United States v. Santay-Rosales

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Case No. 1:20-cr-243-RCL-2
CRISTIAN SANTAY-ROSALES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2020, defendant Cristian Santay-Rosales was charged with four federal crimes: one
count of conspiracy to commit carjacking and three counts of carjacking and aiding and abetting
the same. Indictment, ECF No. 5. Mr. Santay-Rosales pleaded guilty to all four charges and was
sentenced to a total of 121 months’ imprisonment. Plea Agreement, ECF No. 28; J., ECF No. 67.
Mr. Santay-Rosales now moves pro se to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 78. The government opposes Mr. Santay-Rosales’s
motion and urges the Court to summarily deny his claims as vague, procedurally barred, and
without merit. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 89.
Upon consideration of the parties’ filings, the applicable law, and the record, the Court
will DENY Mr. Santay-Rosales’s § 2255 motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 26, 2020, Mr. Santay-Rosales, who had recently turned 18 years old, and
codefendants Romeo Francisco Ramirez and Diego Rigoberto Lopez engaged in a carjacking
spree throughout northwest and northeast Washington, D.C. Final Presentence Investigation Rep.
(“PSR”) J 28, ECF No. 41. Mr. Santay-Rosales ultimately admitted responsibility for six
carjackings over a nearly twelve-hour period. Id.; {J 13-25. Mr. Santay-Rosales and his co-
defendants followed a similar pattern for each carjacking; the defendants would identify a “target
vehicle” and drive up to it in a vehicle they had already stolen. Jd. ff] 13-21. Ramirez would
approach the driver of the target vehicle brandishing a firearm and order the driver out of the car.
Id. Once the target vehicle was seized, Ramirez would enter the driver’s seat, sometimes with
Mr. Santay-Rosales. Jd. At approximately 7:01 p.m. that day, Metropolitan Police Department
(“MPD”) officers observed Mr. Santay-Rosales and Lopez in a stolen vehicle and initiated a
traffic stop. Id. § 22. Mr. Santay-Rosales and Lopez fled and led MPD officers in a chase. Jd.
They ran through several red lights and drove at high speeds on the wrong side of the road before
crashing and rolling over. Jd. Mr. Santay-Rosales fled on foot before he was apprehended by
MPD officers. Jd.
On November 3, 2020, Mr. Santay-Rosales was charged by indictment with one count of
conspiracy to commit carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and three counts of carjacking
and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1), 2. Indictment at 1-9. David Bos of
the Federal Public Defender (“plea counsel”) was appointed to represent Mr. Santay-Rosales.
Minute Entry (Oct. 29, 2020).
Mr. Santay-Rosales, in consultation with plea counsel, executed and signed a written plea
agreement with the government. See Plea Agreement. In the plea agreement, Mr. Santay-Rosales
agreed that he was pleading guilty to Count Two because he was “in fact guilty.” Id, at 10. In so
doing, Mr. Santay-Rosales averred that the Statement of the Offense “fairly and accurately
describe[d] [his] actions and involvement” in the offense. Jd. 3. Mr. Santay-Rosales also agreed
that he had “read every page of [the] Agreement,” “discussed it with [his] attorney,” and “fully
underst[ood the] Agreement and agree[d] to it without reservation.” /d. at 10. In the plea
agreement, Mr. Santay-Rosales attested that he was “satisfied with the legal services provided by
[his] attorney in connection with [the] Agreement and the matters related to it.” Id.The plea agreement contained—and Mr. Santay-Rosales assented to—several express
waivers. Specifically, Mr. Santay-Rosales agreed to waive his right to directly appeal his sentence,
except for his rights to appeal a sentence imposed beyond the statutory maximum or USS.
Sentencing Guidelines range and to appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Plea
Agreement J 10(C). Furthermore, Mr. Santay-Rosales agreed to waive “any right to challenge the
conviction entered or sentence imposed” through a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless
“such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that [Mr. Santay-Rosales]
received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Jd. { 10(D).
