In Re: Andrena Diane Crockett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN RE:
ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT
DEBTOR/APPELLANT
Civ. Action No. 20-2545
(EGS)
ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT, Bankr. Case No. 19-101
(Chapter 13)
Debtor/Appellant,
Adversary Proceeding No.
v. 19-10030
(Bankr. Court)
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC
D/B/A MR. COOPER,
Creditor/Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Andrena Diane Crockett (“Ms. Crockett”) appeals the
Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion
To Dismiss; Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding; Order
Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; 1 and Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment
Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Transmittal of Record on
Appeal (“A.R.”), ECF No. 2 at 8-40 (Memorandum Decision and
Order re Motion to Dismiss), 41-42 (Judgment Dismissing
1 The Court may consider the Order Dismissing Two Miscellaneous
Motions as Moot even though it was not transmitted as part of
the Record on Appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(e)(2).
1
Adversary Proceeding), 43-50 (Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary
Proceeding); Order Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot,
Crockett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper (In re
Crockett), No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 27. 2 Upon
consideration of the briefing, the applicable law, and the
entire record, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss; AFFIRMS the
Bankruptcy Court’s Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding;
AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Dismissing Two
Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; and AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy
Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to
Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding.
I. Background
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual
background of this case, as set forth in its July 20, 2023
Memorandum Opinion. See In re Crockett, No. BR 19-101, 2023 WL
4637000, at *1-2 (D.D.C. July 20, 2023). The Court therefore
reviews only the relevant procedural history here.
Ms. Crockett filed the Complaint in this Adversary
Proceeding on November 15, 2019. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
2
(Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1. On December 26, 2019, Nationstar
filed its Motion to Dismiss all ten claims raised in the
Complaint. See id., ECF No. 4. The Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia (“Bankruptcy Court”) granted Nationstar’s
motion in its Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss
on January 27, 2020. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 8-40 (Memorandum
Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss).
In that ruling, the Bankruptcy Court granted Ms. Crockett
“leave to file an amended complaint regarding [her] claims under
RESPA and its regulations (other than her claim based on 12
C.F.R. § 1024.38) within 21 days of the entry of this Memorandum
Decision and Order.” Id. at 39-40. Ms. Crockett did not file an
amended complaint. See generally Docket for Bankr. Action No.
19-10030. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Judgment
Dismissing Adversary Proceeding on March 16, 2020. See A.R., ECF
No. 2 at 41-42 (Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding).
Ms. Crockett then moved for relief from the Judgment
Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030
(Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 26. On August 27, 2020, the Bankruptcy
Court denied her motion. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 43-50
(Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider
Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding).
3
Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2020.
See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 34. This
appeal is ripe for review.
II. Standard of Review
A. Appeals of Decisions by the Bankruptcy Court
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions by
the Bankruptcy Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (conferring
jurisdiction on federal district courts “to hear appeals ...
from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy
courts). On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court
“may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment,
order, or decree or remand with instructions for further
proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.
A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s findings of
fact only for indication that they are clearly erroneous. Id.;
see also In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C. 1999). “A
finding [of fact] is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)). A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, however, are
reviewed de novo. See In re WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. 66, 68 (D.D.C.
2002) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405
4
(1990)). The party seeking to reverse the bankruptcy court’s
ruling bears the burden of proof and may not prevail by showing
“simply that another conclusion could have been reached.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, a district court
reviews a bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion under an
abuse of discretion standard. See In re Douglas, 477 B.R. 274,
275 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases).
B. Pro Se Litigants
“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in
all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,
No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,
2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The
pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally
construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even
so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658
F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656
F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply
with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;
Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.
5
III. Analysis
A. The Court Will Not Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
Crockett’s Failure to Timely File and Serve Required
Documents
Nationstar contends that the Court may dismiss this appeal
for two reasons: (1) Ms. Crockett’s failure to timely file her
opening brief; and (2) Ms. Crockett’s failure to timely file or
serve her Rule 8009 Designation of Record or Statement of Issues
on Appeal. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 6. For the reasons
that follow, the Court will entertain this appeal.
