Turner v. Lyons, Doughty, Velduis, P.A./p.C.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TERRANCE TURNER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02361 (UNA)
v. )
)
LYONS, DOUGHTY, )
VELDUIS, P.A./P.C., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No.
1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons
explained below, the IFP application will be granted, and this matter will be dismissed without
prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Sterling, Virginia, sues what appears to a law firm that has associated
addresses in Ohio, New Jersey, and Delaware. Its formal address of record is unclear. Within the
body of the complaint, Plaintiff also lists several federal agencies, including: the United States
Special Operations Command, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission. It is unclear if these agencies are intended as defendants or if Plaintiff
simply wants them noticed regarding this case. In any event, Plaintiff fails to properly name the
defendants and to specify their contact information, as required by D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1).
The contents of the complaint fare no better. The allegations are difficult to follow, but it
appears that plaintiff takes issue with his treatment by the defendant law firm, and perhaps other
law firms, alleging that they were generally disrespectful and threatening, and that they would
accept his payment, but then refuse to ultimately file any “federal cases” on his behalf. He also
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alleges that these firms discriminated against him by failing to offer him employment because he
is a Federal Bar Association “appointee.” He demands $10 million in damages. Plaintiff faces
hurdles here that he cannot overcome.
First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.
Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v.
CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive
fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate
defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.
497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither
plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp
harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v.
D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL
5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions
. . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s
complaint falls within this category, failing to provide the defendants or this court with notice of
his intended claims or a clear basis for this court’s jurisdiction.
To that end, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set
forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is
available only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and
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the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As discussed, a plaintiff seeking relief in the district
court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a), and failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Here, plaintiff’s allegations do not raise any federal question. Although he discusses
“discrimination” in passing, “bare assertions” of a “discrimination claim” are “not entitled to be
assumed true[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). Indeed, plaintiff’s purported
involvement in the Federal Bar Association does not constitute membership in a protected class.
See Jianqing Wu v. Special Counsel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14–
7159, 2015 WL 10761295 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 904 (2016). Put
differently, federal question jurisdiction “must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly. The
mere suggestion of a federal question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal
courts[,]” Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan, 904
F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).
And, while plaintiff and the defendant law firm may be of diverse citizenship, it is not
entirely clear, because plaintiff has presented several different addresses for that defendant. It is a
“well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the suit is
filed[,]” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore, “the
citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot be
established presumptively or by mere inference[.]” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55
(D.D.C. 2004). Moreover, to the extent that he sues the noted federal agencies, they are not
considered “citizens of a state.” Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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Finally, this matter presents no connection to the District of Columbia whatsoever. Venue
in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property
that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant may be found,
if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper venue). The primary defendant is not
located in this District, and to the extent that he intends to sue the federal agencies, he has not
presented any allegations against them. Furthermore, none of the acts or omissions giving rise to
this case, as far as they can even be understood, occurred in this District.
For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: October 19, 2023 ___________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
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