Finally, Mr. Santay-Rosales agreed to several provisions regarding sentencing. As relevant
here, Mr. Santay-Rosales agreed that his sentence would be “determined by the Court, pursuant to
the factors sector forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the Sentencing
Guidelines,” id. 5, and that “the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion
of the Court,” id. 8. He further agreed to the government’s estimated offense level calculations
under the Guidelines. Jd. Specifically, he agreed that U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A), which provides
a 5-point enhancement for the brandishing of a firearm during a robbery, applied to his case. Id.
The Court held a plea hearing and accepted Mr. Santay-Rosales’s plea. Minute Entry (04/15/2021).
On December 3, 2021, the Court held a sentencing hearing. Minute Entry (12/03/2021).
The Court adopted the Probation Office’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation, including the
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement, and determined a Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’
incarceration. Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 3:10-17, ECF No. 62; PSR ] 41, 47, 53, 59, 65, 71; Sent’g R. &
R. at 1, ECF No. 42.
During the government’s allocution, the government directly addressed the
enhancement, arguing that Mr. Santay-Rosales “[could not] disclaim responsibility for
brandishing a firearm just because it was Mr. Ramirez who had the gun in his hand” because Mr.
Santay-Rosales was a “but-for cause of these offenses, and without [him Ramirez] could not
have committed these crimes.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 5:4-9. In response, plea counsel acknowledged
that “Mr. Santay-Rosales is accountable for the conduct of Mr. Ramirez,” but aimed to
distinguish the two by stressing that “Mr. Ramirez was the one with the gun that day. Mr.
Ramirez was the one that was assaulting and threatening the individuals that were in the car.” Jd.
at 11:25-12:4. After considering these arguments and others, the Court sentenced Mr. Santay-
Rosales to a 60-month term of imprisonment on the first count of the indictment and a 121-
month term for each of the second through fourth counts, to be served concurrently. J. at 2. The
judgment of conviction was entered on December 22, 2021. Jd. at 1. Mr. Santay-Rosales did not
file a direct appeal. Def.’s Mot. at 4—5.
On November 19, 2022, Mr. Santay-Rosales filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See id. at 11. Mr. Santay-Rosales makes two
claims: (1) that his plea counsel was ineffective and (2) that the Court improperly applied the
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) sentencing enhancement for brandishing a firearm because he did not
personally brandish the firearm during the crimes. Jd. at 3, 6, 8-9. The government opposes Mr.
Santay-Rosales’s motion on the grounds that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is too
vague and conclusory to establish an entitlement to relief, Gov’t Opp’n at 4—5, and that his
sentencing-enhancement argument is both procedurally barred and meritless, id. at 7-9. Mr.
Santay-Rosales did not file a reply. His motion is now ripe for review.
Il. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255Section 2255 permits a prisoner serving a federal sentence to move to “vacate, set aside,
or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The sentencing court is authorized to discharge or
resentence a prisoner if (1) the sentence was imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States”; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence “was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law”; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to
collateral attack.” Id. § 2255(a). Relief under § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy and is generally
only granted “if the challenged sentence resulted from ‘a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice,’ or ‘an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure.’” United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). The defendant carries the burden of
sustaining his contentions by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Simpson, 475
F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
While a district court must construe prose filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 94 (2007), the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when “the motion and the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(b).
B. Cause and Prejudice
Usually, claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review.
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). “The procedural-default rule is neither a
statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve
judicial resources and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.” Id.If a defendant failed pursue a direct appeal or raise a particular claim on direct review,
the claim may be raised on collateral review only if the defendant can show that there is
sufficient “cause” excusing the double procedural default as well as actual prejudice resulting
from the errors of which he complains. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). To
establish prejudice, a defendant “must at least demonstrate that ‘there is a reasonable probability
that, but for [the errors], the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United States
v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Dale, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must satisfy a two-part test
that requires proof of both incompetence and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986).