1. The Court Declines to Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
Crockett’s Failure to Timely File Her Appellant Brief
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8018(a)(4) states that
“the district court . . . , after notice, may dismiss the appeal
on its own motion” when “an appellant fails to file a brief on
time or within an extended time authorized by the district
court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has declined
“to impose on district courts any hard-and-fast rule” to govern
summary dismissals of bankruptcy appeals. Eng.-Speaking Union v.
Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Instead, it has
expressed a “preference for an adjudication on the merits and a
corresponding disfavor for resolving litigation by default.”
Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 307 F. Supp. 2d 2, 9 (D.D.C.
2004). District courts therefore should “consider[] the
6
circumstances before them and explain[] why it is in the
interest of justice to dismiss rather than to proceed to the
merits.” Eng.-Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1022.
Here, Ms. Crockett filed her Notice of Appeal on September
8, 2020, and the Clerk of this Court entered it on September 9,
2020. See Transmittal of Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 1. The Clerk
of the Bankruptcy Court transmitted the Record on Appeal on
November 30, 2020. See A.R., ECF No. 2. This Court granted Ms.
Crockett’s motion for an extension of time to file and ordered
that she submit her appellant brief by January 27, 2021. See
Minute Order (Jan. 25, 2021). The docket does not show that any
brief was filed on or before January 27, 2021. See generally
Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2545. In fact, the appellant brief
first appears on the docket for this case on July 19, 2021 as an
addendum to Ms. Crockett’s motion for an extension of time to
file her reply brief. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 7-35.
Nationstar noted the absence of Ms. Crockett’s appellant
brief in its opposition, stating that she sent its counsel an
email with her brief as an attachment. See Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11 at 4 n.1, 6. 3 In response, Ms. Crockett requested a 30-day
extension to file her reply brief in order “to research the
missing filing and correct and update the [U.S.] District Court
3 Nationstar does not identify the date on which she sent that
email. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 6.
7
docket.” Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2. 4 She explains that the
“docket does not reflect the filing of [her] Appellant brief on
January 14, 2021.” Id. Later, in her reply brief, Ms. Crockett
claims that she corrected the record on July 18, 2021 by hand-
delivering a copy of “[a] timely electronic filing dated January
14, 2021” and depositing the copy in the Court’s after-hours
box. Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 7. She also supplies a
copy of the email she purportedly sent to the Court with her
appellant brief attached. See Ex. A, ECF No. 12 at 5 (January
14, 2021 email from Ms. Crockett to the Court).
Despite these arguments, the Court still does not have any
record of an electronic filing on January 14, 2021, see
generally Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2545; and does not
possess a physical copy of Ms. Crockett’s appellant brief.
According to federal rules, then, this appeal is subject to
dismissal. See Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8018(a)(4).
Nevertheless, the circumstances in this case and the
interest of justice counsel against dismissal. Most
significantly, there is little risk of prejudice to Nationstar.
Nationstar received Ms. Crockett’s appellant brief at some time
4 Ms. Crockett also explains that she needed additional time to
file her reply brief because “she needed to be out of town” and
“also had to be focused on other personal obligations requiring
immediate attention” “[d]ue to the COVID-19 pandemic” and
related restrictions. See Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2.
8
before filing its brief in opposition. See Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11 at 4 n.1. Indeed, Nationstar’s appellee brief clearly
responds to the points Ms. Crockett raises in her appellant
brief. See id. at 6 n.4 (“All references herein to Appellant’s
Brief are to the unfiled brief that was emailed to undersigned
counsel.”). Moreover, continuing to the merits serves important
public policy interests, including the public interest favoring
disposition of cases on their merits, the public interest
favoring prompt resolution of cases, and the public interest in
conservation of judicial resources. See In re Fletcher Int’l,
Ltd., 536 B.R. 551, 558-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. In
the Matter of: Fletcher Int’l, Ltd., 661 F. App’x 124 (2d Cir.
2016). Accordingly, the Court will consider Ms. Crockett’s
appeal despite her failure to properly file her appellant brief.
