Lang v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHEILA LANG,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-1199 (TSC)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sheila Lang brings this action against the District of Columbia and Anna R.
Krughoff. Plaintiff alleges that, based on events during her tenure as a teacher for the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), Defendants violated her rights under the First Amendment,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VI”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 15
(“TAC”). Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety. Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 18 (“MTD”). For the reasons that follow, the court will GRANT in part and
DENY in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
At the motion to dismiss stage, the court assumes the following allegations to be true.
Plaintiff is a Black, non-Latina, American woman who, while in her sixties, worked as a reading
resource teacher from 2011 until 2018 at DCPS-operated Cleveland Elementary School
(“Cleveland”). TAC ¶¶ 3(a), 4(a). In that capacity, she was subject to the collective bargaining
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agreement between DCPS and the Washington Teacher’s Union (“Bargaining Agreement”).
Section 7.11.1 of the Bargaining Agreement provides:
As appropriate protocol, and when possible, all differences of an interpersonal
nature should be worked out between an informal conference between the
Teacher and the Administrator. When interpersonal differences occur, the parties
recognize that it is inappropriate to criticize each other in the presence of others.
See id. ¶ 4(d)(2). 1 Defendant Krughoff became Cleveland’s principal in May 2017. Id. ¶ 5(a).
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2004, “much of the neighborhood surrounding
Cleveland became racially gentrified by white families, many of whom enrolled their children at
Cleveland.” Id. ¶ 14(a). She claims that starting in 2013, “white gentrifying parents” conspired
with DCPS officials, including Krughoff, to target “middle-aged, black African-American
professionals” at Cleveland with “(1) unjustifiably low performance or work evaluations; (2)
defamation; (3) involuntary transfers; (4) administrative leave and disciplinary investigations as
a form of reprimand, demotion, suspension, or harassment; (5) excessing . . . jobs into
nonexistence; and (6) forced retirements.” Id. ¶ 15.
These targeted actions were allegedly taken repeatedly over the course of several years
and against multiple Black women employees at Cleveland. In 2013, DCPS gave “an
unjustifiably low performance evaluation” not only to Plaintiff, but also to her colleagues Rita
Mickey and Delores Rushing. Id. ¶¶ 16(d), 21(i). Plaintiff alleges that Cleveland administrators
1
While Plaintiff’s allegations only cite excerpts, the entire Bargaining Agreement is available at
https://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/WTU-
DCPS%20Contract%202016-2019.pdf. “A court may take judicial notice of facts contained in
. . . government documents available from reliable sources.” Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t
of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 84-85 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v.
Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Moreover, the court may consider “documents
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or documents upon which
the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff
in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth
Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted).
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intended those evaluations to cause the removal of the women “from the school on account of
their race, color, national origin, or age.” Id. ¶¶ 16(d), 21(k), 21(n). She claims that during the
2015-16 school year, Cleveland, “with encouragement from white gentrifying parents, barred
Ms. Lang from selling snacks inside the Cleveland school building” to raise money for field
trips, forcing her to “[sell] snacks outdoors, sometimes in bitterly cold or otherwise unpleasant
weather.” Id. ¶¶ 17(b)-(e). At the same time, Cleveland “allowed the white gentrifying parents
to sell snacks inside the Cleveland school building, so that they could raise funds for
extracurricular activities.” Id. ¶ 17(f). Meanwhile, another teacher, Jacqueline Nelson, was
“railed against” with criticism of her field trips until she felt forced to retire. Id. ¶ 18. And in
2017, Cleveland administrators gave teacher Charisse Robinson an unjustifiably low rating, id.
¶ 19, and warned nurse Tina Samuels not to “object[] to the demands of Cleveland’s white
gentrifying parents,” id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff also alleges that from 2013 through 2018, Cleveland maintained a “racially
bigoted ‘dual language program.’” Id. ¶ 4(c). The program “segregated” students “by placing an
overwhelming majority of the nonwhite, English-language students in English-only classes while
placing nearly all of the white students in a . . . Spanish immersion program.” Id. The
“gentrifying white students” in the program “benefitted from a relatively low student-teacher
ratio, and from a student body with very few, if any, special education or emotionally troubled
students.” Id. ¶ 22(c). The racial disparity persisted “despite the alleged use of a DCPS lottery
for selecting students for the program.” Id. ¶ 22(e). “Because of the racist undergirding of the
dual language program, many of Cleveland’s black professionals opposed the program.” Id.
¶ 22(i). Plaintiff alleges that their opposition made them targets for Cleveland’s white parents
and administrators. Id. ¶ 22(j). DCPS actions in giving a “biased evaluation of Rita Mickey,”
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“false and defamatory criticism of [Rita] Samuels,” and denying Plaintiff permission to fundraise
inside the school “obliged” all three employees “to support the dual language program or to keep
quiet about its racist segregation of Cleveland’s students.” Id. ¶¶ 22(k), (m), (o).
In June 2017, Plaintiff used the funds she raised from selling snacks to sponsor a field
trip to Europe for interested Cleveland students. Id. ¶¶ 24(a)-(b). Eight students and one parent
joined the trip, which was to depart from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City. Id.
