Edwards v. Best Buy Co., Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN S. EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civ. Action No. 19-3316 (EGS)
BEST BUY CO., INC., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Stephen S. Edwards (“Mr. Edwards”) brings this
suit after an incident at a Best Buy store in Arizona, where Mr.
Edwards resides. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Mr. Edwards
claims that an elderly Best Buy employee, Mr. Lance Klein (“Mr.
Klein”), physically and sexually assaulted him while he was at a
Best Buy store but provides no further details of the incident.
See id. ¶ 13-15.
The present Complaint is the latest in a series of actions
related to this incident. The first dates to September 22, 2015,
when Mr. Edwards filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona against Best Buy Company of Minnesota, Inc.,
BestBuy.com LLC, and Mr. Klein. See Edwards v. Best Buy, Civ.
No. 15-1901 (PHX-DLR), Compl., ECF No. 1. The action was
1
dismissed on October 15, 2015, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Edwards, Civ. No. 15-1901, Order, ECF No. 9.
Mr. Edwards subsequently brought a suit against Best Buy Company
of Minnesota and BestBuy.com in Arizona state court on December
15, 2015, which the defendants removed to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona. See Edwards v. Best Buy Co.,
Inc., Civ. No. 16-0014 (DKD), Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-1.
The federal court in Arizona dismissed all of Mr. Edwards’s
claims and granted Best Buy’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
March 28, 2017. See id., Order, ECF No. 54.
Following a timely appeal, on October 31, 2018, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”)
affirmed the holding of the Arizona District Court and
“reject[ed] as without merit Edwards’s contentions that the
district court was biased against him.” Edwards v. Best Buy, No.
17-15642 (9th Cir.), ECF No. 27-1 at 2. A three-judge panel then
denied his petition for a panel rehearing on April 4, 2019; and
asserted that “[n]o further filings will be entertained in this
closed case.” Id., Order, ECF No. 30 at 1.
While the Arizona case was ongoing, Mr. Edwards filed a
Complaint on August 29, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota against Best Buy Corporate Office, Best
Buy, Inc., and Mr. Klein. See Edwards v. Best Buy Corporate
Office, Civ. No. 04016 (WMW-FLN). The case was dismissed by a
2
Magistrate Judge on January 30, 2018, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See id., Order, ECF No. 22 at 4. Mr. Edwards
timely filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order, which
the District Court overruled. See id., ECF No. 27.
Mr. Edwards now brings his claims against Best Buy in this
District, alleging fraud on the court, a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, negligent hiring and respondeat superior, instead of his
earlier claims of assault, sexual battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Compare Compl., ECF No. 1 at
2-4, with Best Buy, Civ. No. 16-0014 (DKD), ECF No. 1-1 at 9-11.
He also sues the United States of America, claiming that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) “violated [his] civil
rights under [Section] 1983 . . . by refusing to investigate the
illegal activities of the Arizona Federal District Court to
allow [him] to proceed with civil litigation [and] denied [him]
his Sixth Amendment rights afforded by the United States
constitution.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 35-39. Mr. Edwards seeks
“judgment in an amount sufficient to compensate him.” Id. at 6.
The Best Buy defendants move this court to dismiss the
complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, res judicata and
collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations. See Defs.’
Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF
No. 7-1 at 11-12. Best Buy further moves this Court for
3
attorney’s fees and an injunction to prevent additional
litigation. See id. at 30. The government also moves to dismiss,
arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim against the government, and that sovereign immunity
bars any money damages claim. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to
Dismiss (“Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 20-1 at 4-5. Mr.
Edwards has responded to both motions. See Pl.’s Resp. to Mot.
to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp. to Best Buy”), ECF No. 11; Pl.’s Resp.
to Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp. to Gov’t”), ECF No 21. Best Buy
has also submitted a reply. See Defs.’ Reply (“Best Buy’s
Reply”), ECF No. 9. The motions are ripe and ready for
adjudication.
