In Re: Jeffrey B. Clark

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
:
IN RE JEFFREY B. CLARK : Case Nos.: 22-mc-0096
: 22-mc-0117
: 23-mc-0007
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING MOTIONS TO REMAND
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 19, 2022, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) for the D.C. Board on
Professional Responsibility (the “Board”), the entity that regulates the conduct of attorneys
admitted to the D.C. Bar, commenced a disciplinary proceeding against Jeffrey B. Clark, an
attorney admitted to the D.C. Bar and a former Assistant Attorney General of the United States.
See 1d Notice of Removal, Ex. A-2 (“Petition and Specification”), ECF No. 1-2. Mr. Clark
removed the disciplinary proceeding to this Court, see 1d Notice of Removal, Case No. 22-mc-
0096, ECF No. 1, and subsequently filed separate notices of removal as to ODC’s motion to
enforce a subpoena, see 2d Notice of Removal, Case No. 22-mc-0117, ECF No. 1, and as to a
separate subpoena later issued by ODC, see 3d Notice of Removal, Case No. 23-mc-0007, ECF
No. 1. Before the Court are ODC’s motions to remand. See 1d Mot. Remand, ECF No. 5; 2d
Mot. Remand, ECF No. 4; 3d Mot. Remand, ECF No. 4. 1 As set forth in detail below, because
1
Because Mr. Clark filed three separate notices of removal, there are three separate case
numbers and dockets corresponding to this matter. For purposes of citations in this Opinion, all
citations to Mr. Clark’s first notice of removal, ODC’s first motion to remand, and related
submissions refer to docket entries in Case No. 22-mc-0096; all citations to Mr. Clark’s second
notice of removal, ODC’s second motion to remand, and related submissions refer to docket
entries in Case No. 22-mc-0117; and all citations to Mr. Clark’s third notice of removal, ODC’s
third motion to remand, and related submissions refer to docket entries in Case No. 23-mc-0007.
The parties have agreed to consolidate Case No. 22-mc-0096 and Case No. 22-mc-117. See
the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Board’s disciplinary proceeding, ODC’s
motions to remand are granted. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The DCCA and Attorney Discipline in D.C.
In 1970, Congress passed legislation creating the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“DCCA”) as Article I courts. See
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
§ 101, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (1970). For present purposes, two sections of that legislation bear
notice. First, the legislation rewrote subchapter I of chapter 5 of title 11 of the D.C. Code, which
concerns the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id., 84 Stat. at
476. As amended, that subchapter contained three sections. The first two provided for the
District Court’s jurisdiction, “[i]n addition to its jurisdiction as a United States district court and
any other jurisdiction conferred on it by law,” over certain “civil action[s]” and “criminal
case[s],” respectively, brought under D.C. law. Id., 84 Stat. at 476–78. The third provided that
“[a] civil action or criminal prosecution in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is
ODC’s Reply Supp. 2d Mot. Remand at 1, ECF No. 6. The Court consolidates all three cases, as
all involve “common question[s] of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see Biochem Pharma,
Inc. v. Emory Univ., 148 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The district court has broad
discretion in determining whether to consolidate related cases.”).
2
Mr. Clark’s third notice of removal nominally concerns a subpoena, but he claims that it
was never served on him. See 3d Notice of Removal at 1. In addition, as explained below, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has issued an order holding in abeyance a prior subpoena
pending this Court’s resolution of the first two motions to remand, see 3d Notice of Removal,
Ex. 14, ECF No. 1-14, and ODC acknowledges both that the production deadline for the later
subpoena has passed and that it has not brought a motion to compel a response to that subpoena,
see 3d Mot. Remand at 1. While the analysis herein would apply equally to the issues presented
by removal of that subpoena, because it does not appear to represent a live proceeding over
which the Court could exercise removal jurisdiction, the Court confines its analysis to the similar
arguments raised in the parties’ briefing on the first and second notices of removal and
corresponding motions to remand.
2
removable to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in accordance with [28
U.S.C. § 1441, et seq.].” Id., 84 Stat. at 478. These provisions remain unchanged in the version
of the D.C. Code in force today. See D.C. Code §§ 11-501–03.
Second, the legislation separately rewrote chapter 25 of title 11 of the D.C. Code. 84
Stat. at 520. It provided that the DCCA “shall make such rules as it deems proper respecting the
examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure,
suspension and expulsion,” specifying that the DCCA “may censure, suspend from practice, or
expel a member of its bar for crime, misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional
misconduct, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Id., 84 Stat. at 521. The
legislation required that “written charges, under oath” be filed with the DCCA before a member
of “its bar” could be censured, suspended, or expelled, but also permitted “other courts”—the
“Federal courts in the District of Columbia and the Superior Court”—to “censure, suspend, or
expel an attorney from the practice at their respective bars.” Id. All of this language remains
unchanged in the D.C. Code today. See D.C. Code §§ 11-2501–04. No provision for removal of
disciplinary actions to the U.S. District Court was included in the original legislation, nor has one
been added since. See D.C. Code tit. 11, ch. 25.
Pursuant to its authority under this chapter, the DCCA has adopted standards of conduct
for members of the D.C. Bar and rules governing attorney discipline. See generally D.C. Rules
of Pro. Conduct (D.C. Bar 2018); D.C. Bar R. XI (disciplinary proceedings). Specifically, D.C.
Bar Rule XI lays out the grounds for discipline and the procedure for disciplinary proceedings.
See D.C. Bar R. XI. As relevant here, it establishes the Board and authorizes it to “consider and
investigate any alleged ground for discipline . . . called to its attention, or upon its own motion,
and to take such action with respect thereto as shall be appropriate to effect the purposes of this
3
rule.” Id. § 4(e)(1). In particular, Rule XI authorizes the Board to “adopt rules, procedures, and
policies not inconsistent with this rule or any other rules of [the DCCA],” id. § 4(e)(10), which
the Board has done, see Board Rules (Bd. on Prof. Resp. 2023). Rule XI also empowers the
Board to appoint “Disciplinary Counsel,” together with a staff, and to appoint “Hearing
Committees.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 4(e)(2), (e)(4).
Disciplinary Counsel is charged with “investigat[ing] all matters involving alleged
misconduct by an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of [the DCCA]” and
“prosecut[ing] all disciplinary proceedings before Hearing Committees, the Board, and the
Court.” Id. § 6(a)(2), (a)(4). Hearing Committees are three-member panels that “conduct
hearings on formal charges of misconduct” and “submit their findings and recommendations on
formal charges of misconduct to the Board, together with the record of the hearing.” Id. § 5(c).
The Board “review[s] the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Committees” and
“prepare[s] and forward[s] its own findings and recommendations, together with the record of
proceedings before the Hearing Committee and the Board, to the [DCCA].” Id. § 4(e)(7). Upon
receiving the Board’s report, the DCCA must “enter an appropriate order as soon as the business
of the Court permits.” Id. § 9(h)(1). In doing so, the DCCA must “accept the findings of fact
made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt
the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward
inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” Id.
B. 28 U.S.C § 530B, the McDade Amendment
In 1979, Congress folded a requirement into a Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
appropriations bill that DOJ attorneys “shall be duly licensed and authorized to practice as an
attorney under the laws of a State, territory, or the District of Columbia.” Department of Justice
4
Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 1040, 1044 (1979). The
following year, the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), responding to an American Bar
Association (“ABA”) disciplinary rule that prohibited direct contact with a represented opposing
party without the consent of the party’s counsel (the “no-contact rule”), issued an opinion finding
that “courts have no authority to exclude evidence solely on the basis of a violation of [the ABA
rule], and state bar associations may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, impose
sanctions on a government attorney who has acted within the scope of his federal
responsibilities.” Ethical Restraints on the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility on Federal
Investigations, 4B Op. O.L.C. 576, 577 (1980).
