Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States Department of the Interior

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE
INDIANS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
and
THE CHEROKEE NATION,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v. Civil Action No. 20-757 (JEB)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, et al.,
Defendants,
and
THE CATAWBA INDIAN NATION,
Defendant-Intervenor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
“Las Vegas is the only place I know where money really talks — it says, ‘Goodbye.’” So
says Frank Sinatra’s character in the 1957 film The Joker is Wild. Put differently: it’s good to be
in the casino business.
The Catawba Indian Nation are eager to get into that business. Like many Native tribes,
the Catawba’s members face serious economic difficulties. Like many tribes, the Catawba do
not have a large tax base or other revenue stream, leaving them dependent on inconstant public
funding. And like many tribes, the Catawba believe that a casino and entertainment complex
will help with both problems. To that end, in 2018 the Tribe asked the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
a part of the U.S. Department of Interior, to take a 16-acre parcel of land in North Carolina into
trust so that the Tribe could build a casino and entertainment complex there. On March 12,
2020, the agency formally agreed.
Within days, Plaintiff Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), which has its own
casinos in North Carolina, filed this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting
that BIA’s decision violated a host of federal statutes and regulations. The Catawba quickly
intervened as Defendants to protect their project. Concerned that the construction of the
complex would destroy Cherokee historical artifacts or human remains — or perhaps pose a
competitive gambling threat — Plaintiff then moved to preliminarily enjoin the transfer of land
to the federal government. This Court denied that motion, finding that because EBCI had not
“shown that it is likely that Cherokee historical artifacts even exist at the [development] site,” the
Tribe had not established the requisite irreparable harm. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, No. 20-757, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2020) (EBCI).
Although construction has commenced at the site, the litigation continues, and all
Plaintiffs — including Intervenor-Plaintiff the Cherokee Nation (a distinct entity from EBCI) and
twelve individual Plaintiffs who are members of EBCI — now move for summary judgment.
The Government and the Catawba oppose and so cross-move. Plaintiffs raise several close and
complex questions of statutory and regulatory construction, and the Court certainly cannot fault
them for rolling the dice here. In the end, though, they come up with snake eyes, as on each
claim they either lack standing or lose on the merits. The Court will thus enter summary
judgment for Defendants.
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I. Background
A. Factual Background
Because this is an APA case, there is little (though not zero) factual dispute. The Court
accordingly draws on its prior Opinion, which sets out many of the relevant facts here. EBCI,
2020 WL 2079443, at *1–3. It also preliminarily notes the high quality of briefing on both sides,
which greatly helped clarify the complex issues at stake, but also made declaring no simple task,
as the length of this Opinion attests.
1993 Settlement and Settlement Act
Long before the arrival of the English colonists on our shores, the Catawba Indian
Nation’s ancestors resided in what is now North and South Carolina. Over the ensuing centuries,
a familiar and unfortunate drama played out, as the Tribe ceded nearly all of its aboriginal lands
in exchange for promises often broken. See generally South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe,
Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986). Although that story certainly deserves more in-depth treatment in
another forum, we pick it up in 1980 when the Tribe, at that point not federally recognized,
commenced a series of lawsuits against the United States and South Carolina, asserting its rights
to certain lands in that state. Id.; Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564(Fed. Cir. 1993). After trips up, down, and around the federal judiciary, in 1992 the parties came
to a comprehensive settlement, ending the disputes and restoring the Tribe’s federal recognition.
That agreement is reflected in three different legal instruments. First, the Tribe and South
Carolina executed a settlement agreement in 1993. See Agreement in Principle, as reprinted in
Hearing on S. 1156 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 120 (1993). In short,
this Settlement Agreement obliged the Tribe to relinquish its land claims, outlined the State’s
obligations to the Tribe going forward, and established the legal regimes that would govern the
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Tribe. For instance, the Agreement required South Carolina to transfer title to the Catawba’s
existing reservation, which the state had held in trust, to the federal government, see Settlement
Agreement § 14.1, and further provided that the State would pay (along with the feds) millions
into several different trust funds for the benefit of the Tribe. Id. §§ 5.1, 5.2, 13. The Agreement
also established detailed procedures by which the Catawba could acquire further land both as
part of its reservation and outside of it. Id. §§ 14, 15.
The Agreement’s negotiators, which included members of South Carolina’s
congressional delegation, recognized that both state and federal legislation would be “necessary”
to implement the agreement. See Memorandum of Cooperation, as reprinted in Hearing on S.
1156 Before the Senate. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 118 (1993). To that end, in mid-
1993, South Carolina enacted the Catawba Indian Claims Settlement Act, 1993 S.C. Act No. 142
(codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-10 et seq.). Congress followed up in October with the
Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
116, 107 Stat. 1118 (1993) (Settlement Act). Both enactments noted the need for the legislation
in order to effectuate the settlement, see S.C. Code. Ann. § 27-16-20(4); Pub. L. No. 103-116, §
2(a)(7), and the federal Settlement Act expressly stated that one of its purposes was “to approve,
ratify, and confirm the Settlement Agreement . . . except as otherwise provided by this Act.”
Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 2(b). Construing the terms of the federal Settlement Act is one of the
Court’s central tasks in this case.
The Catawba’s Current Situation
Today, the Catawba are the only federally recognized tribe headquartered in South
Carolina. Although most of its 3,000 or so members live in that state, “approximately 253
resid[e] in North Carolina.” U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
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for Catawba Indian Nation Fee-to-Trust Land Acquisition Application 4 (Mar. 10, 2020), AR
3842 (Proposed Findings).
As noted above, the Tribe has significant economic troubles. According to data from
several years ago, its unemployment rate is over three times the averages in the Carolinas (13.8%
to 4.3%), while its members’ median household income is roughly two-thirds of the states’
medians ($33,029 to about $47,000). See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Decision Letter 12 (Mar. 12,
2020), AR 3866. The Tribe’s tax base is thus quite weak, and it lacks its own reliable revenue
stream, leaving it heavily dependent on federal funding. Id.; Application of the Catawba Indian
Nation to Acquire 16.57 Acres +/- of Off-Reservation Trust Land at AR 456 (Sept. 17, 2018)
(Discretionary Application). When in the past that funding has dried up, the Tribe has been
forced to cut programming for its members, such as after-school programs for its children and
services for domestic-violence victims. See Decision Letter at 12. As is often true for entities in
distress, the Tribe is caught in a vicious cycle: much of the reason it lacks sustainable revenue is
that it lacks developable land, id. at 27, and it lacks developable land in large part given the debts
it has increasingly incurred. For instance, the Tribe recently had to transfer a sizeable parcel of
fee-simple land to a local South Carolina school district just to cover the cost for tribal students
to attend. Id. at 12; Discretionary Application at AR 456.
The Catawba’s Casino Plans
Seeking a much-needed economic foothold, in 2013 the Catawba requested the
Department of the Interior to take into trust on its behalf a 16-acre parcel of land known as the
Kings Mountain Site in Cleveland County, North Carolina. See Decision Letter at 2. The Tribe
hoped to use that site, which is only 33 miles from its South Carolina headquarters, see Proposed
Findings at 12, to conduct gaming and build an entertainment complex. See Application of the
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Catawba Indian Nation to Acquire 16.57 Acres +/- in Kings Mountain, North Carolina 4 (Aug.
30, 2013), AR 185 (Mandatory Application).
The Tribe argued that Interior was required to grant its application given the agency’s
obligations under the 1993 Settlement Act. Id. at 1–3. Interior, however, did not share that
view. In a 2018 memorandum, it concluded that the reservation-expansion provisions of the
Settlement Act cited by the Tribe applied exclusively to land located in South Carolina and thus
did not require Interior to grant the application. See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Memorandum,
Mandatory Trust Authority Under the Catawba Settlement Act 5 (Mar. 23, 2018), AR 434
(Mandatory Trust Memo).
After closing that door, however, the agency conspicuously opened a window. As it
explained, “Though the mandatory trust provisions of the Settlement Act are unavailing here,
there are other avenues through which the Kings Mountain parcel may be brought into trust.” Id.
“For example,” it explained, “the Tribe may file a discretionary fee-to-trust application under”
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and its implementing regulations. Id.; see 25
U.S.C. § 5108; 25 C.F.R. Part 151. Shortly thereafter, the Tribe did just that, asking Interior to
take the same land into trust in its discretion, thereby enabling the Catawba “to construct a casino
and mixed-use entertainment complex.” Decision Letter at 2. It also asked Interior to confirm
that the land would be eligible for gaming pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2719. Id. at 1. The Catawba estimated that, if allowed to proceed, “the complex would
generate $72 million in income in its first year of operation, rising to $150 million in year five.”
EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *1. Perhaps more importantly, the development would create over
“2,600 direct employment opportunities.” Id. (quoting Decision Letter at 27).
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Interior’s Process
In considering the Tribe’s discretionary application, Interior undertook a lengthy project
analysis aimed at satisfying the myriad statutory prerequisites to federal action, including those
imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act and National Historic Preservation Act.
Broadly speaking, NEPA mandates that agencies evaluate the potential environmental impact of
any “major Federal action[],” 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(h), whereas NHPA requires
similar consideration of effects on “historic propert[ies],” including “[p]roperty of traditional
religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe.” 54 U.S.C. §§ 302706, 300308, 306108.
Pursuant to those obligations, the agency took a number of steps to ascertain whether any
historic or cultural resources might be present at the Kings Mountain Site. It conducted a search
of the “historical and archaeological literature” and queried the National Register of Historic
Places (using an online tool created by North Carolina) within a one-mile range of the site. See
Final Environmental Assessment: Catawba Indian Nation Trust Acquistion [sic] and Multi-Use
Entertainment Complex 24 (March 2020), AR 2529. That inquiry turned up “[n]o verified
historic properties” and “[n]o eligible or potentially eligible historic properties” at the site. Id. at
25. Interior also contacted North Carolina’s State Historic Preservation Office to see whether it
knew of any historic resources present at the Kings Mountain Site. See Letter from Ramona M.
Bartos to Kim Hamlin (Feb. 22, 2019), AR 2975; Decision Letter at 33. The SHPO likewise
responded that it was “aware of no historic resources which would be affected by the project.”
Bartos Letter, AR 2975.
The agency accordingly forged ahead with its evaluation, and on December 22, 2019, it
published its draft Environmental Assessment as required by NEPA and opened a thirty-day
comment period. See Decision Letter at 31; see also Draft Environmental Assessment: Catawba
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Indian Nation Trust Acquisition and Multi-Use Entertainment Complex (Dec. 2019), AR 1763.
The Draft EA reported the agency’s assessment that “[n]o known historic, cultural, religious, or
archaeological resources or paleontological resources would be affected” by the proposed
development. See Draft EA at 36. The agency thought it “unlikely that the area [would] yield[]
important paleontological specimens” because it was “highly disturbed,” having “previously
[been] prospected for tin,” used “as a soil borrow site” for another construction project, and later
graded (leveled) by the state Department of Transportation. Id. at 19, 23–24; Letter from R.