II. Standards of Review
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and “possess only that power conferred by [Article III of the]
Constitution and [by] statute.” Logan v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 357 F. Supp. 2d 149, 152 (D.D.C. 2004)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994)). “There is
a presumption against federal court jurisdiction and the burden
is on the party asserting the jurisdiction, the plaintiff in
this case, to establish that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action.” Id. at 153 (citing McNutt v. Gen.
4
Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 182–83, 56 S. Ct.
780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936)).
The requirement of “standing is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). “[T]he defect of standing is a defect
in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d
902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). There are three requirements for
standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,
there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the
court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed
to merely “speculative,” that the injury will
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal citation omitted).
In assessing whether a complaint sufficiently alleges
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court accepts as true the
allegations of the complaint, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); and
liberally construes the pleadings such that the plaintiff
5
benefits from all inferences derived from the facts
alleged, Barr v. Clinton, 370 F. 3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
However, “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (internal citations, quotation marks and brackets
omitted). Consequently, “[a] claim invoking federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ... may be dismissed for
want of subject matter jurisdiction if it is not
colorable, i.e., if it is immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or it is wholly insubstantial
and frivolous.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10, 126 S. Ct. 1235(2006) (internal citation omitted); accord Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
citation omitted).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
A “court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents must satisfy both the Due Process Clause and D.C.’s
long-arm statute.” Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President,
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 173 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal citation
omitted). To satisfy due process requirements, “a plaintiff must
demonstrate that there are ‘minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum establishing that the maintenance of the
6
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Swecker v. Midland Power Coop., 253 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 278 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal citation omitted). The
court may exercise either general or specific personal
jurisdiction. The Urban Institute v. Fincon Services, 681 F.
Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2010).
“A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim
against that defendant.” Brystol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780,
198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017). For purposes of general jurisdiction,
a corporate defendant is “paradigmatically ‘at home’ at either
their place of incorporation or principal place of business.”
Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct 746, 749 (2014)).
In addition, “‘[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear
any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the
State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.’” Id. (quoting Goodyear,
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 562 U.S. 915, 919, 131
S. Ct. 2846; 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011)).
In contrast, “[s]pecific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Molock v. Whole
Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 122 (D.D.C. 2018)
7
(quoting Goodyear, 562 U.S. at 919). “[S]pecific jurisdiction
exists if a claim is related to or arises out of the non-
resident defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Molock, 297 F.
Supp. 3d at 122. A plaintiff must demonstrate “that specific
jurisdiction comports with the forums long-arm statute, D.C.
Code § 13-423(a), and does not violate due process.” Id. (citing
FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094-65
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
C. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). While
detailed factual allegations are not required, a complaint must
contain “sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may
consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents
either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters
of which we may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
8
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F. 3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In
so doing, the court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v.
MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A "pro
se complaint is entitled to liberal construction." Washington v.
Geren, 675 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).
Even so, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements" are not
sufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
D. Res Judicata
Under the doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim
preclusion, “a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a
second suit involving identical parties or their privies based
on the same cause of action.” Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 393 F. 3d 210,
217 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “As the Supreme Court has explained: ‘To
preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries
from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.” Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153-54, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979)). The doctrine
embodies the principle “that a party who once has had
a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal
9
usually ought not to have another chance to do so.” SBC Comms.
Inc. v. FCC, 407 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation omitted).
III. Analysis
A. The Court Has No Personal Jurisdiction Over Mr.
Edwards’s Claims Against Best Buy
Best Buy argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction,
both general and specific, over the Best Buy defendants. See
Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 15-17. Best Buy
asserts—and Mr. Edwards does not dispute—that there is no
general jurisdiction in this case. 1 See id. Best Buy also argues
that there is no specific jurisdiction, since the claims against
Best Buy arise from an alleged incident in Arizona unrelated to
its business in the District of Columbia (“D.C.” or the
“District”). See id. at 17. Mr. Edwards responds that “there can
be no doubt that Defendant Best Buy purposely conducted business
in Washington D.C.” and that “the cause of action between the
1
Best Buy points out that it is incorporated in Virginia and has
its principal place of business in Minnesota. See Best Buy’s
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 16. It has one store in D.C.,
and therefore asserts—and the Court agrees—that it is not
subject to general jurisdiction within D.C. See id. at 17; see
also Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Since Edwards does not contest
the issue, the Court does not discuss it further.