¶ 24(e). While Plaintiff was at the departure gate, however, the students and parent “slipped
away from Ms. Lang and secretly shopped at a mall inside the airport.” Id. ¶ 24(f). Plaintiff
boarded the plane and did not realize until the flight reached London that the rest of the group
had missed the flight. Id. ¶¶ 24(g)-(h). DCPS would later investigate the incident, and in
September 2017 found “no wrongdoing on her part with regard to the field trip.” Id. ¶ 24(j).
Plaintiff claims that in the aftermath of that incident, Krughoff “organized with several of
Cleveland’s white gentrifying parents so as to establish a campaign that complained falsely to
DCPS that [Plaintiff] abandoned the Cleveland students at JFK Airport,” and “conspired to target
Lang to be fired or at least to be removed from Cleveland on the basis of her race, color, national
origin.” Id. ¶¶ 25(d)-(e). On November 8, 2017, Krughoff and DCPS involuntarily transferred
Plaintiff from her assignment at Cleveland to Browne Education Campus (“Browne”) effective
November 27 and placed her on administrative leave for the intervening weeks. Id. ¶¶ 26(a), (e)-
(f).
Plaintiff alleges that at least two Black Cleveland employees protested her involuntary
transfer and were punished for it: Robyn Knight and Rodney Carter “complained directly to
Principal Krughoff and in front of each other that Krughoff lacked a valid basis for involuntarily
transferring Lang to Browne,” and that the transfer was “illegal,” “punitive,” and “racially
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discriminatory.” Id. ¶¶ (g)-(h). In retaliation, Defendants allegedly “excessed”—eliminated—
Carter’s job position as Director of School Operations and Knight’s position as Mathematics
Assistant Principal. Id. ¶¶ 26(v)-(z). Knight was allowed to remain at Cleveland as General
Assistant Principal, but Carter was effectively forced to retire. Id. ¶¶ 26(y)-(z).
While Plaintiff was on administrative leave, she was invited by Cleveland’s Parent-
Teachers Association (“PTA”) “to speak as one of its dues paying members at its November [15,
2017] meeting” about her involuntary transfer and its impact on “the literacy instruction and the
emotional wellbeing of black students.” Id. ¶¶ 26(i)-(j). The meeting was held at Cleveland
after school hours, and Krughoff was in attendance. Id. ¶¶ 26(k)-(l). In her speech, Plaintiff
“condemn[ed] Cleveland’s illegal workplace harassment” and her “involuntary transfer to
Browne on the basis of her race, color, national origin, and age, with this involuntary transfer
harming the literacy instruction and the emotional wellbeing of many of Cleveland’s black
students.” Id. ¶ 26(m). Plaintiff also “declared more or less that ‘there are people going
downtown [to DCPS] saying false things about [middle-aged black] teachers.’” Id. (alterations
in original). Plaintiff then said that anyone in the audience behind those alleged wrongs should
“Stand up and make yourselves known!” Id. ¶ 26(q). When no one stood, Plaintiff “continued
with her speech by calling on those who opposed both Cleveland’s hostile workplace and its
harmful impact upon Cleveland’s students to ‘Stand up!’” Id. ¶ 26(s).
Plaintiff alleges that following her speech at the PTA meeting, Krughoff filed “a
complaint or an adverse action” against her, and DCPS placed her “on forced administrative
leave for more than seven months” while it “investigated the speech.” Id. ¶¶ 31(a)-(b), 32(a).
Plaintiff claims those actions were punishment for violating the Bargaining Agreement’s Section
7.11.1. Id. ¶ 30(a). On June 15, 2018, while the investigation was ongoing, DCPS eliminated
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Plaintiff’s former position at Cleveland. Id. ¶ 35(a). Under the Bargaining Agreement, Plaintiff
had a limited time to seek another DCPS job, but she concluded that doing so would be futile and
so decided to retire on June 30, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 35(h)-(l), 36. The next month, DCPS informed
Plaintiff by letter that its investigation had “substantiated” allegations about her “insubordination
and discourteous treatment.” Id. ¶ 34(a). 2
B. Procedural history
In April 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), alleging retaliation, a hostile work environment, and discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, and age. TAC ¶ 85; see MTD, Ex. 1. In November
2019, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter. TAC ¶ 85.
Plaintiff initially brought this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; it
was removed to this court in May 2020. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. The court granted
Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint later that year. See TAC.
Plaintiff’s claims fall into four categories:
(1) a First Amendment retaliation claim, TAC ¶¶ 27-39 (Count 1);
(2) hostile work environment claims based on race, color, national origin, or age under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the DCHRA, id. ¶¶ 40-45, 51-57, 61-68 (Counts 2, 4, and
6);
(3) retaliation claims under those statutes, id. ¶¶ 72-84 (Counts 8, 9, and 10); and
(4) claims under those statutes that Defendants negligently failed to protect her against
the hostile work environment, id. ¶¶ 46-50, 58-60, 69-71 (Counts 3, 5, and 7).
2
Plaintiff alleges that while she was being investigated and on leave, Defendants violated the
terms of the Bargaining Agreement in various ways. See TAC ¶¶ 25(h)-(i), 26(a)-(d), 31(c),
32(c)-(d), 33(c)-(d), 34(a)-(b), 35(a)-(h), 39. But she does not claim that she challenged those
violations under the Bargaining Agreement and does not raise any unfair labor practice or
similar claims here.