Spurred by unanimous state-level adoption of a version of the no-contact rule over the
following years, see Charles Doyle, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30060, McDade-Murtha Amendment:
Ethical Standards for Justice Department Attorneys 10 (2001), together with a Second Circuit
decision rejecting DOJ’s argument that state bar ethics rules did not apply to prosecutors
conducting investigations before formal initiation of a prosecution, see United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990), Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum in 1989 to all DOJ litigators, see N.Y. Bar Ass’n v.
FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 131–32 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Hammad, 858 F.2d at 837). The
Thornburgh Memorandum “encouraged” DOJ attorneys to be “sensitive to the interests that are
sought to be protected by [the no-contact rule],” but explained the “Department’s position that
contact with a represented individual in the course of authorized law enforcement activity does
not violate [the no-contact rule]” and that DOJ would “resist, on Supremacy Clause grounds,
local attempts to curb legitimate federal law enforcement techniques.” In re Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478, 492–93 (D.N.M. 1992) (quoting in full the Thornburgh Memorandum). Both the courts and
5
Congress took issue with the Thornburgh Memorandum. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4
F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (endorsing the district court’s “trenchant analysis of the
inefficacy of the [Thornburgh Memorandum],” which the district court described as
“preposterous” (citing United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.)); United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (quoting House Subcommittee’s
conclusion, after a hearing in 1990 “address[ing] the propriety of the Thornburgh
Memorandum,” that it “disagree[d] with the Attorney General’s attempts to exempt departmental
attorneys from compliance with the ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they
belong and in the rules of the Federal Courts before which they appear.”).
Still, in 1994, DOJ, under Attorney General Janet Reno, promulgated regulations
“intended to preempt and supersede the application of state laws and rules and local federal court
rules to the extent that they relate to contacts by attorneys for the government . . . with
represented parties[.]” O’Keefe, 961 F. Supp. at 1293 (quoting the version of 28 C.F.R. pt. 77
then in force). But in 1998, the Eighth Circuit struck down these regulations as in excess of
statutory authority. See U.S. ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257
(8th Cir. 1998).
While this played out, Congress carried through the requirement from the 1979
appropriations bill that DOJ attorneys maintain state bar licensure. See, e.g., Department of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
[hereinafter “Appropriations Act”] of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 102(a), 106 Stat. 1828, 1838
(1992) (reenacting the provisions in Pub. L. No. 96-132); Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-121, § 102, 107 Stat. 1153, 1163 (1993) (same); Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L.
6
No. 103-317, § 102, 108 Stat. 1724, 1734 (1994) (same); Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-119, § 102, 111 Stat. 2440, 2456–57 (1997) (same); Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, § 102, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-19 (1999) (same). And in 1998, less than a year
after the Eight Circuit’s decision in O’Keefe, Congress passed what is referred to as the McDade
Amendment, after its sponsor Representative Joseph McDade. See Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112 Stat.
2681, 2681-118–19 (1998). Passed as a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill, the McDade
Amendment, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (hereinafter “section 530B”), provides in full:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local
Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in
that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in
that State.
(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to
assure compliance with this section.
(c) As used in this section, the term “attorney for the Government” includes any attorney
described in section 77.2(a) of part 77 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations
and also includes any independent counsel, or employee of such a counsel, appointed
under chapter 40.
The McDade Amendment passed after Representative McDade introduced a standalone
version of the legislation in May 1996, see H.R. 3386, 104th Cong. (1996), reintroduced it in
January 1997, see H.R. 232, 105th Cong. (1997), and reintroduced it again together with
Representative John Murtha in amended form in March 1998, see H.R. 3396, 105th Cong.
(1998). The version passed into law closely resembled the 1996 and 1997 bills, and the
committee report explained that the enacted version “includes language to make government
attorneys subject to laws and rules of the State and the rules of the local Federal court in which
they are practicing” and “addresses the concerns of the Committee about the Department of
Justice’s issuance of a regulation that exempts its attorneys from the same State laws and rules of
7
ethics which all other attorneys must follow.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-636, at 154 (1998). In April
1999, pursuant to section 530B(b), DOJ promulgated regulations to enforce the McDade
Amendment. See Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 64 Fed. Reg. 19273,
19275 (Apr. 20, 1999) (codified in 28 C.F.R. pt. 77).
C. Disciplinary Charges Against Mr. Clark
On July 19, 2022, ODC filed with the Board a Petition Instituting Formal Disciplinary
Proceedings against Mr. Clark together with a Specification of Charges (the “Specification”).
See Petition and Specification. The Specification alleges that Mr. Clark, who “at all relevant
times” concurrently served in DOJ as Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and
Natural Resources Division and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division,
“attempted to engage in conduct involving dishonesty” in violation of D.C. Bar Rules 8.4(a) and
(c) and “attempted to engage in conduct that would seriously interfere with the administration of
justice” in violation of D.C. Bar Rules 8.4(a) and (d). Id. ¶¶ 8, 31. These charges arose out of
Mr. Clark’s alleged conduct in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. The Specification
alleges that, despite having “no involvement in or responsibility for [DOJ’s] post-election
investigations into allegations of fraud or irregularities,” on December 28, 2020, Mr. Clark
tasked a senior counsel in the Civil Division with researching “the authority of state legislatures
to send unauthorized slate [sic] of electors to Congress.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. Mr. Clark allegedly then
“used this research to write” what came to be referred to as the “Proof of Concept letter,” which
he emailed to the Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey Rosen, and the Principal Associate Deputy
Attorney General, Richard Donoghue. Id. ¶¶ 4, 12, 13 (formatting omitted). The Proof of
Concept letter, which was “drafted to be signed by Mr. Rosen, Mr. Donoghue and [Mr. Clark],”
and “addressed to the Georgia Governor, Speaker of the House, and President Pro Tempore of
8
the Senate,” “recommended that the Governor call the Georgia legislature into special session
and argued that if the Governor refused to do so, the legislature had the authority to convene
such a session on its own initiative.” Id. ¶ 14.
The Specification alleges that the Proof of Concept letter contained multiple false or
misleading statements. First, the letter “stated that the Department of Justice had ‘identified
significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States,
including the State of Georgia.’” Id. ¶ 15. The Specification alleges that this statement was
false, as DOJ was “aware of no allegations of fraud in Georgia that would have affected the
results of the presidential election.” Id. Second, the letter “stated that [DOJ] found ‘troubling
the current posture of a pending lawsuit in Fulton County’ and the ‘litigation’s sluggish pace.’”