2. The Court Declines to Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
Crockett’s Failure to File and Serve a Designation of
Record and Statement of Issues on Appeal
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009 states that an
“appellant must file with the bankruptcy clerk and serve on the
appellee a designation of the items to be included in the record
on appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented” “within
14 days after[] the appellant’s notice of appeal as of right
becomes effective.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1). Local Rules
provide that the Court, “after notice and reasonable opportunity
to respond, may dismiss the appeal on its own motion” in cases
9
where “an appellant fails timely to designate items to be
included in the record on appeal or to file a statement of the
issues to be presented.” LCvR 8009–1.
There is no dispute that Ms. Crockett failed to timely file
and serve a designation of record and statement of issues on
appeal. 5 See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 2 (Clerk of Bankruptcy Court
stating that “[t]he appellant failed to file a designation of
the record and a statement of issues on appeal”); see also
Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 (not addressing issue); Appellant’s
Br., ECF No. 12 (same); Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 (“As of the
filing of this Appellee Brief, Appellant has still not filed, or
served, her Rule 8009 Designation of Record or Statement of
Issues on Appeal.”); Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1 (not
addressing issue). The appeal is therefore subject to dismissal
on this ground. See LCvR 8009–1.
The D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed this issue.
Accordingly, the Court assesses the appropriateness of dismissal
on this ground using the same standard the D.C. Circuit has
imposed for assessing whether dismissal is appropriate for
failure to timely file an appellant brief. See supra; Eng.-
5 Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Filing of Appellant’s Statement
of Issue and Designation of Record on Appeal with this Court on
January 6, 2021. See ECF No. 8. However, she never filed this
document with the Bankruptcy Court as required by Rule 8009. See
generally Docket for Bankr. Action No. 19-10030.
10
Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1022. Based on that standard, the
Court concludes that dismissal is not warranted here. It appears
unlikely that any party will be prejudiced if the Court hears
this appeal. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court transmitted to
this Court portions of the record, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 2
(citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(4)); and the Court may refer
to other documents from the Bankruptcy Court as needed, see Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 8009(e)(2). The parties have completed briefing
without raising any problems with the existing Record on Appeal.
See generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12; Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11; Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1. Further, as above,
entertaining this appeal despite Ms. Crockett’s failure to file
serves important public policy goals. The Court therefore
declines to dismiss this appeal for failure to timely file and
serve a designation of record and statement of issues on appeal.
B. The Bankruptcy Court Correctly Dismissed the Adversary
Proceeding After Ms. Crockett Failed to File an Amended
Complaint
Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an
err[or] of discretion” when it dismissed the Adversary
Proceeding. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 16. She acknowledges
that the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case only after she
failed to timely file an amended complaint or file an extension
of time to do so according to that court’s prior order. Id. She
states that she did not receive the Bankruptcy Court’s
11
Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss on time
because: (1) the electronic copy “went into junk mail”; and (2)
a family member “misplaced [the physical copy mailed to her
address] in another location unbeknown to [her].” Id. at 17. She
also mentions the COVID-19 pandemic but does not explain how the
pandemic or related circumstances affected her ability to file.
See id. Nationstar does not address this issue in its opposition
briefing. See generally Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11. 6
Rule 58 provides that “[e]very judgment and amended
judgment must be set out in a separate document.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 58(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7058 (incorporating Rule 58
in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court). Here, in its
Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss, the
Bankruptcy Court “ordered that Claims II and X of the Complaint
are dismissed with [Ms.] Crockett granted leave to file an
amended complaint regarding [her] claims under RESPA and its
regulations (other than her claim based on 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38)
within 21 days of the entry of this Memorandum Decision and
Order.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at 39-40 (Memorandum Decision and Order
re Motion to Dismiss) (capitalization omitted). Ms. Crockett did
not file an amended complaint or request an extension of time
6 Nationstar instead addresses the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment
Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11
at 11-12.
12
within 21 days of that decision. See generally Docket for Bankr.