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The pleadings also include a “Count 11: EEOC Right to Sue Letter.” Id. ¶¶ 85-86. That Count
does not set forth any cause of action, but merely states that Plaintiff’s filed an EEOC charge and
received a right to sue letter. Id. Consequently, Count 11 does not set forth any claim for relief
and will be dismissed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court
does not assess the truth of what is asserted nor “whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back up
what is in the complaint.” Id. (citation omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
move plaintiff’s claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555, 570 (2007). Facts that are “merely consistent” with a defendant’s
liability do not meet the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
“Courts in this Circuit ‘have consistently recognized the ease with which a plaintiff
claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to dismiss.’” McNair v. District
of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Fennell v. AARP, 770 F. Supp. 2d
118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011)). A plaintiff need not “plead every fact necessary to establish a prima
facie case to survive a motion to dismiss.” Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 642 F.3d 1100,
1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see Farrar v. Wilkie, No. 18-cv-1585, 2019 WL
3037869, at *2 (D.D.C. July 11, 2019) (citing Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 161–
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62 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Nonetheless, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to make such a claim
plausible, such as what happened, who was involved . . . and how such conduct constitutes . . .
discrimination.” Arnold v. Speer, 251 F. Supp. 3d 269, 273 (D.D.C. 2017); see Harris v. D.C.
Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that while a plaintiff need
not plead a prima facie case on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must nonetheless allege facts
that if accepted as true would make the discrimination claims plausible).
In assessing a motion to dismiss, the court presumes the truth of a plaintiff’s factual
allegations, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who
must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga
v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This presumption does not apply, however, to a “legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d
296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (the court “do[es] not accept as true . . . the plaintiff’s legal
conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged”).
III. ANALYSIS
The court will address Plaintiff’s four categories of claims in turn. Ultimately, the court
concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Krughoff and some of Plaintiff’s
hostile workplace environment claims against the District may proceed, but the remaining claims
must be dismissed.
A. First Amendment claim
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her First
Amendment rights by retaliating against her for her speech at the November 15, 2017 PTA
meeting. Although Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim that Krughoff violated clearly
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established First Amendment rights and therefore is not shielded by qualified immunity, she has
failed to establish a basis for municipal liability.
1. Qualified immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity unless
they “violated a statutory or constitutional right” that was “‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 743 (2011). 3 “‘Clearly
established’ means that . . . existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer’s
conduct ‘beyond debate.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting
al-Kidd, 564 U.S. at 741). “[T]here is no need that ‘the very action in question [have] previously
been held unlawful.’” Navab-Safavi v. Glassman, 637 F.3d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). But the law must have been “sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
at 589 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the court looks “to cases from the Supreme Court and
[the D.C. Circuit], as well as to cases from other courts exhibiting a consensus view.” Bame v.
Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), as amended (Mar. 29, 2011).
Under that standard, the First Amendment rights allegedly violated here were clearly established.
The Supreme Court has long maintained that teachers do not “relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563,
3
Plaintiff does not state whether she is suing Krughoff in her individual or official capacity. But
if she is suing Krughoff in her official capacity, that is tantamount to suing the District of
Columbia. “The Supreme Court has noted that ‘[t]here is no . . . need to bring official-capacity
actions against local government officials, for . . . local government units can be sued directly
for damages or injunctive relief.’” Mack v. Aspen of DC, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 215, 218
(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
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568 (1968). But those rights must strike “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Id.“A public official seeking to make out a claim of retaliation in violation of her First
Amendment rights must meet a four-factor test.” O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1133
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
First, the public employee must have been speaking on a matter of public concern.
. . . Second, the court must consider whether the governmental interest in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees
without disruption, outweighs the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern, and the interest of potential audiences in hearing
what the employee has to say. Third, the employee must show that her speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in prompting the retaliatory or punitive act
of which she complains. And finally, the employer should have an opportunity to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.
Id. “The first two factors under the Pickering test are questions of law for the court to resolve,
while the latter are questions of fact ordinarily for the jury.” Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639
(D.C. Cir. 1994). At this motion to dismiss stage, therefore, the court focuses its attention on the
first two.
Beginning with the nature of Plaintiff’s speech, the court finds that Pickering itself
largely places the rights asserted here beyond debate. In that case, the speech in question was a
teacher’s letter to the editor of a local newspaper with respect to a proposed school bond,
criticizing the school board’s allocation of school funds between education and athletics.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566. The Supreme Court concluded that “the question whether a school
system requires additional funds is a matter of public concern” and that the teacher spoke as a
member of the public when he wrote that letter. Id. at 571-72. The Court noted that “[t]eachers
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are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions
as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent,” so “it is essential that
they be able to speak out freely on such questions.” Id. at 572. As a result, the Court concluded
that the First Amendment protected the teacher’s letter.