Id. ¶ 16. The Specification alleges that this statement also was false, as DOJ “had no
involvement in the Fulton County case and was not concerned by its lack of progress.” Id.Third, the letter stated that DOJ “believed ‘that in Georgia . . . both a slate of electors supporting
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a separate slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on
that day at the proper location to cast their ballots, and that both sets of those ballots have been
transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be opened by Vice President Pence.’” Id. ¶ 17. The
Specifications alleges that this statement was “misleading,” as the “Governor of Georgia had
certified a slate of electors to the Electoral College pledged to Joseph Biden, and there was no
legitimate alternative slate of Georgia electors pledged to Donald Trump.” Id. Fourth, the letter
stated that DOJ “had concluded that the Governor should convene a special session of the
Georgia legislature. Id. ¶ 18. The Specification alleges that this “statement was false,” as DOJ
“had not made such a determination.” Id. Finally, the letter “stated that [DOJ] had concluded
that if the Governor refused to convene a special session of the Georgia legislature, the
9
legislature had the authority to do so on its own initiative.” Id. ¶ 19. The Specification alleges
that this “statement was false,” as DOJ “had made no such determination.” Id.The Specification also details efforts allegedly undertaken by Mr. Clark to ensure the
Proof of Concept letter’s transmission, over the objections of his superiors, Mr. Rosen and Mr.
Donoghue. Specifically, it alleges that “a little more than an hour” after Mr. Clark sent the Proof
of Concept letter to Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue, Mr. Donoghue responded, in a message
copying Mr. Rosen, that he would not sign the letter because he “kn[e]w of nothing that would
support the statement ‘we have identified significant concerns that may have impacted the
outcome of the election in multiple states’” and did not think DOJ’s “role should include making
recommendations to a State legislature about how they should meet their Constitutional
obligations to appoint Electors.” Id. ¶ 20. That evening, Mr. Clark allegedly met with Mr.
Rosen and Mr. Donoghue, who informed Mr. Clark that they “would not authorize or sign the
letter because it contained false statements.” Id. ¶ 21. On January 2, 2021, Mr. Clark allegedly
had a second meeting with Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue, at which he “informed them that the
President had offered him the position of Acting Attorney General, and that he was thinking
about accepting it if Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue were unwilling to send the Proof of Concept
letter.” Id. ¶ 23. After Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue again refused to send the letter, Mr. Clark
allegedly met with Mr. Rosen again the following day and told him that “he intended to accept
the President’s offer to become Acting Attorney General and that he would send the Proof of
Concept letter once he assumed the position.” Id. ¶ 26.
The Specification states that Mr. Rosen informed Mr. Donoghue, who in turn informed
“some of the Assistant Attorneys General,” all of whom “agreed that they would resign if [Mr.
Clark] carried out his plan.” Id. ¶ 27. The following day, Mr. Rosen organized a meeting
10
between himself, the President, Mr. Clark, Mr. Donoghue, the White House Counsel, and two
additional lawyers. See id. ¶ 28. In the meeting, “all the lawyers argued against appointing [Mr.
Clark] as Acting Attorney General,” and “[a]ll but [Mr. Clark] opposed sending the letter,” but
Mr. Clark allegedly “stated that he would send the Proof of Concept letter if the President
appointed him Acting Attorney General.” Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Donoghue allegedly informed the
President that “he should expect that all the Assistant Attorneys General would resign” if Mr.
Clark was appointed Acting Attorney General, and that he believed “a number” of U.S.
Attorneys would too. Id. ¶ 30. The White House Counsel also allegedly threatened to resign.
See id. The Specification states that “[t]he President decided not to appoint [Mr. Clark] Acting
Attorney General, and the Proof of Concept letter was never sent.” Id.D. Relevant Procedural History
Mr. Clark’s notices of removal and the more than 100 attached exhibits reveal a
labyrinthine procedural history beginning before ODC filed the Petition and Specification. The
Court briefly summarizes the most relevant pieces of this backstory. The disciplinary proceeding
against Mr. Clark was assigned to Hearing Committee Number Twelve. See 1d Notice of
Removal at 6. On October 6, 2022, ODC served on Mr. Clark a subpoena for documents. Id.Ex. A-54, ECF No. 1-54. On October 17, 2022, Mr. Clark filed a notice of removal in this
Court, purporting to remove the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and federal officer jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). See 1d Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Mr. Clark subsequently filed a
motion to stay the deadline for responding to the October 6 subpoena and a motion to quash. See
Mot. Stay, ECF No. 2; Mot. Quash, ECF No. 4. On October 21, 2022, ODC moved to remand.
See 1d Mot. Remand, ECF No. 1-5. On October 26, 2022, ODC moved in the DCCA to enforce
11
its October 6 subpoena. See 2d Notice of Removal, Ex. A-3, ECF No. 1-3. Mr. Clark filed a
second notice of removal as to that motion on November 25, 2022, see id., and ODC filed a
second motion to remand on November 29, 2022, see 2d Mot. Remand, ECF No. 4. On
December 27, 2022, ODC attempted to serve another subpoena on Mr. Clark. See 3d Notice of
Removal, Ex. 7, ECF No. 1-7; 3d Notice of Removal at 4–5, ECF No. 1. On January 17, 2023,
the DCCA issued an order holding in abeyance ODC’s motion to enforce the October 6
subpoena “until [Mr. Clark’s] removal of this matter to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia has been resolved.” 3d Notice of Removal, Ex. 14, ECF No. 1-14. Still,
Mr. Clark filed a third notice of removal as to the December 27 subpoena on January 26, 2023,
see 3d Notice of Removal, and ODC filed a third motion to remand on February 8, 2023, see 3d
Mot. Remand, ECF No. 4.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Removal and remand are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. Section 1441 provides
for removal, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,” of “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction.” § 1441(a). Additionally, section 1442, the federal officer removal statute, provides
in relevant part that “[a] civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court”
may be removed to U.S. district court if it is “against or directed to”
[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or person acting under that
officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in any official or individual
capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right,
title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment
of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
§ 1442(a). Section 1442 also contains a paragraph defining “State” to include the District of
Columbia and “State court” to include “the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, a court of
12
a United States territory or insular possession, and a tribal court.” § 1442(d)(1), (d)(5)–(6).
Sections 1446 and 1455 go on to provide the procedures for removal of civil actions and criminal
prosecutions, respectively. See §§ 1446, 1455. Section 1447 governs remand after removal,
providing that, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” § 1447(c).
“When a plaintiff seeks to have a case that has been removed to federal court remanded
back to state court, the party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing that
subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Mizell v. SunTrust Bank, 26 F. Supp. 3d 80,
84 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation omitted). Courts in this Circuit generally “construe[] removal
jurisdiction strictly, favoring remand where the propriety of removal is unclear,” Ballard v.
District of Columbia, 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011), except that cases removed under
§ 1442 should be construed “liberally in favor of removal,” K&D LLC v. Trump Old Post Off.
LLC, 951 F.3d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
IV. ANALYSIS
Mr. Clark’s notices of removal and the parties’ submissions in relation to ODC’s
corresponding motions to remand are addressed to the same controlling jurisdictional questions,
so the Court considers them together, except as explained supra note 2. Mr. Clark asserts two
sources of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441
and federal officer removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442. See 1d Notice Removal at
23–34; Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 3–7; 19–23, ECF No. 13.
A. “Civil Action” or “Criminal Prosecution”
Mr. Clark acknowledges that this case is neither a “civil action” nor “criminal
prosecution” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442, 1446, 1455. Instead, he argues
13
that the “hybrid nature of Bar disciplinary proceedings as quasi-criminal” requires the Court to
“harmonize the removal statutes’ treatment of civil and criminal cases.” Opp’n to 2d Mot.
Remand at 17–18 (arguing that “D.C. bar discipline proceedings are both criminal and civil”).
ODC takes the position that disciplinary proceedings are “neither civil nor criminal” and
therefore not removeable. 1d Mot. Remand at 6. Confining its analysis to the nature of the
Board’s proceeding against Mr. Clark, the Court agrees with ODC.