Glen Melville to Russell Townsend (Jan. 30, 2020), AR 2481. The Draft EA also noted that the
project, if approved, would abide by a number of archaeological “Best Management Practices”
aimed at “minimiz[ing] the potential adverse effect of construction activities to previously
unknown archaeological or paleontological resources in the case of inadvertent discovery.”
Draft EA at 14.
Immediately after publishing the Draft EA, Interior notified EBCI via email and
“request[ed] [its] review and comments.” See ECF No. 13-2 (Declaration of Chester McGhee),
¶¶ 6–7, ECF pp. 3–4 (“I know EBCI is interested in the project, so I wanted to make sure you
were aware.”). EBCI responded several weeks later, objecting to the Draft EA on several
grounds. See EBCI Comments on the Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Trust
Acquisition (Jan. 22, 2020), AR 2475. EBCI first protested that the Draft EA had been
developed without consulting it as to the potential impact of the project on Cherokee cultural
resources, although Plaintiff did not state or suggest that any such resources existed at the Kings
Mountain Site. Id. at 1–2. Interior followed up eight days later with a letter to EBCI’s Tribal
Historic Preservation Officer Russell Townsend, seeking to “verify with [his] office that the
proposed project w[ould] not impact any specific sites having potential religious or cultural
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significance” to EBCI. See Melville Letter, AR 2481; see also id. (“BIA is very interested in
hearing from your office regarding the project.”); see also ECF No. 13-2 at ECF p. 9 (Email from
Chester McGhee to Russell Townsend and Brian Burgess) (“We would very much like to know
from your office if there are cultural sites significant to EBCI within the [site].”).
Over the next few weeks, the agency and EBCI exchanged further email correspondence
that culminated in a meeting here in Washington on February 10, 2020. See ECF Nos. 14-7
(Briefing Emails); 14-2 (Declaration of Richard Sneed), ¶¶ 7–9, 13; 14-5 (EBCI Briefing Paper).
At that meeting, EBCI Chairman Richard Sneed reiterated Plaintiff’s concern that the “project
could impact Cherokee cultural sites because the land is within [Cherokee] traditional territory.”
Sneed Decl., ¶ 15. Those concerns were later raised again by Townsend in a March 15 email and
letter to an Interior official. See McGhee Decl. at ECF pp. 29, 36–37. In this letter, Townsend
mentioned (for the first time, as far as the Court can tell) that “according to [EBCI’s] records
there actually is an archaeological site recorded within the project location listed in the NC State
Archaeological Site Inventory.” Id. at ECF p. 36. The letter did not claim that the site involved
Cherokee artifacts or remains, nor did it provide any further detail.
In any event, by that point Interior had already completed its Final EA and issued a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), paving the way for the project to go forward under
NEPA without a more detailed environmental impact statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6.
Specifically, the Final EA and FONSI were completed as of March 10, 2020. See Proposed
Findings at 1; see also Decision Letter at 12, 31; Finding of No Significant Impact Kings
Mountain, NC Fee-To-Trust Casino Project Catawba Indian Nation (Mar. 12, 2020), AR 3893.
The Final EA responded to EBCI’s comments, explaining that Interior had “conclude[d] that no
historic resources would be affected by the [p]roposed [p]roject” based on the process and
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information discussed above. See Final EA, App. M, at 8, AR 3238. The agency also noted that
it had “received no response from [Townsend] regarding the [project] prior to making a final
decision on the Catawba Indian Nation’s application.” Id.Armed with the Final EA and FONSI, on March 12, 2020, Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs Tara Sweeney granted the Catawba’s discretionary fee-into-trust application, concluding
in a lengthy opinion that the Tribe would be eligible to conduct gaming at the Kings Mountain
Site under IGRA and instructing that the site be taken into trust for that purpose. See Decision
Letter. Sweeney noted the agency’s conclusion that the development would “not affect historic
resources.” Id. at 33.
B. Procedural History
Within days, on March 17, EBCI filed this suit against the Government and sought a
preliminary injunction preventing the agency from taking the Kings Mountain Site into trust.
See EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *3. The Catawba sought to intervene as Defendants to support
the Government, which this Court permitted. Id.After hearing oral argument via teleconference (the pandemic having just begun), the
Court denied EBCI’s motion on the ground that it had failed to establish irreparable harm. Id.EBCI argued that injunctive relief was necessary to ensure that it did not forever lose its NHPA
and NEPA rights to consultation on whether Cherokee artifacts or remains exist at the Kings
Mountain Site. Id. at *4. As the Court’s Opinion explained, however, that was merely a
procedural injury that could not, “standing alone . . . constitute irreparable harm.” Id. (citing
Friends of Animals v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 232 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2017)).
EBCI, however, did offer a sufficiently concrete interest that is meant to be protected by NHPA
and NEPA consultation rights — namely, the preservation of “cultural patrimony and/or human
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remains” that would otherwise be destroyed by the casino’s construction. Id. (quoting ECF No.
2 (Pl. PI Motion) at 3). But Plaintiff failed to establish that “such irreparable injury [was] likely
in the absence of an injunction,” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008), because, in the Court’s
view, it had “not shown that it is likely that Cherokee historical artifacts even exist at the Kings
Mountain Site.” EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5 (“Given this thin record, the Court cannot
conclude that it is likely that any EBCI resources exist on the parcel of land at issue.”). The
Catawba had also agreed to halt construction and alert EBCI if any artifacts were uncovered,
further mitigating the possibility of irreparable injury. Id. at *6. The Court consequently denied
injunctive relief on those grounds alone. Although transfer of the land thus went forward in
early 2020, construction is still ongoing and will likely continue for at least six more months.
See ECF No. 68 (Notice Regarding Execution of Gaming Compact) at 1–2. To date, no party
has alerted the Court of any discoveries.
The litigation did not end, however; indeed, a number of additional parties have joined
the fray. One day after the Court denied injunctive relief, the Cherokee Nation — a distinct
tribal entity from EBCI, though the two share a common history — sought to intervene as
Plaintiff, asserting that the Government had also violated its separate consultation rights under
NEPA and the NHPA by failing to contact it at all while analyzing the project. See ECF No. 26
(Mot. to Intervene); ECF No. 33 (Cherokee Complaint), ¶¶ 136–40. Several months later, after
Defendants moved to dismiss, EBCI filed an Amended Complaint adding as Plaintiffs twelve
enrolled members of the Tribe who live near the Kings Mountain Site. See ECF No. 41
(Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 11–24. The Cherokee, too, amended their Complaint. See ECF No.
42.
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EBCI and its members assert six different claims. The first three allege that Interior’s
decision is contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act for several reasons, namely:
(1) the 1993 Settlement Act categorically bars the Catawba from operating a casino under IGRA;
(2) the Settlement Act similarly precludes the Catawba from having land taken into trust on their
behalf under the IRA; and (3) the Kings Mountain Site is not eligible for gaming activities under
IGRA’s implementing regulations. EBCI and its members’ fourth claim, also arising under the
APA, is that Interior arbitrarily ignored the sordid background of Wallace Cheves, a private
businessman and the Catawba’s partner in the casino venture. Finally, Plaintiffs also maintain
that Interior violated NEPA and the NHPA. See ECF No. 52 (Pl. SJ Mot.) at 15–16. The
Cherokee Nation itself asserts only the last two causes of action (although EBCI and the
Cherokee filed consolidated briefs). Id. at 16. The Federal Defendants and Catawba answered
the Amended Complaints, and all parties have now moved and cross-moved for summary
judgment.
After those motions were ripe for decision, the Court ordered Interior to supplement the
administrative record with two agency memoranda referred to in its final decision documents.
See Minute Order of March 16, 2021; Amfac Resorts, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 143 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[A] complete administrative record should include all materials
that might have influenced the agency’s decision.”) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
The agency then moved for reconsideration of that Order on the ground that the identified
materials were privileged. See ECF No. 71. In light of the Government’s representation that the
relevant memos “substantially overlap with” materials already in the record, id. at 4, the Court
sees no need for protracted litigation of privilege issues, and it will therefore grant the
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reconsideration motion and vacate its earlier Order. That procedural hiccup overcome, the Court
is now ready to rule.
II. Legal Standard
The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the administrative record and
seek review of an agency decision under the APA. See Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357,
1367 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[B]ecause NEPA does not create a private right of action, we can
entertain NEPA-based challenges only under the [APA].”); Karst Env’t Educ. & Prot., Inc. v.
EPA, 475 F.3d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“NHPA actions must also be brought pursuant to
the APA.”). The summary-judgment standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
therefore, “does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative
record.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted).
Rather, “when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, . . . the district judge sits as
an appellate tribunal.” Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Am.
Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). In other words, “[t]he
entire case on review is a question of law.” Id. (quoting Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth. v.
Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The APA “sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency
action for procedural correctness.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513
(2009). It requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agency action is obviously “not in accordance
with law” if it violates some extant federal statute or regulation. Arbitrary-and-capricious review
is somewhat more amorphous. Agency action will fail that test if, for example, the agency
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“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
“‘The scope of review [in an APA case] is narrow and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency,’ provided the agency has ‘examine[d] the data and articulate[d]
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’” Airmotive Eng’g Corp. v. FAA, 882 F.3d 1157, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). While the Court
“may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given, [it]
will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)
(citation omitted) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); then citing Colo.
Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595 (1945)).
III. Analysis
Like the parties, the Court will begin with the thorniest questions presented here, which
correspond to the first three claims set forth above: (1) whether the Catawba are generally
eligible to game under IGRA; (2) whether the Catawba are eligible to benefit from Interior’s
land-into-trust authority under the IRA; and (3) whether the Kings Mountain Site is suitable for
gaming under IGRA and its implementing regulations. The Court proceeds in this order because
the first two issues require structurally similar analyses of the 1993 Settlement Act. Although all
three questions are close, the Court ultimately finds that the answers come back “Yes, Yes, Yes”
— a jackpot for Defendants. (For this reason, there is no need to address Defendants’ additional
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argument that Plaintiffs fall outside the “zone of interests” protected by the Settlement Act. See
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 156 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 844
F.3d 952 (D.C. Cir. 2016).) The Court then proceeds in turn through the remaining APA,
NHPA, and NEPA claims.
A. IGRA
The first issue raised by Plaintiffs involves the applicability of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. The Catawba, like all tribes, may only conduct “class II” and “class III gaming
activities” — with class III covering most of the games typically offered at casinos, see 25
U.S.C. §§ 2703(7)–(8) — as allowed by that statute. Id. § 2710(a)(2) (“Any class II gaming on
Indian lands . . . shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.”); id. § 2710(d)(1) (“Class III
gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities [meet IGRA’s procedural
and substantive requirements].”). In addition to setting out the general conditions under which
such gaming may occur, IGRA also vests the federal government with substantial regulatory and
enforcement powers. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 785–86 (2014).
EBCI argues that section 14 of the Settlement Act makes IGRA inapplicable to the
Catawba, such that they may not benefit from its general authorization of Indian gaming on
Indian lands. That section reads as follows:
SEC. 14. GAMES OF CHANCE.