Plaintiff’s PTA speech warrants the same protection for the same reasons. Speech
addresses public concerns “when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[a] statement concerning racial
discrimination on the part of a public agency is a matter of public concern because it involves
information that enables members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of
their government.” Tao, 27 F.3d at 640 (quotations omitted) (citing McKinley v. City of
Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1946)); see Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411-13 (1979) (holding that the
First Amendment protected a teacher’s complaints “involv[ing] employment policies and
practices at the school which [Plaintiff] conceived to be racially discriminatory” even when those
complaints were “privately expressed . . . to the principal”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148
n.8 (1983) (confirming that, in Givhan, the employee’s “right to protest racial discrimination
[involved] a matter inherently of public concern”); Teasdell v. District of Columbia, No. CV 15-
0445 (ABJ), 2016 WL 10679536, at *18-19 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016) (“[S]peaking out about the
fact that the Office on Against was discriminating against its older employees qualifies as speech
on a matter of public concern.”). And like in Pickering, a teacher is particularly well positioned
to have an informed opinion on the existence and impact of discrimination in the school.
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Plaintiff’s speech addressed the allegedly discriminatory aspects of “Cleveland’s illegal
workplace harassment,” as well as her own “involuntary transfer to Browne,” and claimed that
“there are people going downtown [to DCPS] saying false things about [middle-aged black]
teachers.” TAC ¶ 26(m) (brackets in original). Thus, while Defendants are correct that “a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior,” Connick, 461 U.S. at
147, they are incorrect that Plaintiff merely “complain[ed] of a personnel action affecting her,
and no other employees,” MTD at 10. As the court in Tao noted, the plaintiff’s “complaint of
discrimination, while expressed in connection with her disappointment over [being involuntarily
transferred], was a matter of serious public import that was broader than her individual personnel
dispute.” Tao, 27 F.3d at 641 (FBI translator complained of discrimination in promotion
decisions against not only her, but also against all Chinese Americans in her unit); see Teasdell,
2016 WL 10679536 at *18-19. Like the Pickering teacher’s letter, therefore, Plaintiff’s PTA
speech on an issue of community interest at her school is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Moreover, Plaintiff spoke “as a citizen,” not “pursuant to employment responsibilities.”
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423-24 (2006). Plaintiff’s job was to teach children, not to
address generalized discrimination at her former workplace. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Robinson, 480
F.3d 1140, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Wilburn was hired not only to direct personnel matters in
[the D.C. Office of Human Rights] but also to root out discrimination in the District government
and, thus, when Wilburn commented on racial discrimination in the performance of her duties,
she did not speak as a citizen.”). Nothing about her employment required her to make her speech
to the PTA at Cleveland—a school to which she was not even assigned as a teacher any longer.
The fact that Cleveland’s alleged discrimination could affect Plaintiff’s former students, see
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TAC ¶¶ 26(i)-(n); MTD at 9-10, does not mean that Cleveland “commissioned” or “paid
[Plaintiff] to perform” the duty of decrying that discrimination, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422, and
could therefore control the content of her speech. In fact, the PTA invited Plaintiff to speak—“as
one of its dues paying members”—to address the community’s questions. TAC ¶ 26(j)
(emphasis added). And in her speech, Plaintiff made clear that “I’m here tonight because I know
there is a concern” among the PTA community members about discrimination at Cleveland. Id.
¶ 26(n). Her remarks “had no official significance and bore similarities to” speeches any other
PTA member could make. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. That is quintessential citizen speech.
In contesting this part of the First Amendment analysis, Defendants rely mainly and
mistakenly on Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See MTD at 9-11. There, the
speech in question was a tiny portion of a long email from a teacher to the DCPS Chancellor. In
that five-page email, the teacher began by identifying himself as a teacher, and identifying his
“primary duty” as “ensur[ing] student achievement.” Id. at 288, 291. In addition to complaining
at length about classroom resources, misbehaving teaching assistants, and an indifferent school
administration, the teacher wrote a single sentence that—he argued—should receive First
Amendment protection: that the school principal had “misrepresented students’ performance and
results” on a standardized test. Id. at 292. The D.C. Circuit disagreed that the sentence was
protected. In context, those “16 words out of more than 1300” in the email were “also plainly a
grievance about [the principal’s] interference with [the teacher’s] duty to assess and ensure the
achievement of his students.” Id. The teacher’s complaint in that case confirmed that
conclusion; the teacher alleged that the principal had ordered sham assessments of only the
teacher’s students, and only after he had refused to falsify their records himself. Id. at 293. In
other words, the problem was limited to that teacher and his experience.
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Mpoy differs from this case, and the analysis comes out the other way. The distinction is
not only in the quantity of speech at issue, although Plaintiff’s PTA speech obviously dwarfs the
single sentence at issue in Mpoy. Here, Plaintiff’s speech did not take the form of a private email
to a DCPS superior; it was a public speech to a community gathering of invested citizens. TAC
¶ 26(k). Moreover, Plaintiff did not limit her remarks to what she perceived as her
discriminatory transfer or biased performance evaluation but spoke generally about “Cleveland’s
illegal workplace harassment” and the system-wide targeting of “middle-aged black teachers”
there. Id. ¶ 26(m). And while she shared the PTA’s concern that Cleveland’s discrimination
could affect black students, she also plainly opposed that discrimination for its own sake. Id.