1. The Board’s Disciplinary Proceeding is not a Civil Action under §§ 1441, 1442, 1446
Mr. Clark concedes that this case is not purely a “civil action” under sections 1441, 1442
and 1446. See 1d Notice of Removal at 1 (“Jeffrey B. Clark (‘Respondent’) hereby gives notice
and removes this quasi-prosecution case . . .”). This is appropriate, as the disciplinary
proceeding bears none of the essential hallmarks of a civil case. It involves no “private injury,”
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 299 (1888), overruled on other grounds by
Milwaukee v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); see also Action, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019) (defining “civil action” as “[a]n action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a
private or civil right”). Nor is it “of a character traditionally cognizable by courts of common
law or of equity.” Milwaukee v. M.E. White, 296 U.S. at 271; see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S.
438, 442 (1979) (rejecting out-of-state lawyers’ claim of right to appear pro hac vice in Ohio
court, explaining that “[s]ince the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of
lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia,” which “prescribe
the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of professional conduct” and “are
responsible for the discipline of lawyers”). Other federal courts have similarly found that
attorney disciplinary proceedings are not “civil actions” under the removal statute. See, e.g.,
Mass. Bd. of Bar Overseers v. Belanger, No. 20-cv-10445, 2020 WL 1821826, at *2 (D. Mass.
14
Apr. 10, 2020) (finding that a bar disciplinary action is “not a civil matter but, rather, ‘quasi-
criminal’ or ‘sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in character’ such that this court has no
jurisdiction” (citations omitted)); Colorado v. Ziankovich, No. 19-cv-3087, 2019 WL 6907460,
at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2019) (finding that attorney disciplinary proceedings are “not ‘civil
actions’ subject to removal”); Sup. Ct. of Cal. v. Kinney, No. 15-cv-1552, 2015 WL 3413232, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2015) (“[T]he disciplinary proceedings formerly pending before the State
and now pending before the California Supreme Court are not ‘civil actions’; they ‘are sui
generis, neither civil nor criminal in character.’”) (citations omitted); Ala. Bar Ass’n v.
Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Ala. 1965) (finding an attorney disciplinary proceeding
“not a civil action within the contemplation of the federal removal statute”).
This understanding also comports with the history of the removal statute. The version of
the removal statute in effect until 1948 provided for removal of “[a]ny suit of a civil nature, at
law or in equity,” over which U.S. district courts have original jurisdiction. Judicial Code of
1911, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094 (1911). In 1948, Congress codified Title 28, and in doing so
revised the general removal statute to the formulation that endures in relevant part today
permitting removal of “any civil action brought in a State court” over which U.S. district courts
have original jurisdiction, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress.” Pub.
L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 937 (1948); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The right to remove a case from a state
to a federal court is purely statutory,” Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 14C Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed. 2023), and “[b]ecause of the significant federalism
concerns involved, [the court] strictly construes the scope of its removal jurisdiction,” Downey v.
Ambassador Dev., 568 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107–09 (1941)). Consistent with this approach, the Court views as
15
significant Congress’s decision to limit the scope of removeable proceedings from “[a]ny suit of
a civil nature, at law or in equity” to only “any civil action brought in a State court” and not
otherwise expressly barred by Congress. Mr. Clark argues that the “hybrid nature” of the
disciplinary proceeding makes it “both criminal and civil” for purposes of evaluating removal
under section 1442. See Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 18. But to whatever extent certain
features of the Board’s disciplinary proceeding could be viewed as “civil in nature,” see, e.g.,
Board Rules, ch. 3 (governing discovery), as explained above, they do not transform the
proceeding into a “civil action” within the meaning of sections 1441, 1442, and 1446.
2. The Board’s Disciplinary Proceeding Is Not a Criminal Prosecution under §§ 1442, 1455
Unlike with civil actions, there is no statute generally permitting removal of criminal
prosecutions. This reflects the understanding, grounded in principles of federalism and comity,
that upon removal of a state prosecution to a federal court, “the jurisdiction of the courts of a
state to try offenses against its own laws and in violation of its own peace and dignity is wrested
from it by the order of an inferior federal court.” Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29 (1926); see
also California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that “removal of state
criminal prosecutions constitutes a far greater disruption of legitimate state authority than
removal of state law civil suits against federal officials” because “removal forces the state to
enforce its own laws in an alien forum” and “a polity’s ability to protect its citizens from
violence and other breaches of the peace through enforcement of criminal laws is the centermost
pillar of sovereignty”). Instead, Mr. Clark relies on section 1442(a)(1)’s provision for removal
of criminal prosecutions against federal officers.
Recall that section 1442(a) permits removal of a “civil action or criminal prosecution that
is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to . . . any officer . . . of the United
16
States . . . in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of [his]
office.” § 1442(a). While section 1442 operates as an exception to the general rule that the
cause of action must arise under federal law in order to establish federal jurisdiction, an officer
seeking removal under section 1442 still must “raise a colorable federal defense.” K&D LLC,
951 F.3d at 506 (quoting Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999)).
Mr. Clark relies heavily on In re Artis, 883 A.2d 85 (D.C. 2005) to analogize the Board’s
disciplinary proceeding to a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., 1d Notice of Removal ¶¶ 48–49;
Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 16–17; Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 17. In that case, the DCCA,
acknowledging the “quasi-criminal” nature of a disciplinary proceeding commenced by the
Board, found no error in the Board’s decision to recognize the respondent’s right to assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering interrogatories. See In
re Artis, 883 A.2d at 101, 103. Without disagreeing with the argument that the proceeding
would not result in “criminal liability,” the court emphasized that “the privilege against self-
incrimination can be asserted in any proceeding, including administrative, investigatory or
adjudicatory ones.” Id. at 102–03. The court explained that “[t]he Fifth Amendment protects
against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Id. (quoting Littlejohn v.
United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotation omitted)). As the court
suggested, the mere fact that one may invoke the Fifth Amendment in the context of a
disciplinary proceeding does not transform the proceeding into a criminal prosecution for
purposes of removal. See City of Neodesha v. BP Corp. N. Am., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1243 (D.
Kan. 2016) (explaining, before finding state complaints for violations of a city waste ordinance
civil actions for purposes of removal, that the fact that a “proceeding provides procedural
17
protections that are usually reserved for criminal trials does not turn [them] into criminal
prosecutions” (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986)).
Moreover, the Board’s disciplinary proceeding serves a different primary purpose than a
criminal prosecution. Whereas “[p]unitive fines and imprisonment are the common tools of the
criminal law,” “[t]ools of attorney discipline, such as reprimands, are not traditional criminal
punishments.” Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2009); see
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982) (“States
traditionally have exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attorneys. The
ultimate objective of such control is the protection of the public, the purification of the bar and
prevention of recurrence.” (cleaned up)). This distinction has deep roots. See Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265, 288 (1883) (“[T]he constitutional privilege of trial by jury for crimes does not apply to
prevent the courts from punishing its officers for contempt, or from removing them in proper
cases.”). At the same time, whatever the primary aim of a bar disciplinary proceeding, the
Supreme Court also has acknowledged that “[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a
punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968); see also
Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting the same language from In re
Ruffalo in the context of reviewing a decision by the Federal Trade Commission to reprimand an
attorney and suspend him from practicing before it).
Perhaps in light of this tension, the Supreme Court also has held, in the context of
evaluating the nature of contempt proceedings, that courts generally should “defer[] to a
legislature’s determination whether a sanction is civil or criminal,” as “state law provides strong
guidance about whether or not the State is exercising its authority in a nonpunitive, noncriminal
manner.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994)
18
(quoting Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) (internal quotation omitted)).