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parties arose in Washington, D.C.” Pl.’s Resp. to Best Buy, ECF
No. 11 at 2. The Court disagrees.
“[S]pecific jurisdiction exists if a claim is related to or
arises out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts with the
forum.” Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 122. A plaintiff must “make
two showings... that specific jurisdiction comports with the
forums long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a), and does not
violate due process.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Under the
District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, “jurisdiction exists if
the claim against the non-resident defendant arises from the
defendant’s:
(1) transacting any business in the District
of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the
District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District
of Columbia by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District
of Columbia by an act or omission outside
the District of Columbia if the defendant
regularly does or solicits business, engages
in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed, or services rendered, in
the District of Columbia; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or
possessing real property in the District of
Columbia[.]”
D.C. Code § 13-423.
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Here, Mr. Edwards’s claims against Best Buy do not arise
from or relate to the business it conducts in D.C., which
includes one store. See Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No 7-1
at 17. The alleged incident from which this action arises took
place in Phoenix, Arizona. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.
Consequently, asserting specific personal jurisdiction in this
case, as Best Buy points out, would offend “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Accordingly, the Court
concludes that it is without jurisdiction to consider Mr.
Edwards’s claims against Best Buy. Absent personal jurisdiction,
the Court does not need to address Best Buy’s additional
arguments of failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the statute of
limitations. 2 See Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 11-
12.
B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Mr.
Edwards’s Claim Against the Government
The government contends that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because Mr. Edwards does not have standing to
challenge the action, or in this case, inaction, of the FBI. See
2
Although not necessary for the purpose of determining whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless considers some
of these arguments in the context of its sanctions analysis. See
infra, Section III(C)(2).
12
Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 20-1 at 4. 3 Mr. Edwards’s response confuses
subject matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction and
thereby does not respond to the government’s argument. See Pl.’s
Resp. to Gov’t, ECF No. 21 at 1-2.
When a suit challenges the legality of government action or
inaction, the factual basis needed to establish standing
“depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an
object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561. In cases where “a plaintiff's asserted injury
arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or
lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.” Id.
at 562. The rule is even more inflexible in the criminal
investigation and prosecution context: “[A] private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973); see also
Maguire v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 236 F. Supp. 3d 147,
150 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Whitner v. United States, No. 11-
14458, 2012 WL 88284, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2012)) (“The
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a discretionary
3The government also asserts that Mr. Edwards fails to state a
claim and that the Court lacks authority to grant relief due to
federal sovereign immunity. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 20-1 at 4-
5. Since the Court agrees that it does not have subject matter
jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to reach either issue.
13
function of the FBI, and the Plaintiff lacks standing to
challenge any decision by the FBI with regards to an alleged
failure to investigate.”).
Mr. Edwards claims damages based on the FBI’s failure to
investigate his claim of the “illegal activities of the Arizona
Federal District Court,” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 37; his asserted
injury therefore arises from the government’s “unlawful
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 562. The authority before the Court, which Mr. Edwards
does not distinguish, establishes that “the investigation and
prosecution of crimes is a discretionary function of the FBI,”
and that Mr. Edwards lacks a “judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution” of the Arizona District
Court.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Edwards lacks
standing to challenge the FBI’s alleged inaction and seek money
damages.
C. Best Buy is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Filing
Sanctions against Edwards
Best Buy argues that this action is Mr. Edwards’s “fourth
attempt to litigate the same allegations and issues against Best
Buy” and that there is “absolutely no justifiable reason for Mr.
Edwards to bring his complaints to D.C., except for improper,
vexatious, and frivolous reasons.” Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 7-1 at 30. Consequently, Best Buy argues that it should
14
be awarded all attorney’s costs and fees, and Mr. Edwards should
be enjoined from bringing this cause of action in another court.