¶¶ 26(o)-(q). All of that context emphasizes that Plaintiff was not using her speech as “a way to
report classroom problems,” Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 294, but rather to “assert[] that discrimination is
occurring against all” women like her at Cleveland, Tao, 27 F.3d at 640. As a result, Mpoy does
not disturb the straightforward conclusion that when Plaintiff addressed the PTA, she was
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
Because Plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the First Amendment
protects her interest in making that speech unless it is outweighed by the government’s interest in
“promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568. At this stage, the court cannot conclude that it does. At the outset, the D.C.
Circuit has recognized that “speech alleging discrimination” generally does not “adversely
impact an efficient office environment.” Tao, 27 F.3d at 641 n.5. But more importantly, “[t]here
is nothing in the record”—because there is no factual record yet—“to show that [Plaintiff’s]
speech was disruptive to the functioning of the office, would affect her ability as a teacher, or
would impair discipline or working relationships.” Id. (distinguishing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-
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53); id. at 641; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70 (recognizing similar potential government
interests).
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Navab-Safavi is instructive. In that case, a translator for
the government-directed Voice of America international broadcasting service was fired after she
appeared in a music video that “protest[ed] the United States’ involvement in Iraq and depict[ed]
casualties of the war.” 637 F.3d at 313. The translator sued Voice of America and its officials,
who moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Defendants did not dispute that the
translator spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, but they argued that her speech was
nonetheless unprotected because of the “government’s strong interest in presenting through an
organ with the highest journalistic credibility a clear message of United States policy,” such as
the United States’ involvement in Iraq. Id. at 316. Specifically, they argued that her public,
contrary position could “cause Voice of America to produce biased work” or at least cause the
public to “perceive [Voice of America’s] broadcasting to be biased because of her editorial role
in the agency.” Id. But “[t]aking the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint to be true and
construing them in the light most favorable to her,” the Circuit concluded that those
consequences were too speculative to warrant dismissal. Id. at 317. The Circuit noted that
discovery and other factual development might later substantiate Defendants’ claims, but “the
district court correctly kept [them] in the litigation until that determination.” Id.
The Circuit’s conclusion that “qualified immunity cannot be based on a ‘simple assertion
by [Defendants] without supporting evidence’ of the adverse effect of the speech on the
governmental function” applies with equal force here. Id. at 318 (quoting with modification
Shockency v. Ramsey Cnty., 493 F.3d 941, 949-50 (8th Cir. 2007)). Defendants contend that
Plaintiff’s PTA speech “impaired discipline by superiors and harmony among co-workers,” and
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“interfered with the regular operation of the school by publicly discrediting the school and its
leadership.” But the Plaintiff’s allegations do not support those inferences. At most, the Third
Amended Complaint acknowledges DCPS’s own conclusion that Plaintiff’s speech was
“insubordinat[e] and discourteous.” TAC ¶ 34(a). If true, that conclusion could give DCPS
independent, permissible grounds for taking disciplinary action against Plaintiff. But construed
in light most favorable to Plaintiff, that allegation does not establish that school discipline,
harmony, or regular operation were in fact disrupted by her PTA speech, or even that those
consequences could reasonably be expected to follow from the speech. It only states DCPS’s
conclusion on that issue. Plaintiff does not share that conclusion, alleging to the contrary that her
speech—which she made after school hours in a non-official setting—was “dignified and
respectful.” TAC ¶¶ 26(k), (m). So, even assuming that Defendant’s asserted consequences
outweigh Plaintiff’s right to speak and the public’s interest in hearing her, contra Tao, 27 F.3d at641 n.5, those consequences are not alleged in or reasonably inferred from the Third Amended
Complaint and therefore cannot form a basis for qualified immunity at this stage.
Based on the allegations before it and the law of this Circuit, therefore, the court
concludes that qualified immunity does not shield Krughoff from liability at this juncture. A
reasonable official in Krughoff’s position would have recognized that a teacher voluntarily
addressing a PTA meeting about widespread discrimination at her school was speaking as a
citizen about a matter of public interest, and that a reasonable official therefore would have
known that responding with “a complaint or adverse action,” TAC ¶ 31(b), would run afoul of
the First Amendment. In a motion for summary judgment or at trial, Defendants may present
evidence that Plaintiff’s speech did in fact threaten government interests, or that her protected
speech did not substantially prompt their alleged retaliation, or that they would have reached the
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same decision even if Plaintiff hadn’t made the protected speech. See Navab-Safavi, 637 F.3d at
315, 318. The evidentiary record may change “where the Pickering balancing tips.” Id. at 318.
But for now, Plaintiff may go forward on her First Amendment claim against Krughoff in her
individual capacity.
2. Municipal liability
To hold a municipality like the District of Columbia liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
Plaintiff must establish both a deprivation of a constitutional right and that the municipality
caused that deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). As the previous section explained, Plaintiff has pled that she was deprived of a clearly
established First Amendment right. But Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the District of
Columbia caused that deprivation, and therefore has not pleaded a claim for municipal liability.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff’s claim against a municipality must allege an
“affirmative link” establishing that the municipality was the “‘moving force’ behind the
constitutional violation.” Baker v.District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(first quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (op. of Rehnquist, J.),
then quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). The courts have identified
several potential categories of links between municipality and violation, including:
[1] the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution
. . . ; [2] the action of a policy maker with the government . . . ; [3] the adoption
through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates
that are so consistent that they have become custom . . . ; [or] [4] the failure of the
government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a
manner as to show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the need
will result in constitutional violations.
