Monbo v. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEAFUEH MONBO,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-02205 (TNM)
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF
MARYLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Proceeding pro se, Deafueh Monbo sues the Appellate Court of Maryland 1 and its chief
judge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding a now-closed state court appeal. The
Court dismisses the case without prejudice for lack of both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.
I.
One gleans few facts from Monbo’s rudimentary complaint. At base, Monbo seeks
review of an Appellate Court order instructing her to include certain portions of the trial court
record in the record on appeal. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–10, ECF No. 5. But she does not identify the
case underlying her Complaint—and there are several to choose from since Monbo is a serial
state court litigant in Maryland. 2 The Appellate Court helpfully reviewed Monbo’s litigation
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Monbo names the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in her Amended Complaint. But in
December 2022, it was renamed the Appellate Court of Maryland. The Court refers to the
tribunal by its current name.
2
Review of the Maryland’s central case search database reveals that Monbo has been a plaintiff
in at least 26 cases since 2000. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67 (D.D.C. 2014)
(“A court may take judicial notice of facts contained in public records of other proceedings
. . . .”).
history and found that her appeal in Monbo v. Richmond American Homes of Maryland, Inc.,
Case No. ACM-REG-0039-2023, was dismissed following her failure to comply with a court
order compelling her to file trial court transcript. Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 1–2, ECF No. 9-1.
Monbo agrees that this case prompts her present complaint. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 12.
According to the Appellate Court docket, Monbo filed her appeal in Richmond American
Homes in March 2023. MTD Exhibit 1, ECF No. 9-2. That June, the appellees moved to
dismiss. MTD Ex. 2 at 1, ECF No. 9-3. They asserted that, under Maryland court rules, Monbo
was required to submit to the appellate record a transcript from the lower court hearing. Id. In
an order signed by Chief Judge Wells, the Appellate Court denied the motion to dismiss and
ordered Monbo to submit the trial court transcript. MTD Ex. 3 at 1–2, ECF No. 9-4. The next
day, Monbo filed a “response.” MTD Ex. 4, ECF No. 9-5. She denied participating in the
hearing for which Appellate Court was requiring a transcript. Id. And she asserted that, in any
case, the transcript was not relevant to any issues on appeal. Id. The Appellate Court construed
Monbo’s response as a motion for reconsideration, which it denied. MTD Ex. 5, ECF No. 9-6.
Monbo then petitioned for writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme Court of Maryland to
decide whether the Appellate Court could force her “to seek out a transcript for a hearing that
[she] never participated in, never testified in, and is not relevant to the issues on appeal.” MTD
Ex. 6, ECF No. 9-7. The Supreme Court of Maryland denied Monbo’s petition. MTD Ex. 7,
ECF No. 9-8. And in August 2023, the Appellate Court dismissed Monbo’s appeal. MTD Ex. 7,
ECF No. 9-9.
Having struck out in state court, Monbo now airs her grievances here. Indeed, her
Amended Complaint presents the same question that she posed to the Supreme Court of
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Maryland: whether the Appellate Court erred in requiring her to produce the lower court
transcript. In turn, the Appellate Court has moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, state sovereign immunity, and failure to state a claim. The
motion is now ripe for resolution.
II.
The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, keeping in mind that complaints
filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But like all plaintiffs, pro
se plaintiffs must plead facts that establish jurisdiction. See Theus v. Ally Fin., Inc., 98 F. Supp.
3d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2015).
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the Court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Chow v. WMATA, 391 F.
Supp. 3d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2019). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court is not limited to
the allegations in the Complaint but may also consider material outside of the pleadings. See id.
at 41.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction here. To start, Monbo’s claim is moot.
According to the Appellate Court docket, the appeal in which she was ordered to submit the
transcript has been dismissed, Monbo has not appealed, and the time to file an appeal has lapsed.
Ex. 1; see Md. Code 8-302(a). Now that the state court case is over, a decision by this Court will
“neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting
them in the future.” Reid v. Hurwitz, 920 F.3d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Because it is
“impossible for [the] court to grant any effectual relief,” the case is moot. Knox v. Serv. Emps.
Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (cleaned up).
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This is not to say that if the state court case were live, jurisdiction would be proper.
Federal district courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
Singletary v. District of Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). And they
most certainly cannot exercise jurisdiction over a state court under the Administrative Procedure
Act, as Monbo suggests. Opp’n at 4–8; see Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1055 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“the federal APA clearly does not apply to state agencies.”). Because Monbo is “complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments,” the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)). So dismissal is required under Rule 12(b)(1).
The Court also dismisses Monbo’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) because she fails to
show personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d
883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[Plaintiffs] have the burden of establishing the court’s personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.”). The Supreme Court has developed “two distinct analyses” for
establishing personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Id. For general
jurisdiction, Monbo must show that the defendant is domiciled, headquartered, or incorporated in
the District of Columbia. Id. at 889 (citing D.C. Code § 13-422). Meanwhile, specific
jurisdiction applies when the defendant takes “some act by which it purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).
Monbo has not alleged—for obvious reasons—that the Appeals Court is headquartered or
incorporated in the District of Columbia. Nor has she shown that Chief Judge Wells is domiciled
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here. So general jurisdiction is off the table. As for specific jurisdiction, “[w]hat is needed—and
what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Calif., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017).
Of the limited acts alleged in the complaint, all appear to have occurred in Maryland. And none
appear to bear any relation to the District of Columbia. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) is thus
appropriate. 3
* * *
Recently, Monbo moved to amend the operative complaint. Mot. to Amend/Correct
Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 13. Since Monbo has already amended the complaint once as a
matter of course, she may amend the complaint again only with “the opposing party’s consent or
the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). There is no suggestion Defendants consented.
Leave to amend will be “freely given” unless “(1) undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant,” (2) a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed,” (3) “undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment,” or (4) that granting leave to amend would be futile. Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv.
ex rel. Hylton, 766 F.3d 25, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). Because Monbo’s proposed second amended complaint does not resolve the
jurisdictional defects discussed above, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend would
be futile. Accord Outterbridge v. DHS, No. 15-cv-1391, 2017 WL 3503376, at *2 (D.D.C. July
3
The Court does not address the Appellate Court’s arguments on venue, immunity, and whether
it should decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court further lacks
jurisdiction to address the Appellate Court’s arguments on the merits. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007).
5
7, 2017) (denying leave to amend when granting leave “would not solve the subject matter
jurisdiction defect”).
III.
For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and deny Monbo’s
motion for leave to amend. A corresponding order will issue today.
2023.12.12
13:51:11 -05'00'
Dated: December 12, 2023 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.
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