Maniar v. Wolf

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ASHRAF MANIAR and UMAIMA
SHAIKH,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 19-3826 (EGS)
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his
official capacity as
Secretary of the United
States Department of
Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs Ashraf Maniar (“Mr. Maniar”) and Umaima Shaikh
(“Ms. Shaikh”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action
asserting constitutional and procedural claims related to their
alleged inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Dataset (“TSDS”), a
governmental, interagency tool that compiles the nation’s
watchlists, including the No Fly List and the Selectee List. See
Second Am. Compl. (“Compl.”), ECF No. 22 at 4 ¶ 8. 1 Plaintiffs
have sued various federal government officials in their official
capacities (collectively, “Defendants” or “the government”),
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
original page number of the filed document.
1
including Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”); David Pekoske, Administrator of
the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”); Troy Miller,
Acting Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”); Merrick Garland, the U.S. Attorney General; Christopher
Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”);
and Charles Kable, IV, Director of the Terrorist Screening
Center (“TSC”). 2 Id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 3-8. Plaintiffs, two U.S. citizens
married to each other who identify as practicing Muslims, id. at
3 ¶¶ 1-2; have alleged violations of the First and Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and are seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, see id. at 17-26.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Renewed Motion to
Dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23. Upon consideration of
Plaintiffs’ complaint, the pending motion, the opposition, the
reply thereto, and the applicable law and regulations, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 22; for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current
government officials holding these positions are “automatically
substituted as” Defendants for their predecessors.
2
II. Background
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
The TSC is a multi-agency executive organization created by
Presidential Directive in 2003, Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 17;
that is administered by the FBI in coordination with DHS, the
Department of State, and the Department of Justice, Defs.’ Ex.
A, Overview of the U.S. Government’s Watchlisting Process and
Procedures, ECF No. 23-2 at 3 [hereinafter “Watchlisting
Overview”]. 3 The TSC consolidates the U.S. government’s terrorist
watchlists into a single database known as the TSDS, 4 which
3 The Court takes judicial notice of the Watchlisting Overview,
“released by the U.S. government in January 2018” and providing
“a description of watchlisting policies and procedures[,]”
Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 17 n.2; and of the other exhibits
attached to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that are also
referenced in Plaintiffs’ complaint, see Patrick v. Dist. of
Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Although a
court generally cannot consider matters beyond the pleadings at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, it may consider ‘documents attached
as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or
documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily
relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in
the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss[.]’”
(citation omitted)); Ashbourne v. Hansberry, 245 F. Supp. 3d 99,
103 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that courts may take judicial notice
of “official, public documents”); Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v.
Gov’t of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 85 (D.D.C. 2015) (same
conclusion for “public records and government documents
available from reliable sources”).
4 The TSDS was formerly known as the Terrorist Screening
Database. See Defs.’ Ex. 3, Decl. of Jason V. Herring (TSC’s
Deputy Director for Operations), Moharam v. FBI, No. 21-2607
(JDB) (D.D.C. Jan. 18. 2022), ECF No. 20-5 at 3 ¶ 5 (explaining
that the term “TSDS” “more accurately describes the terrorist
screening information maintained by the TSC”).
3
“contains both biographic and biometric identifying information
. . . of known and suspected terrorists”—which is “accessible
only to persons who have a ‘need to know’ such as federal law
enforcement officials for their screening and vetting
activities.” Id. Inclusion in the TSDS results from a multi-step
nomination process, in which U.S. government agencies and
foreign partners “nominate” individuals to add to the database
where there is enough credible investigative information “to
satisfy a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a [known
or suspected terrorist].” Id. at 4; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at
18. These nominations are then reviewed by the FBI and the
National Counterterrorism Center before the TSC makes the final
determination on whether to add the nominated persons to the
TSDS. See Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 4-5.
Once individuals are added to the database, the TSC sorts
them into subset lists, known as the No Fly List and the
Selectee List, which are used by TSA “to secure commercial air
travel against the threat of terrorism.” Id. at 3; see 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(f) (providing TSA’s mandate to “assess” and “deal[] with
threats to transportation security” “at airports and other
transportation facilities”); 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(ii)
(directing TSA to perform “the passenger prescreening function
of comparing passenger information to the automatic selectee and
no fly lists” to identify threats to civil aviation or national
4
security). Nominees to the No Fly and Selectee Lists “must
satisfy criteria distinct from that used for mere inclusion in
the TSD[S,]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 5; with
inclusion on the No Fly List being the most restrictive of the
subsets, reserved for individuals presenting “a terrorist threat
with respect to an aircraft, the homeland, U.S. facilities or
interests abroad, or a threat of engaging in or conducting a
violent act of terrorism and is operationally capable of doing
so[,]” id.; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 18. TSA prohibits
individuals on the No Fly List from boarding flights on U.S.
carriers, as well as flights into, out of, over, or within U.S.
airspace, Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 3; while it
subjects individuals on the Selectee List to enhanced security
screenings at airports and border crossings, 5 id.; Compl., ECF
No. 22 at 15 ¶ 104. The U.S. government does not publicly
disclose who is on either TSDS list or the criteria for
placement on the Selectee List. 6 Watchlisting Overview, ECF No.
23-2 at 3, 5; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 18.
5 Plaintiffs allege that these enhanced screening measures “can
take several hours on departing flights at U.S. airports[,]”
which “can result in the individuals missing scheduled flights.”
Compl., ECF No. 22 at 15 ¶ 105. They also allege that “Selectee
list persons often encounter extreme difficulties traveling
abroad, including being detained in foreign countries . . . , or
being prohibited from entering them altogether, due to the
dissemination of the TSD[S] to foreign governments.” Id. ¶ 106.
6 According to Plaintiffs, “[p]ersons removed from the No Fly
List are often demoted to the Selectee List.” Id. at 16 ¶ 112.
5
The U.S. government also has a policy against informing
individuals of their placement on or removal from the Selectee
List, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 113; although it may inform
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (“U.S. persons”) of
their presence on the No Fly List after they are denied boarding
of a commercial aircraft, Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at
10. U.S. persons who “believe they have been unfairly or
incorrectly delayed, denied boarding, or identified for
additional screening or inspection at airports or U.S. ports of
entry” may submit an inquiry through DHS’s Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program (“DHS TRIP”). Id. at 8; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.205(a)-
(b); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I), (j)(2)(G)(i),
44926(a)-(b); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1560.201–207. As part of the inquiry,
individuals must send DHS TRIP “personal information and copies
of the specified identification documents.” 7 49 C.F.R. §
1560.205(c). Then, the TSC’s Redress Office, “a separate
component within the TSC that processes inquires related to the
use of TSD[S] data by screening agencies[,]” works with DHS TRIP
to review travelers’ information and documentation to determine
whether they “should remain in the TSD[S], be modified, or be
removed[.]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 9. If changes
7 Each DHS TRIP inquiry is assigned a unique Redress Control
Number, enabling individuals to check the status of their
inquiry on DHS’s TRIP website at any time. Watchlisting
Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 8; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.205(c).
6
to a record’s status are warranted, the TSC’s Redress Office
ensures corrections are made, and then DHS TRIP “sends a
determination letter advising the traveler of the results of the
adjudication of the redress inquiry.” Id. at 10.
Historically, the U.S. government did not confirm or deny
for DHS TRIP complainants whether they were on the No Fly List,
Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 114; but in 2015, in response to
litigation, TSA adopted revised DHS TRIP procedures to allow
disclosure of No-Fly status to U.S. persons denied boarding who
thereafter file a redress inquiry, id. ¶ 116; Defs.’ Mot., ECF
No. 23-1 at 21. Complainants can “request and receive additional
information” regarding the reason(s) for their status, which
includes, “where possible when national security and law
enforcement interests at stake are taken into account, an
unclassified summary of information supporting the individual’s
No Fly List status[,]” and they may also submit information in
rebuttal to their No-Fly designation. See Compl., ECF No. 22 at
17 ¶¶ 118-121 (stating that upon election by the traveler to
receive more information, “DHS TRIP commits to [ ] provide a
second, or ‘stage-two’ letter, including the specific criteria
under which the individual has been placed on the No Fly List”);
Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10 (noting that “[t]he
amount and type of information provided will vary on a case-by-
case basis,” and in some instances, an unclassified summary may
7
not be provided due to national security concerns). The TSC will
then review the complainant’s file and either: (1) remove the
person from the No Fly List if it determines that such status is
unwarranted; or (2) conclude that the person should stay on the
No Fly List and provide a recommendation as such to the TSA
Administrator. Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 9-10;
Compl., ECF No. 22 at 17 ¶ 122. The TSA Administrator “makes
final determinations concerning listing on the No Fly List[,]”
Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10 n.5; and will issue a
final order either maintaining or removing the person’s No-Fly
status, or alternatively remanding the matter back to the TSC
for more information or clarification, id. at 10. If TSA issues
a final order maintaining the person’s No Fly List designation,
DHS TRIP will send the complainant a determination letter, which
states the basis for the decision “to the extent feasible in
light of national security and law enforcement interests at
stake,” and notifies the person of the ability to seek judicial
review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. Id.; Compl., ECF No.
22 at 17 ¶ 123; see also 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (“[A] person
disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by . . .
the Administrator of the [TSA] . . . may apply for review of the
order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court
8
of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the
person resides or has its principal place of business.”). 8
Selectee List persons are also sent “a determination letter
advising [them] of the results of the adjudication of the
redress inquiry[,]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10;
but this response does not confirm or deny travelers’ inclusion
in or deletion from that list, 9 Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 117,
17 ¶ 124; information which is protected by the law enforcement
privilege and as Sensitive Security Information pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 114(r), Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 14 n.1, 18; see
also 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(9). “Individuals who are not on the
8 Prior to the 2015 revisions to DHS TRIP procedures, the TSC was
the “sole entity with . . . the authority to remove names from
the No-Fly List/TSD[S.]” Ege v. DHS, 784 F.3d 791, 795 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, under the current procedures, “the TSA Administrator is
solely responsible for issuing a final order maintaining a
traveler on the No Fly List. TSC submits a recommendation, along
with supporting materials, to the TSA Administrator[,]” who
“ultimately issues the final order[.]” Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d
358, 391 (9th Cir. 2019); accord Busic v. TSA, No. 20-1480, 2023
WL 2565069, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2023).
9 According to plaintiffs in similar cases, “the standard
response sent to people who are not on the No Fly List, but who
could be on the Selectee List” states as follows: “DHS has
researched and completed our review of your case. DHS TRIP can
neither confirm nor deny any information about you which may be
within federal watchlists or reveal any law enforcement
sensitive information. However, we have made any corrections to
our records that our inquiries determined were necessary,
including, as appropriate, notations that may assist in avoiding
incidents of misidentification.” Jibril v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th
804, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also Matar v. TSA, 910 F.3d
538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (indicating that the petitioner
received a letter with identical wording from DHS TRIP).