(a) INAPPLICABILITY OF INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY
ACT.—The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.)
shall not apply to the Tribe.
(b) GAMES OF CHANCE GENERALLY.—The Tribe shall have
the rights and responsibilities set forth in the Settlement Agreement
and the [South Carolina] Act with respect to the conduct of games
of chance. Except as specifically set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and the [South Carolina] Act, all laws, ordinances, and
regulations of [South Carolina], and its political subdivisions, shall
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govern the regulation of gambling devices and the conduct of
gambling or wagering by the Tribe on and off the Reservation.
Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 14.
Plaintiffs argue that section 14(a), which states that IGRA “shall not apply to the Tribe,”
plainly and categorically prohibits the Catawba from gaming under the Act. See Pl. SJ Mot. at
17. That is an understandable first-blush reaction. Yet it depends on “examining [that]
particular statutory provision in isolation” and ignoring the maxim that “[t]he meaning — or
ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). That is the case here.
Reading section 14(a) in its proper context reveals a critical ambiguity: it is not clear whether
section 14(a)’s IGRA ban applies outside of South Carolina. Indeed, as the Court will presently
explain, the better construction is that section 14(a) makes IGRA inapplicable only in South
Carolina and says nothing about the law’s applicability elsewhere. At a minimum, the
Settlement Act is ambiguous on this question, and because it was “passed for the benefit of [an]
Indian tribe[],” that ambiguity must be “resolved in favor of the Indians.” Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (citation omitted).
Two key pieces of evidence suggest that section 14(a), despite its unqualified text, is
implicitly limited in effect to South Carolina. First, section 14 has materially identical language
to a corresponding section of the Settlement Agreement that is best read as applying exclusively
in South Carolina. Like section 14 of the Settlement Act, section 16.1 of the Settlement
Agreement states that IGRA “shall not apply to the Tribe.” Immediately following that sentence,
however, the Agreement sets out paragraph upon paragraph of rules specifying how the Tribe’s
gambling will be regulated under South Carolina law. Id. § 16.2–16.9. (Those rules are
duplicated in the South Carolina Settlement Act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-110.) In context,
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then, the intent of the Settlement Agreement seems to have been to establish a specific regime
for Catawba gambling in South Carolina that would supersede IGRA’s more Tribe-friendly
framework — hence the need to clarify that an otherwise preemptive federal law, IGRA, would
not apply. Put differently, the Settlement Agreement made clear that IGRA would not apply to
the Tribe because tribal gambling would instead be covered by specific rules set out in the
Settlement Agreement and/or state law. Under that reading, the Agreement has nothing to say
about whether the Tribe would be permitted to game under IGRA outside of South Carolina.
That is unsurprising, as the Agreement is exclusively between South Carolina and the Tribe. See
Settlement Agreement § 1 (naming parties to the Agreement). There is no apparent reason why a
contractual arrangement between South Carolina and the Tribe would need to address whether
IGRA would apply outside the state, nor any indication that South Carolina was keen to ban the
Tribe from gaming altogether outside its borders.
If that is right, then the words “[IGRA] shall not apply to the Tribe” in the Settlement
Agreement are best read as governing only gaming in South Carolina. And given that
interpretation, the Court fails to see why the identical words of the federal Settlement Act,
lodged within a largely identical section of text addressing the same gaming issue, should be
construed any differently. A key purpose of the federal Act, after all, was to “to approve, ratify,
and confirm the Settlement Agreement.” Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 2(b)(1). To that end, where
Congress simply copied and pasted the Settlement Agreement’s language, one should assume
that it meant to ratify the bargain struck in that Agreement.
Second, although the text of section 14(a) itself does not suggest that it is limited to South
Carolina, nearby statutory text strongly implies that to be the case. Consider section 14(b),
which also lacks any textual limitation to South Carolina, but in context must be read as limited
17
to just that one state. Section 14(b) states that “all laws, ordinances, and regulations of [South
Carolina], and its political subdivisions, shall govern the regulation of gambling devices and the
conduct of gambling or wagering by the Tribe on and off the Reservation.” Pub. L. No. 103-116,
§ 14(b). Because the phrase “off the Reservation,” read in isolation, would apply nationwide, the
plain text seems to provide that South Carolina law “shall govern [gambling] by the Tribe” in the
other 49 states. If that were true, however, absurd consequences would follow. For instance, the
Tribe could “apply to the South Carolina Department of Revenue for a special bingo license” to
hold bingo games in North Carolina, which South Carolina would be required to grant, see S.C.
Code. Ann. § 27-16-110(C), and which would result in income taxable only by South Carolina.
Id. Even if that regime were constitutional, which the Court doubts, but see United States v.
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294–97 (1958), it is not plausible that Congress intended to create such
a bizarre law-school hypothetical by enacting section 14(b). That absurd outcome is easily
avoided, of course, by reading in an implicit limitation: “off the Reservation in South Carolina.”
And as discussed above, that limitation makes perfect sense in light of Congress’s goal of
ratifying an agreement between South Carolina and the Tribe to govern their relationship.
If section 14(b) is implicitly limited to South Carolina, despite its plain text suggesting
otherwise at first glance, then it makes sense to read section 14(a) the same way. “Statutory
construction is a holistic endeavor,” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993) (cleaned
up), which means that “unless the text clearly indicates otherwise, adjacent subsections on
similar topics presumably have the same scope.” Stanford v. United States, No. 12-93, 2014 WL
2574492, at *3 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2014) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs insist that the text of
section 14(a) is unavoidably unambiguous, since it states without qualification that IGRA “shall
not apply” to the Catawba. But just because a provision has no express textual geographic limit
18
does not mean that it unambiguously applies nationwide. Section 14(b), as just discussed,
obviously has a limited scope — i.e., it governs the Tribe’s activities only in South Carolina —
even though the phrase “off the Reservation” applies nationwide if read in isolation. It is hardly
a stretch, then, to read section 14(a) as also implicitly restricted to South Carolina. Again, the
Settlement Act is at least open to that interpretation.
That, it bears noting, was Interior’s view back in 2018 when it invited the Catawba to
submit the discretionary land-into-trust application at issue here. (The agency, oddly, did not
offer any statutory analysis on this point in its 2020 Decision Letter or in other contemporaneous
record documents.) As it explained then, reading the isolated language of section 14(a) literally
would “potentially exclude the Tribe from a statutory scheme permitting games of chance on
territory outside of South Carolina without replacing it without an alternative approach,” thereby
“crea[ting] an ambiguity.” Mandatory Trust Memo at 5 n.18. Citing the famous Chevron U.S.A.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Interior suggested that it would address that
ambiguity by “reasonably read[ing]” section 14(a) as this Court now does: as “replacing the
IGRA framework with the framework set forth in the Settlement Agreement for [South Carolina]
lands and those lands only.” Mandatory Trust Memo at 5 n.18.
That ambiguity alone is sufficient reason to read section 14(a) as barring the Tribe from
gaming under IGRA only in South Carolina. This is not due to Chevron — after all, Interior did
not even cite its earlier footnoted musings in the decision under review here — but instead
because of the principle that, in light of the trust relationship between the United States and
Indians, “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
The Court’s choice between “two possible constructions . . . must be dictated by [this] principle.”
19
County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); see Muscogee (Creek)
Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[I]f [the relevant statute] can
reasonably be construed as the Tribe would have it construed, it must be construed that way.”).
Applying that dictate here yields a straightforward result: section 14(a) is at a minimum
ambiguous as to whether it bars the Catawba from gaming under IGRA outside of South
Carolina; therefore, the Court is bound to construe it not to.
Likely recognizing the force of the Indian canon in this case, Plaintiffs scramble to obtain
its protection as well. They cite a number of Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that the
canon does not apply where “all tribal interests are not aligned.” Rancheria v. Jewell, 776 F.3d
706, 713 (9th Cir. 2015). Such is the case here, they maintain, since the interests of EBCI and
the Catawba are in conflict: EBCI would be harmed by interpreting section 14(a) as allowing the
Catawba to game under IGRA in North Carolina.
The status of this exception to the Indian canon is unsettled. Although “no D.C. Circuit
cases . . . have adopted [it],” several “judges in this District have done so, citing [the same] Ninth
Circuit case law.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Bernhardt, 442 F. Supp. 3d 53,
80 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279, 314
(D.D.C. 2018) (applying the exception)); see also Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of
Oregon v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty.
v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 3d 269, 280 (D.D.C. 2018) (same).
Even assuming the exception exists as a general matter, the Court does not believe it
applies here. As Sault Ste. Marie Tribe explained, “All but one of the cases [that stand for] this
exception dealt with statutes that benefit all Indians generally, such as IGRA. . . . The other case
involved a treaty, and the tribe with countervailing interests was a signatory to — and
20
beneficiary of — the treaty.” 442 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (last citing Confederated Tribes of Chehalis
Indian Reservation v. Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1996)). When interpreting
such generally applicable enactments, it might well be appropriate to discard the Indian canon on
the theory that Congress would not have intended to benefit one Indian tribe if it would come at
the cost of another. After all, the United States’ trust duties are “owe[d] the same . . . to all
tribes.” Confederated Tribes of Chehalis, 96 F.3d at 340. That rationale, however, evaporates
when considering a statute (like the Settlement Act) and a specific provision (like section 14)
that governs “only one tribe.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 80. The Settlement Act
was enacted expressly “in recognition of the United States[’] obligation to the” Catawba, see
Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 2(a)(8), and it implements a bargain between the Tribe and South
Carolina in which the Tribe accepted specific burdens in exchange for other benefits. Those
burdens are inflicted on the Catawba and the Catawba alone, and the Court’s task here is to
determine the extent of one of them: did Congress deprive the Tribe of their IGRA rights on
lands nationwide or only in South Carolina? Given the principles behind the Indian canon, the
Court must assume Congress meant to do less, not more, damage to the only tribe directly
harmed by the provision at issue.
In sum, as set out at length above, the Act’s context and history strongly suggest that to
be the right assumption, as there is no evidence that either legislature had any reason to bar the
Catawba from gaming under IGRA outside of the Palmetto State. Whether that view is the best
de novo interpretation, or only an available reading of an ambiguous statute, the outcome is the
same: the Catawba may game under IGRA at the Kings Mountain Site in North Carolina.