Id. (quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff only advances allegations in support of the first and third
categories. See Pl.’s Opp’nto Mot. to Dismiss at 40-42, ECF No. 19 (“Opp’n”); Defs.’ Reply in
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Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6, ECF No. 22 (“Reply”). Ultimately, however, neither is
sufficient to establish municipal liability.
For starters, Plaintiff fails to identify “the explicit setting of a policy by the government
that violates the Constitution.” Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397 (1997) (referring to this category as “involving an allegation that the municipal action
itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights”). In her
pleadings, Plaintiff claims the District punished her pursuant to two policies. First, she points to
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, §§ 1401.1, 1401.2(e), (n), which provide that “adverse action shall be
taken for grounds that will promote the efficiency and discipline of [DCPS] and shall not be
arbitrary or capricious,” and that just cause for adverse action may include “insubordination” and
“[d]iscourteous treatment of the public, supervisor, or other employees.” See TAC ¶¶ 4(d),
30(a)-(d). Second, Plaintiff cites the Bargaining Agreement’s Section 7.11.1, which provides
that “when possible, all differences of an interpersonal nature should be worked out between an
informal conference between the Teacher and the Administrator” and that “[w]hen interpersonal
differences occur, the parties recognize that it is inappropriate to criticize each other in the
presence of others.” See id. ¶¶ 4(d), 30(a)-(d).
However, Plaintiff does not explain how or even if the D.C. regulations or the Bargaining
Agreement violate the Constitution. That would be an uphill battle. As the previous section
explained, the First Amendment permits “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. “Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise
unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster
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disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency.” Connick, 461 U.S. at
152. On their face, the D.C. regulations and Bargaining Agreement provisions at issue target
insubordinate, discourteous, or interpersonal disagreement-based speech—the very kind of
disruptive employee speech that the First Amendment permits public employers to police.
Plaintiff has not provided any reason to question that facial constitutionality, and consequently
cannot proceed on a municipal liability claim on the basis of either policy. 4
Of course, those policies could give rise to municipal liability if they were systematically
applied in unconstitutional ways—that is, if the District had “adopt[ed] through a knowing
failure to act” the “actions of [its employees] that are so consistent that they have become
custom.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. This is the third category of claims that may establish
municipal liability under § 1983. But to qualify as customary policies under this theory of
liability, the practices must be “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of
law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. That is because the District “could realistically be deemed to
have adopted a policy” only where it “must have been aware” of its “subordinate’s discretionary
decisions.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly establish a custom sufficient to hold the District
liable. Besides her own experience after her PTA speech, Plaintiff only alleges three other
instances of First Amendment retaliation, spread over the course of several years, and occurring
only at Cleveland. TAC ¶ 4(e). That is not persistent or widespread enough to make such action
part of District policy, or even to infer that the District must have been aware of it. See, e.g.,
4
At least one other court in this District has concluded that the Bargaining Agreement is a form
of municipal policy for purposes of § 1983. Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 311 F. Supp.
3d 242, 258 (D.D.C. 2018). But unlike in Cohen, here there is no assertion that the Bargaining
Agreement itself “is constitutionally inadequate.” Id. at 256.
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Sheller-Paire v. Gray, 888 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that four instances of
discrimination did not rise to the level of custom). Indeed, Plaintiff only alleges that those
examples show that “DCPS or a DCPS principal may retaliate against a DCPS employee’s
exercise of his or her right to free speech by enforcing section 7.11.1,” TAC ¶ 4(e) (emphasis
added), not that DCPS or its officials do consistently retaliate. 5 Likewise, Plaintiff has “failed to
allege (even upon information and belief)” that retaliation is more widespread and consistent
than her examples show. Page v. Mancuso, 999 F. Supp. 2d 269, 285 (D.D.C. 2013). Without
more, the court cannot conclude that that the District has effectively adopted an unconstitutional
policy by custom.
Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead that the District was by policy or custom
the moving force behind the First Amendment violation she alleges, there is no basis for
municipal liability. The court will accordingly grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim against the District.
B. Hostile work environment claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants created a hostile work environment based on race, color,
national origin, or age, thereby violating Title VII, the ADEA, and the DCHRA. TAC ¶¶ 40-45,
5
Plaintiff also makes the contradictory allegation that Defendants’ retaliation was “required by
section 7.11.1.” TAC ¶ 30(a). The court cannot agree, even at the motion to dismiss stage.
For one, courts do “not accept as true self-contradictory factual allegations.” Amore ex rel.
Ests. of Amore v. Accor N. Am., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Kaempe v.
Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). “Nor must we accept as true the complaint’s
factual allegations insofar as they contradict exhibits to the complaint or matters subject to
judicial notice.” Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963. As the court has noted, the full text of the
Bargaining Agreement is subject to judicial notice. See supra Section I.A. Section 7.11.1
recognizes that interpersonal differences should be resolved in private but does not require the
principal or the District to punish someone who violates the policy.