9
No Fly List, but who may be on the Selectee List, are therefore
often unable to receive a response that meaningfully informs
them of the results of their DHS TRIP inquiry.” Jibril v.
Mayorkas, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2023 WL 2240271, at *1 (D.D.C.
Feb. 27, 2023) [hereinafter “Jibril III”]. 10
B. Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts reflect the allegations in the
Complaint and the documents incorporated by reference therein,
which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding
this motion and construes in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Baird v.
Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff Ashraf Maniar is a U.S. citizen by birthright and
of Pakistani national origin. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 3 ¶ 1.
Plaintiff Umaima Shaikh is a U.S. citizen of Pakistani national
origin who acquired citizenship at birth due to the U.S.
citizenship of a parent. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs identify as
practicing Muslims and are a married couple living together in
10Jibril III is the most recent decision issued by this Court
regarding TSDS watchlists. It is preceded by Jibril v. Wolf, No.
1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2020 WL 2331870 (D.D.C. May 9, 2020), which
was affirmed in part and reversed in part by Jibril v. Mayorkas,
20 F.4th 804 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Jibril II”). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion, which culminated in Jibril III, decided on February 27,
2023. Although these cases primarily concerned the Jibrils’
alleged placement on the Selectee List, the Court relies on
Jibril II and Jibril III in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ No Fly
List and Selectee List claims. See infra section IV.A.
10
North Carolina. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Neither has a history of mental
health concerns, id. at 5 ¶ 13, 10 ¶ 64; nor have they ever been
convicted of or charged with criminal activity, id. at 10 ¶ 63;
Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 9. Both Plaintiffs have “experienced
ongoing and severe difficulties in airport travel,” including
“the inability to print boarding passes and the inability to
board a plane,” with Mr. Maniar also once “being escorted out of
the airport.” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5 ¶ 19, 10 ¶ 65. They have
also encountered difficulties with ground travel within the U.S.
and traveling via car to Canada. See id. at 9 ¶¶ 50-54, 10-11 ¶¶
66-67. Plaintiffs were placed on the No Fly List, id. at 7 ¶ 36,
12 ¶ 78; but have both since been removed from that list, id. at
8 ¶ 44, 13 ¶ 88. The facts of their alleged experiences
pertaining to their designations on and subsequent removals from
the No Fly List are detailed separately below.
1. Plaintiff Ashraf Maniar
Mr. Maniar has business and religious interests involving
travel abroad. See id. at 5 ¶¶ 15-18. First, he maintains
commercial ventures in Malaysia via online business
transactions. Id. ¶ 15. Second, as a practicing Muslim with
sincerely held religious beliefs, he intends to travel to Saudi
Arabia to complete Hajj and Umrah, two religious pilgrimages.
Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Mr. Maniar has traveled to Saudi Arabia for Umrah
in the past and hopes to complete Hajj in the future. Id. ¶ 17.
11
Mr. Maniar alleges that because of his placement on the No Fly
List, he was “unable to travel to Saudi Arabia to complete Hajj
and pilgrimage requirements, or participate in chosen employment
and business ventures.” Id. ¶ 20, 9 ¶ 56.
Mr. Maniar recalls being prohibited from flying for the
first time in May 2017, id. ¶ 22; and as a result, he filed his
first DHS TRIP inquiry around that time, id. at 6 ¶ 23. Although
he was permitted to fly in November 2017 from Boston to Los
Angeles, id. ¶ 25; he claims his travel experiences worsened
thereafter despite the initiation of his inquiry, id. ¶ 26.
First, on December 14, 2017, FBI agents raided Mr. Maniar’s
house pursuant to a warrant and seized his electronics and
passport. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Then, on December 16, 2017, Mr. Maniar
booked a flight from Nevada to Georgia to attend his wedding in
Atlanta, but two days later, when he tried to board his flight,
he was not allowed to print his boarding pass, was prohibited
from flying, and was escorted out of the airport. Id. ¶¶ 29-31.
These events led Mr. Maniar to initiate another DHS TRIP inquiry
on February 21, 2018 to “acquire information as to whether he
[was] on the No Fly List, the reasons for that designation, if
any, and a way to appeal any determination.” Id. ¶ 32.
On June 7, 2018, Mr. Maniar filed a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus in this Court, explaining his travel difficulties and
seeking to compel DHS TRIP “to provide an initial determination
12
as to whether or not [he was] on the No Fly List” in line with
the applicable regulations regarding redress. Id. at 7 ¶ 35;
Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, Maniar v. Nielsen, No. 18-1362 (RDM)
(D.D.C. June 7, 2018), ECF No. 1 at 5. 11 On June 27, 2018, DHS
sent Mr. Maniar a letter confirming his placement on the No Fly
List because, following a review of his records “in consultation
with other federal agencies,” he was “identified as an
individual who ‘may be a threat to civil aviation or national
security.’” Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 23-3 at 2 (quoting 49 U.S.C. §
114(h)(3)(A)). No other information as to the reasons for his
No-Fly designation were provided in the letter. See id.; Compl.,
ECF No. 22 at 7 ¶¶ 36-38. That same day, Mr. Maniar’s counsel
contacted DHS TRIP to notify the agency that its letter was
“insufficient” given Mr. Maniar’s entitlement to “the specific
criterion under which [he was] placed on the No Fly List and . .
. an unclassified summary of information supporting [his] No Fly
List status[.]” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 7 ¶ 39.
On October 30, 2018, DHS TRIP issued Mr. Maniar a stage-two
letter that provided him with “an unclassified summary that
include[d] the reasons supporting [his] placement on the No Fly
List . . . to the extent feasible,” after considering national
11This matter was voluntarily dismissed on August 19, 2020
following Mr. Maniar’s removal from the No Fly List. See Notice
of Non-Suit & Voluntary Dismissal, Maniar v. Wolf, No. 18-1362
(RDM) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2020), ECF No. 35 at 1.
13
security and law enforcement interests. Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No.
23-4 at 2. The letter informed Mr. Maniar that he was determined
to represent “a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent
act of terrorism and [ ] operationally capable of doing so[,]”
and stated:
You are on the U.S. Government’s No Fly [L]ist
due to, in part, your association and
extensive communication with a known extremist
located in the United Kingdom who has
supported terrorist organizations. The
additional details regarding your placement on
the U.S. Government’s No Fly List cannot be
provided to you due to national security
concerns.
Id. at 2-3; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 7-8 ¶ 40. Despite claiming
that this “unclassified summary” did not provide him with “a
meaningful [way to] challenge” his designation, Compl., ECF No.
22 at 8 ¶ 41; 12 on December 31, 2018, Mr. Maniar timely filed an
administrative appeal with DHS TRIP, which included information
contesting the reasons for his No Fly List status as stated in
his stage-two letter, id. ¶ 43.
While his appeal was pending, in June 2020, Mr. Maniar was
pulled over by CBP agents in New Mexico while he was driving
from Georgia to California. Id. at 9 ¶ 53. Although he only had
12Mr. Maniar claims that the lack of specific information in his
stage-two TRIP letter did “not satisfy the Agency’s substantive
obligation to disclose sufficient information to allow [him] ‘to
correct erroneous information in the government’s terrorism
database.’” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 42 (quoting Latif v.
Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1162-63 (D. Or. 2014)).
14
a backpack with him, CBP detained him for over an hour, searched
him, and fingerprinted him. Id. ¶ 54.
On August 18, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Mr. Maniar by letter
that he had been removed from the No Fly List “based on the
totality of available information, including information [he]
provided to DHS TRIP.” Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2. The
letter also stated that he would “not be placed back on the No
Fly List based on currently available information[,]” and that
the determination “render[ed his] administrative redress case
moot” and therefore closed. Id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 44.
2. Plaintiff Umaima Shaikh
Ms. Shaikh has familial and religious interests involving
travel abroad. See Compl., ECF No. 22 at 14 ¶ 99, 15 ¶ 100.
First, she has family members residing in Pakistan with whom she
was unable to visit for two years as a result of her designation
on the No Fly List. Id. at 14 ¶ 99. This separation included
missing her brother’s wedding, her grandmother’s funeral, family
members’ graduations, and visits to sick relatives. Id. Second,
as a practicing Muslim with sincerely held religious beliefs,
Ms. Shaikh has pilgrimage obligations that she claims were
hindered by her No-Fly status. Id. at 15 ¶ 100. She has traveled
to Saudi Arabia for Umrah in the past and hopes to travel there
to complete Hajj in the future. Id.
15
Ms. Shaikh recalls being prohibited from traveling via car
to Canada with Mr. Maniar on March 15, 2018, id. at 11 ¶ 67; and
being prohibited from flying for the first time on or before
July 3, 2018, id. ¶ 68. Ms. Shaikh was scheduled to take an
Emirates Airline flight to Pakistan to attend her brother’s
wedding, but when she arrived at the ticketing counter, airline
officials informed her that they could not issue her a boarding
pass, nor provide her with a reason why. Id. ¶¶ 68-71. As a
result, Ms. Shaikh was not able to board her flight and missed
her brother’s wedding. Id. ¶ 72.
On August 13, 2018, Ms. Shaikh initiated a redress inquiry,
in which she notified DHS TRIP that her husband, Mr. Maniar, had
received an initial determination letter that he was on the No
Fly List. Id. ¶¶ 74, 77. Four months later, on December 18,
2018, Ms. Shaikh also received an initial determination letter
from DHS TRIP informing her that she was on the No Fly List
because she was “identified as an individual who ‘may be a
threat to civil aviation or national security.’” Defs.’ Ex. E,
ECF No. 23-6 at 2 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(A)). No other
information as to the reasons for her No-Fly designation were
provided in the letter, although the letter stated that Ms.
Shaikh could request additional information regarding her
designation within thirty days. See id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at
12 ¶¶ 78-79. On December 26, 2018, Ms. Shaikh’s counsel
16
contacted DHS TRIP to request all relevant information
supporting her placement on the No Fly List, including an
unclassified summary. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 12 ¶ 81.