Id.Mr. Edwards’s response does not address the merits of Best
Buy’s res judicata claim but states only that Best Buy “is just
plainly wrong” and that these “issues have not been litigated
previously, and even if some perverse reading suggests they
have, then the Defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct that
would not prohibit the filing of this case.” Pl.’s Resp. to Best
Buy’s Mot., ECF No. 11 at 3. Based on the record before the
Court, the Court is persuaded by Best Buy’s requests. Each is
discussed below in turn.
1. Best Buy is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees
“Rule 11 authorizes the court to sanction an attorney, law
firm, or party under specified circumstances, but also makes
clear that [a] sanction imposed under this rule must be limited
to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct[.]” Smith v.
Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11) (internal quotation marks omitted). The bases for
sanctions include that a party’s legal contentions are frivolous
or unwarranted under existing law, or that the claims have been
presented for an improper purpose such as harassment. Id.; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1); Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 600, (1998); Anthony v. Baird, 12 F. Supp. 2d 23,
15
25 (D.D.C. 1998).
Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed on pro se litigants. See
Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b);
Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F. 2d 386 (11th Cir. 1988)). In
Patterson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s “imposition of attorney’s
fees as monetary sanction under Rule 11” after the pro se
plaintiff filed a fifth lawsuit bringing antitrust and
constitutional claims against parties who were involved in
litigating his four prior actions. 841 F.2d at 387.
Here, the procedural history establishes that Mr. Edwards
brought this action first in Arizona, then in Minnesota, then
filed an appeal which he lost in the Ninth Circuit, before
filing suit in D.C. See supra, Section I; see also Edwards, Civ.
No. 17-15642, Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 23 at 2 (asserting that
“[Mr.] Edwards has No Trust in Phoenix hence why he filed his
action [while the Arizona case was pending] against Best Buy in
their home district of Minnesota.”). Mr. Edwards was
unsuccessful in each case.
Not only do his claims against Best Buy arise from the same
incident, but Mr. Edward’s claim of fraud on the court was
raised on appeal in the Arizona case and dismissed by the Ninth
Circuit. See Edwards, No. 17-15642, ECF No. 23 at 2 (raising the
fraud on the court argument); ECF No. 27-1 at 2 (“reject[ing] as
16
without merit Edwards’s contentions that the district court was
biased against him” and denying all pending requests and
motions).
The record shows that in bringing the present action, Mr.
Edwards did not distinguish his claims from the earlier actions,
instead choosing to repeat his conclusory statements that
“[t]here remains a video of an assault by Best Buy and that Best
Buy continues to surpress [sic] that evidence is a conscience of
guilt.” Pl.’s Resp. to Best Buy’s Mot., ECF No. 11 at 3. Like
the pro se plaintiff in Patterson, 841 F.2d at 387, Mr. Edwards
should have realized that bringing the same claims yet again,
this time in a third District, is improper and amounts to
harassment. Accordingly, the Court will award attorney’s fees as
a monetary sanction under Rule 11.
2. Best Buy is Entitled to a Pre-Filing Injunction
The Court also grants Best Buy’s request for an injunction
to bar Mr. Edwards from filing this claim again. “[A] court may
employ injunctive remedies”—such as filing restrictions—“to
protect the integrity of courts and the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice.” Kaempfer v. Brown, 872 F.2d 496, 496
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d
1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). However, such restrictions must be
narrowly tailored and “should remain very much the exception to
the general rule of free access to the courts.” In re
17
Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Urban, 768 F.
2d at 1500). In addition, “the use of such measures against pro
se plaintiffs should be approached with particular
caution.” Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
In response to these concerns, prior to issuing pre-filing
injunctions, Courts employ three steps: first, “notice and the
opportunity to be heard are provided;” second, “the court
develops a record for review that considers both the number and
content of the [plaintiff's] filings;” and third, “the court
make[s] substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing
nature of the litigant's actions.” Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
a. Mr. Edwards Had Notice Of a Possible Injunction and
Opportunity to Be Heard
Here, Best Buy’s motion to dismiss provided Mr. Edwards
with sufficient notice that he may be enjoined from making
future filings regarding this claim, stating that “[Mr. Edwards]
should be barred from filing this cause of action in another
court.” Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 30. Mr.
