Hill v. Government for the District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ERIC RODNEY HILL, )
)
Petitioner )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02067 (UNA)
)
)
GOVERNMENT FOR THE )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
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Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of petitioner’s imitating submission,
ECF No. 1, which includes a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and
his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The court will grant the in
forma pauperis application and dismiss the case without prejudice.
Petitioner, an inmate currently designated to the D.C. Central Detention Facility (“CDF”),
appears to sue the D.C. government, D.C. Superior Court, and CDF. At the outset, the court notes
that petitioner has attempted to initiate this case, in part, by filing an untitled letter to Hon. Beryl
A. Howell. But correspondence may not be directed by a party to a judge of this court. See D.C.
LCvR 5.1(a). Petitioner attaches his petition to that letter, but the petition fails to formally comply
with Federal Civil Rule 10(b), or D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(d) or (g), and is also unsigned in
contravention of Federal Civil Rule 11(a).
Even if petitioner had procedurally complied, it is of no consequence. Petitioner moves
this court to review determinations of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and to vacate
his convictions entered by that court due to their alleged unconstitutionality. As a general rule,
applicable here, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions or to enjoin the actions of the
Superior Court. See Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (relying on
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)). That is the province of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals.
More, D.C. Code § 23-110, in relevant part provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District
of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
(3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the
sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
D.C. Code § 23-110(a). A petitioner has no recourse in federal court “if it appears that [he] has
failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that the Superior Court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” D.C. Code § 23-110(g); see Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Although petitioner
broadly contends that he has “no judicial remedies,” presumably in the District of Columbia local
courts, he does not explain that contention, nor does address any efforts that he has made in pursuit
of an appeal or of any post-conviction relief pursuant to § 23-110, let alone establish that his local
remedies were somehow inadequate or ineffective.
For these reasons, this habeas action will be dismissed without prejudice for want of
jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Date: 7/31/23 United States District Judge