On May 14, 2019, Ms. Shaikh filed suit in this Court,
seeking to compel DHS TRIP to provide the specific reasons
supporting her placement on the No Fly List pursuant to a
complaint for declaratory relief under the APA and a Petition
for Writ of Mandamus. Id. ¶ 82; Compl. & Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus, Shaikh v. McAleenan, No. 19-1398 (RBW) (D.D.C. May 14,
2019), ECF No. 1 at 7. 13 Nearly nine months later, on February 3,
2020, DHS TRIP issued Ms. Shaikh a stage-two letter providing
her with “an unclassified summary that include[d the] reasons
supporting [her] placement on the No Fly List.” Defs.’ Ex. F,
ECF No. 23-7 at 2. The letter informed Ms. Shaikh, like Mr.
Maniar, that she was determined to represent “a threat of
engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and [ ]
operationally capable of doing so[,]” and stated:
You are on the U.S. Government’s No Fly List
due to, in part, your provision of support to
an individual, made with the knowing purpose
of furthering the individual’s desire to join
a foreign-based terrorist organization, as
well as your association and communication
13This matter was dismissed on March 31, 2020 following Judge
Reggie B. Walton’s order granting Defendant’s Second Motion to
Dismiss. See Order, Shaikh v. Wolf, No. 19-1398 (RBW) (D.D.C.
Mar. 31, 2020), ECF No. 16 at 7. Judge Walton determined that
Ms. Shaikh’s claims “were rendered moot when [DHS TRIP] issued
the [stage-two] February 3, 2020 letter to [her].” Id. at 5.
17
with multiple known extremists. Additional
reasons for and details regarding your
placement on the U.S. Government’s No Fly List
cannot be provided to you due to law
enforcement and national security concerns.
Id. at 2-3; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶¶ 84-85. Despite claiming
that this “cursory stage-two letter” did not “permit her to make
a meaningful response,” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶ 86; on March
9, 2020, Ms. Shaikh timely filed an administrative appeal, which
included information contesting the reasons for her No Fly List
status as stated in her stage-two DHS TRIP letter, id. ¶ 87.
On July 15, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Ms. Shaikh by letter
that she had been removed from the No Fly List “based on the
totality of available information, including information [she]
provided to DHS TRIP.” Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2. The
letter also stated that she would “not be placed back on the No
Fly List based on currently available information[,]” and that
the determination “render[ed her] administrative redress case
moot” and therefore closed. Id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶ 88.
3. Events Following Plaintiffs’ Removals from the
No Fly List
Plaintiffs jointly initiated the instant suit on December
26, 2019, see Original Compl., ECF No. 1; but following their
removals from the No Fly List—first Ms. Shaikh on July 15, 2020
(after approximately two years on the list), and then Mr. Maniar
on August 18, 2020 (after approximately three years on the
18
list)—they have since amended their pleading twice, first on
August 12, 2020, see First Am. Compl., ECF No. 19; and again on
September 9, 2020, see Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 22. As
Defendants’ note, “[t]he allegations in the operative Second
Amended Complaint are materially similar to those in
[Plaintiffs’] original pleading . . . except that [they] now
include [ ] additional allegations concerning certain subsequent
events following their removal[s] from the No Fly List.” 14 Defs.’
Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 25.
As to Ms. Shaikh, she alleges that on July 25, 2020—ten
days after her removal from the No Fly List on July 15, 2020—she
was unable to obtain a boarding pass for her flight from
Raleigh, North Carolina to Atlanta, Georgia without speaking to
a ticketing counter clerk, who in turn had to receive permission
prior to issuing the boarding pass. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶¶
89-90. When Ms. Shaikh received her boarding pass, it had an
“SSSS” notation printed on it, which stands for “Secondary
Security Screening Selection.” Id. at 14 ¶ 91. Ms. Shaikh
alleges that such a notation indicates that she is “still
included within the TSD[S], even though no longer on the No Fly
14Defendants originally moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on
March 9, 2020, see Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 at 1; but
the Court denied that motion as moot after granting Plaintiffs
leave to file their first amended complaint, see Minute Order
(Aug. 11, 2020); and thereafter granted them leave to file their
second amended complaint, see Minute Order (Aug. 24, 2020).
19
List” and that her July 2020 travel experience is “consistent
with persons on the Selectee List.” Id. ¶¶ 92-93.
As to Mr. Maniar, he alleges that on August 30, 2020—twelve
days after his removal from the No Fly List on August 18, 2020—
he traveled to Pakistan to visit family and friends. Id. at 8 ¶
45; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 12. Upon arrival in Turkey for
his connecting flight, Mr. Maniar was subjected to “extensive
individualized questioning” before being allowed to board his
next flight to Pakistan. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 46. When he
landed in Pakistan, Mr. Maniar was detained by Pakistani
authorities and again questioned extensively. Id. at 9 ¶ 47.
Although he was released, Mr. Maniar was not permitted to remain
in Pakistan and was forced to immediately book travel back to
the U.S. Id. Mr. Maniar alleges that such events indicate that
he “is still included within the TSD[S], even though no longer
on the No Fly List” and that his August 2020 travel experience
is “consistent with persons on the Selectee List[,]” which is
“communicat[ed ] to other nations.” Id. ¶¶ 47-49.
Plaintiffs additionally allege that they have both
separately learned that FBI agents have asked people they
personally know questions about them, during which the agents
“strongly impl[ied] that [Plaintiffs have] criminal and/or
nefarious intentions and/or contacts.” Id. at 10 ¶ 57, 14 ¶ 95.
Both Plaintiffs claim the actions of these FBI agents damaged
20
their reputations and violated their privacy interests, id. at
10 ¶ 59, 14 ¶ 97; as well as caused them “extreme emotional
distress, as a result of the stigmatization created by [ ]
Defendants’ actions[,]” id. at 10 ¶ 60, 14 ¶ 98; see also id. at
9 ¶ 55 (stating Mr. Maniar’s belief that he found helicopters
hovering above his house and has been followed on more than one
occasion subsequent to his placement on the No Fly List).
Plaintiffs claim that their “former designation on the No
Fly List, believed current placement on the Selectee List, and
substantial likelihood that [they] could again be placed on the
No Fly List, infringe on [their] religious exercise,” id. at 10
¶ 61, 15 ¶ 100; in addition to prior and ongoing “infringements
on [their] chosen employment [and ability to travel],
reputational damage, [ ] emotional distress[,]” and family
separation, id. at 9 ¶ 50, 14 ¶ 94, 16 ¶ 110; see also id. at 3(“These ongoing travel difficulties, and the risk of repetition
for [Plaintiffs] to again be placed on the No Fly List, result
in infringements upon their constitutional rights and protected
interests.”); Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 12 (alleging “ongoing”
harm due to the “continuing heightened scrutiny” of Plaintiffs
during travel and the sharing of their TSDS placement with
foreign governments). They bring the following claims in
“challenging the constitutionality and adequacy of Defendants’
policies and actions,” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 7: (1)
21
violations of their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive
due process rights against all Defendants (Counts One and Two,
respectively); (2) violations of the APA due to alleged
inadequacies in the DHS TRIP redress process against Defendants
Alejandro Mayorkas (DHS) and David Pekoske (TSA) (Count Three);
(3) violations of their First Amendment rights against all
Defendants (Count Four); and (4) entitlement to attorney’s fees
and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Count Five), see
Compl., ECF No. 22 at 17-25.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. See id.
at 25-26. First, they ask the Court to declare that Defendants
violated and continue to violate their rights under the U.S.
Constitution. See id. at 25. Second, they ask the Court to
declare that Defendants’ actions against them “constitute an
abuse of discretion” and are “arbitrary and capricious” in
violation of the APA. See id. at 25-26. Third, they ask the
Court to order DHS TRIP “to provide persons with meaningful
opportunities to challenge future inclusion on the No Fly List
moving forward[.]” Id. at 26. Finally, they seek attorney’s fees
and costs and any additional relief the Court deems proper. Id.On September 28, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF
22
No. 23 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6)). In
support of that motion, Defendants filed accompanying Exhibits A
through G, of which the Court takes judicial notice. See supra
note 3. Plaintiffs filed their opposition brief on October 19,
2020, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25; to which Defendants replied
on November 2, 2020, see Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26. On September
28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority to
bring to the Court’s attention “the recently issued decision[s]
of Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 762 (9th Cir. 2022)” and Long v.
Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417 (4th Cir. 2022), which they claim “bear[]
directly on the facts of this case.” See Pls.’ Notice of Suppl.
Authority (“Pls.’ Suppl. Notice”), ECF No. 29 at 1. Defendants
responded to this notice on October 16, 2022, claiming that
“neither case aids [Plaintiffs’] claims in this action.” See
Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. Authority (“Defs.’ Suppl.
Resp.”), ECF No. 30 at 1. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss
is now ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
“A federal district court may only hear a claim over which
[it] has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court’s
jurisdiction.” Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44
(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1)
23
motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the
court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Moran
v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112
S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). “Because Rule 12(b)(1)
concerns a court’s ability to hear a particular claim, the court
must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more closely when
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than
it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”
Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65
(D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, the court must accept as true all of
the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but the court need not
“accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal
conclusions that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao,
154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
“the court need not limit itself to the allegations of the
complaint.” Id. (citing Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227,
241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107
S. Ct. 2246, 96 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1987)). Rather, the court “may
consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems
appropriate to resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction
to hear the case.” Scolaro v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Elections
24
& Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir.
2005). “Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and
Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
motion because [o]nce a court determines that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.” Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C.
2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Article III Standing
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed.
2d 246 (2014) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “‘One element
of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must
establish that they have standing to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264(2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S. Ct.
2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997)); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560(calling standing “the irreducible constitutional minimum”); see
also Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *4 (“[A] court might lack
subject-matter jurisdiction [ ] if a plaintiff lacks Article III
standing.” (citing Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.
Cir. 1987))). The law of Article III standing “is built on
separation-of-powers principles” and “serves to prevent the
25
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
political branches.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.
To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an
‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a
‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 157-58 (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693, 705, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013) (“To
have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that
affects him [or her] in a personal and individual way[, i.e.,] .
. . possess[ing] a direct stake in the outcome of the case.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The
plaintiff, as “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction[,]
bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561. “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but
rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each
element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.” Id.; see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141
S. Ct. 2190, 2208, 210 L. Ed. 2d. 568 (2021) (“[S]tanding is not
dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing
26
for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that
they seek (for example, injunctive relief and damages).”).
At the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only “‘state a
plausible claim’ that each of the standing elements is present.”
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted); see also Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim [of standing] that
is plausible on its face.’” (citation omitted)). The court
“assume[s], for purposes of the standing analysis, that
plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their claim[s,]”
Attias, 865 F.3d at 629; but it “must dismiss the case pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1)” if plaintiffs fail to prove that they have
standing, Jibril v. Wolf, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2020 WL
2331870, at *3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2020), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part & remanded, Jibril v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 804 (D.C. Cir.