Action No. 19-10030. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court issued
the Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, “order[ing] that
this adversary proceeding is dismissed on the merits.” A.R., ECF
No. 2 at 41 (Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding). Stated
differently, the Bankruptcy Court set forth its judgment
dismissing the Complaint, including the claims for which it had
previously granted Ms. Crockett leave to amend. See id.Ms. Crockett does not cite any legal authority to explain
why the Bankruptcy Court should have ignored its prior order and
the rules by which it is bound. In fact, her arguments suggest
that she should have taken certain steps—such as checking her
email junk folder, adding the court’s email address to her
contact list, and communicating about court mail with family
present at her designated address—to ensure that she received
communications from the court. And even so, there is no evidence
that Ms. Crockett would have ever filed an amended complaint.
See generally Docket for Bankr. Action No. 19-10030 (no entry
indicating that she attempted to file or was prepared to file an
amended complaint).
The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Complaint, and Ms.
Crockett failed to file an amended complaint for Claims II and X
per court order. Because the entry of judgment is required by
Rule 58, the Bankruptcy Court did not err or abuse its
13
discretion in entering its Judgment Dismissing Adversary
Proceeding.
C. The Bankruptcy Court Correctly Dismissed Claim I
Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made a
clear err[or] of law,” arguing that Nationstar violated the
automatic stay by participating in a status hearing at the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior
Court”) without informing that court of her second bankruptcy
petition. 7 See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22. She alleges
that a paralegal from the law firm representing Nationstar in
the D.C. Superior Court emailed her on May 28, 2019 with a
request to cancel the May 31, 2019 status hearing “due to the
bankruptcy filing.” Id. at 18. She contends that she “relied on
the email and assumed the hearing would be cancelled.” Id. She
further alleges that the attorney in that case was aware of her
second bankruptcy petition but failed to inform the D.C.
Superior Court at the May 31, 2019 status hearing. See id. As a
result, she continues: she did not attend the hearing; the D.C.
Superior Court “lifted the [s]tay” at the hearing; the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Court of Appeals”)
7 Ms. Crockett also argues that Nationstar violated the automatic
stay by making collections calls. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No.
12 at 20-21. Because she did not raise this claim in her
Complaint, see Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF
No. 1 ¶ 24 ; the Court will not address this argument here.
14
affirmed the D.C. Superior Court’s Decree of Sale; and she
experienced “stress as a result of the foreclosure moving
forward.” Id. at 18-19. She alleges that Nationstar’s actions
“amount[] to fraudulently omitting that fact [of the second
bankruptcy petition] for the purpose of lifting the stay and
financial enrichment.” Id. at 18.
Nationstar does not dispute Ms. Crockett’s factual
allegations. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 9. Instead,
Nationstar contends that these allegations “would not change the
Bankruptcy Court’s [a]nalysis in [d]ismissing the Claim”—
specifically, that “Nationstar took no action to resume the
civil litigation, so there was no violation of the automatic
stay.” Id. Nationstar further asserts that Ms. Crockett has not
met her burden to show that the Bankruptcy Court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion in dismissing Claim I,
arguing that the decision to lift the automatic stay “‘is within
the discretion of the bankruptcy judge and . . . may be
overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 10
(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342, 345
(4th Cir. 1992)) (citing In re Ramarkan, 315 B.R. 361, 363-64
(D. Md. 2004)).
As a preliminary matter, the Court clarifies that Ms.
Crockett appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim I,
15
not its decision to lift the automatic stay. 8 See Appellant’s
Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22. As such, the Court reviews the
Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. See In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518; In re
WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. at 68. Applying these standards, the Court
concludes that Nationstar did not violate the automatic stay
through its participation in the May 31, 2019 status hearing at
the D.C. Superior Court.
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code “is one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws,
designed to relieve the financial pressures that drove [the]
debtors into bankruptcy” by “afford[ing] [the] debtors a
breathing spell from the collection process and enabl[ing] them
to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan to satisfy
existing debt.” E. Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations
Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (alterations, citations,
and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this provision, the
filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay,
“applicable to all entities, of” most actions against the debtor
and the property of the debtor and bankruptcy estate, including
the continuation of judicial foreclosure actions against the
8 Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the
Bankruptcy Court ever lifted the automatic stay. Cf. A.R., ECF
No. 2 at 13 (D.C. Superior Court determined that the automatic
stay was lifted because Bankr. Action No. 19-00019 was closed).