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51-57, 61-68 (Counts 2, 4, and 6). Insofar as those claims rely on national origin-based hostility
or are raised against Krughoff in her individual capacity, they cannot survive the motion to
dismiss. But Plaintiff has adequately stated the remaining claims.
1. National origin claims
Plaintiff’s national origin-based claims cannot proceed for at least two reasons. The first
is Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust this claim in her EEOC charge. Where an “EEOC charge
contained no claims or factual allegations that could reasonably be expected upon investigation
to lead to a hostile work environment claim,” she has “failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies for such a claim.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Although “Plaintiff checked the box for ‘national origin’ on her EEOC charge, the body of the
charge makes no mention of national origin discrimination.” MTD at 28. It is not sufficient, as
Plaintiff contends, for the charge to merely mention that Krughoff was “Hispanic.” Opp’n at 18-
19. That allegation does nothing to establish an atmosphere of discrimination against Plaintiff
based on her own national origin, much less give rise to the reasonable expectation that an
investigation would lead to a hostile work environment claim.
Second, the Third Amended Complaint is similarly devoid of any allegations to support
Plaintiff’s national origin-based hostile work environment claim. Like her EEOC charge, it does
no more than state the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s respective national origins. TAC ¶¶ 3(a),
15(c). For example, it makes no allegations about any remarks, actions, or disparities by virtue
of national origin. Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege that she was treated worse than anyone
else, much less a similarly situated coworker, because of her national origin. McNair, 213 F.
Supp. 3d at 87-88. Thus, even assuming that Plaintiff was treated unfairly, “there are not
sufficient allegations demonstrating that such treatment stemmed from discrimination on the
basis of” her national origin. Speer, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 273.
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For these reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of
national origin-based hostile workplace environment.
2. Claims against Krughoff
Plaintiff’s hostile workplace environment claims against Krughoff likewise cannot
succeed. Neither Title VII nor the ADEA authorize liability against individuals in their personal
capacities—only against the employers themselves. Thomas v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
305 F. Supp. 3d 77, 86-87 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (Title VII); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(ADEA)). As for the DCHRA claim, Defendants persuasively argue that because Krughoff did
not become principal until mid-2017, she cannot be held accountable for most of the incidents
allegedly comprising Cleveland’s hostile environment, which happened before her tenure. MTD
at 29-30. Plaintiff does not respond to that argument, see Opp’n at 20-29, and therefore
concedes it, Am. Waterways Operators v. Regan, 590 F. Supp. 3d 126, 138 (D.D.C. 2022) (“If a
party fails to counter an argument that the opposing party makes in a motion, the court may treat
that argument as conceded.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim against Krughoff.
3. Remaining claims
The remaining hostile work environment claims are asserted against the District and
based on race, color, or age. Plaintiff has adequately pleaded these claims.
By “[t]heir very nature,” hostile environment claims “involve[] repeated conduct”; they
are “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). That effect must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. at 115
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(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). As the Supreme Court stated in
Morgan:
In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists, we
look to “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s
work performance.”
Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the
court finds that her allegations sufficiently state a plausible claim of hostile work environment
under these factors.
Plaintiff pleads frequent and severe instances of discrimination. Over a five-year period
(2013-2017), Plaintiff alleges:
(1) Four instances in which Cleveland administrators targeted middle-aged Black women
teachers for unjustifiably low performance evaluations, intending to bring about their
removal, see TAC ¶¶ 16(d), 19(d), 21(k), 21(i), two in which the teachers felt forced
to retire to escape the discrimination, id. ¶¶ 16(m), 21(n);
(2) Another instance in which a middle-aged Black woman teacher was “railed
against”—intentionally targeted for discriminatory criticism—until she felt forced to
retire, id. ¶¶ 18(f)-(i);
(3) Prolonged preferential treatment for White parents in fundraising for extracurricular
activities, id. ¶¶ 17(b)-(f);
(4) Intentional racial and ethnic disparities in Cleveland’s dual-language program that
effectively “segregated” White students into better-resourced classes, id. ¶¶ 4(c),
22(c)-(e);
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(5) Cleveland administrators taking actions to “warn[] middle-aged black professionals
against objecting to the demands of Cleveland’s white gentrifying parents,” id. ¶ 20,
or requiring its employees “to support the dual language program or to keep quiet
about its racist segregation of Cleveland’s students,” id. ¶¶ 22(k), (m), (o);
(6) An organized “campaign” against Plaintiff, promoting the false narrative that she
“abandoned the Cleveland students at the JFK Airport” which was part of a
“conspir[acy] to target [her] . . . to be removed from Cleveland on the basis of her
race, color, national origin,” id. ¶¶ 25(d)-(e);
(7) Two instances of Black Cleveland employees’ jobs being excessed as punishment for
protesting Plaintiff’s involuntary transfer; one employee was effectively forced to
retire, id. ¶¶ 26(v)-(z); and
(8) Krughoff pursuing adverse action against Plaintiff because of her PTA speech
condemning discrimination at Cleveland, which ultimately made Plaintiff feel that
she had no choice but to retire, id. ¶¶ 31(a)-(b), 35(h)-(l), 36.