To prove incompetence, a defendant must show that his attorney’s errors were “so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment[,]”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This standard requires that a defendant’s “representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness” and “undermined the proper functioning of the judicial
process [such] that the [process] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Jd. at 686—
88. A court should not scrutinize counsel’s actions retrospectively but must, instead, evaluate
counsel’s performance based on how he would have viewed the case at the time, without the
benefit of hindsight. Jd. at 689. The court’s assessment of counsel’s performance must also be
comprehensive rather than limited to a particular act or omission. Morrison, 477 U.S. at 386.
Finally, the reviewing court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
To establish prejudice when a defendant pleaded guilty, he must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” United States v. Smoot, 918 F.3d 163, 169 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). This standard requires the petitioner to show
there “a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (internal quotations and modifications omitted). The defendant “must
shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice,
but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding]
with error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.
A failure to make the required showing on either prong defeats a defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
I. DISCUSSION
Mr. Santay-Rosales’s motion makes two claims: (1) that his plea counsel failed to
adequately represent him in an unspecified way and (2) he should not have been subject to the
sentencing enhancement for brandishing a firearm because he did not personally brandish a
firearm during the carjackings. See Def.’s Mot. at 3, 6, 8-9. The government argues Mr. Santay-
Rosales’s ineffective assistance claim is vague and conclusory, and his sentencing-enhancement
claim is procedurally barred. See Gov’t Opp’n at 4-7. This Court agrees with the government on
both points.
A. Mr. Santay-Rosales’s Plea Agreement Waived His Sentencing-Enhancement Claim
As a threshold matter, the express terms of Mr. Santay-Rosales’s plea agreement preclude
him from collaterally attacking his conviction on any grounds except for ineffective assistance of
counsel. That plea agreement was accepted by the Court.
“A waiver of the right to appeal is generally enforceable, so long as it is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.” United States v. Thomas, 999 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “a waiver should not be enforced insofar as a
defendant makes a colorable claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to the
waiver.” United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Teeter, 257
F.3d 14, 25 n.9 (2001)). This is because a defendant’s waiver cannot be knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary if the “defendant’s attorney failed to ensure the defendant understood the consequences
of his waiver.” Jd. At the same time, when “‘a defendant’s complaints of his counsel’s inadequacy
plainly lack merit, a court cannot allow itself to be manipulated’ into voiding a bargained-for
waiver of the right to appeal.” Jd. at 530-31 (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385,
1392 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
Mr. Santay-Rosales has not made a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
see Part IIIB, therefore the Court will enforce the plea agreement’s waiver of the sentencing-
enhancement claim. Even if he had not waived this claim, it would be procedurally barred because
Mr. Santay-Rosales “has not even alleged, much less established, cause and prejudice to excuse
his procedural default.”’ Gov’t Opp’n at 7.
Accordingly, the Court must deny Mr. Santay-Rosales’s sentencing-enhancement claim.
| Even if the claim were not procedurally barred, it is not clear that Mr. Santay-Rosales could raise it. Gov’t Opp’n at
8-9. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has not addressed the question of whether a
Sentencing Guidelines error is a cognizable claim on collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and one other
court in this District has acknowledged but did not answer the question. See United States v. Peterson, 916 F. Supp.
2d 102, 108-10 (D.D.C. 2013). Most circuit courts to address the issue have held that it is not. Sun Bear v. United
States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 496 (4th Cir. 1999); Jones v. United States, 178 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir. 1999);
Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 590 (2nd Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). But see Narvaez v. United States, 674
F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the defendant was entitled to § 2255 relief based on “a special and very
narrow exception” to the general rule). Because Mr. Santay-Rosales may not raise his sentencing-enhancement claim,
this Court need not weigh in on whether the claim is cognizable or meritorious today.