2021) [hereinafter “Jibril II”].
IV. Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ operative complaint
on the ground that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any of
their claims, and thus the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 27-31.
Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ “injury theory”
rests on speculation and does not establish “certainly
27
impending” harm sufficient to confer standing since they “seek
prospective relief for a number of alleged injuries associated
with the No Fly List . . . [b]ut [ ] are no longer on the No Fly
List[.]” Id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing,
despite their removals from the No Fly List, due to ongoing
religious infringements and reputational, employment, and
emotional harms resulting from their former No-Fly status, along
with continued impacts to their ability to travel from their
“believed current placement on the Selectee List,” and because
of a “substantial likelihood [they] could again be placed on the
No Fly List[.]” See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 15-17; Compl.,
ECF No. 22 at 9 ¶ 50, 10 ¶ 61, 14 ¶ 94, 15 ¶ 100, 16 ¶ 110.
Moreover, Plaintiffs proffer arguments as to why their claims
under the First and Fifth Amendments, APA, and EAJA should
proceed to the merits. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 21-35.
Because “[a] federal district court may only hear a claim
over which [it] has subject-matter jurisdiction[,]” Gregorio,
238 F. Supp. 3d at 44; the Court first turns to the parties’
jurisdictional arguments before determining whether “it can
proceed [ ] further” to the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
and statutory claims, Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 90.
A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Any of Their Claims
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they “have
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to
28
the challenged conduct of [Defendants], and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635(2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Here, Plaintiffs’
case for declaratory and injunctive relief “primarily concerns
injury in fact, the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three
elements.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210(1998)); Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158 (“This case
concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, which helps to ensure
that [Plaintiffs have] a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To establish injury in fact, Plaintiffs must show that they
suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339-40
(defining a “particularized” injury as one that “affect[s] the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way” and a “concrete”
injury as a “real, and not abstract” injury that “must actually
exist” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Chemistry
Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 820 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“Article III does not require actual harm. . . . [I]mminent
harm will suffice.”). “Although imminence is concededly a
29
somewhat elastic concept,” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409; for claims
seeking prospective relief, like those alleged by Plaintiffs,
“[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice [as imminent] if
the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur[,]” Susan B. Anthony
List, 573 U.S. at 158 (citation omitted); Clapper, 568 U.S. at
409 (distinguishing between threatened injury that is “certainly
impending,” which constitutes injury in fact, and “[a]llegations
of possible future injury,” which are insufficient); see also
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210 (“[A] person exposed to a risk of
future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to
prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of
harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” (citing Clapper,
568 U.S. at 414 n.5; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
102, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983))).
Although a plaintiff seeking prospective relief “may not
rest on past injury” alone to establish standing, Arpaio v.
Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Dearth v. Holder, 641
F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011); “[p]ast wrongs may serve as
evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat
of repeated injury,” Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 814 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, past exposure to
illegal conduct, when accompanied by “any continuing, present
adverse effects,” may suffice to support Article III standing in
30
a case or controversy regarding declaratory and injunctive
relief. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct.
669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974); see also Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501(requiring plaintiffs to show they are suffering from “an
ongoing injury or face[] an immediate threat of injury”).
In addition, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs
must state a plausible claim that any alleged injury in fact is
“‘fairly traceable to the actions of [Defendants, and] is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.’” Taylor
v. FAA, 351 F. Supp. 3d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Food &
Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir.
2015)). Causation and redressability “‘are closely related’ like
‘two sides of a . . . coin.’” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1235
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Dynalantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 115
F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “Like heads and tails,
however, the two concepts are distinct: causation focuses on the
‘connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the
alleged injury’ whereas redressability focuses on the
‘connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested.’” Id. at 1235-36 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 753 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984)).
Given the constitutional import of standing, the Court
delineates in detail the parties’ opposing arguments. First,
Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs do not have standing to obtain
31
prospective relief with respect to their prior No Fly List
placement” because they cannot establish a “certainly impending”
injury. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 28. The government
identifies, from the Second Amended Complaint, “a number of
[Plaintiffs’] alleged injuries associated with the No Fly List,”
such as: (1) an alleged inability to travel, including for
religious or professional reasons; and (2) alleged reputational
or emotional impacts. Id. at 14-15, 28. However, at the time
they filed the operative complaint, Plaintiffs were “no longer
on the No Fly List,” so the government argues that they cannot
now proffer allegations of harm “due to any ongoing placement”
on the list, nor allegations that “they are currently unable to
travel[,]” as both have traveled recently. Id. at 15, 28
(emphases added). Instead, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on past
emotional, reputational, or travel impacts, the government
argues that “their requested, prospective relief [ ] cannot
redress th[o]se harms.” Id. at 28; see also Defs.’ Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 10 (“[B]ecause Plaintiffs have been removed from the
No Fly List, any declaration or injunction regarding the
lawfulness of that list . . . could have no immediate . . .
consequences for [them.]”). Also, to the extent “Plaintiffs’
injury theory” rests on the assertion that they “may again be
restored on the [No Fly] list, despite DHS’s assurance that they
will not be placed back on the list based on currently available
32
information[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15; see also Defs.’
Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2; Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2;
Defendants argue that such a “speculative” theory “‘does nothing
to establish a real and immediate threat that [they] [will]
again’ be placed on the No Fly List[,]” id. at 15, 25, 29
(quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105); see also Defs.’ Reply, ECF No.
26 at 11 (“[A]ny risk of a future re-designation is . . .
‘hypothetical[.]’”). In other words, Defendants claim that
“Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate an injury in fact at this
time” in relation to their former placement on the No Fly List.
Id. at 15, 25; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 14.
Second, the government argues that Plaintiffs also cannot
establish standing as to their Selectee List claims, as “the
Second Amend[ed] Complaint does not bring [well-pled] claims
that challenge [their] alleged Selectee List placement, and in
any event could not allege that placement on the Selectee List
will result in harms equivalent [to those] associated with the
No Fly List[.]” See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 25, 30
(“Plaintiffs also allege that they may be on another, less
restrictive watch list, thus creating the risk of future delays
and additional screening at airports[, b]ut there is no
allegation that [they] will necessarily suffer these injuries
when traveling in the future.”). Finally, Defendants argue that
standing, not mootness, “is the proper jurisdictional framework”
33
for evaluating Plaintiffs’ No Fly and Selectee List claims since
they filed the Second Amended Complaint after being removed from
the No Fly List, and the Court “must measure standing” as of the
date of that complaint. Id. at 27 n.5-28.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ arguments regarding
standing “ignore[] important factual realities[,]” as they
allege that their “harm did not cease at the time of their
removals from the No Fly List[.]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. at 25 at
14-15. They argue that they continue to suffer from “extreme
emotional distress” because of prior periods of family
separation and hindrances to chosen employment ventures while
they were on the No Fly List, along with “the stigmatization
created by [ ] Defendants’ actions[,]” none of which
“evaporate[d] upon removal from the” list. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs
also allege concrete injury in the form of continued impacts to
their ability to travel, namely the potential for “severe” and
“extensive” questioning and detention abroad, like what Mr.
Maniar experienced in Turkey and Pakistan, and “extensive
screening” in the U.S. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiffs thus allege that
they have standing because “[a]s pled in [their] Amended
Complaint, . . . these actions occurred due to [ ] Defendants[’]
placement of [them] on the No Fly List and Selectee List, and
communication of that placement to other nations[,]” which have
caused them “particularized” and “ongoing” harms. Id. at 16-17.
34
Although Plaintiffs concede they are no longer on the No Fly
List, they furthermore allege harm due to “the very real
possibility of recurrence of [ ] injury[,]” namely redesignation
to the No Fly List. Id. at 17. They argue that this potential
harm is “capable of redress only by a ruling ordering DHS TRIP
to revise [its] procedures to provide [them] with an ability to
meaningfully challenge future likely inclusions on the No Fly
List[.]” Id.; see also Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26.
As an initial matter, the Court adopts the government’s
(uncontested) argument that “standing, rather than mootness, is
the proper jurisdictional framework.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1
at 27 n.5. Whereas standing mandates that “[t]he requisite
personal interest . . . exist at the commencement of the
litigation[,]” mootness “has been described as . . . standing
set in a time frame[,]” requiring that the personal stake
continue throughout the duration of the litigation. Arizonans
for Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22, 117 S. Ct.
1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). A case becomes moot, mandating dismissal, “when
the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v.
Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S. Ct. 721, 184 L. Ed. 2d 553(2013) (citation omitted); see also Clarke v. United States, 915
F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Even where litigation poses a
35
live controversy when filed, the [mootness] doctrine requires a
federal court to refrain from deciding it if events have so
transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the
parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of
affecting them in the future.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Long, 38 F.4th at 423 (defining mootness as
“[a] change in factual circumstances[,] . . . such as when the
plaintiff receives the relief sought”). While plaintiffs bear
the burden of establishing standing, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561;
defendants bear the “heavy” burden of establishing “that a once-
live case has become moot[,]” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct.
2587, 2607, 213 L. Ed. 2d 896 (2022); see also Zukerman v. USPS,
961 F.3d 431, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he party urging mootness
bears a heavy burden.”).
“[T]here are important exceptions to the mootness doctrine
that distinguish it from standing.” Nat. L. Party of the U.S. v.
FEC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D.D.C. 2000). One such exception is
the voluntary cessation doctrine, which “disfavors dismissal of
claims a defendant purposely ‘moots’ when such dismissal would
leave the defendant ‘free to return to his old ways.’” Hinton v.
Dist. of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 3d 30, 43 (D.D.C. 2021)
(citation omitted). To protect against this unfair outcome, the
doctrine “prohibits courts from conclud[ing] that a defendant’s
voluntary cessation of disputed conduct renders a case moot
36
unless the party urging mootness demonstrates that (1) there is
no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur,
and (2) interim relief or events have completely or irrevocably
eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190,
120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (“[A] defendant
claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears a
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.”). Another exception to mootness is the “capable of
repetition yet evading review” doctrine, requiring a plaintiff
to demonstrate that “(1) the challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation
or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d
316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Clarke,
915 F.2d at 704 (requiring proof as to both prongs to “fit [a]
case into one of the ‘exceptional situations’ to which this
doctrine applies”). 15
15Defendants note that “Plaintiffs appear to reference the
‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ mootness
exception[.]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 29 n.6; see Pls.’
Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17 (arguing that Defendants can “escape
37
In this case, the Court need not address the issue of
whether Plaintiffs’ removals from the No Fly List have possibly
mooted their case, since Defendants argue for dismissal solely
on the basis that Plaintiffs lack standing, and Plaintiffs
proffer no arguments in opposition that the burden should shift
to the government to prove mootness. 16 See Nat. L. Party, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 41; see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180(addressing the question of standing before determining whether
review” in this and future lawsuits “by removing Plaintiffs from
the No Fly List for the time being”). Because the Court is
persuaded that standing, not mootness, “is the proper
jurisdictional framework,” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 27 n.5;
to the extent Plaintiffs’ Opposition seeks to apply this
mootness exception, the Court rejects that attempt.
16 The Court notes Plaintiffs’ Notice of Supplemental Authority,
which brings to the Court’s attention “the recently issued
decision[s] of Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 762 (9th Cir. 2022)” and
Long v. Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417 (4th Cir. 2022), which they claim
“bear[] directly on the facts of this case.” Pls.’ Suppl.
Notice, ECF No. 29 at 1. However, the Court’s review of these
cases, which concern the “application of the voluntary cessation
exception to mootness to a[ government] affidavit promising that
a plaintiff would not be added back to a TSDS watchlist[,]”
indicates that they do “not provide a helpful analog.” Jibril
III, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 n.2 (D.D.C.
Feb. 27, 2023). “Unlike in those cases,” where mootness was the
“proper framework,” under the standing analysis, it is not
“incumbent on the government to make ‘absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior’ of returning [Plaintiffs] to a
watchlist ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id.(quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607, 213 L. Ed.
2d 896 (2022)). Defendants made the same argument in their
response to Plaintiffs’ supplemental notice. See Defs.’ Suppl.
Resp., ECF No. 30 at 1-2 (arguing that neither Fikre nor Long
“aids [Plaintiffs’] claims in this action[,]” as “the ‘voluntary
cessation’ exception to mootness has no analogue relevant to the
standing question presented by Defendants’ motion”).
38
to turn to mootness). While standing is generally determined at
the time the suit is initiated, Nat. L. Party, 111 F. Supp. 2d
at 41; “when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and
then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the
amended complaint to determine jurisdiction[,]” Rockwell Int’l
Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473-74, 127 S. Ct. 1397,
167 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2007); see also Cnty. Of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49(1991) (assessing standing “at the time the second amended
complaint was filed”); Feinman v. CIA, No. 08-2188 (EGS), 2009
WL 10692650, at *3 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2009) (“Because subject
matter jurisdiction must be evaluated at the time the action was
brought, this Court must evaluate standing from the time the
motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed.”); G&E Real
Estate, Inc. v. Avison Young-Washington, D.C., LLC, 168 F. Supp.
3d 147, 159-60 (D.D.C. 2016) (requiring courts to “measure
standing by the state of the world as of the date of . . . a
supplemental or amended complaint”). Here, Ms. Shaikh and Mr.
Maniar were removed from the No Fly List on July 15, 2020 and
August 18, 2020, respectively, Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 8;
and thereafter filed their Second Amended Complaint on September
9, 2020, see Compl., ECF No. 22. Therefore, the relevant
question is whether they had “[t]he requisite personal interest”
to establish standing as of “the state of the world” on
39
September 9, 2020. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22; G&E Real
Estate, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 159.
Given the parties’ above arguments as to standing and
Plaintiffs’ burden to establish standing “for each claim” they
are pursuing and “for each form of relief” they are seeking, see
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439, 137
S. Ct. 1645, 198 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2017) (collecting U.S. Supreme
Court cases “mak[ing it] clear that ‘standing is not dispensed
in gross’”); the Court separately evaluates standing for
Plaintiffs’ claims first as to the No Fly List, and second as to
the Selectee List. For the reasons detailed below, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to
pursue both their No Fly and Selectee List claims.
1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Standing to
Pursue Their No Fly List Claims
Presuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor,
Rann, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 64; the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
lack standing to pursue their No Fly List claims because both
were removed from that list as of the date of the Second Amended
Complaint, such that “any declaration or injunction regarding
the lawfulness of that list, their alleged prior status on it,
and/or the procedures that they were afforded to challenge the
same, could have no immediate or real-world consequences for”
40
them, i.e., “nothing concrete remains at stake in their
claims[,]” Defs.’ Reply. ECF No. 26 at 10. Because Plaintiffs
seek prospective relief as to their No Fly List claims, see
Compl., ECF No. 22 at 25-26; they cannot rely on “past injuries
alone” to establish standing, Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501; rather,
they must “establish an ongoing or future injury that is
‘certainly impending[,]’” Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 472
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19). But, by
continuing to advance claims based on their former No Fly List
designations, Plaintiffs fail to allege any “ongoing” injury, as
“[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-96; see also Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1
at 15, 28 (arguing that there can be no reputational or
emotional impacts to Plaintiffs due to “ongoing placement on the
No Fly List,” nor allegations that they are “currently unable to
travel” because of that list); Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10
(“Simply put, the No Fly List no longer prevents either
Plaintiff from boarding flights, and can by no means be said to
present any ‘certainly impending’ injury to either of them.”
(quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401)). Recent cases considering
standing following a person’s removal from a TSDS watchlist have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Jibril III, 2023 WL
412240271, at *6 (concluding that subsequent removal from a TSDS
list after initiating a DHS TRIP inquiry but prior to the filing
of a complaint causes plaintiffs to “lack standing to seek
prospective relief because they could not demonstrate a
substantial risk of future injury”); Nur v. Unknown CBP
Officers, No. 1:22-cv-169, 2022 WL 16747284, at *8 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 7, 2022) (concluding that a plaintiff would lack standing
if “he was once on [a TSDS] watchlist but has since been
removed, as he does not face a ‘real and immediate’ threat of
injury”); Scherfen v. DHS, No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 WL 456784, at
*8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (concluding that plaintiffs who were
in the TSDS “at one time, but have since been removed” would
lack standing because their removal “would deprive [the c]ourt
of the requisite ‘live controversy’” and would make the court
“unable to grant effective relief”); see also Feinman, 2009 WL
10692650, at *4-5 (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing
to challenge an FBI policy or practice “at the time she sought
leave to amend her complaint” because “the injury she had
allegedly sustained no longer existed”). 17
17Defendants direct the Court to cases dismissing “analogous
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, following the
plaintiff’s removal from the No Fly List.” See Defs.’ Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 10; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 28-29. The Court does
not regard these cases as directly on point because they pertain
to dismissal based on mootness rather than standing, but to the
extent they support the Court’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s
claims are no longer justiciable following removal from a TSDS
42
Although Plaintiffs claim that they continue to suffer from
“extreme emotional distress” and “stigmatization created by [ ]
Defendants’ actions[,]” which “did not cease at the time of
their removals from the No Fly List,” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at
watchlist, the Court cites them here. See, e.g., Bosnic v. Wray,
No. 3:17-cv-826, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. July 10,
2018) (recommending dismissal based on the conclusion “that the
relief sought by Plaintiff with respect to the No Fly List—
injunctive or declaratory—no longer ‘remains viable, and without
any tenable claim to redress, the case [with respect to the No
Fly List] has become moot’” where “DHS TRIP affirmatively
informed Plaintiff that he had been removed from” that list),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-cv-826 (Aug. 1,
2018), ECF No. 32 at 1-2; Scherfen v. DHS, No. 3:CV-08-1554,
2010 WL 456784, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (concluding that
under both the standing and mootness doctrines, plaintiffs who
are removed from the TSDS “cannot maintain” their actions
because no meaningful injunctive relief could be granted without
the existence of the requisite “legally cognizable
interest[s]”); Mokdad v. Sessions, 876 F.3d 167, 170 (6th Cir.
2017) (“When TSC agreed to stipulate that [Plaintiff] was not on
the No Fly List and would not be put on the list based on
current information, . . . there was no live case or
controversy, and the district court properly dismissed [his]
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10 (collecting cases from other
contexts that were dismissed on mootness grounds following the
plaintiffs’ removals from the lists or designations at issue).
Thus, even if the Court were to assume Plaintiffs have standing
and move on to analyzing their subsequent removals from the No
Fly List under the mootness doctrine, see Arizonans for Off.
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs had
standing to analyze the mootness issue); these cases indicate
that their No Fly List claims would still fail, Scherfen, 2010
WL 456784, at *8-9; see also Long, 38 F.4th at 423 (concluding
“that Long’s claims challenging his No-Fly status [were] moot”
following his removal from that list); Kovac v. Wray, 449 F.
Supp. 3d 649, 655 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (finding that the plaintiff’s
removal from the No Fly List was a “change in circumstances”
that mooted those particular claims).
43
15; however true that may be, the Court is persuaded by existing
caselaw that such “residual” feelings, id. at 17; do not amount
to “actual” or “concrete” injury in fact, Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560; see also Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 (“Even if the
interests cited by the Jibrils amount to constitutionally
protected liberty interests[, including travel, religious, and
reputational interests], the alleged injuries to those interests
would be ongoing only if the Jibrils were in fact currently on
the Selectee List.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the harms
Plaintiffs allegedly experienced because of their placement on
the No Fly List, including “family separation” from relatives
abroad and hindrances to Mr. Maniar’s “chosen employment and
business ventures[,]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 15; are not
“ongoing” but “past” injuries, for which they may not now seek
declaratory and injunctive relief, see Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19.
“[I]t is equally insufficient for a plaintiff claiming
standing to observe that the challenged conduct is repeatable in
the future.” See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 561 (4th Cir.
2012) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a basis
for standing.” (citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, 89
S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969))). Yet, Plaintiffs argue
that “the power to decide whether to place them back on the No
Fly List . . . rests entirely and exclusively in the hands of
Defendants with no meaningful way for Plaintiffs to challenge
44
the underlying data[,]” and that the “threat of recurring harm
continue[s]” because they have “no assurance that they will not
again be placed on the No Fly List[.]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25
at 15, 17. Although DHS TRIP told both Plaintiffs, in their
letters informing them of their removals from the No Fly List,
that they “no longer satisfy the criteria for placement” on that
list “based on currently available information[,]” Defs.’ Ex. D,
ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2; Plaintiffs argue
that this “explicit language . . . leaves open the possibility
for recurrence[,]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17. The government
responds that “any risk of a future re-designation is the very
definition of an entirely ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’
alleged harm that cannot support Article III standing.” Defs.’
Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11. The Court agrees.
To establish standing based on an “imminent” injury in
fact, Plaintiffs must allege that the threatened injury—
redesignation to the No Fly List—is not merely “possible” but
“certainly impending” or has a “substantial risk” of occurrence.
