act, to collect individuals’ personal information and
keep it out of the public sphere, matched the Circuit’s interpretation of the confidentiality
provision, that census information should be kept private. See 559 F.2d at 809. In comparison,
the purposes of the Crime Control Act and the DCRA are separate, distinct, and divergent. The
former is focused on federal funding of law enforcement at the state and local level, and the latter
on oversight, transparency, and accountability in law enforcement actions. Put simply, the plain
text of the Crime Control Act’s Title I’s confidentiality provision is not impacted by Seymour’s
holding and thus is inapplicable to information collected pursuant to the DCRA.
B. Structure
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” West
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Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607 (2022) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). In context, Title I of the Crime Control Act does not cover the specific
death-in-custody reporting requirements provided in the DCRA—Title I’s purview includes
financial assistance to state law enforcement programs, independent from the DCRA’s reporting
requirements. Additionally, reading Title I as the vehicle for the production of death-in-custody
information to DOJ, as defendant seeks to do, impermissibly expands Title I’s scope in that the
statute provides funding for state and local governments whereas the DCRA imposes reporting
requirements on both state and federal governments. See DCRA § 2(a), 128 Stat. at 2861
(outlining state reporting requirements); accord 34 U.S.C. 60105(a) (codification of such); see
also DCRA § 3(a), 128 Stat. at 2861 (outlining federal law enforcement reporting requirements).
Thus, to interpret the requested records as being “furnished under” Title I when non-Title I
entities must also comply with the DCRA’s requirements is a puzzle defendant fails to
acknowledge, let alone resolve.
Defendant’s reading of the statute also does not account for its incompatible effect on
related provisions. See Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 1929, 1939 (2022) (“[Courts]
must normally seek to construe Congress’s work so that effect is given to all provisions, so that
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal citation omitted));
Genus Medical Technologies, 994 F.3d at 638 (“[A] statute should be construed to give effect to
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”
(internal citation omitted)). As plaintiff raises, see Pl.’s Mem. at 16–19, Congress incorporated
explicit reference to Title I’s confidentiality provision in two statutes that are otherwise
independent of Title I, namely, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act and the
Justice Assistance Act, thereby making clear that those statutes were subject to the statutory
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exemption in the Crime Control Act. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 641, 98 Stat. 1837, 2122
(1984) (amending the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act to read, “Sections 809(c),
811(a), 811(b), 811(c), 812(a) [the confidentiality provision], 812(b), and 812(d) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as so designated by the operation of the
amendments made by the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, shall apply with respect to the
administration of and compliance with this Act”); id., § 609Q, 98 Stat. at 2105 (amending the
Justice Assistance Act to read, “Section 812 [the confidentiality provision] of part H of title I of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 . . . shall apply with respect to . . .
information furnished under this subdivision . . . except that the terms “this title” and “this
section”, as such terms appear in such section 812, shall be deemed to be references to this
subdivision and this section, respectively, of this Act”).
Defendant now asks this Court to accept that Congress saw no need for such explicit
reference in the DCRA because of the “necessarily and inextricably intertwined” nature of the
DCRA and Title I of the Crime Control Act by the DCRA’s cross-reference to a Title I program.
See Def.’s Mem. at 11. That logic does not hold water and instead undermines Congress’s
deliberate choice to add such statutory reference in two statutes and notably not in the DCRA,
enacted in 2014, long after enactment of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
and the Justice Assistance Act. While the lack of explicit statutory reference to the
confidentiality provision in the DCRA is not conclusive of Title I’s meaning, cf. Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) (“If the text is clear, it needs no
repetition in the legislative history; and if the text is ambiguous, silence in the legislative history
cannot lend any clarity.”), it surely supports the confidentiality provision’s plain-text meaning as
reaching no further than Title I and other statutes expressly made subject to its terms.