B. Mr. Santay-Rosales’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim is Timely and Not
Procedurally Barred
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a defendant must bring any 28
§ 2255 claims within one year of when the “judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(1). If a defendant does not appeal his conviction, the judgment of conviction becomes
final fourteen days after entry of the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1); United States v.
Booker, 564 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2008). Mr. Santay-Rosales did not appeal his sentence and
thus his conviction became final on January 5, 2022. Mr. Santay-Rosales attested to placing his
motion in the prison mailing system on November 19, 2022. Motions by pro se prisoners are
considered filed when placed in the prison mailing system. See Blount v. United States, 860 F.3d
732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Because Mr. Santay-Rosales filed his motion within one year after his
conviction became final, his motion is timely.
Additionally, the Court notes that Mr. Santay-Rosales’s claim could be construed as
procedurally barred because he did not pursue a direct appeal, nor does he rely on a new legal
theory that was previously unavailable. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 168. However, his motion alleges
ineffective assistance of his counsel. That claim, if true, could have prevented Mr. Santay-Rosales
from exercising the opportunity to challenge his conviction on direct appeal. Thus, out of fairness
to Mr. Santay-Rosales, and particularly because of his pro se status, the Court will not construe
his claim as procedurally barred and instead will evaluate his claim on the merits.
C. Mr. Santay-Rosales’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim is Without Merit
Having determined that the only claim Mr. Santay-Rosales properly raises in his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion is his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court will now address
that claim. The government argues that Mr. Santay-Rosales’s claim is vague and conclusory and
does not advance a viable claim or shows either cause or actual prejudice. Gov’t Opp’n at 4-6.
This Court agrees.
Mr. Santay-Rosales’s motion does not specify how he believes that plea counsel
performed deficiently except for statements that “[he] was letting [his] lawyer do his job” and
“The] thought [his] lawyer was going to do his job.” Def.’s Mot. at 3, 8. When a defendant fails
to “allege sufficient facts or circumstances ‘upon which the elements of constitutionally deficient
performance might properly be found,’” the Court is left with little choice but to deny his
motion. United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Even if the Court were liberally construe Mr. Santay-Rosales’s motion as alleging that
plea counsel was ineffective by (a) advising him to accept the plea agreement containing the
waiver preventing him from collaterally attacking the sentencing enhancement, (b) not
successfully arguing that the enhancement should not apply, or (c) not successfully advocating
for a lower sentence, such arguments would be without merit.
Mr. Santay-Rosales cannot demonstrate that his attorney performed deficiently by
advising him to accept the plea. Regarding deficiency, it is well-settled that a “prosecutor is not
obligated to make a plea offer at all, let alone a plea offer on any particular terms.” United States
y. Zaia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 132, 143 (D.D.C. 2010). Dissatisfaction with the terms of a plea
agreement alone cannot serve as a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United
States v. Brunetti, 376 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2004); Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109, 1115
(6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, plea counsel’s suggestion to Mr. Santay-Rosales that he accept the
plea agreement with the sentencing enhancement and appeal waiver in exchange for a swift
resolution of the case fell squarely within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance”
that Strickland protects. 466 U.S. at 689; Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 15:17-19.
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Similarly, Mr. Santay-Rosales cannot demonstrate that his attorney performed deficiently
by not arguing that the U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement did not apply. At sentencing,
plea counsel acknowledged that Mr. Santay-Rosales was responsible for co-defendant Ramirez’s
conduct. See Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 11:25-12:4. This statement reflected a correct understanding of
the applicable law. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2021) (noting that the district court may take into
account all relevant conduct for sentencing purposes); United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 182
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that relevant conduct in a joint criminal activity includes “all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity”). Thus, plea counsel’s conduct met the requirements for constitutionally
effective representation. United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“[F]amiliarity with the structure and basic content of the Guidelines . . . has become a necessity
for counsel who seek to give effective representation.”) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)). In fact, plea counsel went further to advocate that
additional circumstances surrounding the offense, specifically his client’s age and early
acceptance of responsibility, among others, were factors that the Court could and should consider
in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis to mitigate the enhancement. See Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 7:16—
10:6. These actions reflect that plea counsel did not perform deficiently.