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5 (emphasis in original);
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210 (requiring future injury for
purposes of prospective relief to be “sufficiently imminent and
substantial”). However, when “the prospect of future injury
rest[s] on the likelihood that [Plaintiffs] will again be”
redesignated to the No Fly List, “[t]he most that can be said
45
for [their] standing” is that if they are redesignated to the No
Fly List, they will again be subjected to the subsequent
discriminatory harms alleged in their complaint. See Lyons, 461
U.S. at 102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the
Court cannot “find a case or controversy in those circumstances:
the threat to [Plaintiffs is] not sufficiently real and
immediate to show an existing controversy simply because they
anticipate” redesignation to the No Fly List. Id. at 103(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); O’Shea, 414
U.S. at 497 (“attempting to anticipate whether and when” a
future injury will recur is “speculation and conjecture”);
Golden, 394 U.S. at 109 (stating that prior events are “hardly a
substitute for evidence . . . of ‘immediacy and reality’”); see
also Lebron, 670 F.3d at 560-61 (concluding that a plaintiff,
who was formerly designated and detained as an enemy combatant,
lacked standing to pursue declaratory relief when his prior
designation “prove[d] no more than . . . a possibility that [he]
could be redesignated as an enemy combatant” in the future);
Feinman, 2009 WL 10692650, at *4 (“[T]here is simply nothing in
the record the Court could rely on—aside from ‘unadorned
speculation’—to conclude that Plaintiff [ ] is likely to be
subjected to the FBI’s alleged policy or practice again.”).
Moreover, both Plaintiffs have received confirmation from
the government that they will “not be placed back on the No Fly
46
List based on currently available information[,]” Defs.’ Ex. D,
ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2; which leads to
the inference that the same information that led to their
original designations, “without more, cannot be used to re-
nominate either of them to th[at l]ist,” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No.
26 at 11; or create an “‘immediate threat that [they] [will]
again’ be placed on the No Fly List[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-
1 at 29. Another Judge in this District reached a similar
conclusion in Jibril III, when he determined that the plaintiffs
in that case could not establish standing based on hypothetical
future redesignation to the Selectee List:
[I]f the government satisfied the Court with
an affidavit given under penalty of perjury
that it would not add Mohammed Jibril back to
the Selectee List unless new information
provided a reason for doing so, any
apprehension that the Jibrils might be
subjected to similar enhanced screening
measures on a future trip . . . or have any
reason to make further attempts to contest
their potential watchlist status . . . , would
depend on the hypothetical possibility that
the government might receive new information
in the future convincing it that Mohammed
Jibril once again met the criteria for
inclusion on the Selectee List. Without a way
of demonstrating that ‘a threatened inquiry
[was] certainly impending or there [was] a
substantial risk that the harm will occur,’
the Jibrils would be unable to meet their
burden of establishing standing.
Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *6 (emphasis added) (citations
and some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals
47
for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) reached a similar
conclusion in Long: “The [TSC] has removed Long from the No Fly
List and has assured us that won’t change based on the
information it has now. Taking that assertion at face value, any
future controversy over Long’s No-Fly status is not only distant
and hypothetical but would also depend on a new set of facts.”
38 F.4th at 423; see also Scherfen, 2010 WL 456784, at *8
(concluding that removal from a TSDS watchlist “would render
speculative any claim that Plaintiffs will again experience the
kind of injury attributable to the alleged wrongful conduct that
animates this litigation” (emphasis added)); Bosnic v. Wray, No.
3:17-cv-826, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2018)
(finding it “not reasonably likely that Plaintiff will be added
back to the No Fly List, based on existing circumstances”),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-cv-826 (Aug. 1,
2018), ECF No. 32 at 1-2. The Fourth Circuit further held that
it was “satisfied”—based on identical language to that in
Plaintiffs’ final determination letters, that “the government
[would] only return Long to the No Fly List on a new factual
record[,]” which could include, though not exclusively,
“whatever information prompted it to add him in the first
place.” 18 Compare Long, 38 F.4th at 422, 425 (quoting DHS TRIP’s
18The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”)
reached an opposing conclusion in Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 76248
letter to Mr. Long, and a similar signed declaration from the
government, “that [he would] not be placed back on the No Fly
List based on the currently available information”), with Defs.’
(9th Cir. 2022). In Fikre, the Ninth Circuit declined to moot
the plaintiff’s claim after he was removed from the No Fly List
following the commencement of the litigation despite a
government declaration that he “was removed from the No Fly List
upon determination that he no longer satisfied the criteria for
placement on the [list]” and would “not be placed back on the
[list] in the future based on currently available information.”
35 F.4th at 767. In its analysis of the voluntary cessation
exception to the mootness doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that
the government’s declaration did “not satisfy the heavy burden
of making it absolutely clear that the government would not in
the future return Fikre to the No Fly List for the same reason
it placed him there originally[,]” leaving the government
“practically and legally free to return to [its] old ways.” Id.
at 771-72 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth
Circuit”) rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “strict application of”
the voluntary cessation doctrine to the government. See Long, 38
F.4th at 424-25 (determining that Fikre went “too far” and
“demand[ed] too much of the government” because “[t]o say
otherwise would be to suggest the government risked national
security simply to moot a lawsuit”); see also Nur v. Unknown CBP
Officers, No. 1:22-cv-169, 2022 WL 16747284, at *9 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 7, 2022) (following the approach in Long rather than Fikre
to find the plaintiff lacked standing); Kovac, 449 F. Supp. 3d
at 655 n.17 (distinguishing Fikre and finding the plaintiff’s
challenge to his No-Fly status moot because DHS “informed Kovac
that he no longer satisfie[d] the criteria for placement, he was
removed, and he [would] not be placed back on the list based on
currently available information”). The Court reiterates its
prior determination, see supra note 16; that neither Fikre nor
Long directly apply, since they analyzed the voluntary cessation
doctrine, which imposes a heavy burden on the government to
prove mootness, in contrast to the standing analysis at issue
here, in which Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, see Jibril
III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 n.2. In addition, both cases from
outside this Circuit are merely persuasive authority, but the
Court finds itself persuaded by Long, to the extent it supports
Jibril III’s position as to the speculative nature of
Plaintiffs’ No Fly List redesignation arguments. See id. at *6.
49
Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2 (exhibiting
nearly identical assurances). “The plain lesson of these cases
is that there are circumstances in which the prospect that a
defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too
speculative to support standing,” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S.
at 190; and since Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of
“new evidence that has or will come to light which would result
in their reinstatement onto the No Fly List[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF
No. 23-1 at 29; the Court concludes that their “speculative
chain of possibilities does not establish that injury based on
potential future [redesignation] is certainly impending[,]”
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.
Finally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that removal from the
No Fly List should at least “not affect their standing to bring
their due process and APA challenges to the policy itself—that
is, the DHS TRIP procedures for [challenging] one’s possible
placement on the [No Fly] List.” Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at
*6; see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17 (arguing that they have
standing, despite their removals from the No Fly List, to
challenge “the current regulatory framework” and request that
the Court order DHS TRIP “to revise their procedures to provide
Plaintiffs with an ability to meaningfully challenge future
likely inclusions on the No Fly List”); Compl., ECF No. 22 at
26. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “under the legal
50
analysis urged by Defendants, [they] would not possess standing
to challenge their placement on a watchlist until after they
‘tested’ that placement by attempting to travel, encountered
difficulties, and suffered the effects of those injuries[,]” and
that Defendants could “escape review” in “this or any future
lawsuit” by removing individuals from the No Fly List “for the
time being.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17. However, to pursue a
challenge to the government’s policy once their “request for
specific relief is no longer at issue,” Plaintiffs “must still
demonstrate standing to challenge th[at] disputed policy or
practice.” See Cause of Action Inst. v. Dep’t of Just., 999 F.3d
696, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (finding the plaintiff met that
standard in establishing standing because it had “additional
FOIA requests” pending with the Department of Justice and was
thus “at risk of receiving the same improper treatment in the
future” based on the application of the policy guidance).
Here, Plaintiffs have been removed from the No Fly List and
are therefore not presently “at risk” of the same treatment they
allegedly experienced in the past based on their prior placement
on that list. See id.; Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7
(concluding that the Jibrils would lack standing to challenge
DHS TRIP procedures if they were removed from the Selectee List
because then “there would be no agency policy ‘continu[ing] to
affect a present interest’ asserted in the complaint”). Because
51
the Court has already concluded that the challenged policy—the
DHS TRIP process for challenging one’s No-Fly status—“[does] not
continue to injure” Plaintiffs and does not pose “a substantial
likelihood that it [will] injure them again in the future, they
[do] not have standing to challenge that policy” in its
entirety. Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7; see also Lyons,
461 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing
to challenge the city’s allegedly unconstitutional policy of
using chokeholds, and concluding that his claim of having
previously been subjected to the policy was insufficient to
confer standing to challenge future applications of that
policy); Feinman, 2009 WL 10692650, at *4 (deciding that the
plaintiff lacked standing because she was unlikely to again be
subjected to the FBI’s alleged policy and that her additional
attempt “to challenge the legality of the policy itself rather
than a particular application of that policy [did] not permit
her to simply sidestep the constitutional standing
requirement”); Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at *5 (negating the
plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief as to the legality of
the No Fly List nomination policies since those claims were moot
after his removal from that list). 19
19The Court acknowledges the possibility that the government
could remove someone from the No Fly List during the pendency of
litigation “to escape review.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17.
The Court encourages caution regarding this possibility, but it
52
In sum, because Plaintiffs cannot show an ongoing, legally
cognizable harm capable of redress today from their former No
Fly List statuses, or certainly impending injury from the
potential for redesignation to that list, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to pursue
their No Fly List claims and are constitutionally prohibited
from proceeding to the merits of those claims. See Defs.’ Mot.,
ECF No. 23-1 at 25; Long, 38 F.4th at 427 (reaching the same
conclusion based on mootness grounds). 20
notes that Plaintiffs in this case have proffered no factual
allegations in their complaint that the government specifically
removed them from the No Fly List for the purposes of escaping
judicial review (instead only mentioning this argument for the
first time in their opposition brief). Since Plaintiffs have not
pled any such allegations to substantiate this possibility, the
Court declines in this instance to consider that the government
might have “risked national security simply to” have this
lawsuit dismissed on standing grounds. See Long, 38 F.4th at
425; Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4 (finding that “the decision
to remove Plaintiff from the No Fly List appear[ed] to be the
result of substantial deliberation, and not merely an attempt to
manipulate jurisdiction[,]” as there was “no evidence to suggest
that Plaintiff’s removal from the No Fly List was not a result
of a genuine assessment of [his] DHS TRIP complaint”). Thus, to
the extent Plaintiffs argue for “a pre-deprivation challenge to
the No Fly List,” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11 n.1; the Court
rejects that attempt, see Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-50,
2015 WL 4394958, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2015) (concluding that
“a balancing of the respective interests does not weigh in favor
of pre-deprivation notice” of a No Fly List designation since
such notice “would alert an individual, and through him or her,
others, whom the government suspects of terrorist activity, and
thereby compromise on-going investigations and endanger those
persons involved in those investigations”).