The DCCA, the highest court in D.C., has repeatedly held, in decisions both before and after In
re Artis, that, “[i]n all cases, the purpose of imposing a sanction is not to punish the attorney, but
to protect the public and the courts, safeguard the integrity of the profession, and deter
respondent and other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1,
17 (D.C. 2005); see also In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1, 16 (D.C. 2010) (explaining the purpose of
attorney discipline to “protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.”); In re Abrams,
689 A.2d 6, 12 (D.C. 1997) (“Disciplinary sanctions are designed to maintain the integrity of the
profession, to protect the public and the courts, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in
similar misconduct. Our purpose in conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposing sanctions
is not to punish the attorney; rather, it is to offer the desired protection by assuring the continued
or restored fitness of an attorney to practice law.” (cleaned up)). The D.C. Code also makes
clear that disciplinary actions by the Board are not considered criminal prosecutions in the
District of Columbia. See D.C. Code § 23-101 (providing, in section titled “Conduct of
prosecutions,” that all prosecutions either must be conducted by the D.C. Attorney General’s
office or U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C.); D.C. Code tit. 22 (laying out “Criminal Offense and
Penalties” in D.C., but not including violations of attorney professional conduct rules adopted by
the DCCA pursuant to § 11-2501); D.C. Code § 16-702 (providing that all criminal offenses
must be prosecuted by either indictment or information). While it may be possible to imagine a
state bar disciplinary proceeding designed such that it is simply a criminal prosecution by
another name—for example, one designed to punish attorneys, perhaps through imposition of a
monetary penalty, beyond the protective and deterrent purposes of the Board’s proceeding—no
such proceeding is at issue here.
19
3. Section 530B and the Functional Test
Mr. Clark argues that the court should find that, regardless of how it is labeled, “[i]f a
state investigative body operates in an adjudicatory manner, and if a federal officer or his agent
is subject to its process, the statutory requirements of § 1442(a)(1) are satisfied.” Opp’n to 1d
Mot. Remand at 7. For support, Mr. Clark relies principally on Kolibash v. Comm. on Legal
Ethics of W. Va. Bar, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989), which endorsed a “functional test” to
determining the nature of a proceeding for purposes of section 1442. Wilson v. Gottlieb, 821 F.
Supp.2d 778, 783 (D. Md. 2011) (characterizing Kolibash); see Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 6–
7. The Kolibash court found that, although a state bar disciplinary proceeding was a “quasi-civil
proceeding,” because it was “adjudicatory in nature,” to hold it “outside the operation of the
removal statute would be to elevate form over substance.” Kolibash, 872 F.2d at 576.
At the outset it is important to note that the functional test is heavily contested in the
context of removal under both sections 1441 and 1442. See Or. Bureau of Lab. and Indust. ex
rel. Richardson v. West Comms., 288 F.3d 414, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the functional
test because it “goes beyond the language of the statute” and is a “judicially-developed analysis
that neither appears in, nor is necessarily implied by, the statutory language” and “changes the
meaning and the reach of the statute.”); Porter Trust v. Rural Water Sewer and Solid Waste
Mgmt. Dist. No. 1, 607 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he appropriate test involves
application of the plain language of § 1441(a) rather than a functional test . . .”); Sun Buick v.
Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1261–64 (3d Cir. 1994) (casting doubt on the functional test
in context of removal under section 1441); Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N. Am.,
Inc., 224 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2000) (declining to extend previous application of the
functional test beyond “the particular facts of that case”); N.Y. Div. of Human Rts. on Complaint
20
of Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Folino, No. 11-cv-569A, 2011 WL 11068867, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. July 11, 2011) (aligning with the “more recent trend away from functional
analysis and toward the plain language of the removal statute.”); Wade v. Burns, 361 F. Supp. 3d
306, 311 (D. Conn. 2019) (rejecting the functional test in context of removal under section
1442); In re Gorence, 810 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting Kolibash as nonbinding
authority and finding that state bar disciplinary proceeding was not removeable under section
1442). 3
It is also somewhat out of date. The only case Mr. Clark cites that cuts against the “more
recent trend away from functional analysis and toward the plain language of the removal statute”
is In re Lusk, SACV 16-0930 AG, 2016 WL 4107671, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2016). Folino,
2011 WL 11068867, at *2; see Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 7 n.2. In that case, the court applied
Kolibash to uphold removal pursuant to section 1442 of a complaint by a private individual
against a National Guardsman for unlicensed practice of law in California. See In re Lusk, 2016
WL 4107671, at *1–2. In doing so, however, the court explained that the relevant state
procedure gave the state court “the potential power to seize [the respondent’s] . . . military law
practice.” Id. at *5. Accordingly, the court stressed that to grant remand would be to risk the
“extraordinary result” of “a state court seizing a military law practice regulated by the United
3
The D.C. Circuit has not considered the merits of Kolibash. Nor has it weighed in on
the broader issue beyond noting, in the context of evaluating the civil contempt proceeding that
could follow issuance of subpoenas in a state contract and tort action, that “[t]he circuits that
have considered whether proceedings not generally thought paradigm ‘civil actions’ or ‘criminal
prosecutions’ can be removed under § 1442(a) have not been uniform in their approach.” Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Circuit found
no occasion to resolve the ambiguity left by that lack of uniformity, as it found that the “circuits
to have confronted the question whether a contempt proceeding is removable have . . . answered
affirmatively.” Id. In addition, as explored in depth below, decisions like this one that were
decided before the enactment of section 530B have limited relevance to the present analysis.
21
States Army.” Id. No similar risk is present here. See D.C. Code § 11-2502 (permitting only
censure, suspension or disbarment). Indeed, a more closely analogous case decided closer in
time to Kolibash, which the Court discusses further below, found that a state bar disciplinary
proceeding was not removeable under the functional test. See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 482–
83 (D.N.M. 1992) (distinguishing Kolibash and finding that state bar disciplinary proceeding
was “neither civil nor criminal in nature” and therefore not removeable under section 1442). 4
More centrally, Kolibash was decided long before section 530B was enacted, and the In
re Lusk court did not consider—nor have the parties identified any court that has considered—
how section 530B interacts with removal under section 1442. Addressing itself to that task now,
the Court finds that any argument that the Board’s disciplinary proceeding should fit within a
functional definition of “criminal prosecution” for purposes of removal under section 1442 is
foreclosed by reference to section 530B.
Recall that, as discussed in detail supra Section II.A, Congress passed legislation
amending the D.C. Code to authorize the DCCA to “make such rules as it deems proper
respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and
their censure, suspension, and expulsion.” District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 101, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (1970). Unlike in the
sections of that legislation concerning “civil action[s]” and “criminal case[s],” 84 Stat. at 478–
480, the chapter authorizing the DCCA to regulate admission to and empowering it to discipline
members of its bar contained no provision for removal to federal court, see 84 Stat. at 520–21.
4
In re Doe and a related case from this District, United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp.
964 (D.D.C. 1993), involved consideration of the predecessor statutes to section 530B—which
required that DOJ attorneys maintain state bar licensure, as discussed supra Section II.B—in
relation to a New Mexico bar disciplinary proceeding. These cases, the closest analogies to the
present case of which the Court is aware, are discussed in detail below.