Although some of these instances of discrimination were not directed at Plaintiff specifically,
taken together, these allegations plausibly allege a pervasive pattern of overt discrimination at
Cleveland. While perhaps different from the prototypical hostile workplace events like
“intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116, such repeated and targeted unfair
treatment could nonetheless create an “abusive working environment . . . so intolerable that . . .
resignation qualified as a fitting response,” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129,
133-34 (2004).
Defendants’ counterarguments are unavailing. They are incorrect that the intentional
targeting of middle-aged Black women for unfair treatment is “nothing more than the ‘ordinary
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tribulations of the workplace.’” MTD at 25 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998)). And they are equally mistaken that years of such persistent treatment amounts only
to “several discrete acts and does not show any severe or pervasive harassment.” MTD at 26.
Indeed, as Defendants acknowledge, courts have expressly identified “‘historic discrimination’
over a period of several years” as an “aggravating factor[]” supporting a constructive discharge
claim. Id. at 27 (quoting Floyd v. Lee, 85 F. Supp. 3d 482, 521 (D.D.C. 2015)). Of course,
Defendants may marshal evidence to challenge Plaintiff’s individual allegations and their
collective effects. But that evidence will be considered at summary judgment or trial. The court
will not dismiss Plaintiff’s hostile workplace environment claims at this stage.
C. Retaliation claims
Plaintiff also raises retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the DCHRA. Her
pleadings do not clearly identify the act(s) she believes to be retaliatory. See TAC ¶¶ 72-84. But
her briefing clarifies that her retaliation claims are based on Defendants’ creation of a hostile
work environment. See Opp’n at 29-32; Reply at 15. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ allegations do
not plausibly support those claims.
“In this circuit, a hostile work environment can amount to retaliation.” Hussain v.
Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But as with all retaliation claims, Plaintiff’s
allegations must support the plausible inference that her employer retaliated against her based on
her protected activity. Id. at 366. Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ “acts of retaliation
responded immediately to Lang’s [PTA] speech, which condemned Cleveland’s hostile
workplace.” Opposition at 31. But most of the instances of discrimination Plaintiff identified as
creating a hostile environment occurred before her PTA speech on November 15, 2017. See
supra Section III.B.3. After that speech, the only discriminatory actions Plaintiff identifies are
her being placed on administrative leave during DCPS’s disciplinary investigation, and
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Cleveland’s excessing her former job. Opposition at 31. But those actions far more closely
resemble the “personnel decision[s] taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee’s behavior,” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, or other “[d]iscrete acts” that, while they may
or may not be actionable on their own, do not occur “repeated[ly] . . . over a series of days or
perhaps years” and therefore cannot give rise to a hostile work environment claim, Morgan, 536
U.S. at 115; see id. at 114-17. 6 Taken alone, they do not plausibly establish that “the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to
employees.” Suders, 542 U.S. at 133. Accordingly, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
D. Failure to protect claims
That leaves Plaintiff’s claims based on Defendants’ negligent failure to protect her from
the hostile work environment. These claims are not cognizable.
Under District of Columbia law, “a common law claim of negligent supervision may be
predicated only on common law causes of action or duties otherwise imposed by the common
law.” Young v. Covington & Burling LLP, 736 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 576 (D.C. 2007)). Plaintiff raises her hostile work
environment claims exclusively under Title VII, the ADEA, and the DCHRA. As a result, these
claims are duplicative of Plaintiff’s statutory hostile work environment claims and must be
dismissed. See id. at 163-65 (dismissing Title VII and ADEA claims).
6
It appears that the allegedly retaliatory actions against Robyn Knight and Rodney Carter also
took place after Plaintiff’s PTA speech. See TAC ¶¶ 26(v)-(z). But Plaintiff does not cite
those actions as contributing to the retaliatory hostile work environment she alleges, see
Opposition at 29-32.
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Plaintiff mistakenly relies on Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 446-47 (2013), in
which the Supreme Court mainly addressed the question of “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’ in a
case in which an employee asserts a Title VII claim for workplace harassment?” Id. at 424. The
Court concluded that in that context, a supervisor is someone who “is empowered by the
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim,” and a supervisor’s harassment
renders the employer strictly liable under Title VII. Id. In addition, the employer could be held
liable if it was “negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place,”—if, for instance, it
“did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for
registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed.” Id. at 449.
Plaintiff apparently reads that latter portion of Vance to establish a freestanding, common-law,
negligence-in-preventing-hostile-workplace cause of action. Nothing in Vance supports that
reading. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court made clear that it was speaking about ways
to establish an employer’s “liability under Title VII,” not any statute or common-law doctrine.
Id. at 424 (emphasis added); see, e.g., id. at 426-27, 450. Vance therefore does not permit
Plaintiff to assert her independent claims of negligent failure to protect against a hostile
workplace environment, and they will be dismissed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. Specifically, the court will DISMISS the following claims: Count 1, as
against the District; Counts 2, 4, and 6, as against Krughoff; and Counts 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11,
as against both Defendants. That leaves the following claims: Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim
(Count 1) as against Krughoff, and Plaintiff’s hostile workplace environment claims (Counts 2,
4, and 6) as against the District. A corresponding Order will accompany this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date: March 30, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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