21
B. IRA Section 5
Plaintiffs next argue that Interior acted contrary to law by using its authority under
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act to take the Kings Mountain Site into trust on behalf of
the Catawba. Enacted in 1934, the IRA “reflected a new policy of the Federal Government” and
“aimed to put a halt to the loss of tribal lands” by giving “Interior power to create new
reservations” and “encourag[ing] [tribes] to revitalize their self-government.” Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973). To that end, section 5 of the Act broadly authorizes
the agency to “acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . for the purpose of providing land for
Indians,” and it specifies that “[t]itle . . . shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust
for the Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
On EBCI’s view, however, the 1993 Settlement Act renders the Catawba ineligible to
benefit from that provision. It contends that, properly understood, the Act displaces section 5’s
general federal land-into-trust authority by creating a specific land-acquisition scheme that
governs the Tribe in its place. Defendants unsurprisingly disagree, contending that the Act’s
specific land-acquisition procedures are best read as applying only in South Carolina, such that
the Settlement Act leaves the IRA’s general land-into-trust authority available as to lands in
other states, including North Carolina. See ECF Nos. 54 (Catawba SJ Mot.) at 6–8; 53 (Interior
SJ Mot.) at 13–16. The Court is thus dealt a similar hand here as with the IGRA issue: a dispute
as to the geographic scope of a Settlement Act provision. Retaining the courage of its earlier
convictions, the Court will double down and side with Interior and the Catawba for essentially
the same reasons as before: they have the better reading of the statute de novo, and even if they
did not, the statute is ambiguous and must therefore be construed to the Tribe’s benefit.
22
Section 9(a) of the Settlement Act provides that “[i]f the Tribe so elects, it may organize
under the [IRA]” and further directs that “[t]he Tribe shall be subject to such Act except to the
extent such sections are inconsistent with this Act.” Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 9(a). The relevant
“such section” of the IRA here is section 5, which authorizes Interior to “acquire . . . any interest
in lands . . . within or without existing reservations . . . for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108. Interior used that authority to take the Kings Mountain Site into
trust. See Proposed Findings at 2. The question here, then, is whether section 5 of the IRA is
“inconsistent with” the Settlement Act, such that the Tribe is not “subject to” that section.
As a brief aside, the parties separately tangle over whether section 4(b) of the Settlement
Act provides independent authority for taking land into trust on behalf of the Tribe. See
Catawba SJ Mot. at 14; ECF No. 58 (Pl. Reply) at 29. That section states, “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, . . . the Tribe . . . shall be eligible for all benefits and services furnished to
federally recognized Indian tribes and their members because of their status as Indians.” Pub. L.
No. 103-116, § 4(b). The Court sees no need to analyze section 4(b) here because of the well-
worn interpretive rule that the specific governs the general. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC
v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“[T]he canon has full application . . . to
statutes . . . in which a general authorization and a more limited, specific authorization exist side-
by-side.”). As Interior recognized in its decision, whereas “Section 4(b) of the Settlement Act
generally addresses the Nation’s eligibility for federal benefits and services,” it is section 9(a)
that “specifically made the Nation subject to the terms of the IRA.” Decision Letter at 22. With
the more specific section 9 on point, section 4(b) adds nothing to the analysis.
Returning to whether section 5 of the IRA is “inconsistent with” any provision(s) of the
Settlement Act, Plaintiffs (naturally) contend that the answer is yes. Their argument is, to a large
23
extent, a kind of field-displacement argument — i.e., rather than use the off-the-rack land-
acquisition provisions of the IRA, “the Catawba may acquire trust lands only via the bespoke
system the 1993 Act creates.” Pl. SJ Mot. at 23.
That logic makes sense as far as it goes. Sections 12 and 13 of the Settlement Act and
various provisions of the Settlement Agreement do lay out a specific set of procedures and
conditions to govern Interior’s acquisition of land for the Tribe and the Tribe’s acquisition of
land for itself. See Pub. L. No. 103-116, §§ 12, 13; Settlement Agreement §§ 14.1–14.5, 14.8,
14.10–14.16, 15. And those provisions would be superfluous if Interior could acquire land for the
Catawba using the general IRA land-into-trust process. Neither the Government nor the
Catawba, in fact, disagree that the Settlement Act displaces section 5 of the IRA to an extent.
See Catawba SJ Mot. at 6, 8; Interior SJ Mot. at 15 & n.8, 16. They simply assert that the
displacement is limited to lands within South Carolina because the Settlement Act’s land-
acquisition rules apply only there. The dispute is thus a familiar one — viz., over the geographic
scope of certain Settlement Act provisions.
Same basic question, same basic answer. The land-acquisition rules established by the
Settlement Act and Settlement Agreement are plainly addressed to acquisitions that occur within
South Carolina. Most of those rules pertain to lands eligible to become part of the Tribe’s
“Expanded Reservation.” See Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 12(b). On that front, the Agreement
specifically identifies the metes and bounds of the eligible parcels of land, all of which are
located in South Carolina. See Settlement Agreement §§ 14.3 (defining “Primary Expansion
Zone”); 14.4 (“Secondary Expansion Zone”); 14.5 (stating that “Other Expansion Zone[s]” may
be “approved by” South Carolina local and state governments). The Act and Agreement also
provide for acquisition of “Non-Reservation Properties” by the Catawba in fee simple. See Pub.
24
L. No. 103-116, § 13; Settlement Agreement § 15. Although they do not specifically identify
lands, context makes clear that only South Carolina lands are contemplated. Per both the
Agreement and Act, the Tribe as fee-simple owner “shall be subject to the same obligations and
responsibilities as other persons and entities under State [defined as South Carolina], federal, and
local law,” id. § 15.1, and the “the laws, ordinances, taxes, and regulations of [South Carolina]
and its subdivisions shall apply to such non-reservation properties in the same manner as [they]
would apply to any other properties held by non-Indians located in the same jurisdiction.” Id. §
15.2; accord Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 13(b). It would, again, be absurd to conclude that Congress
and South Carolina intended to subject “non-reservation properties” owned by the Tribe outside
South Carolina to that State’s property and tax laws. The only sensible reading, then, is that the
Agreement and Act’s provisions governing the acquisition of “non-reservation properties” do not
authorize such acquisitions outside of South Carolina. There is thus no conflict or inconsistency
between the Settlement Act’s land provisions and Interior’s background IRA authority when it
comes to lands outside of South Carolina.
Plaintiffs attempt to drum up such a conflict by pointing to two different provisions of the
Settlement Act. The first states that the “[j]urisdiction and status of all non-Reservation lands
shall be governed by section 15 of the Settlement Agreement,” which, as just discussed, states
that South Carolina law is to govern. See Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 13(a) (emphasis added). The
second provides that “[a]ll properties acquired by the Tribe shall be acquired subject to the terms
and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement.” Id. § 12(f) (emphasis added). EBCI
argues that “all” must mean “all” in both provisions, and so the Settlement Act and Agreement’s
provisions must govern lands even if they are outside of South Carolina.
25
The Court cannot follow suit. As to the former provision, “all non-Reservation lands”
cannot be read literally to mean all lands nationwide, as doing so would create the same
untenable outcome of South Carolina law applying to lands outside of South Carolina. As to the
latter, the Court is dubious that its language, which speaks of terms and conditions applicable to
the Tribe’s acquisition of property, is in conflict with section 5’s grant of authority to “the
Secretary of the Interior[] . . . to acquire” lands to be held in trust on the Tribe’s behalf. See 25
U.S.C. § 5108 (emphasis added). At any rate, section 12(f) appears in the middle of section 12
of the Settlement Act, which is titled “Establishment of Expanded Reservation” and, as discussed
above, specifically identifies only South Carolina lands as eligible to become part of the Tribe’s
reservation. Again, then, the Court is hard pressed to read a phrase of the Settlement Act for all
it is literally worth even though the words “all non-Reservation lands” and “all properties” could,
in a vacuum, apply across the board. Cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005)
(declining to read phrase “convicted in any court” to include foreign courts because “even
though the word ‘any’ demands a broad interpretation . . ., we must look beyond that word
itself”) (citing other similar cases). To the extent the reader is not convinced, the Court may fall
back once again on the Indian canon. Because the Settlement Act’s bespoke land-acquisition
scheme can at the very least be reasonably read as applying (and therefore supplanting the IRA)
only as to South Carolina lands, the Court must read it that way.
Plaintiffs raise two additional arguments on this front, neither of which moves the needle.
First, they point to two statements in the legislative history. The first is from the House report,
which notes that the Settlement Act “incorporates by reference . . . limitations on the
applicability of . . . the Indian Reorganization Act contained in the Settlement Agreement and
State Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-257, pt. 1, at 20 (1993). This statement adds nothing to our
26
understanding of the question at hand, since, again, all agree that those instruments limit the
applicability of the IRA to some significant extent. If anything, this statement helps Defendants:
if the federal Settlement Act merely “incorporates by reference” the limits on the IRA imposed
by the State Settlement Act, then those limits must apply only within South Carolina, as the State
Act’s drafters would have had neither power nor reason to limit the federal government’s
authority to take land into trust outside the Palmetto State.
The other piece of history is a floor statement from Senator Fritz Hollings of South
Carolina, in which he stated that the Settlement Act “permits only two types of lands. First, the
land held in trust by the United States as the expanded reservation. Any other land . . . will be
held in fee simple and have all the jurisdictional attributes of any other land in South Carolina.”
139 Cong. Rec. 19,919 (1993). “[F]loor statements by individual legislators,” of course, “rank
among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct.
929, 943 (2017). In any event, Senator Hollings’s statement, like the statute itself, contemplates
that the regime established by the Act addresses acquisitions only of land in South Carolina. It
thus offers no indication that the Settlement Act is inconsistent with section 5 of the IRA as to
lands outside its borders. Perhaps Plaintiffs mean to focus on the statement that the Act’s land-
acquisition scheme “permits only two types of lands,” but, of course, that is literally true of the
Act’s procedures themselves; the question here is to what extent those procedures displace
Interior’s section 5 authority by establishing a more specific, superseding regime.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Interior is guilty of double-dealing on the IRA section 5
issue. Specifically, they argue that in the agency’s 2018 decision denying the Catawba’s
mandatory trust application, Interior took the position that the Settlement Act bars it from taking
land into trust for the Catawba outside South Carolina. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 24. But Interior did no
27
such thing. Its 2018 decision, recall, expressly invited the Tribe to file a section-5-based trust
application, see Mandatory Trust Memo at 5, a strange move if the agency thought it had no
authority to grant such an application. Interior’s 2018 reasoning explains why the agency’s
views were and are internally consistent. The Tribe’s first application was “mandatory” in
nature because it asserted that the agency was required to take the land into trust “pursuant to
Section 12 of the Settlement Act,” as opposed to under the IRA. See Mandatory Application at
1. In rejecting that application, Interior concluded that “the mandatory trust provisions of the
Settlement Act” did not authorize acquisition of the Kings Mountain Site “because the text of the
Settlement Act unambiguously limits the scope of those provisions to land acquired in South
Carolina.” Mandatory Trust Memo at 1 (emphasis added). That is exactly the position that
Interior takes, and the Court adopts, in this case: the Settlement Act’s acquisition rules do not
apply outside of South Carolina; therefore, there is no conflict with the agency’s separate, IRA
land-acquisition authority as to such lands. See Decision Letter at 26.
C. Restored-Lands Exception
EBCI’s third and final contrary-to-law argument is that even if the Catawba may game
under IGRA in North Carolina, and even if Interior may use the IRA to take land into trust for
that purpose, the Kings Mountain Site in particular is still not eligible for IGRA gaming. IGRA
provides that “gaming regulated by [that statute] shall not be conducted on lands acquired by the
Secretary in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988,” unless those lands fit
into one of several statutory exceptions. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a). Here, Interior concluded that
the Kings Mountain Site fits under the “restored lands” exception, which exempts “lands . . .
taken into trust as part of . . . the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal
recognition.” Id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Decision Letter at 3.