16
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re McGuirl, 349 B.R. 759, 760–61
(D.D.C. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362). Still, “[t]he automatic
stay is not permanent.” In re McGuirl, 349 B.R. at 760–61. It
continues until: (1) the property is no longer property of the
estate, if the action is against property of the estate; or (2)
the time that the case is closed, the case is dismissed, or a
discharge is granted or dismissed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). “The acts
prohibited by the stay do not include[] . . . a status hearing
in such proceeding to ascertain if the automatic stay still
applies.” Steah v. Shinn, No. CV2101265PHXJATJZB, 2023 WL
2330714, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2023) (citing In re Miller, 262
B.R. 499, 503 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); In re Perryman, 631 B.R.
899, 903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021)).
Here, the D.C. Superior Court held a status hearing on May
31, 2019. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No.
1 ¶ 24. The record does not include an audio recording or
transcript of the hearing. However, following that hearing, the
D.C. Superior Court entered on the docket: “Bankruptcy case [No.
19-00019] was closed as of 05/24/2019. Bankruptcy stay is
lifted. Status Hearing continued to 08/02/2019 at 10:00 AM.” See
A.R., ECF No. 2 at 13 (Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion
to Dismiss). There is no indication that the D.C. Superior Court
took any other action during or as a result of this hearing.
Based on this evidence from the record, this Court agrees with
17
the Bankruptcy Court that the status hearing “served
informational purposes” and did not “entail a resumption of the
litigation.” Id. at 15. Nationstar therefore did not violate the
automatic stay by attending the status hearing.
The Court also concludes that Nationstar did not violate
the automatic stay by failing to inform the D.C. Superior Court
of the automatic stay imposed by Bankr. Action No. 19-00101.
Local Bankruptcy Rule 2072-1 states: “The Debtor, petitioning
creditor(s), or other party filing a bankruptcy case must
promptly send notice of the bankruptcy filing to the following
persons: (1) the clerk of any court where the debtor is a party
to a pending civil action and all parties of record; [and] (2)
chambers of any judge specially assigned to a pending civil
action in which the debtor is a party.” Local Bankr. R. 2072-1.
Ms. Crockett states no legal authority to support her position
that Nationstar—a non-petitioning creditor—had a duty to notify
the D.C. Superior Court of her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition,
see generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22; and the
Court knows no such authority. 9 Accordingly, this Court concludes
9 Ms. Crockett’s argument is particularly confusing because her
attorney was present at the May 31, 2019 status hearing and did
not inform the D.C. Superior Court at that time of the automatic
stay imposed by Bankr. Action No. 19-00101. See Crockett, No.
19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.
18
that Nationstar did not violate the automatic stay and AFFIRMS
the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim I.
D. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Ms. Crockett’s
Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Unjust Enrichment
Claims
Ms. Crockett next asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made
an error of law” by dismissing Claims II, III, V, and VI. 10
Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23. This Court addresses each
claim and, for the reasons that follow, AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision to dismiss these four claims.
1. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim II
Ms. Crockett contends that: the Proof of Claim contains
inaccuracies; Nationstar “knew the documents were misleading”;
and Nationstar “meant to deceive for their enrichment taking
[her] property equity.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 25. She
also acknowledges that, at the time of her submission, this
Court was reviewing her appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings
with respect to her Objection to the Proof of Claim. Id.
Nationstar asks this Court to affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s
dismissal because Ms. Crockett has not identified any particular
10Ms. Crockett also argues that Nationstar violated various
consumer laws. See id. at 23-28. Because she did not make these
allegations in the Complaint, see generally Crockett, No. 19-ap-
10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1; the Court will not address
those arguments here.
19
error(s) of law made by the Bankruptcy Court. Appellee’s Br.,
ECF No. 11 at 12.
This Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Ms.
Crockett’s claim regarding Nationstar’s Proof of Claim. In the
related case, the Court explained that “Ms. Crockett had not
produced sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof to show
an error in the Proof of Claim.” In re Crockett, 2023 WL
4637000, at *3. The Court has no occasion to disturb that ruling
here since: her arguments are confusing and conclusory; and she
has not identified any errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings.
See generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 25 (failing to
discuss evidence of inaccuracies in the Proof of Claim or
alleged errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision); Appellant’s
Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 14 (raising arguments similar to those
she raised in the appeal in the related case).
Ms. Crockett makes other allegations in Claim II. See
Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29-41.
However, her briefing here does not clearly or specifically
address Nationstar’s alleged violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)
or of 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.32, 1024.34, 1024.35, and 1024.38. See
generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28; cf. Appellant’s
Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 11 (arguing in a conclusory fashion that
three exhibits consisting of QWRs “clearly state[] the required
information” without any further explanation). Finding no error
20
with the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis as to these other alleged
violations, this Court therefore AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
dismissal of Claim II.
2. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim III
Ms. Crockett asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made an
error of law” by dismissing Claim III, but her briefing does not
address the allegations in Claim III or identify any errors in
the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at
23-28. Consequently, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
dismissal of Claim III.
3. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim V
Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court
dismissed Claim V in error. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at
23-28. Her briefing in this appeal restates the allegations she
makes in the Complaint. Compare id., with Crockett, No. 19-ap-
10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55-69. Specifically, she
argues that: Nationstar has made statements and omissions that
it knowingly or reasonably believed to be “untrue or misleading,
amount[ing] to fraud or deceit”; Nationstar did not have the
authority to exercise the power of sale when the D.C. Superior
Court issued the Decree of Sale; and Nationstar submitted
inaccurate documentation, including in the Proof of Claim. See
Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28. She cites various legal
authority, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
21
unrelated caselaw, but does not explain the relevance to this
appeal. See id.In its opposition briefing, Nationstar argues that Ms.
Crockett has not specified any errors of law in the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision, which dismissed Claim V for failure to plead
all necessary elements of a fraud claim. See Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11 at 14-15. The Court agrees with this assessment. Ms.
Crockett has not identified any errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s
analysis of Claim V. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28.
She has also failed to cure the pleading defects discussed by
the Bankruptcy Court. Compare id., with A.R., ECF No. 2 at 28-30
(Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss).
Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal
of Claim V.
4. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim VI
Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an
error of law” in dismissing Claim VI, stating that “Nationstar
broke consumer trust by engaging in unfair and deceptive
practices prohibited by the Consumer Financial Protection Act of
2010, as well as violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act and the Homeowner’s Protection Act.” Appellant’s
Br., ECF No. 12 at 23, 27. She also mentions a class action
settlement against Nationstar by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau but does not explain that settlement’s
22
connection to her Complaint. See id. at 28; see also Crockett,
No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 70-75.
Nationstar again points out that Ms. Crockett has failed to
specify any error of law in the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum
Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss. See Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11 at 15-16. The Court agrees. Ms. Crockett’s briefing makes
only a brief and conclusory argument as to her unjust enrichment
claim and makes no reference to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.
See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28.
Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made
an error of discretion when dismissing . . . Claim VI without
understanding Nationstar[’s] accounting or requiring them to
explain their accounting records leading to unjust enrichment.”
Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 33 (citing Chen v. Bell-Smith,
768 F. Supp. 2d 121, 151 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Griffith v.
Barnes, 560 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2008))). She states that
there is an unexplained increase of $45,000 in the principal
balance in the Proof of Claim and asserts that the Bankruptcy
Court abused its discretion by not requiring Nationstar to
explain its documents in a hearing. See id. Nationstar does not
address this argument in its opposition briefing. See generally
Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 15-16.
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The Court previously decided this issue in the related
case. See In re Crockett, 2023 WL 4637000, at *4-5. Accordingly,
this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim VI.
E. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claims IV and X
Ms. Crockett next asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made
an error of law” in dismissing Claims IV and X. Appellant’s Br.,
ECF No. 12 at 28.
As to Claim IV, she argues that “[l]ack of standing has
been alleged and unsettled in both [the D.C.] Superior Court and
the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. She then recounts the history of the
judicial foreclosure proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court,
focusing on Nationstar and MTGLQ’s actions. See id. at 28-29. As
Nationstar points out in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s
Br., ECF No. 11 at 13-14; Ms. Crockett neither explains how
Nationstar lacked standing nor specifies any errors of law
committed by the Bankruptcy Court, see Appellant’s Br., ECF No.