22
Acting pursuant to that chapter, the DCCA, and through it the Board, have adopted a
comprehensive set of procedural and substantive rules governing discipline for admitted
attorneys. See D.C. Bar R. XI; Board Rules (Bd. on Prof. Resp. 2023). Those rules provide for
the DCCA-appointed Board to investigate “any alleged ground for discipline” and make findings
and recommend sanctions to the DCCA, which holds final authority over disciplinary decisions.
D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 4, 9; see In re Artis, 883 A.2d at 92 (“[T]he ultimate choice of sanction is for
the court to decide.”). Congress then passed section 530B making “attorney[s] for the
Government . . . subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties.” 28 U.S.C. §
530B(a). It would utterly frustrate this scheme to construe the terms “civil action” and “criminal
prosecution” in section 1442 to encompass the Board’s disciplinary proceedings, and thereby
permit near wholesale removal of such proceedings against federal government attorneys to
federal court. 5
Mr. Clark makes two unpersuasive arguments to the contrary. First, he argues at length
that D.C. is not a “state” within the meaning of section 530B because the statute does not
specifically reference D.C. in subjecting government attorneys to “State laws and rules, and local
Federal court rules.” See 1d Notice of Removal at 29–30; Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 13; 2d
Notice of Removal at 23–25; Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 3–6. The Court questions whether the
DCCA, being on the one hand an Article I court and on the other specifically constructed to be
“comparable to [courts] of the states,” could plausibly be found to be neither a federal nor a state
court. JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal
5
And surely it would be near wholesale, given that professional misconduct, by nature, is
likely to be carried out “under color of” official authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
23
quotation omitted)). 6 Regardless, section 530B does apply to D.C. by its own terms. Section
530B(c) defines “attorney for the Government” to include “any attorney described in section
77.2(a) of part 77 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” § 530B(c). That regulation
defines “attorney for the government” broadly to include attorneys who practice, by nature of
their positions, in D.C. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a). For example, it defines the term to include the
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Solicitor General and, “the Assistant Attorneys
General”—the same position held by Mr. Clark. Id. It also includes “any attorney employed in,
or head of, any other legal office in the Department of Justice agency,” “any United States
Attorney,” and “any Assistant United States attorney,” among others. Id. To accept Mr. Clark’s
position would be to subscribe to the absurd proposition that Congress chose to make these
officials subject to jurisdictional rules of professional conduct everywhere except where they
work. See United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that “‘absurd
results’ are strongly disfavored” in statutory interpretation (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)). That D.C. is home to, by far, the most government
lawyers in the country only compounds this absurdity. See FedScope Federal Workforce Data,
6
The Court also notes that, applying Mr. Clark’s literalist approach more broadly would
threaten the availability of removal under section 1442 without reference to section 530B.
Section 1442 permits removal civil actions or criminal prosecutions “commenced in a State
court,” a term it defines to include only, as relevant here, “the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), (d)(6). But the disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Clark was
commenced in the DCCA, not the Superior Court. See Petition and Specification. As it was
Congress that vested the DCCA with authority to administer attorney discipline in D.C., see D.C.
Code § 11-2502, that Congress also defined “State court” to include only the D.C. Superior
Court is further evidence that it did not intend to make the Board’s disciplinary proceeding
removeable under section 1442.
24
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (Dec. 2022), https://www.fedscope.opm.gov (showing
D.C. with 14,810 government attorneys, compared to the next highest Virginia with 3,115). 7
The legislative history confirms beyond a whisper of doubt that Congress did not intend
to exempt D.C. from section 530B. First, debate over section 530B took place during the
investigations of independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr. Indeed, Mr. Starr issued his report
concluding that President Clinton committed perjury and attempted to obstruct justice on
September 11, 1998, just weeks before Congress passed section 530B as part of the omnibus
appropriations bill. See Communication from Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel, H.R.
Doc. No. 105-310 (1998). This context, including broad upset among President Clinton’s
supporters over a perception of prosecutorial overreach, affected Congress’s consideration of
section 530B. Most significantly, during floor debate, Representative John Conyers offered an
amendment to add “independent counsel[s] appointed under title 28 of the United States Code
and any employee of such independent counsel” to the definition of “attorney[s] for the
government” who would be subject to section 530B. 144 Cong. Rec. H7229 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1998) (perfecting amendment offered by Rep. John Conyers). Propounding the amendment from
the floor, Representative Conyers argued that “the present independent counsel, perhaps more
than anyone else, should be subject to each and every stringent provision that is included in this
measure.” Id. (statement of Rep. John Conyers). This sentiment was echoed by others, see, e.g.,
id. at H7236 (statement of Rep. Terrance John Cox) (“I am talking about generic prosecutors, but
I am talking about Ken Starr also. . . . We would not be in this debate today, would not have this
7
To access the correct data set, click the link to “Employment” under heading “Status
Data” on homepage; then click the link for March 2022; then click “Occupation – All” in the top
ribbon; then select “White Collar,” then “09xx-Legal and Kindred,” then “0905-General
Attorney;” and then click “United States” to see a state-by-state breakdown.
25
amendment today if this poster boy for unethical prosecutors had not violated all of us in the way
he has done.”), and the amendment passed by a vote of 249 to 182, id. at H7242. 8 The language
from the Conyers amendment remains in force in section 530B. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(c).
Of course, Mr. Starr’s investigation was based in Washington, D.C., so the purpose of the
Conyers amendment could only have been to subject him to D.C.’s bar rules. Similarly, in a
floor speech accompanying the introduction of his standalone version of the legislation that
would become section 530B, Representative McDade listed “specific instances of prosecutorial
misconduct” that would be remediated by the bill. 144 Cong. Rec. E301 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Joseph M. McDade). Included in that list were multiple cases prosecuted in
D.C., which, again, only makes sense if the intent of the legislation was to subject government
attorneys in D.C. to D.C.’s bar rules. See id. at E302–03 (citing Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989), United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1996), United States v.
Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 345–47
(D.D.C. 1990)). Accordingly, both the text and legislative history of section 530B make
unmistakably clear that it applies to D.C. 9
8
Congress considered, and rejected, legislation to amend section 530B after it took effect
in 1999. See Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999). The report of a hearing
by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight in which the bill was considered further
confirms that Congress understood section 530B as at least in part a reaction to the Starr
investigations. See, e.g., The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Chuck Schumer) (“I also believe the adoption of [section 530B] last year had something to do
with the fact that 1998 presented us with a high-profile example of overreaching on the part of
one prosecutor. In this sense, Federal prosecutors as a whole were punished for the sins of Ken
Starr.”).
9
ODC also makes an alternative argument that, even if section 530B is ambiguous in its
application to D.C., the Court should apply deference, under Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to DOJ’s reasonable interpretation, made explicit in its regulations
pursuant to section 530B(b), that the statute does apply to D.C. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(i) (defining
“state of licensure” to include “the District of Columbia”); 1d Mot. Remand at 4. Mr. Clark
26
Second, Mr. Clark cites authority for the general proposition that section 1442 should be
construed broadly. He principally relies on the Supreme Court’s opinions in Willingham v.
Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969) and Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989). See Opp’n to 1d
Mot. Remand at 14–15; Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 17. Willingham involved a suit against the
warden and chief medical officer at a U.S. prison. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 403. The Court
reviewed the long history of section 1442 and its purpose to “protect federal officers from
interference by hostile state courts.” Id. at 405. In light of that purpose, the Court explained that
section 1442 “is not ‘narrow’ or ‘limited’” but “is broad enough to cover all cases where federal
officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.” Id. at 407(emphasis added). Mesa reiterated this explanation in the context of a suit against U.S. Postal
Service employees for traffic violations, although, notably, in the process of affirming the
remand order of the court below. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 123.