Finally, Mr. Santay-Rosales cannot demonstrate that his attorney performed deficiently
by failing to secure a lower sentence. The Court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 97
to 121 months’ incarceration for Mr. Santay-Rosales’s offenses. Plea counsel advocated for a
sentence of 60 months in prison, Def.’s Sent’g Mem. at 1, ECF No. 52, and the government
requested 97 months, Gov’t Sent’g Mem. at 1, ECF No. 54. Plea counsel’s lengthy sentencing
memorandum and allocution explained the reasoning behind counsel’s recommendation,
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specifically, why the Sentencing Guidelines range was inappropriate in this case and how Mr.
Santay-Rosales’s specific history and circumstances supported a lower sentence. See generally
Def.’s Sent’g Mem.; Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 7:16-16:5; In.re Sealed Case, 901 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (“We have recognized that counsel fulfills an essential function at sentencing by
navigating the sentencing guidelines and presenting the various considerations that may drive the
court’s sentencing determination.”). Plea counsel’s conduct plainly cleared the low bar of
avoiding “errors ‘so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Even if he could establish deficiency, Mr. Santay-Rosales has not suffered any prejudice
because he cannot claim that he would have opted for trial absent counsel’s performance. He said
as much himself at sentencing. See, e.g., Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 19:15—21 (“I want to say I was
responsible for some of the stuff that happened that day, and I accept it, and I just want to
apologize to the victims and . . . change my life around.”); id. at 15:17-19 (plea counsel stating
that “Mr. Santay-Rosales explained to me very early on that he wanted to get this case resolved
as quickly as possible because he felt very badly about what had happened.”). Nor could he show
“a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result” with respect to his sentence.
Cullen, 563 U.S. at 189. Considering the parties’ arguments in conjunction with Mr. Santay-
Rosales’s Guidelines calculations, his criminal history, and the nature and circumstances of the
offense—engaging in a carjacking “spree for 12 hours, [involving] eight cars” and “terrorizing
our citizens” —among other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the Court determined that a carceral
sentence at the maximum end of the Guidelines range was appropriate in this case. Sent’g Hr’g
Tr. at 12:8, 12:16, 20:3-11. The Court was well within its authority to sentence Mr. Santay-
2
Rosales to a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines but above that requested by either party.
See United States v. Samuel, 296 F.3d 1169, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2002). And Mr. Santay-Rosales
demonstrated his understanding of that principle through his plea agreement. Plea Agreement
q7 5, 8. A defendant cannot establish prejudice under these circumstances. See United States v.
Ayers, 938 F. Supp. 2d 108, 115 (D.D.C. 2013).
Because neither the vague allegation actually raised by Mr. Santay-Rosales nor the
Court’s liberal construction of additional claims he could have raised supports a finding that his
counsel was ineffective or that counsel’s performance caused him actual prejudice, Mr. Santay-
Rosales’s second claim must be denied.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before a final order denying a § 2255 motion can be appealed, a court must “issue or deny
a certificate of appealability.” Fed. R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings | l(b). A defendant may not
appeal a final order without a certificate of appealability, which requires a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(c)(3). A defendant must demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to process further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot
y. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Santay-
Rosales’s claims are without merit. For these reasons, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would
not debate whether Mr. Santay-Rosales’s claims should proceed further. Mr. Santay-Rosales has
not shown he was denied a constitutional right. The Court will thus decline to issue a certificate of
appealability here for Mr. Santay-Rosales’s claims.
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Vv. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Mr. Santay-Rosales’s motion and the record in
his case do not show entitlement to relief. No evidentiary hearing is warranted, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(b), and the Court will DENY Mr. Santay-Rosales’s motion. No certificate of appealability
shall issue. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue on this date.
SIGNED this “*™ day of August, 2023. apy C Lintitine
Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge
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