Palacio v. Luckstone

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAURO C. PALACI 0,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 22-cv-2800 (RCL)
CHARLOTTE M. LUCKSTONE,
Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Officer, U.S. Marshals Service,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Mauro C. Palacio, proceedingpro se, brings this action against defendant
Charlotte M. Luckstone, a Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act ("FOIA/P A") officer at
the U.S. Marshals Service ("USMS"), for allegedly violating the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a,
by failing to correct an error in the closing date of an arrest warrant, an error which allegedly
resulted in his denial of benefits by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). Compl., ECF
No. 1. Through his Complaint and subsequent motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading,
Mr. Palacio seeks injunctive and monetary relief. See Comp1. at 4; Pl.' s Mot. for Leave to File
Suppl. Pleading, ECF No. 5 ("Pl. 's Mot."). Ms. Luckstone moves to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction because, among other reasons, the USMS has confirmed that there is no error
in the warrant records. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12.
Upon consideration of the parties' filings, the applicable law, and the record, the Court
will GRANT Ms. Luckstone's motion to dismiss, DENY Mr. Palacio's motion for leave to file a
supplemental pleading, and DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Complaint.
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I. BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a
warrant for Mr. Palacio's arrest, No. 178007287126D, after he violated the terms of his
supervised release imposed as a result of his earlier conviction in that court for a federal sexual
offense against a minor. Warrant, Ex. B to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12-3; Warrant,
United States v. Palacio (RP), No. 03-cr-302 (W.D. Tex.), ECF No. 143. The next day, the
USMS received the warrant and opened the associated case. Pesina Deel., Ex. A to Def. 's Mot.
to Dismiss, ,r 4. Mr. Palacio was arrested on August 1, 2017, id. ,r 5, and the warrant was
returned to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas on August 3, 2017, id. ,r 6.
The associated case was purged on December 3, 2017, id. ,r 7, and the warrant case was
administratively closed on January 28, 2020, id. ,r 9.
Starting in 2018, Mr. Palacio allegedly received several communications from the VA
detailing that his benefits would be terminated, and that he would be required to repay benefits
received, for the period July 27, 2017 to December 3, 2017 because the VA considered him to be
a fugitive felon during that time and fugitive felons are prohibited from receiving VA benefits.
See Ex. 1 & 2 to Pl.' s Resp., ECF No. 14-1. The VA allegedly stated that its determination of
Mr. Palacio's fugitive-felon status was based on "evidence [the VA] reviewed," Ex. 2 to Pl. 's
Resp., as well as information allegedly provided to the VA by the USMS via telephone, see Ex. 7
& 8 to PL's Resp., ECF No. 14-1. In 2022, the VA allegedly expanded the benefit-denial period
from July 27, 2017 until January 28, 2020, the latter date being, in the VA's view, the warrant's
actual closing date. See id.; Ex. 9 to Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 14-1.
In response, Mr. Palacio petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas to correct the closing date on warrant No. 178007287126D from January 28, 2020 to
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August 3, 2017. Ex. B to Comp!., ECF No. 1-1. The court denied the motion, stating that the
court lacked authority to change any date on the warrant. Order, Palacio, ECF No. 216.
Mr. Palacio then submitted a FOIA request to the USMS asking that the agency correct
the closing date of his warrant. Compl. at 4. The USMS informed Mr. Palacio that he had not
filed a proper FOIA request and therefore closed out the request without any further action. Ex.
A. to Comp!., ECF No. 1-1.
In September 2022, Mr. Palacio filed the instant Complaint, alleging that Ms. Luckstone
violated his rights under the Privacy Act by failing to correct the warrant's closing date. Comp!.
at 4. Mr. Palacio seeks the following relief: (1) correction of the closing date to August 3, 2017;
(2) damages of $10,000 per day starting from August 4, 2017; and (3) $500 in legal fees. Id. In
December 2022, Mr. Palacio moved for leave amend the Complaint to request additional
monetary relief in the amount of $10,064.05, allegedly representing Mr. Palacio's outstanding
debt to the VA. Ex. A. to PL 's Mot., ECF No. 5-1. In response, Ms. Luckstone moved to dismiss
the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), arguing that the case is moot
because the USMS has confirmed that Mr. Palacio's warrant records are correct, and that Mr.
Palacio lacks standing to bring his claim. Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, at 3-7. Mr.
Palacio responded, Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 14, and Ms. Luckstone replied, Def.'s Reply, ECF No.
15. Both motions are now ripe for review.
II. LEGALSTANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). "[T]wo things are
necessary to create [subject-matter] jurisdiction" in a district court: "The Constitution must have
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given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it." Micei
Int'! v. Dep 't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Mayor v. Cooper, 73
U.S. 247,252 (1868); U.S. Const. art. III§ 1) (emphasis removed)). A plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). If the plaintiff cannot establish
both elements of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action. Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506,
514 (1868) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.")).
In assessing the case for the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court will
"assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and 'construe the complaint
liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged."' Am. Nat'! Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v.
Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Additionally, "the district court may consider
materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction." Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). A
court must construe a prose plaintiffs claims liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), but a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from the requirements of the federal rules. See
Atherton v. D.C. Off of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
A court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if a case becomes moot-that is, "when 'the
challenged conduct ceases such that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated' in circumstances where 'it becomes impossible for the court to grant any effectual
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relief whatever to the prevailing party."' United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F .3d 1095,
1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting City ofErie v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277,287 (2000) (quotation
marks omitted)). The party claiming mootness "bears the burden to establish that a once-live
case has become moot." West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607 (2022). Another way a
court might lack subject-matter jurisdiction is if a plaintiff lacks Article III standing. See Haase
v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The plaintiff must establish standing by
demonstrating: (1) an "injury in fact" that is (2) "fairly ... trace[ able] to the challenged action of
the defendant," and (3) "redressable by a favorable decision." See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
B. Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Pleading
A court may permit a party to submit a supplemental pleading to, among other things,
"provide the basis for additional relief." Thorp v. District of Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 510, 513
(D.D.C. 2018) (internal citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). "The decision to grant or deny
leave to ... supplement a complaint is 'within the discretion of the district court, but leave
should be freely given unless there is a good reason, such as futility, to the contrary."' Pinson v.
US. Dep 't ofJust., No. 18-cv-486 (RC), 2023 WL 2708815, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2023)
(quoting Wildearth Guardians v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2008)). "A
proposed supplement to a complaint is futile if it would not survive a motion to dismiss." Lannan
Found. v. Gingold, 300 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Even after liberally construing Mr. Palacio's Complaint, as this Court must, Erickson,
551 U.S. at 94, the Court concludes that Mr. Palacio has failed to adequately allege the existence
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of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court has no choice but to dismiss Mr. Palacio's
Complaint and deny his motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading.
A. This Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court must dismiss this suit because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction for at
least three reasons: failure to name the proper defendant, mootness, and lack of standing.
First, Ms. Luckstone is not a proper defendant for a Privacy Act claim. "[T]he law is
clear that only federal agencies, not individuals, are the proper defendants for a Privacy Act
cause of action." Dickv. Holder, 67 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176 (D.D.C. 2014); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(l) (stating that an "individual may bring a civil action against the agency") (emphasis
added). "Courts, as a result, routinely dismiss these claims when they are lodged against
individual defendants." Deleon v. Wilkie, No. 19-cv-1250 (JEB), 2020 WL 210089, at *7
(D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2020). Mr. Palacio sued Ms. Luckstone in her individual capacity, rather than
the USMS. Because it is "patently obvious" that Mr. Palacio's Privacy Act claim against Ms.
Luckstone "cannot prevail," the Court is well within its authority to dismiss the Complaint on
this basis alone. See Abdelfattah v. DHS, 787 F.3d 524, 533 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal
citation omitted). Mr. Palacio nevertheless contends that Ms. Luckstone is a proper defendant
because he "requested a response from [her]." Pl.'s Resp. at 4-5. But Mr. Palacio's personal
preference for communication from this defendant does not supersede Congress's clear
jurisdictional mandate.
Second, this case is moot. As Ms. Luckstone identifies, there is no live controversy
because the USMS has confirmed that the records for warrant No. 178007287126D do not
contain any inaccuracies, and therefore there is nothing to correct. Def. 's Mot. at 7. According to
a declaration from Deputy U.S. Marshal Yolanda Pesina, the case associated with Mr. Palacio's
warrant was no longer active after 2017 and was simply administratively closed in 2020. Pesina
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Deel. ,r,r 7-9. Mr. Palacio claims that he "is not satisfied" with this evidence. PL 's Resp. at 1. He
appears to offer records from his correspondence with the VA as an attempt to rebut the
declaration. See generally Ex. 1-9 to PL' s Resp., ECF No. 14-1. However, those records do not
materially dispute the declaration's contents. Moreover, the VA records offered by Mr. Palacio
corroborate the declaration. See, e.g., Ex. 1 to Pl.'s Resp. (noting that Mr. Palacio's warrant was
"cleared" on December 3, 2017, which is consistent with Pesina Deel. ,r 7). Ms. Luckstone
clearly meets her burden to demonstrate that this case is moot.
Third and finally, Mr. Palacio lacks standing. As discussed above, the USMS confirmed
that Mr. Palacio's warrant records are accurate, thus he lacks injury-in-fact for his Privacy Act
claim. Def.'s Mot. at 3-4. Construing the Complaint liberally, Mr. Palacio appears to allege an
injury in the form of termination of VA benefits and subsequent creation of a debt to the VA.
Compl. at 4; PL' s Resp. at 2. Even if this were a cognizable injury in this case, which it is not,
that injury would not be fairly traceable to this defendant. Ms. Luckstone, a FOIA/P A officer
within the USMS, was not responsible for the VA's decision to terminate Mr. Palacio's benefits.
And similarly, Ms. Luckstone is not capable of redressing Mr. Palacio's benefit-denial injury.
Potential inaccuracies in the VA's evidence, and the subsequent denial of benefits and debt
accrual on that basis, are matters that Mr. Palacio must take up with VA, not Ms. Luckstone.
In sum, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because Ms. Luckstone
is not a proper defendant, the case is moot, and Mr. Palacio lacks standing.
B. The Court Will Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental
Complaint
Mr. Palacio moves for leave to amend the Complaint to request additional monetary
relief. See Pl. 's Mot. Because that motion relies on the same basis of subject-matter jurisdiction
as the original Complaint, and because the Complaint does not survive a motion to dismiss,
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granting leave to file a supplemental Complaint would be futile. Lannan Found., 300 F. Supp. 3d
at 12. Therefore, the Court will deny Mr. Palacio's motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court will GRANT Ms. Luckstone's motion to
dismiss, DENY Mr. Palacio' s motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading, and DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Complaint. A separate order shall issue.
SIGNED this 11 ,._ day of July, 2023.
Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge
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