Mr. Clark seizes on the words “all cases” as used in Willingham and quoted in Mesa as if
they rewrite the statutory language “civil action” and “criminal prosecution” rather than simply
paraphrasing it. See, e.g., Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 2–3. But the question before the
Willingham court was how broadly to read section 1442’s requirement that the federal officer’s
actions be done “under color” of his office. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. And the related
question before the Mesa court was whether removal under section 1442 also requires the federal
officer to raise a federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 139. Neither case examined the scope
of the terms “civil action” or “criminal prosecution,” neither involved a state bar disciplinary
proceeding, and both were decided long before the enactment of section 530B. The teaching of
disagrees. See 1d Notice of Removal at 31. Because the Court finds that section 530B
unambiguously applies to D.C., it does not reach this alternative argument.
27
these cases, therefore, is that courts should construe broadly what conduct provides a proper
basis for removal of a proceeding under section 1442; they say nothing about how courts should
construe the nature of the proceeding itself—especially in the presence of a separate statute
committing the subject matter of a proceeding to state control.
Moreover, the concern animating the principle of broad construction is not present here.
The Willingham Court explained that the availability of removal under section 1442 reflects the
concern that, in certain cases, “federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself, require
the protection of a federal forum.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. The Mesa Court similarly
recognized section 1442’s purpose to protect against “true state hostility.” Mesa, 489 U.S. at 139.
Both cases cited Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) for support. See id.; Willingham, 395
U.S. at 406. Davis involved the state murder prosecution of a federal revenue officer who
returned fire when attacked in the performance of his “duty to seize illicit distilleries and the
apparatus used for the illicit and unlawful distillation of spirits.” Davis, 100 U.S. at 257. The
Court found removal of such criminal proceedings appropriate, explaining that “[t]he legislation
of a State may be unfriendly” and “affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direction of
the national government, and in obedience to its laws,” or “deny the authority conferred by those
laws.” Id. at 263. Indeed, intense state opposition to federal revenue laws motivated passage of
an early iteration of the federal officer removal statute, see David N. Goldman, The Neglected
History of State Prosecutions for State Crimes in Federal Courts, 52 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 783,
788–89 (2020) [hereinafter Neglected History] (explaining the history of the Force Act of 1833),
an amended version of which was in force when Davis was decided, see Davis, 100 U.S. at 261.
Davis was itself an echo of earlier cases involving sharp disagreements between the state
and federal governments. In fact, the first known case of federal officer removal involved a
28
federal officer, acting under orders to enforce a treaty protecting tribal territory in Alabama from
incursion by settlers in the early 1830s, who was prosecuted by Alabama after he shot a settler
who resisted his attempts to remove him from the territory. See Goldman, Neglected History,
supra, at 813–14. With “the Alabama government and its citizens on one side and the federal
government on the other,” President Andrew Jackson ordered the case removed to federal court.
Id. at 813–15. 10 Similarly, in response to northern states’ efforts to legislatively nullify the
Fugitive Slave Act, in 1855 the Senate engaged in “epic” debate over a bill to amend the federal
officer removal statute to permit removal of cases against officers for enforcing the Act. Id. at
795–96.
The point is that, to whatever extent Mr. Clark’s appeal to precedent counsels in favor of
a broad construction of section 1442, it equally reveals the roots of this principle in conflict
between state and federal interests. See, e.g., Davis, 100 U.S. at 263 (warning of the peril of
providing no federal forum for federal officers charged with “an alleged offense against the law
of the state, yet warranted by the federal authority they possess”). It is because of such conflict
that federal officers require the “protection of a federal forum,” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, lest
they be subject to “true state hostility,” Mesa, 489 U.S. at 139. See In re Gorence, 810 F. Supp.
at 1238 (“Without conflict [between state and federal interests], no purpose exists for removing
the action concerning the federal officer to federal court.”). In stark contrast to the divergent
state and federal approaches to tribal land use, revenue collection, and slaveholding that
motivated early attempts to craft federal officer removal policy, here, through section 530B,
10
While Congress had recently passed the first version of the federal officer removal
statute, as noted in reference to Davis above, it only covered removal of cases against federal
officers “for or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States.”
Goldman, Neglected History, supra, at 788 (quoting the Force Act of 1833).
29
Congress has explicitly directed that federal officers be subject to state bar rules. With federal
and state interests thus aligned, nothing in the cases cited by Mr. Clark, or in the history of the
federal officer removal statute, supports resolving any remainder of ambiguity concerning the
removability of a state bar disciplinary proceeding in favor of granting a federal forum. Indeed,
well-established principles of comity for state proceedings counsel against it. See Garden State,
457 U.S. at 431 (applying the abstention principle first outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) to a constitutional attack on state bar disciplinary rules during the pendency of a
disciplinary proceeding, explaining that such proceeding “are of a character to warrant federal-
court deference”); Klayman v. Lim, 830 Fed. Appx. 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming district
court’s abstention from deciding claims for injunctive relief “against ongoing proceedings within
the District of Columbia’s system of attorney discipline”).
This reasoning is reinforced by the related opinions of the only courts that appear to have
directly considered a similar question. In In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992), the court
considered the removal of a New Mexico state bar disciplinary proceeding against an Assistant
U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) for violation of the no-contact rule. The prosecution at issue occurred
in D.C., so the Board first considered the alleged misconduct, but referred the matter to the New
Mexico Disciplinary Board (the “NM Board”) upon finding that the AUSA was licensed only in
New Mexico. See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 480–81. The AUSA removed the proceeding to
federal district court in New Mexico under section 1442. See id. at 481. Considering the NM
Board’s motion to remand, the court found that the “disciplinary proceeding [was] neither a
criminal prosecution nor a civil action against [the AUSA]” and that the AUSA had no colorable
federal defense, so it granted the motion. Id. at 482–89.
30
Thereafter, back in D.C., the United States initiated an action to enjoin the NM Board’s
proceeding, giving rise to the court’s opinion in United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964(D.D.C. 1993). The issue before the court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment
was “whether the Supremacy Clause would be violated by allowing the disciplinary proceeding
in New Mexico to go forward.” Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 967. The court first held that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over the NM Board, but nonetheless found, after thorough analysis, that the
“Supremacy Clause is no impediment to the maintenance of a disciplinary proceeding against
[the AUSA] by the Disciplinary Board of New Mexico.” Id. at 968. Importantly, the court
explained that the predecessor statutes to section 530B, which required that DOJ attorneys “be
duly licensed and authorized to practice as an attorney under the laws of a State, territory, or the
District of Columbia,” Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
132, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 1040, 1044 (1979), 11 established that Congress “clearly contemplated
compliance with [the state of licensure’s] code of professional responsibility,” Ferrara, 847 F.
Supp. at 969. Accordingly, it reasoned that, “[b]ecause state regulation of the federal function is
here authorized by Congress, this Court will not interfere with that regulation.” Id.; see also In
re Howes, 123 N.M. 311, 320–21 (N.M. 1997) (adopting In re Doe, 801 F. Supp 478 and
Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964); United States v. Tapp, No. CR107-108, 2008 WL 2371422, at *9
(S.D. Ga. June 4, 2008) (describing the section 530B predecessor statute as a “major change for
Justice Department lawyers” in which “Congress mandated that they be admitted to practice and
licensed by the state courts, thereby placing them under the supervisions of these courts
concerning their professional conduct” (emphasis added)).