20 The government also argues that “even if Plaintiffs ha[ve]
standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims
relating to the No Fly List because there is a special review
53
2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Standing to
Pursue Their Selectee List Claims
procedure for challenging No Fly List determinations and related
procedures: 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (“[§] 46110”).” Defs.’ Mot., ECF
No. 23-1 at 15. § 46110 states that “a person disclosing a
substantial interest in an order issued by . . . the
Administrator of the [TSA] with respect to security duties and
powers . . . may apply for review of the order by filing a
petition for review in” the D.C. Circuit. 49 U.S.C. § 46110. The
statute further states that the D.C. Circuit “has exclusive
jurisdiction to affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of
the order[.]” Id. The D.C. Circuit recently embraced § 46110’s
review scheme to conclude that it has exclusive jurisdiction to
review petitions challenging No Fly List designations made
pursuant to a final order issued by the TSA Administrator. Busic
v. TSA, No. 20-1480, 2023 WL 2565069, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20,
2023); accord Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 391 (9th Cir. 2019).
However, the Court does not view Busic as divesting it of
jurisdiction in this instance because: (1) Plaintiffs are no
longer on the No Fly List and thus cannot challenge the earlier
order maintaining them on the list, and (2) they have not framed
their complaint as challenging the final order removing them
from the list. See Busic, 2023 WL 2565069, at *1 (noting that a
traveler may challenge the TSA Administrator’s final order
either “‘maintaining’ or ‘removing’ [them] from the No Fly
List”). In any event, the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs
lack standing to pursue their No-Fly claims (in relation to both
their former statuses and possible re-designations), so there
remain no substantive claims to transfer to the D.C. Circuit. In
addition, Plaintiffs’ complaint asks for declaratory relief as
to the DHS TRIP procedures for challenging future No Fly List
designations, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26; but the “procedures
themselves are not an order within § 46110, . . . [so those]
claims fall outside § 46110 jurisdiction[,]” Long v. Barr, 451
F. Supp. 3d 507, 530 (E.D. Va. 2020). But see Mokdad v. Lynch,
804 F.3d 807, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to opine whether
§ 46110 would deprive the district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims challenging the adequacy of the DHS
redress process but noting that such challenges to the redress
process could “amount to a challenge to a TSA order”).
Ultimately, should Plaintiffs be re-designated to the No Fly
List, they will need to “file a new redress inquiry[,]” which
“could culminate in a final order by the TSA over which the
[D.C. Circuit] would [then] have ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction.”
Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 32.
54
Presuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor,
Rann, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 64; the Court next concludes that the
remaining allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint specific to the
Selectee List, along with their current prayer for relief as to
that list, do not establish that Plaintiffs have standing to
pursue those claims.
Defendants argue that to the extent “Plaintiffs attempt to
premise their standing on their alleged continued placement on
‘another watchlist’—by which Defendants assume Plaintiffs mean
the [TSDS] and its Selectee List subset—any such argument”
should fail for two reasons. Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11.
First, Defendants argue that assuming Plaintiffs are currently
on the Selectee List, “the Second Amended Complaint does not
bring any actual claims based on such status[,]” id. at 12; and
that “in any event [it does] not allege that placement on [that
l]ist will result in harms equivalent [to those] associated with
the No Fly List (e.g., an inability to travel)[,]” instead only
alleging risks “of being subject[ed] to additional screening and
delays at airports” when traveling in the future, Defs.’ Mot.,
ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 25, 30. Second, Defendants note factual
allegations in the Complaint about travel incidents Plaintiffs
experienced following their removals from the No Fly List, such
as the extensive questioning and detention abroad that Mr.
55
Maniar experienced in August 2020 when he traveled to Turkey and
Pakistan, see Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8-9 ¶¶ 45-47; and the
difficulties Ms. Shaikh encountered in obtaining a boarding pass
for a domestic flight in July 2020, see id. at 13-14 ¶¶ 89-91;
but they argue that nothing in these allegations supports a
finding that the incidents are fairly traceable to Defendants,
nor “attributable to [Plaintiffs’] alleged placement on the
Selectee List[,]” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 12; Defs.’ Mot.,
ECF No. 23-1 at 30. Plaintiffs rebut “Defendants[’] attempt to
reduce [their] harm [from the Selectee List] to the possibility
that [they] may ‘face delays and inconveniences when traveling,’
[as] the realit[ies]” of extensive questioning, screening, and
foreign detention are “substantially more severe.” Pls.’ Opp’n,
ECF No. 25 at 15-16. In addition, they specifically allege that
“these actions occurred due to the Defendants[’] placement of
[them] on the . . . Selectee List, and communication of that
placement to other nations.” Id. at 16.
After a careful analysis of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, the Court disagrees with the government’s assertion
that the Complaint “includes no well-pled” factual allegations
regarding harms based on Plaintiffs’ alleged placement on the
Selectee List. See Defs. Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30; Defs.’ Reply,
ECF No. 26 at 12. To the contrary, it alleges that, shortly
after his removal from the No Fly List, Mr. Maniar was
56
extensively questioned in Turkey before being allowed to board
his flight to Pakistan, and that upon arrival in Pakistan, he
was detained and again questioned extensively before being
forced to immediately return to the U.S., where he was also
extensively screened. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8-9 ¶¶ 45-47; see
also Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 16 (adding that Mr. Maniar was
detained in Pakistan “by unknown government agents[] and taken
to an unidentified location with a bag over his head during
travel”). The Complaint notes that these travel experiences “are
consistent with persons on the Selectee List” and specifically
alleges that “Plaintiff Maniar believes these actions occurred
due to [ ] Defendants placing him on the . . . Selectee List”
and communicating that list to other countries. Compl., ECF No.
22 at 9 ¶¶ 47, 49. The Complaint also alleges that Ms. Shaikh’s
difficulties, following her removal from the No Fly List, in
obtaining a boarding pass for a domestic flight and subsequently
receiving a boarding pass with the notation “SSSS” are
experiences “consistent with persons on the Selectee List.” Id.
at 14 ¶ 93. Both Plaintiffs furthermore claim that their
“believed current placement on the Selectee List” infringes on
their religious exercise and ability to travel. Id. at 10 ¶ 61,
15 ¶ 100. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ claims, the Second
Amended Complaint not only “challenge[s Plaintiffs’] alleged
Selectee List placement,” but also alleges “comparable” harms,
57
such as severely restricted travel abilities (i.e., Mr. Maniar
being forced to immediately book travel back to the U.S. upon
arrival in Pakistan), detention abroad (which, drawing all
inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, resulted from their inclusion
in the TSDS and the global dissemination of that information, as
opposed to the random “actions of foreign governments” detaining
or denying admission to traveling U.S. citizens), and excessive
screening and questioning (including FBI agents asking invasive
personal questions about Plaintiffs to their acquaintances).
Compare Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30, and Defs.’ Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 11-12, with Compl., ECF No. 22 at 9 ¶ 47, 10 ¶¶ 57-59,
13 ¶ 90, 14 ¶¶ 95-97.
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, taken as true, “lead to
the reasonable inference that [they] will again be subjected to
many of the alleged illegalities they challenge in this action”
should they attempt to travel again, which appears plausible
from the Complaint. Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 812. Plaintiffs’
travel history abroad for employment and religious purposes, and
their existing family ties to Pakistan, “combined with their
professed desire to continue” traveling for those reasons,
“strongly suggest[] that they will travel internationally within
the next year or two.” Id. at 814. For example, Mr. Maniar’s
ongoing commercial ventures in Malaysia, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5
¶ 15; Ms. Shaikh’s inability to visit family members in Pakistan
58
during the two years she was on the No Fly List, id. at 14 ¶ 99;
and Mr. Maniar’s immediate travel to Pakistan just twelve days
after the lifting of his No-Fly status, id. at 8 ¶¶ 44-45;
provide support for this inference, see Jibril II, 20 F.4th at
814. “It is also noteworthy that [Plaintiffs’] sincerely held
religious beliefs require them to travel to Saudi Arabia to
fulfill religious obligations[,]” id.; which they have both done
in the past and have professed an intent to do again in the
future, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5 ¶¶ 15-17, 15 ¶ 100-01. These
allegations enable the Court to infer that Plaintiffs “will soon
travel again,” opening them up to “a substantial risk of future
harm” from more searches, screenings, interrogations, and
detentions. See Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 812, 814 (“The Jibrils’
allegations plausibly support their claim that they will soon
fly again and . . . [be] expose[d ] to an imminent risk of
invasive and undue Government actions[.]”).
Caselaw supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs can allege
“concrete travel plans.” Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 465
(5th Cir. 2021). For example, in Jibril II, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the government’s contention that the Jibrils had only
alleged “‘some day’ intentions” to travel, as was the case for
the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
564, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). 20 F.4th at 815.
Based on the Lujan plaintiffs’ affidavits that they intended to
59
travel abroad but “had no current plans” to do so, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that their previous travel “prove[d]
nothing,” and only “‘some day’ intentions—without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification
of when the some day will be”—could not support an imminent
future injury sufficient to confer standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
564. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Lujan “is easily
distinguishable, as the Jibrils allege[d] an extensive travel
history supporting their future plans, which evince[d] an
imminence the Lujan plaintiffs’ ‘some day’ intentions lacked.”
Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 815 (some internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ghedi, 16 F.4th at 465 (concluding that a
plaintiff, purportedly on the Selectee List, who “allege[d] both
a professional need for habitual travel and that his injuries
[were] tied to the act of flying, not his destination” plausibly
pled “that his next flight, and thus, injury, [wa]s both real
and immediate” and that the government’s attempt to compare his
case to Lujan was “an apples-to-oranges comparison”).
That the Complaint only states Plaintiffs’ beliefs that
these actions occurred due to their placement on the Selectee
List, see Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30; does not necessarily
prevent the Court, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, from
accepting the truth of these allegations, especially since the
government “does not disclose the status of any individual with
60
respect to the TSD[S], or its subset lists[,]” id. at 14 n.1. 21
Drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, as it must,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
they appeared on a terrorist watchlist in 2020. The Court
“infer[s] from the inclusion of ‘SSSS’ on [Ms. Shaikh’s]
boarding pass[]” from her July 2020 domestic flight, along with
her inability to obtain that boarding pass without speaking with
airline officials, and from “the extensive searches and
interrogation [Mr. Maniar] endured during [his] international
travels” in Turkey and Pakistan in August 2020 that they both
“appeared on a terrorist watchlist during [those] trip[s].”
Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 815. The D.C. Circuit in Jibril II used
nearly identical experiences to those of Plaintiffs, including
extensive searches and screenings, interrogations, and prolonged
detainment, which it labeled “severe and time-delaying”
treatment, to infer that the Jibrils appeared on the Selectee
List in 2018 at the time of their travels. Id. at 815-16; see
also Scherfen, 2010 WL 456784, at *3, *7 (finding that the
plaintiffs’ complaint alleging additional screenings at airport
security checkpoints, difficulties obtaining a boarding pass,
detention during travel, and advisement that they were “on some
21In fact, the government states that the Court must, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), accept as true
“Plaintiffs’ apparent allegations that they are now on the
Selectee List.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 14 n.1.
61
watch list” supported “a fair inference that [they] ha[d]
experienced intensified screening as a result of inclusion in
the TSD[S]”); Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir.
2013) (noting the conclusion of other courts that “a traveler’s
subjection to heightened searches while entering the United
States can be an indicator that an individual is on a terrorist
watchlist”). Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged imminent injury that “is plainly traceable to
the [g]overnment’s actions,” Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 817; thereby
negating Defendants’ argument to the contrary, see Defs.’ Reply,
ECF No. 26 at 12 (“[N]othing in Plaintiff Maniar’s allegations
supports any finding that the actions of the Pakistani
Government are fairly traceable to [ ] Defendants.”); Defs.’
Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30 (attempting to argue that the alleged
injuries resulted “from the independent actions of some third
party not before the court”).
Despite Plaintiffs’ plausible satisfaction of the first two
standing elements, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
have failed to satisfy their burden to prove the redressability
aspect of their Selectee List harms. “To demonstrate that a
claimed injury is redressable requires [Plaintiffs] to show that
the [C]ourt possesses the authority to grant the remedy
requested.” Taylor, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 104; see also Swan v.
Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the
62
“‘redressability’ element of standing . . . causes [ ] concern”
when the federal court does not have the power to grant the
plaintiff’s requested relief); West, 845 F.3d at 1236 (noting
that “redressability focuses on the connection between the
alleged injury and the judicial relief requested” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “[t]he
redressability inquiry, to which the [C]ourt now turns, poses a
simple question: If [P]laintiffs secured the relief they sought,
. . . would [it] redress their injury?” Taylor, 351 F. Supp. 3d
at 104 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, this question is not so “simple” in Plaintiffs’
case because the Complaint, as written, does not indicate the
specific declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs are
seeking regarding the Selectee List. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ causes of action “based on the No Fly List and the
TSD[S] are so intertwined that it is difficult to evaluate
[their] claims based on the [Selectee List alone] now that [they
have] been removed from the No Fly List.” Bosnic, 2018 WL
3651382, at *5. Although Plaintiffs were given leave to amend
their complaint following their removals from the No Fly List
and did so twice to reflect this change, see First Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 19; Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 22; as discussed above,
their operative complaint continues to maintain claims related
to the No Fly List, including allegations of ongoing injury
63
related to that list, the possibility of redesignation to that
list, and procedural insufficiencies related to the process for
challenging future inclusion on that list, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF
No. 25 at 15-17. Claims related to the No Fly List dominate the
operative complaint, and in their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs
mention only the No Fly List, see Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26
(requesting that the Court “[o]rder DHS TRIP to provide persons
with meaningful opportunities to challenge future inclusion on
the No Fly List moving forward (emphasis added)); while only
generally requesting that the Court declare that Defendants’
actions “violated, and continue to violate” their rights under
the First and Fifth Amendments and the APA, see id. at 25-26.
Plaintiffs thus never mention the Selectee List by name in their
request for prospective relief. See id.Instead, in the “Causes of Action” section of their
complaint, Plaintiffs allege, without reference to either list
by name, that they “have suffered punishments, including the
inability to fly, substantial burdens on their religious
exercise, the inability to engage in chosen employment, and
more,” including, injury to their reputations and stigmatization
by the government and in their community. See id. at 20-21 ¶¶
148-49 (appearing in Count One: “Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fifth
Amendment Procedural Due Process Rights”). The Court notes that
these alleged Fifth Amendment violations could refer to factual
64
allegations in the Complaint pertaining to both the No Fly and
Selectee Lists; however, the Selectee List is only named under
Count Four: “Violations of the First Amendment.” See id. at 23-
24 ¶ 180 (stating that “Defendants’ supposed demotion of
[Plaintiffs] to the Selectee List still creates a risk that they
will likely be detained internationally or prohibited from
traveling overseas altogether”). The Court therefore concludes
that the Complaint fails to clearly request a specific remedy
for Plaintiffs’ Selectee List claims, separate and apart from
that requested for their No Fly List claims, such that the Court
could be certain that there remains any requested prospective
relief that could redress injuries related to the Selectee List.
See, e.g., id. at 10 ¶ 61 (combining Mr. Maniar’s “former
designation on the No Fly List, believed current placement on
the Selectee List, and substantial likelihood that he could
again be placed on the No Fly List” as the reasons for the
alleged constitutional infringements requiring redress).
For example, in Jibril II, the plaintiffs “ask[ed] the
court to order the Government to revise its TRIP policies” as to
the Selectee List redress process and “then re-examine [their]
inquiries” regarding “the extensive and intrusive security
screenings they endured [ ] consistent with the Government’s
treatment of Selectee List travelers.” 20 F.4th at 810-11. Here,
however, as part of their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs have not
65
asked for redress regarding the sufficiency of the procedures
involved in challenging potential Selectee (as opposed to No
Fly) List inclusion, nor have they asked for removal from the
Selectee List or the TSDS as a whole. See, e.g., Scherfen, 2010
WL 456784, at *1 (“Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as
well as injunctive relief in the form of ‘removal of Plaintiffs
from any watch lists or databases that inhibit their travel in
any manner.’”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they
attempted the DHS TRIP process in relation to their 2020 travel
experiences, which as Plaintiffs admit, “represents [their] only
administrative avenue of redress” before proceeding to judicial
review. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 6 ¶ 34, 11 ¶ 76. In other words,
Plaintiffs have alleged the resolution of their DHS TRIP
inquiries as to their No Fly List status, but not whether they
ever began or followed through to completion such inquiries
following their 2020 Selectee List suspicions. And completion of
“the only redress process available to them” is necessary for
the Court to reasonably infer, for purposes of redressability,
that they may remain on the Selectee List today. See Jibril II,
20 F.4th at 816-17 (inferring that the Jibrils remained on the
Selectee List when they completed the DHS TRIP process and the
government “provided no information to the contrary”). Thus, the
Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ alleged Selectee List
injuries are redressable by a favorable judicial decision
66
because: (1) they have not alleged completing the DHS TRIP
process as to their 2020 travel experiences, and (2) they have
not asked for any specific relief that might affect their
alleged placement on that list or the procedures involved in
challenging such placement. Cf. id. at 817 (concluding that “the
prospective relief the Jibrils [sought], including revisions to
the TRIP policies [as to the Selectee List], would ameliorate
the alleged future harms with respect to which they complain”).
In sum, the operative Complaint does not make clear what
redress Plaintiffs seek for their remaining claims. It is also
unclear “whether [they] remain[] on any [ ] federal terrorist
watchlist or whether [they are presently] being injured by
[their] presence on any such list.” Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at
*5. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed
to meet their burden to establish all three elements of standing
as to their Selectee List claims, and that it must grant
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismiss without prejudice the
Second Amended Complaint. The Court, however, “will not dismiss
the action itself at this time[,]” and will instead afford
Plaintiffs the chance to file an amended complaint, as they are
in the best position to disentangle their Selectee List claims
from their nonjusticiable No Fly List claims. See Momenian v.
Davidson, No. 1:15-cv-00828, 2016 WL 259641, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan.
21, 2016) (similarly granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
67
dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, and
granting the plaintiffs time to file an amended complaint to
address timeliness issues); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d
661, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between dismissal
of the complaint and dismissal of the action); Food & Water
Watch, 808 F.3d at 913 (“[A]n inability to establish a
substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion
[to dismiss], not dismissal of the case.”). The Court will
afford Plaintiffs 30 days from this date to file an amended
complaint should they choose to do so. 22 See Bosnic, 2018 WL
3651382, at *1, *5 (recommending that the plaintiff’s claims
based on the TSDS “be re-pled in light of his removal from the
No Fly List so that the [c]omplaint [could] reflect[] his
present circumstances”). If Plaintiffs amend their complaint,
the government may file a motion to dismiss that complaint.
Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs presently
lack standing to pursue their No Fly List and Selectee List
claims, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
22Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to
file an amended complaint should be “freely give[n] . . . when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where the court
grants a plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, the
amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint(s) to become
the operative complaint. Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Navarro, 220
F.R.D. 102, 106 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Washer v. Bullitt
Cnty., 110 U.S. 558, 562, 4 S. Ct. 249, 28 L. Ed. 249 (1884)).
68
whether the Complaint also fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 23
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Renewed Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; and DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief, ECF No. 22.
Plaintiffs shall file, by no later than May 1, 2023, an
amended complaint that addresses the Court’s concerns stated
herein. If Plaintiffs do not timely file an amended complaint,
the Court will enter a final, appealable order dismissing this
case.
23Because the Court reaches this conclusion, it does not
consider Defendants’ additional argument that Plaintiffs have
improperly attempted “to expand the reach of their claims to
agencies other than TSA, DHS, and the [TSC.]” See Defs.’ Reply,
ECF No. 26 at 9, 31-32; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 54-56.
Additionally, should the Court ever determine “that Plaintiffs
have standing to challenge their placement on the Selectee
List,” Defendants seek to “preserve[] . . . for the record” an
argument that 49 U.S.C. § 46110 would deprive the Court of
jurisdiction over a procedural due process challenge to the DHS
TRIP redress procedures involving the Selectee List. Defs.’
Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30, 34. While the Court need not fully
address this issue today, it notes that this argument would
likely fail because § 46110 gives the D.C. Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction over final determinations made by the TSA
Administrator “concerning listing on the No Fly List[,]” not the
Selectee List. See 49 U.S.C. § 46110; Watchlisting Overview, ECF
No. 23-2 at 10 n.5. Moreover, as noted above, any challenge to
the DHS TRIP procedures involving the Selectee List would likely
be outside the purview of § 46110 because the “procedures
themselves are not an order within § 46110[.]” Long, 451 F.
Supp. 3d at 530.
69
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 30, 2023
70