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C. Purpose
Although “policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text,”
Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022), courts “‘must avoid an interpretation that
undermines congressional purpose considered as a whole when alternative interpretations
consistent with the legislative purpose are available,’” United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)). As stated, the text of Title I’s confidentiality provision is plain and clear, and for
good measure, the divergent purposes of the Crime Control Act and the DCRA confirm that
interpretation.
The Crime Control Act aimed “[t]o assist State and local governments in reducing the
incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement
and criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). Its 1979 amendment, which provided the exact language of the
confidentiality provision in dispute, further stated its purpose “to restructure the Federal Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, to assist State and local governments in improving the
quality of their justice systems, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. No. 96-157, 97 Stat. 1167
(1979). The text of the confidentiality provision reveals Congress’s desire to keep private “any
research or statistical information furnished under this title by any person and identifiable to any
specific private person,” meant to restrict access to the personal information of individuals. Id.,§ 818(a), 93 Stat. at 1213.
Conversely, the DCRA sought to “encourage States to report to the Attorney General
certain information regarding the deaths of individuals in the custody of law enforcement
agencies.” Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014). The information the DCRA requires to
be reported to the Attorney General includes personal, identifying information about individuals
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arrested, incarcerated, detained, or in the process of which, including, inter alia, their names,
gender, race, age, date and time of their death, and the circumstances surrounding their death.
Id., § 2(b), 128 Stat. at 2860. See, e.g., 160 Cong. Rec. S6579-80 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2014)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“The Death in Custody Reporting Act, which will provide
important transparency to law enforcement efforts and our prison system. The Death in Custody
Reporting Act will require that State and Federal law enforcement officials report deaths in their
custody, including those that occur during arrest. The Justice Department will then have the
opportunity to analyze the data and see what we can learn from it. The American people deserve
as much.”); 159 Cong. Rec. H8048 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013) (statement of Rep. Doug Collins)
(stating that the DCRA “will also provide important information to Congress on any need to
improve Federal custody procedures.”); 155 Cong. Rec. H887 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2009) (statement
of Rep. Mike Honda) (“The data that will be reported under the bill will allow public officials
and those in the nonprofit sector to track mortality rates as related to illness, suicide, homicide,
drug and alcohol use, and other causes of death.”); 154 Cong. Rec. H428 (daily ed. Jan. 23,
2008) (statement of Rep. Nancy Pelosi) (referring to the DCRA: “Its purpose is to provide
continued and improved oversight over the conduct of law enforcement officials during arrest
and imprisonment of fellow citizens.”). That information-gathering spoke to Congress’s desire
to hold states and federal law enforcement entities accountable, to allow for congressional
oversight of those entities’ processes and outcomes, and to provide transparency in state and
federal entities tasked with holding a person in custody and to draw back the curtain on the
oftentimes controversial instances when those in law enforcement custody subsequently die.
With this understanding, to interpret Title I’s confidentiality provision to exempt disclosure of
information gathered pursuant to the DCRA forces a reading of the Crime Control Act that
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undermines the accountability, oversight, and transparency Congress intended to establish in the
DCRA.
Defendant contends that BJS, a subdivision within DOJ, “collected and published
statistics on deaths in custody under its Title I authority for decades prior to the enactment of
DCRA in 2000” and so “[t]hose data have therefore historically been protected from
unauthorized disclosure by the Title I confidentiality statute.” Def.’s Opp’n at 6. This
contention seemingly posits that the Crime Control Act exhibits a purpose to collect statistics,
such as those described in the DCRA. See id. at 7 (citing as support for that authority 34 U.S.C.
§ 10132(c), which describes BJS’s duties to include the compilation and analysis of “national
statistics concerning all aspects of criminal justice”). That argument is unpersuasive. DOJ does
not cite any provision of the Crime Control Act that requires certain statistical recordkeeping and
reporting, let alone of death-in-custody instances. Rather, DOJ cites various statistical tables on
mortality in jails and prisons that BJS has produced since 1980 as well as BJS’s general authority
to collect statistics; but DOJ’s seemingly voluntary and independent effort to compile that
information is quite different from a statutorily mandated reporting requirement with a 10%-
funding-reduction penalty for states required to comply but fail to do so. Second, as plaintiff
notes, the information independently collected by BJS is not the exact type that the DCRA
requires, so it is inaccurate to say that the death-in-custody information plaintiff seeks is the kind
BJS collected on its own—that data would not be fully responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request.