11
See supra Section II.B.
31
Section 530B crystalizes the Ferrera court’s inference in statute: Congress has
committed the regulation of federal government attorneys to the states and courts where they
practice. See N.Y. Bar Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (explaining that section 530B “reflects the
respect Congress has for the right of the states to regulate the ethical conduct of lawyers who
practice law in their jurisdictions.”). 12 Consistent with that directive, and with the tradition,
“[s]ince the founding of the Republic,” that attorney regulation be left “exclusively to the States
and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions,” Leis, 439 U.S. at 442, 13 the
Court finds that Mr. Clark has not met his burden to establish federal jurisdiction over the
Board’s disciplinary proceeding under section 1442. 14
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding its finding that the Board’s disciplinary proceeding is neither a “civil
action” nor a “criminal prosecution” within the meaning of the removal statutes, the Court
briefly addresses Mr. Clark’s inconsistent alternative arguments that federal question jurisdiction
12
As noted above, it may be possible to imagine a state bar disciplinary proceeding
designed such that it is simply a “criminal prosecution” by another name, but for the reasons
explained supra Sections IV.A.1–2, the Board’s proceeding against Mr. Clark is not within that
category.
13
This tradition remains firmly established even where the state proceeding concerns a
high-ranking federal government official. See, e.g., Neal v. Clinton, No. 2000-5677, 2001 WL
34355768, at *3 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2001) (ordering 5-year suspension of President Clinton’s
law license and a fine based on conduct in office); In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976) (ordering disbarment of President Nixon for conduct in office); Md. State Bar Ass’n
v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 544–45, 552–54 (Md. 1974) (ordering disbarment of Vice President
Spiro Agnew); In re Swindall, 266 Ga. 553, 554 (Ga. 1996) (ordering disbarment of
Congressman Patrick Swindall); State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 231-32 (Nev.
1988) (considering at length but ultimately declining to impose discipline on U.S. District Judge
Harry Claiborne).
14
As the Court finds that the Board’s disciplinary action is not a removeable proceeding
under section 1442, it does not reach the questions of whether Mr. Clark acted “under color” of
his office or has pled a colorable federal defense.
32
lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. First, rehashing the argument that section 530B does not apply to
D.C., Mr. Clark’s first and second notices of removal argue that section 530B constitutes a
congressional decree that federal government attorneys in D.C. not be subject to regulation
except by the federal government. See 1d Notice of Removal at 30. Accordingly, he contends,
“the DCCA is entirely fenced out of the federal grant of authority to regulate Justice Department
lawyers engaged in internal deliberations” and “that area of regulation is, in short, completely
preempted.” Id. Next, he amends this argument in his opposition to ODC’s first motion to
remand, claiming instead that complete preemption applies because “[t]he regulation of lawyers
employed by the U.S. Justice Department was not historically within the States’ sphere of
power.” Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at 20. Finally, in opposition to ODC’s second motion to
remand, he reverts to his first argument, but with the twist that, even if section 530B applies to
D.C., the fact that it subjects federal government attorneys to state bar rules only “to the same
extent and in the same manner as other attorneys” somehow renders the Board’s proceeding
preempted. Opp’n to 2d Mot. Remand at 11–12.
There is no merit to these arguments. As to the first, the Court has found that section
530B applies to D.C. See infra Section IV.A.3. As to the second, Mr. Clark, only citing two
out-of-date and largely irrelevant OLC opinions for support, misstates the history of state
regulation of attorneys. See Leis, 439 U.S. at 442 (“Since the founding of the Republic, the
licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of
Columbia within their respective jurisdictions.”). As to the third, the Court struggles to see
anything in a statute that explicitly subjects federal government attorneys to regulation by states
that preempts their regulation by states. This case does not arise under federal law.
33
C. Ancillary Removal
To the extent Mr. Clark argues that ODC’s motion to enforce the October 6 subpoena
should be separately removeable, see 2d Notice of Removal at 1–2; Opp’n to 1d Mot. Remand at
18–19, the Court cannot agree. “Proceedings that are ancillary to an action pending in state court
cannot be removed separately from the main claim.” Wright & Miller, supra, at § 3721.1.
Courts have found this doctrine, historically developed with respect to the general removal
statute, “applicable in the § 1442 context.” Ohio v. Doe, 433 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2006); see
also Armistead v. C&M Transport, 49 F.3d 43, 45–46 (1st Cir. 1995); Wuxi Taihu Tractor Co. v.
York Grp., 460 Fed. Appx. 357, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2012). “This prudential doctrine seeks to avoid
the waste of having federal courts entertain satellite elements of pending state suits and
judgments.” Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714, 724 (7th Cir.) (finding that federal
action for a declaratory judgment alongside a parallel state court proceeding was removeable as
an “independent controversy with some new and different party” (citation omitted)).
Mr. Clark argues that removal of the subpoena enforcement action alone is contemplated
by the text of section 1442, which defines “civil action” and “criminal prosecution” to include
“any proceeding (whether or not ancillary to another proceeding) to the extent that in such a
proceeding a judicial order, including a subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or
raised.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(d)(1); see Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 412–415 (finding
subpoena issued to non-party congressmen in the context of a state contract and tort suit
removeable as a “civil action”). But that provision, added to section 1442 as part of the Removal
Clarification Act of 2011, merely “respond[ed] to” what was at the time an “inter- and intra-
circuit split as to whether State ‘pre-suit discovery’ laws qualify as civil actions or criminal
prosecutions that are removeable under § 1442.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, at 2 (2011). The
34
Committee report explains that this “problem occurs when a plaintiff who contemplates suit
against a Federal officer petitions for discovery without actually filing suit in State court.” Id. at
4. In light of the narrow purpose of this legislation to close a loophole under which certain
courts rejected removal of pre-suit civil discovery demands, the Court will not extend the reach
of section 1442(d)(1) to cover this “satellite ” enforcement action involving no new parties that is
“an integral part of” and “supplementary to” the otherwise unremovable Board proceeding.
Armistead, 49 F.3d at 46. To hold otherwise would render state bars toothless to enforce their
disciplinary rules, in defiance of section 530B’s purpose to subject federal government attorneys
to those rules. This approach also is consistent with well-established principles of comity, under
which federal courts abstain from interfering in “state criminal prosecutions” and “pending ‘civil
proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.’” Spring Comms., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013)
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that these principles apply in the similar
context of state court contempt proceedings. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977)
(“Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a
finding of contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature, we think the
salient fact is that federal court interference with the State’s contempt process is ‘an offense to
the State’s interest . . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding.” (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
Accordingly, because ODC’s motion to enforce the subpoena before the DCCA is a
“supplementary proceeding” that is “incident to” and a “substantial continuation” of the Board’s
disciplinary proceeding, not an “original and independent proceeding,” and in line with
35
principles of comity, the Court rejects Mr. Clark’s attempt to remove it separate from the
disciplinary proceeding to this Court. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 82–83 (1878).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ODC’s Motions to Remand (Case No. 22-mc-0096, ECF No.
5; Case No. 22-mc-0117, ECF No. 4; Case No. 23-mc-0007, ECF No. 4) are GRANTED. In
addition, because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, Mr. Clark’s Motion
to Stay Subpoena Response Deadline (Case No. 22-mc-0096, ECF No. 2) and Motion to Quash
(Case No. 22-mc-0096, ECF No. 4) are DENIED as moot. An order consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: June 8, 2023 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
36