Nwosu v. Bolduc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ADAEZE NWOSU,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 23-cv-3841 (DLF)
MAGDALIT BOLDUC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Adaeze Nwosu visited Israel and Palestine on a church trip. Unhappy with her experience,
she sued Father Luc Vaillant, Sister Magdalit Bolduc, and the Archdiocese of Denver in federal
court. All three defendants move to dismiss Nwosu’s suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dkt. 8.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant their motion.
Lawsuits require personal jurisdiction. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 128–
29 (2023). In this case, personal jurisdiction over the defendants turns on the District of
Columbia’s long-arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(A); GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
Under D.C. law, a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s—(1) transacting any
business in the District of Columbia; (2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of
Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the
District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in
the District of Columbia; [or] (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the
District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Under the Constitution, jurisdiction must also
comport with traditional principles of due process. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
807 (1985); Mallory, 600 U.S. at 128–29.
Nwosu falters at the first step: D.C. law. Nwosu, who lives in Maryland, says that Sister
Bolduc and Father Vaillant, who live in Colorado and work for the Archdiocese of Denver,
harassed and discriminated against her on a “13-day religious pilgrimage [in] the Holy Land.”
Compl. at 4, Dkt. 1. Those claims do not stem from business transacted, services supplied, or real
property held in the District. Cf. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)–(2), (5). They do not imply that the
defendants injured Nwosu in the District by acting or failing to act in the District. Id. § 13-
423(a)(3). And they do not suggest that any defendant “regularly” engages in “conduct” touching
the District, see Shaheen v. Smith, 994 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (D.D.C. 2013), or that Nwosu faced
“tortious injury in” the District, D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). Cf. Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d
201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that injury did not “occur” in D.C. when injurious acts did not
take place in D.C. and injured party did not reside in D.C.). It follows that Nwosu cannot establish
personal jurisdiction under D.C. law and that this Court cannot hear her case.
Nwosu emphasizes that the Archdiocese’s “administration is overseen by the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops . . . in Washington, DC.” Compl. at 4. Even so, the Conference’s
activities in the District do not give rise to personal jurisdiction over the defendants. For one thing,
Nwosu’s “claim[s] for relief” do not “aris[e] from” the Conference’s oversight activities. D.C.
Code § 13-423(a). Claims arise from conduct when they bear a “discernible relationship” to that
conduct, Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335–36 (D.C. 2000), and Nwosu
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pleads no facts suggesting that Conference oversight had anything to do with her experience during
her travels. Just as importantly, even if Conference oversight made the Conference liable for
Nwosu’s injuries, it would not show that the defendants ever acted in the District of Columbia. Cf.
Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Ordinarily, a
defendant corporation’s contacts with a forum may not be attributed to shareholders, affiliated
corporations, or other parties.”). The Court’s personal-jurisdiction inquiry thus begins and ends at
the first step, and the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Finally, the Court will not transfer Nwosu’s action “in the interest of justice” and will deny
her leave to file an amended complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. As for transfer, Nwosu has not
requested it or explained why it is warranted. Cf. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 285
F. Supp. 3d 228, 233 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The party requesting transfer bears the burden of
establishing” that transfer would be in the interest of justice.). In any event, dismissing an action
rather than transferring it is appropriate when “it appears that [a] complaint in its current form
would likely face dismissal . . . for failure to state a claim.” Roman-Salgado v. Holder, 730 F.
Supp. 2d 126, 131 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing cases); accord Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722
F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nwosu’s complaint, which (among other things) seeks damages
for breach of contract based on her contention that the defendants violated the terms of the Catholic
Catechism, fits the bill.1
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In particular, Nwosu’s breach-of-Catechism claim likely fails because it raises “ecclesiastical
questions” federal courts cannot answer under the First Amendment. Presbyterian Church in
U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
Her claim for defamation likely fails because she does not plead defamation per se or show that
the defendants’ remarks caused her “economic or pecuniary” losses. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 575 cmt. b (1977). Her remaining tort claims for loss of privacy and/or intentional
infliction of emotional distress likely fail because she does not plead “highly offensive” or
“outrageous” conduct. Id. §§ 46, 652D, 652E. Her age discrimination claim likely fails for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 6104(f), and because the Age
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As for Nwosu’s Motions for Leave to Amend, Dkts. 15, 17, the Court will deny them as
futile, see, e.g., James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Nwosu’s Amended Complaint adds factual allegations that Sister Bolduc, Father Vaillant, and the
Archdiocese work closely with the Conference in the District. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 2.2–2.4, 4.1–
4.5, Dkt. 17. But it does not tie any of that work to Nwosu’s claims for relief, meaning it does not
shore up her case for personal jurisdiction. Moreno, 746 A.2d at 336.2 For a similar reason,
Nwosu’s new claims against the Catholic Community of the Beatitudes and the Apostolic
Nunciature of the United States of America would fail on their merits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The Amended Complaint pleads no facts—much less sufficient facts—linking
either defendant to Nwosu’s claims or injuries.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 8, is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in a district with
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. It is further
Discrimination Act probably does not proscribe discrimination based on comparative youth, cf.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593 (2004). Her racial discrimination
claim against Bolduc and Vaillant likely fails because Title VI of the Civil Rights Act does not
make individual employees liable for discriminatory acts done in the course of their employment.
Mwabira-Simera v. Howard Univ., 692 F. Supp. 2d 65, 70 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing cases). Finally,
her racial discrimination claim against the Archdiocese likely fails because Title VI likely does
not provide for respondeat superior liability, see Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117, 1119–21
(6th Cir. 2021) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284–85 (1998)), and
because Nwosu does not suggest that the Archdiocese itself discriminated against her or turned a
blind eye to her plight.
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Nor would the Amended Complaint’s allegations show that those defendants maintain their
principal place of business in, are domiciled in, or are organized under the laws of the District
under D.C. Code § 13-422. Cf. Amend. Compl. ¶ 4.3.
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ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Amend, Dkts. 15, 17, are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
________________________
March 10, 2024 DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
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