Overall, though not dispositive, the stark difference between the purpose of Title I’s
confidentiality provision in the Crime Control Act, to assist law enforcement, and the focus on
transparency, accountability, and oversight of custodial institutions at the heart of the DCRA
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further supports the plain text of the provision and its inability to exempt release of plaintiff’s
requested data.
D. Legislative History
As a final note, the legislative history of Title I of the Crime Control Act further confirms
the statute’s plain text meaning. See Carlson v. Postal Regul. Comm., 938 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (“[W]hen the statutory text is clear, legislative history should not be used to muddy its
meaning.”); Milner, 562 U.S. at 574 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is
meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). Since its enactment in 1968, Title I has been
amended numerous times and in those instances, Congress has not mentioned any applicability
of the Title’s confidentiality provision to the DCRA. 2 Additionally, the DCRA in its original
form enacted in 2000 made no reference to Title I, Pub. L. 106-297, 114 Stat. 1045 (Oct. 13,
2000) (now codified at 34 U.S.C.A. § 12104), showing that Congress intended this law to stand
as its own set of requirements regardless of Title I’s requirements and structure. When the
DCRA was reauthorized in 2014, the reference to Title I was merely to establish its enforcement
mechanism, which impacted the allocation of Title I funds—Title I played no greater role in the
DCRA in 2014 than it did in 2000. 3 Of course, “silence in the legislative history, ‘no matter how
clanging,’ cannot defeat the better reading of the text and statutory context.” Encino Motorcars,
2
Plaintiff cites eight instances when Title I has been amended in the last four years. See Pl.’s Mem. at 20
n.2. In addition to those amendments, Title I has also been amended numerous times since its enactment. See, e.g.,
Pub. L. 114-155, 130 Stat. 389 (May 16, 2016); Pub. L. 110-421, 122 Stat. 4778 (Oct. 15, 2008); Pub. L. 110-416,
122 Stat. 4352 (Oct. 14, 2008); Pub. L. 106-110, 113 Stat. 1497 (Nov. 24, 1999); Pub. L. 102-354, 106 Stat. 3542
(Oct. 27, 1992); Pub. L. 102-520, 106 Stat. 3402 (Oct. 25, 1992); Pub. L. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (Oct. 15, 1976);
Pub. L. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (Aug. 6, 1973).
3
Both parties acknowledge that the DCRA was originally enacted in 2000, Pl.’s Mem. at 1; Def.’s Opp’n at
6, but that statute expired in December 2006, see H.R. Rep. No. 113-285, at 2 (2013). Yet plaintiff’s FOIA request
includes information collected by DOJ from 2010 to 2014—a period of time when no DCRA authority existed,
before the reauthorization of the DCRA in 2014. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts at 1; Def.’s Statement of Facts at 1.
Neither party raises that plaintiff requests information during a time when no DCRA reporting requirement was in
effect, and therefore, the Court will not address that point either.
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138 S. Ct. at 1143 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 n.13 (1985)).
Nonetheless, in this instance, the legislative history supports the text and statutory context.
IV. CONCLUSION
Employing all tools of statutory construction, the clear text of the confidentiality
provision in Title I of the Crime Control Act plainly does not exempt release of information
“furnished under” or gathered pursuant to the Death in Custody Reporting Act. As such, DOJ
wrongfully withheld information requested by plaintiff under FOIA Exemption 3. Consequently,
plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted and defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is denied.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.
Date: March 29, 2023
__________________________
BERYL A. HOWELL
District Judge
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