28
Plaintiffs contend that this was wrong for three separate reasons: (i) the Kings Mountain
Site cannot qualify as the Catawba’s “restored lands” consistent with the Settlement Act; (ii)
Interior applied the wrong regulation (25 C.F.R. § 292.12) to determine whether the lands qualify
as “restored,” and under the correct regulation (25 C.F.R. § 292.11(a)(1)) they do not; and (iii)
even if section 292.12 sets forth the applicable standard, the Kings Mountain Site still does not
satisfy its requirements and therefore cannot be “restored lands.” See Pl. SJ Mot. at 28–31.
Although Plaintiffs play their hand well, Defendants hold the high card.
Settlement Act
EBCI’s first argument may be quickly discarded. The Tribe insists that, because the 1993
Settlement Act “restored [the Catawba] to Federal recognition,” and that Act expressly
authorized Interior to take certain lands into trust for the Tribe as part of its existing or expanded
reservation, only those lands can be thought of as “part of the restoration of [the Catawba’s]
lands.” This argument flies in the face of numerous cases squarely holding that where legislation
restoring a tribe to recognition identifies specific parcels to be taken into trust, that does not
preclude other lands from also qualifying as restored. See Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower
Umpqua & Siuslaw Indians v. Babbitt, 116 F. Supp. 2d 155, 158, 162–64 (D.D.C. 2000)
(rejecting argument that “only lands which were restored to the tribe as part of the act of
restoring the tribe to federal recognition would qualify”); Oregon v. Norton, 271 F. Supp. 2d
1270, 1279 (D. Or. 2003) (same); see also Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians
v. U.S. Atty. for W. Dist. of Mich., 46 F. Supp. 2d 689, 700–01 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (rejecting
argument that lands may only qualify as “restor[ed]” if specifically mandated by Congress); cf.
City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adopting broad interpretation
29
of restored-lands exception, but declining to specifically address “its application to Indian lands
not acquired pursuant to a restoration act”).
As these decisions have explained, whether lands taken into trust can be fairly described
as “part of the restoration of lands” to a tribe may depend on a number of factors, including “the
factual circumstances of the acquisition, the location of the acquisition, [and] the temporal
relationship of the acquisition to the restoration.” Confederated Tribes, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 164
(citing Grand Traverse, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 701). Depending on those factors, “lands bearing a
significant connection to an Indian tribe” may well qualify as “part of the restoration of lands”
even “in addition to lands specifically identified in a restoration act.” Norton, 271 F. Supp. 2d at
1278. The statutory language, in other words, “implies a process rather than a specific
transaction, and most assuredly does not limit restoration to a single event.” Grand Traverse, 46
F. Supp. 3d 701. Plaintiffs provide no good reason to depart from these precedents, and the
Court will not do so. (To the extent they contend that the Kings Mountain parcel does not have a
“significant connection” to the Catawba based on the factors just mentioned, that argument is
addressed below. See infra at 39–40.)
Which Regulation Applies?
EBCI’s next two arguments look to Interior’s regulations implementing the restored-
lands exception. Per those rules, “if [a] tribe was restored by a Congressional enactment of
legislation,” as occurred for the Catawba, then for the lands at issue to qualify as “restored,” “the
tribe must show that either:
(1) The legislation requires or authorizes the Secretary to take land
into trust for the benefit of the tribe within a specific geographic area
and the lands are within the specific geographic area; or
30
(2) If the legislation does not provide a specific geographic area for
the restoration of lands, the tribe must meet the requirements of
§ 292.12.
25 C.F.R. § 292.11(a). Section 292.12, in turn, sets forth a number of showings that the Tribe
must make in order to “establish” a sufficient “connection” to the lands at issue: a “modern
connection[] to the land,” “a significant historical connection to the land,” and “a temporal
connection between the date of the acquisition of the land and the date of the tribe’s restoration.”
(If these requirements are familiar, it is because Interior’s drafting largely, though not entirely,
drew upon the influential Grand Traverse opinion discussed above. See Gaming on Trust Lands
Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,354, 29,365 (May 20, 2008) (promulgating
the rules at issue).) Here, Interior concluded that the Kings Mountain Site “me[t] the
requirements of § 292.12” and for that reason qualified as restored lands for purposes of IGRA.
See Decision Letter at 6–11.
EBCI first contends that Interior chose the wrong regulation to apply. On its view, the
agency was not permitted to analyze whether the Kings Mountain Site met section 292.12’s
requirements because the trigger for applying that test was not met: “[T]he legislation does . . .
provide a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands,” 25 C.F.R. § 292.11(a)(2)
(emphasis added), because, as discussed above, it “require[d]” that the Catawba’s existing
reservation would be taken into trust and specifically “authorize[d]” further trust acquisitions in
designated “expansion zones.” See Pub. L. No. 103-116, §§ 12(a), (c). Interior, according to
EBCI, therefore should have asked instead only whether 292.11(a)(1) was met — i.e, only
whether the Kings Mountain Site is “within [the] specific geographic area[s]” expressly
“required” or “authorized” for trust acquisition by the restoring legislation. See Pl. SJ Mot. at
30–31. All agree, of course, that the Site (being in North Carolina) is not within the Tribe’s
31
existing reservation or the Settlement Act’s designated expansion zones (those being in South
Carolina).
Plaintiffs’ interpretation, it is important to note, posits that paragraphs (1) and (2) of
section 292.11(a) are “mutually exclusive” pathways for lands to qualify as restored. See id. at
30. Either the legislation “requires or authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust . . . within a
specific geographic area,” which is equivalent to saying it “provide[s] a specific geographic area
for the restoration of lands,” or it does not so require or authorize and therefore does not so
provide. In the former case, 292.11(a)(1) governs, and the lands at issue must be within that
“specific geographic area” or else are not restored; in the latter, 292.11(a)(2) governs, and the
lands must instead satisfy section 292.12’s connections test or else are not restored. At the risk
of repetition, then, if a tribe’s restoring legislation “requires or authorizes the Secretary to take
land into trust within a specific geographic area,” then on EBCI’s view that legislation
necessarily “provides a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands,” and only that area
is eligible to qualify as restored.
An attentive reader might now feel a sense of déjà vu, and she would be right. If EBCI’s
interpretation were correct, it would mean that Interior’s rules adopted the very restored-lands
test that courts have unanimously rejected — namely, that if a restoration act identifies some
particular parcel or parcels of land to be taken into trust, only that land may qualify as restored.
See supra at 29–30. Plaintiffs do not even gainsay this point. They admit that, under their
construction, if the restoring legislation “enumerate[s] any particular lands to be taken into trust,”
then section 292.11(a)(1) is met and section 292.12’s connection test is thus unavailable. See Pl.
Reply at 15. In other words, the restoring legislation “provides a specific area for the restoration
32
of lands” whenever it authorizes or requires any piece or pieces of land to be taken into trust for
the benefit of the tribe at issue, and that area alone may qualify as restored.
The Court cannot believe that Interior adopted that crabbed view of the “restored lands”
exception. As an initial matter, consider how the agency summarized the rule at a high level in
its preamble:
The regulation . . . articulates the requirement for the parcel to
qualify as “restored lands.” Essentially, the regulation requires the
tribe to have modern connections to the land, historical connections
to the area where the land is located, and requires a temporal
connection between the acquisition of the land and the tribe’s
restoration.
73 Fed. Reg. at 29,354; see Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he preamble to a regulation is evidence of an agency’s contemporaneous
understanding of its proposed rules” and may serve “as a source of evidence concerning
contemporaneous agency intent.”) Interior thus mentioned only section 292.12’s connections
test, as if that test was “essentially” the only test applicable. If Plaintiffs were right, however,
then the connections test is not available any time restoration legislation identifies at least one
parcel of land to be acquired for the tribe. As discussed above, that is not an uncommon
occurrence for restoration legislation. On EBCI’s view, then, Interior suggested that it would use
the connections test when, in fact, that test would frequently be inapplicable. The Court
considers that oversight unlikely.
More to the point, the agency knew when issuing section 292.11(a) that the narrow
approach EBCI now urges had been rebuffed by numerous courts, since Interior itself had
advanced that very interpretation of IGRA back in 2000 in the Confederated Tribes case. See
116 F. Supp. 2d at 162 (“The Solicitor’s opinion states that ‘restored lands’ . . . include only
those lands that are available to a restored tribe as part of its restoration to federal recognition.”);
33
id. at 163 (restating the Government’s position as “‘restoration of lands’ means only restoration
of lands by Congress contemporaneous with the restoration of federal recognition, or in some
other way connected to the Congressional act of restoration”). The United States had also
advanced the same position in 1999 in the Grand Traverse litigation. See 46 F. Supp. 2d at 700–
01. Both courts rejected that reading of the statute. See Confederated Tribes, 116 F. Supp. 2d at
164 (calling Interior’s view “unduly restrictive” considering “the plain meaning of the statute,
the statutory context, and the principle of liberal construction in favor of Indians”); Grand
Traverse, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 700–01. After those decisions, in fact, the Government reversed
itself in the ongoing Grand Traverse litigation, expressly adopting the broader interpretation of
the restored-lands exception it had first fought against. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att’y for W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924, 935 (W.D.
Mich. 2002), aff’d, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004).
It is theoretically possible that Interior (contrary to its actions here) then reversed itself
again seven years later when promulgating the rules at issue here. If it had done so, however,
one would expect some evidence in the rulemaking record, and there is none. The evidence,
indeed, goes the other way. In its statement of basis and purpose, the agency specifically cited
Confederated Tribes and Grand Traverse as cases that “provide guidance for the interpretation
of” the restored-lands exception. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,365. The agency even analyzed
whether a certain component of the test it adopted in section 292.12 was “contradicted by [that]
case law,” ultimately concluding that it was not. See id.; see also id. at 29,366 (stating that
another change was made from the proposed to final regulation in order to “reflect advisories in
case law”). These comments do not reflect an agency that had consciously, yet silently, decided
to re-adopt an old position expressly rejected by multiple court decisions against it.
34
To be sure, if the text of the regulation were susceptible only to EBCI’s construction,
then the Court would have no choice but to adhere to it anyway. But that is not the case. Section
292.11(a) can be reasonably read to establish a scheme under which paragraphs 292.11(a)(1) and
292.11(a)(2) present two non-exclusive, alternative means of satisfying the restored-lands
exception. On this reading, contra Plaintiffs’, the phrase “the legislation requires or authorizes
the Secretary to take land into trust . . . within a specific geographic area” is not equivalent to the
phrase “the legislation . . . provide[s] a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands.”