Edwards also “has had the opportunity to be heard on the matter
of whether a prospective pre-filing injunction is appropriate
because he was free to address the injunction issue in the
context of his briefs in opposition to [Best Buy’s] motion[],”
Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 46; but he did not, see generally Pl.’s
18
Resp. to Best Buy, ECF No. 11.
b. The Number and Content of Mr. Edwards’s Filings
Present a Compelling Record
The number and content of Mr. Edwards’s filings present a
compelling record for consideration of a pre-filing injunction.
Mr. Edwards attempts to litigate the same incident and reasserts
fraud on the court despite his argument not having previously
succeeded on the merits. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1;
Edwards, Civ. No. 16-0014, ECF No. 54; Edwards, No. 17-15642,
ECF No. 27-1. While his Arizona action was pending, Mr. Edwards
improperly brought his case in another district because he
“ha[d] No Trust in Phoenix hence why he filed his action against
Best Buy in their home district of Minnesota.” Edwards, Civ. No.
17-15642, Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 23 at 2. Further, when his
argument of fraud on the court failed on appeal, Mr. Edwards
took it to the FBI, and then brought his case in this District,
adding a frivolous claim against the FBI for not investigating
his allegation of fraud. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. In
view of this record, the Court concludes that the record weighs
in favor of an injunction to prevent further relitigation.
c. Mr. Edwards’s Claims Are Substantively Frivolous
and Unwarranted by Existing Law
The Court has already discussed why it lacks personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Edwards’s claims. However, for purposes of
the injunction analysis, the Court further observes that Mr.
19
Edwards fails to state a claim of either fraud on the court or a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that his remaining claims are
barred by res judicata.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of “a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was
committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Best Buy argues-and the
Court agrees-that the complaint fails to state a claim under §
1983 because “Mr. Edwards does not allege that the Best Buy
Defendants were “acting under color of state law” nor does he
allege a specific deprivation of Constitutional rights nor a
specific law of the United States.” Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 7-1 at 18.
Mr. Edwards does not respond to this argument, but states
in his complaint that he is “entitled to various civil rights,
including the protection of his person from a physical attack,”
and that the Best Buy employee who allegedly assaulted him
“violate[d] his civil rights.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. The Court
is unaware of, and Mr. Edwards does not cite any authority in
support of, any civil right “to be free from assault and safe
while in the [Best Buy] store.” Id. Nor does Mr. Edwards
establish that the alleged deprivation by an employee at a
private company was committed by a person acting “under color of
20
state law.” Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 49-50. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Mr. Edwards fails to state a § 1983 claim.
The Court also holds that Mr. Edwards has not stated a
claim for fraud on the Court. Such a claim would arise under the
Court's statutory and equitable powers, and permits a court to
relieve a party from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding”
for “fraud ... misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). To bring a fraud claim, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that “a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
To satisfy the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement, “[t]he
circumstances that a plaintiff must plead with particularity
‘include matters such as the time, place and content of the
false misrepresentations; the misrepresented fact; and what the
opponent retained or the claimant lost as a consequence of the
alleged fraud.’” Kettey v. Saudi Ministry of Educ., 53 F. Supp.
3d 40, 54 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting McQueen v. Woodstream Corp.,
248 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2008)). “In other words, Rule 9(b)
requires that the pleader provide the ‘who, what, when, where,
and how' with respect to the circumstances of the fraud.” Id.Best Buy alleges that “[t]he Complaint does not identify
who made any fraudulent statement, what the fraudulent
statements stated, when the alleged statement occurred, or who
the statement was made to.” Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
21
7-1 at 23. The Court agrees that the information in Mr.
Edwards’s filings presents no factual basis for his claim of
fraud on the Court. Mr. Edwards alleges only that his prior
action in the Arizona Federal District Court was dismissed by a
Magistrate Judge who was “misled by inaccurate representations
of fact regarding surveillance video by counsel for the
Defendant.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 30-34. Mr. Edwards does not
identify the alleged “inaccurate representations” or provide any
facts establishing how the Magistrate Judge was misled. See id.Even construing the filings liberally since Mr. Edwards is
proceeding pro se, Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545,
548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); the Court concludes that Mr. Edwards
presents only “conclusory statements” alongside the
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” 4
4
“‘Fraud upon the court’ . . . embrace[s] only that species
of fraud which does or attempts to[ ] subvert the integrity of
the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the
court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual
manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented
for adjudication, and relief should be denied in the absence of
such conduct.” Bowie v. Maddox, 677 F. Supp. 2d 276, 278–79
(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F.