12 at 28-31. This Court therefore AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
dismissal of Claim IV.
Ms. Crockett also argues that she suffered damages because
she had to file for bankruptcy to preserve her primary
residence. Id. at 29. She states that this filing affected her
credit and asserts that Nationstar’s actions are
“unconscionable.” Id. She cites various federal and local
statutes but does not explain how those authorities pertain to
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her arguments on appeal. Id. at 29-31, 34. The Court agrees with
Nationstar that Ms. Crockett has failed to specify any errors of
law in the Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss.
See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 20. Further, her arguments
here—like her allegations in the Complaint—are conclusory, so
this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss
Claim X.
F. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim VII
Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made an
error of law” by dismissing Claim VII. Appellant’s Br., ECF No.
12 at 33. She states that she “intended to bring this claim
under D.C. Code § 28-3904(r)” but does not explain if or how she
has pleaded the necessary elements of a claim under that
statute. Id. (citing D.C. Code § 28-3904(r); Johnson v. Long
Beach Mortg. Loan Tr. 2001-4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16, 37 (D.D.C.
2006) (quoting D.C. Code § 28-3904(r))). She argues that “any
reasonable person would deem Nationstar[’s] behavior
unconscionable at best and criminal at . . . worst” and that the
Bankruptcy Court “ignor[ed] and minimiz[ed]” Nationstar’s
actions in its ruling. Id. at 33-34.
Nationstar argues that Ms. Crockett has not specified any
error of law made by the Bankruptcy Court. Appellee’s Br., ECF
No. 11 at 17. This Court agrees that she has not responded to
the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. In the Memorandum Decision and
25
Order re Motion to Dismiss, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Claim
VII for two reasons. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 31-32 (Memorandum
Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss). First, that court
determined that Ms. Crockett’s allegations were “all conclusory
allegations that do not pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at
31. Second, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Claim VII “is
insufficient as a matter of law” because “[c]ourts in this
jurisdiction have found that the crediting and accounting of
mortgage payments and the initiation of foreclosure proceedings
do not rise to the extreme or outrageous level necessary to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.” Id. at 32 (citing Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A., 730
F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2012); Avila v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,
45 F. Supp. 3d 110, 121 (D.D.C. 2014)). This Court agrees with
the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis and conclusion and therefore
AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim VII.
G. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claims VIII and IX
Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an
error of discretion” by dismissing Claims VIII, IX, and XI. 11
11Ms. Crockett does not allege a Claim XI in her Complaint. See
generally Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1.
The Court assumes that she is referring to Section XI of the
Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to
Dismiss, in which that court discusses her request for punitive
damages. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 38 (Memorandum Decision and
Order re Motion to Dismiss).
26
Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 34. She recites part of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, but she does not explain the
alleged “error of discretion.” See id.Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made
an error of law” by dismissing Claims IX and XI. 12 Appellant’s
Br., ECF No. 12 at 31. She claims that Nationstar violated the
Fair Debt Collection Act because it “knowingly forged documents,
kept inaccurate accounting records, and falsified testimony or
omitted material facts.” Id. at 32. She also alleges that
Nationstar engaged in predatory loan practices in violation of
local law. See id. Finally, she discusses various federal
programs pertaining to residential mortgages and states that she
was not offered relief pursuant to any of these programs. See
id. at 32-33.
The Court agrees with Nationstar that Ms. Crockett has
failed to specify any error of law or abuse of discretion made
by the Bankruptcy Court. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 17-
21. Moreover, rather than discuss the allegations in the
Complaint, she raises new allegations with respect to Claims
VIII and IX. Compare Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 31-34, with
Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 85-89.
12Again, the Court will not address Claim XI, as she did not
allege a Claim XI in the Complaint. See supra.
27
Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal
of these claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the
Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to
Dismiss; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Judgment Dismissing
Adversary Proceeding; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order
Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; and AFFIRMS the
Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion
to Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
August 15, 2023
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