Guerrier v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GERALD GUERRIER,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-02283 (JMC)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gerald Guerrier sued the United States and an unnamed employee for allegedly
misreporting in the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System that he used
controlled substances.1 The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims against it. The Court
grants that Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Gerald Guerrier was arrested and charged with driving under the influence in November
2019. ECF 1 ¶ 8. At the time, Guerrier worked for Booz Allen and Hamilton as a systems
contractor. Id. His job required him to maintain a Top Secret security clearance and work in a
secure facility for the FBI. Id. Guerrier notified his employer and the FBI about his arrest, and
neither organization indicated that the arrest would impact Guerrier’s employment. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
On December 11, 2019, Guerrier took a drug test as a condition of release after his arrest.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. Guerrier tested positive for amphetamine because he took Adderall XR, which was
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for
example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization,
and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated
ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.
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prescribed to him with a valid prescription. Id. ¶ 12. Guerrier provided a copy of his prescription
to the Pretrial Services Agency of the District of Columbia (PSA), and a PSA employee assured
Guerrier that the positive result would not be an issue. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. Guerrier later took two
additional drug tests on December 18, 2019, and January 8, 2020. Id. ¶ 14. Neither returned a
positive result. Id.
Guerrier alleges that a United States employee “erroneously and negligently” submitted
his name to the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) and identified
Guerrier as an “unlawful user/addicted to a controlled substance.” Id. ¶ 15. Guerrier contends that
his name should not have been submitted to NICS because he never failed a drug test. Id. ¶¶ 16–
17. He supports his claim with a letter from the PSA asserting that the PSA’s records “do not show
that [Guerrier] failed any drug test” and that “[his] name should not have been submitted to the
FBI.” Id.
Guerrier further alleges that he was terminated from his job because of his inclusion in the
NICS as a controlled substance user. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The misinformation also impaired Guerrier’s
ability to find a new job after his termination. Id. ¶¶ 21–22, 27. Guerrier alleges that he received
employment offers from Amazon Web Services and Boeing, but had both offers rescinded after
the companies discovered that Guerrier was listed as a controlled substance user in NICS. Id. ¶¶
21–22.
Guerrier sued the United States of America and the employee who entered the
misinformation into NICS. See generally ECF 1. He brought negligence and intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims against the United States, and a Due Process Clause claim against the
unnamed employee. Id. ¶¶ 31–42. Guerrier seeks damages, claiming that he has suffered a loss of
income, a loss of employment opportunities, and severe emotional anguish. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34, 38, 42.
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The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF 7. It argues that the claims against the
United States are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction as to the Due Process claim brought against the unnamed employee (insofar as
those claims are brought against the employee in their official capacity). See generally id. Guerrier
responded, ECF 9, and the United States replied, ECF 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is therefore “presumed that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction” unless a party demonstrates that jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that a court has subject matter jurisdiction if a defendant files
a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Masoud v. Suliman, 816 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79
(D.D.C. 2011); accord Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). When deciding
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must “accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint” and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff, Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), but courts are “not
required . . . to accept inferences unsupported by the facts or legal conclusions that are cast as
factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001).
III. ANALYSIS
Guerrier’s Complaint includes two claims against the United States: one alleging
negligence, and one alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF 1 ¶¶ 31–38. The
United States argues that both claims are barred by the FTCA. The Court agrees.
The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain types of tort claims.
Kugel v. United States, 947 F.2d 1504, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For example, it waives the
government’s immunity with respect to injuries caused by the “negligent or wrongful act or
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omission of a government employee acting within the scope of employment.” 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1). But it does not waive immunity for claims “arising out of . . . libel, slander [or]
misrepresentation.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). So whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over Guerrier’s claims against the United States depends on the nature of those claims. To answer
this question, the Court looks past the label that Guerrier applies to his claim, and instead considers
“[t]he government conduct that is alleged to have caused the injury.” Edmonds v. United States,
436 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Kugel v. United States, 947 F.2d 1504, 1507
(D.C. Cir. 1991)). Plaintiffs sometimes try to circumvent the FTCA’s jurisdictional bar by
recasting misrepresentation or defamation claims as a negligence claim. Courts in this district have
routinely denied attempts to do so. See Smalls v. Emanuel, 840 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33–34 (D.D.C.
2012) (collecting cases).
Guerrier argues that he adequately pleaded a negligence claim by alleging each of the
elements in his Complaint. See ECF 9 at 2–4. But even assuming that to be true, it does not change
the fact that Guerrier is alleging that a United States employee negligently misreported information
in the NICS. ECF 1 ¶ 16 (“Defendant Doe erroneously and negligently submitted Mr. Guerrier’s
name to NICS as an unlawful user of controlled substances even though both Defendant Doe and
the PSA knew that Mr. Guerrier had never actually failed a drug test.”). The FTCA bars claims
alleging misrepresentation of information, regardless of whether the misrepresentation is done
intentionally or negligently. Marcus v. Geithner, 813 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 296 (1983)). Because the FTCA bars Guerrier’s claims against the
United States, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, and therefore
grants the United States’ Motion to Dismiss as to both of those claims.
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Guerrier also brings a Due Process claim against an unnamed employee of the United
States who allegedly input the erroneous information into NICS. ECF 1 ¶¶ 39–42. Guerrier’s
Complaint does not explicitly state whether he meant to bring this claim against the John Doe
Defendant in their personal or official capacity, but to the extent that Guerrier intended to sue the
employee in their official capacity, the Court grants the United States’ Motion to Dismiss for the
same reasons. An official-capacity suit is “treated as a suit against the entity” itself. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). So the same FTCA reasoning that barred Guerrier’s claims
against the United States also bars the claim against John Doe. Although this claim alleges a Due
Process violation (rather than a common law tort claim), the premise for the claim is still
misrepresentation. And, as discussed earlier, the FTCA bars misrepresentation claims even when
they are labeled as something else.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Guerrier’s claims against the United States and John Doe,
insofar as John Doe is sued in their official capacity, are dismissed. An accompanying Order will
so indicate.
DATE: April 25, 2022
________________________
Jia M. Cobb
U.S. District Court Judge
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