Supp. 967, 974 (D.D.C.1984)). Although the requirements for a
successful claim of fraud on the court elude precise definition,
the case law suggests that (1) the fraud must be egregious; (2)
the perpetrator of the fraud must possess a sufficient mental
state; and (3) there must be “clear and convincing” evidence
of fraud on the court for the “extraordinary step” of setting
aside a judgment. Id.22
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Additionally, the Court finds that Mr. Edwards’s remaining
claims are barred by res judicata. “A subsequent lawsuit is
barred by [res judicata] if there has been prior litigation (1)
involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the
same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final,
valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” NRDC v. EPA, 513 F. 3d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Res
judicata acts as a bar not only to the specific legal claims
that were raised in the prior case, but also to any legal claims
that “could have been raised” based on the same transaction or
occurrence. Role Models America, Inc. v. Penmar Development
Corp., 394 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130 (2005) (citing Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
Best Buy asserts that “the issues and allegations set forth
in this Complaint have been fully and fairly decided” and that
“Mr. Edwards cannot escape an adverse judgment against him by
raising the same issues, couched under new causes of action, in
a new court.” Best Buy’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 26. The
Court agrees. There is no dispute that the parties in this case
are identical. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 8 (stating “a prior
action between the parties was litigated in the United States
District Court for the District of Phoenix”). There is also no
23
dispute that the Arizona Federal Court was a court of competent
jurisdiction and returned a final judgment on the merits. See
id. ¶ 9 (stating “[t]hat the prior action was resolved favorably
to Defendant Best Buy . . ..”). Although Mr. Edwards contests
the validity of this judgment based on fraud on the court, he
has not adequately pled this claim, see supra; additionally,
this claim has already been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, and
he does not assert any shortcomings in the Ninth Circuit’s
competency or jurisdiction, see generally Compl., ECF No. 1.
The remaining element of res judicata is whether the
lawsuit involves the same claims or cause of action, see
NRDC, 513 F.3d at 260; that is, “[w]hether two cases implicate
the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same
nucleus of facts.” Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F. 3d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation omitted). “In
pursuing this inquiry, the court will consider whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business
understanding or usage.” Id. (internal citation and quotation
omitted).
Mr. Edwards’s claims against Best Buy arise from the same
incident of alleged assault by a Best Buy employee as his
previous claims. Compare Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2, with Best
24
Buy, Civ. No. 16-0014, ECF No. 1-1 at 7-9. Mr. Edwards does not
suggest the existence of a different set of facts or make a case
for why res judicata should not apply to his new claims of
negligent hiring and respondeat superior. See Compl., ECF No. 1
at 1-4. Accordingly, the Court holds that Mr. Edwards’s
remaining claims share the “same nucleus of facts,” Apotex, 393
F. 3d at 217; and “could have been raised” in his previous
cases, Penmar, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
The Court concludes that the repetitive nature of Mr.
Edwards’s claims against Best Buy, compounded by his repeat
allegations of fraud on the court, and broadening of the case to
include new defendants (the government) when the Ninth Circuit
concluded his case lacked merit, is properly characterized as
frivolous and unwarranted in the face of established law.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that narrowly tailored,
prospective filing restrictions are necessary. See Smith, 44 F.
Supp. at 47-48. This Court will order that Edwards is enjoined
from filing new actions in U.S. District Courts arising from the
incident involving Best Buy employee Mr. Klein. See, e.g., Texas
v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex.) (granting
a preliminary nationwide injunction), aff’d, 809 F. 3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Washington v.
Trump, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017).
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the government’s
and Best Buy’s respective motions to dismiss. Further, Best
Buy’s request for attorney fees and a pre-filing injunction is
GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
September 27, 2021
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