Instead, the first phrase in section 292.11(a)(1) simply means that if the restoring legislation
identifies an area or areas eligible to be taken into trust, then those lands qualify as “restored
lands.” The regulations then allow the additional use of the separate, broader section 292.12 test,
unless an exception obtains — namely, that the restoring legislation already “provide[s] a
specific geographic area for the restoration of lands” by clearly limiting the lands that may
qualify. Under this view, just because a tribe’s restoring legislation identifies a particular parcel
of land, that does not itself disqualify all other lands from counting as restored; Congress must
do something more to mandate that only certain lands are eligible (thereby rendering the
connections test inapplicable).
The Court considers that interpretation, on the whole, the best de novo reading of section
292.11. First, and most important, it is wholly consistent with the rulemaking record and
caselaw discussed above. Second, it gives meaning to the drafters’ choice to use two different
phrases in paragraphs (1) and (2). Paragraph (1) speaks only of legislation that “requires or
authorizes [Interior] to take land into trust . . . within a specific geographic area.” Paragraph (2),
by contrast, speaks of legislation that “provide[s] a specific geographic area for the restoration of
lands” (emphasis added). If the drafters had meant the two phrases to refer to entirely
35
overlapping universes of legislation, it would have been far simpler for paragraph (2) to just
repeat paragraph (1)’s “require or authorize” wording.
Third, the Court’s construction is confirmed by the drafting history of section 292.11.
When first proposed by Interior, the draft of that section read, in relevant part, as follows:
For lands to qualify as “restored lands[,]” . . . it must be
demonstrated that:
(a) The legislation restoring the government-to-government
relationship between the United States and the tribe requires
or authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust within a
specific geographical area and the lands are within the
specific geographical area; or
(b) If there is no restoration legislation, or if the restoration
legislation does not provide geographic parameters for the
restoration of lands, the tribe has a modern connection and a
significant historical connection to the land and there is a
temporal connection between the date of the acquisition of
the land and the date of the Tribe’s restoration . . . .
Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,769, 58,774 (Oct. 5,
2006). In this version of the regulation, it is even more apparent that the two paragraphs are not
mutually exclusive, and that the drafters did not think that merely “requir[ing] or authoriz[ing”
the trust acquisition of specific lands would limit the exception to only those lands. Under
paragraph (b), rather, section 292.12’s connections test would be applicable unless the
restoration legislation “provide[d] geographic parameters for the restoration of lands” — i.e.,
geographically limited the lands eligible to qualify. One might argue, of course, that the
language change from the proposed rule to the final rule suggests a change in intended meaning.
But Interior’s statements when promulgating the final rule counsel otherwise. The agency
expressly noted and explained in multiple places why it had “modified” or “reorganized” the
draft version of section 292.11. See 73 Fed. Reg. 29,364. It said nothing, however, about the
36
change from the phrase “provide geographic parameters for the restoration of lands” to “provide
a specific area for the restoration of lands.” Id.The Court does not mean to suggest that its reading of section 292.11(a) is perfect. It
does result in one textual oddity: what is Interior to do “if the legislation does . . . provide a
specific geographic area for the restoration of lands” by, for example, expressly stating that only
certain lands qualify? The obvious answer is that Interior must abide by that legislative
restriction and reject any attempt by a tribe to use lands outside that area for IGRA gaming. But
it is somewhat strange that Interior’s drafters left that as a negative inference rather than
expressly mandating that result.
Ultimately, the Court is not troubled enough by this aspect of its interpretation to find
Plaintiffs’ position more persuasive on the whole. For one thing, section 292.11 is framed in
terms of what an applying tribe “must show.” See 25 C.F.R. § 292.11. As a result, the entire
section carries a negative inference that is not expressly stated: if the tribe fails to make the
required showings, the land does not qualify as restored. The need to draw that sort of negative
inference, then, is not out of place in the section. Indeed, it fits rather well in this specific
context. The phrase “provide[s] a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands” is
essentially question begging — the whole point of the regulation is to establish what areas
qualify as “part of . . . the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal
recognition.” Id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). If Congress’s restoring legislation
answers that question directly, which it would by expressly excluding certain lands, then the
regulations are not much needed to tell Interior what to do. As a result, it is not terribly strange
for section 292.11(a) not to directly address what happens in that circumstance.
37
As the Supreme Court recently counseled in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019),
agency regulations often present “hard interpretive conundrums.” Id. at 2415. That is certainly
the case here, where no construction of section 292.11(a) is without blemish. The Court’s task,
however, is to undertake the “taxing inquiry” of “carefully considering” not only the regulatory
text, but also the “structure, history, and purpose of a regulation” in order to ascertain its
meaning. Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). Having done that, the Court concludes that under the best reading of
Interior’s regulations, the agency did not err by applying section 292.12’s connections test in
deciding whether the Kings Mountain Site qualifies as restored lands. The 1993 Settlement Act
does not “provide a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands” within the meaning of
section 292.11(a)(2) because it does not geographically limit Interior’s land-into-trust authority:
as discussed above, it allows Interior to use its section 5 authority nationwide (outside South
Carolina). See supra at 28. Section 292.12’s connections test is thus applicable.
As a housekeeping matter, while Interior certainly could have articulated its interpretation
of section 292.11(a) more clearly in both the administrative record and its briefing here, the
Court notes that the interpretation it adopts appears to accord with the agency’s view. See
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974) (courts may
“uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned”)
(citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). In its Decision Letter, Interior stated
that the 1993 Settlement Act “does not include language that either requires or authorizes the
Secretary to take land into trust for the Nation within a specific geographic boundary; therefore,
the Nation must also meet the requirements of Section 292.12.” Decision Letter at 6 (emphasis
added). From the use of the adverb “also,” as opposed to something like “instead,” the Court can
38
“reasonably discern” that the agency (correctly) viewed paragraphs 292.11(a)(1) and
292.11(a)(2) as non-exclusive alternatives rather than mutually exclusive pathways. See also
Interior SJ Mot. at 19 (“25 C.F.R. § 292.11(a)(1) does not apply, and the issue whether the site
qualifies as ‘restored lands’ is governed by 25 C.F.R. § 292.11(a)(2).”).
Section 292.12 Requirements
Still seeking an ace in the deck, EBCI contends that even if section 292.12 is applicable
here, Interior was wrong to conclude that the Kings Mountain Site meets one of its requirements.
Specifically, Plaintiffs posit that the Site is not “located within the State or States where the tribe
is now located, as evidenced by the tribe’s governmental presence and tribal population,” 25
C.F.R. § 292.12(a), because the Catawba are “located within” only South Carolina and not North
Carolina. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 31.
No luck here either. Per the terms of the regulation, “where the tribe is now located” for
purposes of the restored-lands exception is “evidenced by” two factors: the tribe’s “governmental
presence” and “tribal population.” Both establish that the Catawba have significant North
Carolina ties even as they are based primarily in South Carolina. According to Interior’s
Decision Letter, as of November 2019, 253 registered members of the Catawba Nation lived in
North Carolina. See Decision Letter at 7. That is by no means a trivial population; a fair number
of the 560 or so federally recognized tribes have total populations of similar or lesser size.
Congress seems to have agreed, as the 1993 Settlement Act identified several counties in North
Carolina as part of the Tribe’s federal “service area,” including the county that contains the
Kings Mountain Site. See Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 3(9). (Although there is no need to decide this
question, this feature of the 1993 Act alone arguably renders the Tribe “located” in North
Carolina.) As to governmental presence, Interior’s decision listed ten different governmental
39
services offered or programs by the Catawba to its members living in North Carolina. See
Decision Letter at 7–8.
EBCI’s twin counterarguments fail. It first insists that the Tribe cannot be “located in”
North Carolina because that term must mean “settled in” or “resident in.” See Pl. SJ Mot. at 31–
32. But the regulation’s text itself makes clear that where a tribe is “located” is “evidenced” by
the tribe’s governmental presence and tribal population; on Plaintiffs’ view, the Court must
ignore those considerations and instead parse dictionary definitions. Even if section 292.12(a)
did not give any clue as to how to apply the concept of location in this context, furthermore,
EBCI would still lose, as the undefined term “located” would be ambiguous and thus amenable
to reasonable interpretation by Interior. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
EBCI next takes aim at the services the Tribe provides to its North Carolina residents,
suggesting that it could and would provide each of those services to its members anywhere they
happen to reside. See Pl. Reply at 18–19. A “governmental presence,” Plaintiffs claim, should
be made of stronger stuff. It is not clear to the Court why the fact that the Tribe could provide
government services in other states means that it lacks a governmental presence in a state where
it actually does provide many services. Even granting that dubious point, however, it does not
help EBCI here, as at least a few of the services the Catawba provide to their North Carolina
residents very likely could not be offered in other, farther-flung states. For example, the Tribe
provides childcare assistance in North Carolina, which is easy enough given the short driving
distance; the Court doubts that the Tribe would provide childcare services to its members in
Connecticut or Idaho. See Decision Letter at 7. Same for the “Family Services Transit services”
the Tribe offers so that its North Carolina members may “access Family Services or the Indian
Health Service clinic,” both of which are in South Carolina. Id. at 8.
40
* * *
Thus ends this Court’s consideration of the legal underpinnings of Interior’s decision to
take the Kings Mountain Site into trust for the Catawba, with Defendants going home with full
pockets. The action now moves to Plaintiffs’ assorted other challenges to that decision.
D. Bad Actor
EBCI’s next contention is something of a wild card. It claims that Interior acted
arbitrarily because it “failed to consider important aspects of the problem,” Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910 (2020) (cleaned up) — namely, the
“extensive history of illegal and corrupt activity” of the Catawba’s main business partner, a
casino developer named Wallace Cheves. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 33. One of IGRA’s purposes,
Plaintiffs note, is “shield[ing] [Indian gaming] from organized crime and other corrupting
influences.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2). And there is nothing in the agency record reflecting any
consideration of Cheves’s involvement.
Defendants respond that the background of Cheves — who has not been convicted of any
crime — is not an “important aspect[] of the problem” that Interior was required to consider
under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Whether they are correct “turns on what
[the] relevant substantive statute makes important.” Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada,
192 F. Supp. 3d 54, 78 (D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Oregon Natural Res. Council v.
Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1996)). It is true that several “bad actor” provisions in IGRA
reflect Congress’s concern with preventing crime or corruption in Indian gaming. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2711(e) (requiring disapproval of management contract between tribe and gaming operator if
any involved person’s “prior activities, criminal record if any, [etc.] pose a threat to . . . the
effective regulation and control of gaming, or create or enhance the dangers of unsuitable, unfair,
41
or illegal practices, methods, and activities in the conduct of gaming”); id. § 2710(d)(2)(B)(ii)
(authorizing rejection of tribal gaming ordinance, which is necessary for gaming, if “the tribal
governing body was significantly and unduly influenced” by such person).
The problem for Plaintiffs is that these provisions are not addressed to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (the specific decisionmaker here). Both, rather, are administered by the National
Indian Gaming Commission, a separate agency specifically created by IGRA “to monitor tribal
gaming and to promulgate the regulations and guidelines necessary to implement the statute.”
Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 448 F. Supp. 3d 217, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2020); see United States ex rel.
Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Management, Inc., 20 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that sections
of IGRA “addressed to the Commission” are “enforceable . . . only by the . . . Commission” and
not by BIA).
Seemingly recognizing this problem, Plaintiffs shift focus somewhat in their reply brief.
Instead of claiming that “Interior improperly applied IGRA,” as they had at first, see Pl. SJ Mot.
at 33; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 243–49, EBCI maintains that Interior should have considered, as part of
its discretionary choice whether to take the Site into trust, the possibility that the NIGC would
hinder the Tribe’s plans because of Cheves’s allegedly sordid past. See Pl. Reply at 42.
The Court is not persuaded. Section 5 itself says nothing about what Interior must
consider, only stating that “the Secretary . . . is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire . . . any
interest in lands . . . within or without existing reservations . . . for the purpose of providing land
for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108. As for the agency’s regulations, just because they require it to
examine “the purposes for which the land will be used,” 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10(c), 151.11(a),
which Interior did, see Proposed Findings at 4, does not oblige it to analyze every possible issue
that might derail some of the tribe’s plans, especially where those issues are beyond Interior’s
42
control or outside its bailiwick. Plaintiffs, for example, do not argue that Interior’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious because it failed to analyze whether the Catawba would successfully
negotiate a favorable gaming compact with North Carolina, see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (such
compact is necessary for gaming), yet their logic necessarily suggests that result. The Court
cannot play along with this sort of nitpicking. Cf. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 646 (1990) (“If federal courts . . . were to require each agency to take explicit account
of” hypothetical issues beyond their authority, a “large number of agency decisions might be
open to judicial invalidation.”).
Even assuming the agency did act arbitrarily by failing to consider whether NIGC would
prohibit the Catawba from gaming with Cheves as business partner, the error was harmless. See
5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”); PDK Labs. Inc.
v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“If the agency’s mistake did not affect the
outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for
reconsideration.”). For one thing, Interior’s land-into-trust analysis was subject to a crucial
caveat: in considering “the intended use of the land . . . for tribal economic development
purposes,” it noted that such uses would “includ[e] an entertainment complex and gaming, to the
extent permissible under relevant law.” Proposed Findings at 4; see also id. (“The Department
understands that the Nation plans to conduct [IGRA] Gaming, to the extent permissible under
relevant law,” on this location.”); id. at 12 (noting that gaming would be “subject to any legal
limitations”). The agency thus essentially disclaimed any significant reliance on the precise
nature of the Tribe’s activities at the proposed entertainment complex, which included plans not
only for gaming, but also for three restaurants, four lounges, a stage for live performances, and a
gift shop featuring Native artwork and products. See Proposed Findings at 12–13; see also
43
Decision Letter at 37 n.218. It is also worth noting that, a few months after the decision under
review here, the NIGC approved the Catawba’s gaming ordinance, see Letter re Catawba Indian
Nation Gaming Ordinance (May 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/31IN5sw, despite IGRA’s prohibition
on doing so if the Tribe had been “significantly and unduly influenced in the adoption of such
ordinance by” a bad actor, as EBCI alleges. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, “even
were [Interior] to redress its alleged error[], the final [outcome],” it seems, “would remain
unchanged, making this the epitome of harmless error.” City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706,
713 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
E. NHPA
The next card EBCI and its members play — now joined by the Cherokee Nation as
Plaintiffs — is to contend that Interior violated the National Historic Preservation Act. That
statute requires federal agencies “to consider the effect of their actions on certain historic or
culturally significant sites and properties . . . and to seek ways to mitigate those effects.”
Narragansett Indian Tribal Hist. Pres. Off. v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Historic
properties are defined to include “property of traditional religious and cultural importance to an
Indian tribe.” 54 U.S.C. §§ 300308, 302706. The NHPA, like the more-familiar NEPA, does
not require any “particular preservation activities; rather, [the law] only requires that the
[agency] consult [the appropriate parties] and consider the impacts of its undertaking.” Davis v.
Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Those parties include affected Indian tribes. See
54 U.S.C. § 306102(b)(4).
Here, it is undisputed that Interior did not consult at all with Plaintiff the Cherokee
Nation. See Interior SJ Mot. at 26–27. The Cherokee argue that this omission violated the
NHPA; the agency rejoins that it had no such duty. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 35; Interior SJ Mot. at 22.
44
By contrast, the agency did engage in at least some back-and-forth with EBCI (a separate tribal
entity) regarding the historic-preservation consequences of the Kings Mountain development.
See supra at 8–9. Still, according to Plaintiffs, that too was insufficient under the Act. Id. at 39.
The Court need not decide either issue. It already held, in denying EBCI’s motion for a
preliminary injunction in this case, that the Tribe had not “shown that it is likely that Cherokee
historical artifacts even exist at the Kings Mountain site.” EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5.
Although Plaintiffs have supplemented the record slightly, the Court reaches the same
conclusion at this stage. Because it is not likely that Cherokee artifacts are on site, it is even less
likely that any damage will occur to such historic properties as a result of the Catawba’s
construction activities. The upshot, as the Court will now explain, is that even if Interior violated
NHPA, it did not inflict a cognizable Article III injury on any Plaintiff.
The well-worn doctrine of standing requires that a plaintiff show that she “(1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016). EBCI and its members, to be clear, undisputedly have Article III standing to
challenge Interior’s decision under the Settlement Act and APA, based on economic, aesthetic,
and environmental impacts caused by the Catawba casino. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 46–47; ECF No.
62 (Interior Reply) at 15. Standing for Plaintiffs’ NHPA claim, however, cannot be based on
those injuries because the construction and operation of the Catawba’s casino is not “fairly
traceable” to Interior’s alleged NHPA violation or “likely to be redressed by” a favorable
decision on that particular claim. The NHPA, after all, does not require Interior to take or not
take any substantive actions. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that had the Act been complied
with, the casino would not have been built.
45
The law accounts for this sort of situation by creating a standing exception for
“procedural rights” such as the right to NHPA consultation: a person “accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7
(1992). The catch is that the “procedures in question [must be] designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest of [the plaintiff] that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Id. at 573
n.8; see City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For NEPA, by way of
example, the relevant concrete interest must be a “particularized environmental interest.” Fla.
Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Lemon
v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs “would feel the environmental effects
of [the challenged] action if it went forward”). For the NHPA, similarly, it must be along the
lines of “damage to an historic site” in which a plaintiff has a particularized interest. Lemon,
514 F.3d at 1315; Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding standing
where “the challenged action may lead to trespassing, vandalism, and looting of historic sites”).
Aiming to fit within this framework, Plaintiffs base their NHPA standing on what they
allege is a “grave risk that [Cherokee] cultural patrimony,” to which both EBCI and the
Cherokee lay claim, “will be destroyed” by the Kings Mountain development. See Pl. Reply at
42; see also ECF No. 2 (Pl. PI Mot.) at 3 (arguing that “cultural patrimony and/or human remains
found on these 16.57 acres will be completely lost”). That is indeed a concrete injury protected
by NHPA’s provisions regarding consultation with tribes. Plaintiffs, however, must still show
“that it is substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause [that] injury.” Waukesha,
320 F.3d at 234. They cannot “substitute speculation for substantial probability, and hope that
doing so will carry them across the causation bridge.” San Juan Audubon Soc’y v. Wildlife
46
Servs., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 257 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141 (D.D.C. 2003). Here,
for two main reasons, the Court finds that the claimed risk to Cherokee remains and artifacts falls
on the speculative side of the line.
First, the Court has already found, on an indistinguishable factual record, that it is not
“likely that Cherokee resources . . . exist on . . . the proposed gaming site.” EBCI, 2020 WL
2079443, at *5. If that is so, then there cannot be a substantial risk of damage to such artifacts.
In reaching its earlier conclusion, the Court considered three pieces of evidence adduced by
EBCI’s Tribal Historic Preservation Officer Russell Townsend:
• “The Kings Mountain site is within the Cherokee treaty and
historical territory,” ECF No. 1-1 (March Declaration of Russell
Townsend), ¶ 8;
• “[Pre-historic Cherokee ceramics” have been discovered “about ten
miles from Kings Mountain,” ECF No. 14-4 (April Declaration of
Russell Townsend), ¶ 5; and
• A “historical pottery kiln and prehistoric lythic scatter,” i.e., “human
made stone tools,” were previously discovered on the “Kings
Mountain Site.” Townsend Mar. Decl., ¶ 17.
The Court was not persuaded by this “thin record.” EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5. As it
recounted, the proposed development site “is a highly disturbed area” that has been “previously
prospected for tin,” used “as a soil borrow pit during the construction of a nearby road,” and
“graded” back to a level surface. Id. at *6 (cleaned up and citations omitted). Townsend’s
answer to that point was conditional and speculative; he noted only the “potential” that “cultural
features” might still be present “if they are deeper in the subsurface matrix than the impacts
caused by” that 2005 work. See id. at *5; Townsend Mar. Decl., ¶ 18. The Court also explained
why Townsend’s evidence fell short of establishing any real probability of harm. Although the
site is in historic Cherokee territory, that territory covers much of the Southeastern United States.
EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5. As to the previously discovered stone tools, Townsend did not
47
claim that they were Cherokee nor offer any proof that they were found on the proposed
construction site itself, since the “Kings Mountain site” appears to be about twice as large as the
parcel being taken into trust and built upon. Id. And although he did point to Cherokee artifacts
ten miles away, that was ten miles away from “Kings Mountain,” the nearby North Carolina city,
not the site contemplated here. In sum, on the record before the Court at the preliminary-
injunction stage, Plaintiff had not established a “likel[ihood] that any [Cherokee] resources exist
on the parcel of land at issue.” Id.At the present summary-judgment stage, Plaintiffs have not improved their hand. All
they have added is new declarations from both Townsend and the Cherokee Nation’s historic-
preservation officer, Elizabeth Toombs, neither of which offers any new facts or evidence.
Instead, based on the same materials discussed in the two’s earlier affidavits — and thus the
same evidence that was before this Court — Townsend and Toombs have changed the wording
of their analysis. For example, whereas in March 2020, Townsend averred that “[a]ny buried
cultural features . . . have a potential to be intact,” Townsend Mar. Decl., ¶ 18, he now states that
“[s]ome of the Cherokee artifacts that are likely to exist at the Kings Mountain Site are likely to
be” intact. See ECF No. 41-2 (July Declaration of Russell Townsend), ¶ 24. Along the same
lines, Townsend earlier cautioned that EBCI “cannot determine whether Cherokee religious or
cultural sites exist at the proposed location.” Townsend Mar. Decl., ¶¶ 15, 18. Now, he avers
that “the Kings Mountain Site is likely to contain Cherokee cultural resources.” Townsend July
Decl., ¶ 26. This shift is not merely from one affidavit to another. Townsend offered the same
circumspect analysis he earlier gave to this Court in a March 2020 letter and email to Interior.
See McGhee Decl. at ECF pp. 29, 36–37. And EBCI’s original Complaint acknowledged that he
was “unable to determine whether this final agency action will destroy or harm Cherokee
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religious or cultural sites.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 68. Townsend offers no explanation why his
assessment is different now even though it is based upon the same evidence he evaluated back
then. See July Townsend Decl., ¶ 26.
Toombs, too, has changed her tune. She initially professed concern only for “the
potential for adverse impacts upon religious or cultural items” as a result of the Catawba’s
development. See ECF No. 17-2 (April Declaration of Elizabeth Toombs), ¶ 8. In her latest
affidavit, without citing any new facts or evidence, she now “agree[s] that it is likely that the
King’s [sic] Mountain site contains Cherokee cultural resources.” ECF No. 42-1 (July
Declaration of Elizabeth Toombs), ¶ 12.
It is well established that “on summary judgment, a party cannot establish standing with
conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Perdue, 935 F.3d
598, 603 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). That principle, to be fair, is not 100% applicable to the
predictive judgments offered by those with relevant expertise. Yet given that both Townsend
and Toombs have significantly upped the ante on their assessments without offering any
additional factual basis for doing so, it seems to the Court that their new affidavits essentially
“opin[e] that the construction activities [will] result in [damage] without citing any supporting
evidence,” thereby falling short of Plaintiffs’ “burden” to present “record evidence establishing
standing.” Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 972–73 (7th
Cir. 2005). Put differently, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the newly strengthened
statements are little more than a reaction to the Court’s earlier Opinion. In that sense, their
speculative assessments are conclusory and do not move this Court from its earlier conclusion
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that, as a matter of law, there is no more than a small chance that Cherokee cultural patrimony is
present at the casino-development site.
Whatever those odds are, moreover, the odds that really matter for standing here — that
Cherokee cultural patrimony will be irrevocably destroyed by the Catawba’s construction — are
much longer still. That is because, even if there are artifacts in the construction zone, the
Catawba have “agreed to use certain best practices and undertake enumerated mitigation
measures” during construction, EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *6, to prevent damage to any
paleontological or archaeological specimens “inadvertently discovered.” Final EA at 16. The
Court previously summarized those measures:
If any [protected tribal] resource is discovered during the
construction process, “work within 50 feet of the find shall be halted
until a professional archeologist . . ., or paleontologist if the find is
paleontological in nature, can assess the significance of the find in
consultation with the BIA, other appropriate agencies and the
[Cherokee] Nation.” Final EA at 18. Under the applicable
regulations, the agency expert shall also notify EBCI’s THPO of the
find. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3); see also Final EA at 16 (listing
EBCI THPO Townsend as contact). If the find is significant, the
THPO shall meet with the archeologist (or paleontologist) to
“determine the appropriate course of action.” Id. at 16–17 . . . .
Separately, the EBCI THPO will also be contacted if human remains
are uncovered. Id. Assuming that such remains are Native
American, the construction process will halt until “the THPO and
[an agency] representative have made the necessary findings as to
the origins and disposition.” Id. at 17.
EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *6 (citations modified). While there are of course no guarantees, in
these particular circumstances, the mitigation measures go a long way toward “assur[ing] . . . that
any significant resources will be preserved if they are discovered during the construction
process.” Id. at *7. At a minimum, they substantially reduce the risk that Cherokee artifacts, if
encountered during construction, will be “completely lost.” Pl. PI Mot. at 3. That takes an
already small risk of injury down to a true longshot — in legal terms, below the “substantial
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probability” threshold necessary to establish future injury under Article III. Plaintiffs
accordingly lack standing to press their NHPA claims.
F. NEPA
Plaintiffs are now down to their final chip: the claim that Interior violated NEPA by (i)
failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and (ii) not adequately considering project
alternatives. Plaintiffs might hope that their lack of success so far makes them overdue for a win
here. The cards, however, tell a different story.
Environmental Impact Statement
If a project will “significantly” affect the “quality of the human environment,” NEPA
requires that the agency complete a detailed EIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). To determine
whether or not there will be such significant effects, however, the agency first prepares a shorter
Environmental Assessment, or EA, which discusses the need for the proposed action, the
alternatives, the environmental impacts, and the agencies and persons consulted. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.5. If the EA concludes that there will be no significant environmental impact, the agency
may forgo completing a full EIS and instead issue a “Finding of No Significant Impact,” or
FONSI. See id. §§ 1501.5(c)(1); 1501.6. That is what Interior did here. See FONSI, AR 3898;
Final EA, AR 2504.
Plaintiffs challenge the agency’s decision not to produce an EIS on several grounds. First
and foremost, they argue that Interior wrongly found that no significant impact would occur to
Cherokee “cultural resources.” Pl. SJ Mot. at 42–43; see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a)(8) (requiring
agencies to consider project’s effect on cultural resources as one “environmental
consequence[]”). Plaintiffs, however, lack standing to press this particular NEPA claim. The
only concrete injury they allege that could undergird their procedural right to greater
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consideration of the casino’s impact on cultural resources is one the Court just found unlikely to
occur: damage to artifacts or remains during construction. For the same reason, Plaintiffs also
lack standing as to their related argument that NEPA, separate from the NHPA, required Interior
to consult them while drafting its EA and FONSI. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 43; Pl. Reply at 39.
Plaintiffs next maintain that the agency “fail[ed] to consider the local effects of the
looming jurisdictional quagmire the Decision threatens.” Pl. SJ Mot. at 43–44. Points for
creative phrasing, but this argument is a nonstarter. Their concern is apparently that other
government actors beside the United States (say, North Carolina or a county government) might
read section 15 of the Settlement Act, which states that “jurisdiction and status of all non-
Reservation [Catawba] lands” falls under South Carolina law, see Pub. L. No. 103-116, § 15
(emphasis added), in a literalist vacuum, leading to conflict over whether South Carolina law
governs. The Court has already explained why this reading of the Act is absurd. See supra at
25–26. But even assuming that some lawyer somewhere might go for it, faulting Interior for
failing to consider that remote possibility is the epitome of impermissible NEPA flyspecking.
See Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Our role is not to ‘flyspeck’ an
agency’s environmental analysis, looking for any deficiency no matter how minor, but instead
simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental
impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.”) (cleaned up and citation
omitted).
Next, EBCI and the Cherokee contend that the agency neglected to consider certain
impacts on the “locality” from the casino development, including “pollution,” “harm to
recreation at nearby state parks,” and additional “crime.” See Pl. Reply at 39–40. All of these
arguments are past post (i.e., late) for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs “did not raise these particular
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objections to the [Draft] EA” during the 30-day comment period Interior provided. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764 (2004). The Cherokee did not submit any comments,
and EBCI’s six pages of comments did not even glancingly refer to pollution, recreation, or
crime. See EBCI Comments, AR 3317. Plaintiffs “have therefore forfeited any objection to the
EA on [these] ground[s].” Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764–65; see Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d
36, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Second, even had Plaintiffs preserved these arguments by raising them
to the agency, they did not bring them up here until their reply brief. “Courts in this Circuit have
generally held that issues not raised until the reply brief are waived,” Bloche v. Dep’t of Def.,
414 F. Supp. 3d 6, 23 n.5 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
although the term forfeited is more appropriate here. See United States v. Miller, 890 F.3d 317,
326 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is
the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”)
Plaintiffs last argue that Interior did not properly analyze the “cumulative impacts” of its
decision to take the Kings Mountain parcel into trust because it did not assess the effects of
further development around the casino that would predictably follow. See Pl. SJ Mot. at 44. The
only source they cite, however, is a September 2020 newspaper article, which itself reports that
sales of nearby land to developers took place over summer 2020. See Collin Huguley,
Ownership of Land Around Kings Mountain Casino Project Taking Shape, Charlotte Bus. J.
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3nmd6Ym. Yet “[t]he scope of [this Court’s NEPA] review is
limited to the administrative record that was before the agency at the time it made its decision,”
which was March 2020. Rock Creek Pack Station, Inc. v. Blackwell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 192, 201
(D.D.C. 2004) (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985)). At that
time, the agency reported that “[p]er the City of Kings Mountain and the Cleveland County
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Planning departments, there [we]re no major new development projects proposed, planned or
currently being constructed in the project study area.” Final EA at 58, AR2563 (assessing
“cumulative impacts” of the project). Plaintiffs offer no reason to think the agency’s assessment
on that score, as of March 2020, was arbitrary or capricious.
Alternatives
Even when an agency properly confines its environmental inquiry to an EA, that
document must still “include a brief discussion of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action”
as well as their environmental effects. Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783
F.3d 1301, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing precursor to 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5). “[T]he discussion of
environmental effects of alternatives need not be exhaustive. What is required is information
sufficient to permit a reasoned choice.” Birckhead, 925 F.3d at 515 (quoting Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (alteration in original). The Final
EA prepared by the agency here contained a thorough (60-pages-plus) analysis of three
alternatives to the Catawba’s proposed casino and entertainment complex at the Kings Mountain
Site: a smaller entertainment complex with less parking; a truck stop; and no action. See Final
EA at 19–21.
Plaintiffs maintain that Interior should have also considered another alternative: taking
land into trust for the Catawba that is not “in Cherokee aboriginal, historical, [or] treaty
territory.” Pl. SJ Mot. at 45; Pl. Reply at 40–41. But as Interior explained in its EA, “Evaluating
any other parcels . . . [was] beyond the scope and control of the BIA action.” Final EA, App. M
at 8. After all, the Catawba had petitioned the agency to take the Kings Mountain parcel into
trust, and Interior’s regulations required it to act on the Tribe’s application. See Final EA at 5;
25 C.F.R. § 151.12. A proposed alternative of development on another parcel was thus
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functionally equivalent to the no-action alternative, which Interior fully analyzed. Even if that
were not so, here the agency “reasonably chose to confine its goal simply to addressing [the
Tribe’s] proposal,” and it thus did not act unreasonably by evaluating only alternatives of
“(1) rejecting the proposal; (2) approving the proposal ‘as is,’ or (3) approving the proposal with
some degree of modification.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership v. Salazar, 661
F.3d 66, 73–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court also notes that much of the Southeastern United
States is historical Cherokee territory. EBCI, 2020 WL 2079443, at *5; ECF No. 8-1 (Royce
Map). The alternative of building a facility outside those vast lands, especially for a Tribe
located in the Carolinas, was not “objectively reasonable” or “feasible,” and for that independent
reason need not have been analyzed. See Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. United States, 177
F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2016).
IV. Conclusion
To the undoubted relief of the reader who has made it thus far, the Court is out of
gambling metaphors. It will, therefore, simply restate its conclusions once more: Interior did not
violate the Settlement Act or IGRA by taking the Kings Mountain parcel into trust for the
Catawba; the agency properly applied its IGRA regulations; it did not act arbitrarily by failing to
consider the background of Wallace Cheves; Plaintiffs lack standing to press their NHPA claims
and those NEPA claims that overlap; and their remaining NEPA claims fail. The Court will
accordingly enter summary judgment on all counts for the Defendants. An Order so stating shall
issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: April 16, 2021
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