St. Peter v. Georgetown University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ZACHARY ST. PETER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-2058 (JEB)
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Zachary St. Peter was a student at Georgetown University’s School of Medicine
until he was dismissed roughly three years ago for his inability to timely complete all
coursework. This was only so, says St. Peter, because he was forced to repeat his first-year
courses twice after he took two medical leaves of absence. He also alleges that during this same
time period, Princy Kumar — the Senior Associate Dean for Students at the medical school —
subjected him to unwanted advances and generally maintained an inappropriate faculty-student
relationship with him. Believing that Georgetown’s and Kumar’s actions were unlawful under
the Rehabilitation Act and D.C. contract and tort law, Plaintiff brought this suit. Both
Defendants now move to dismiss, arguing that all of the claims that Plaintiff puts forth are
untimely, inadequately pled, or both. As the Court agrees that most of the counts in the
Amended Complaint have been brought too late and similarly concurs that the few that were
timely brought are unmeritorious, it will grant the Motion to Dismiss in full.
I. Background
The Court at this stage sets forth the facts as pled in the Complaint, assuming them to be
true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). St. Peter,
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an Arizona resident, enrolled in Georgetown’s School of Medicine in August 2016. See ECF
No. 12 (Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 2, 13. He suffers from “Major Depressive Disorder (MDD),”
a “disability” that “at least some persons at Georgetown” were aware he had. Id., ¶¶ 20–21.
Plaintiff says that this condition “does not interfere with his ability to successfully complete the
School of Medicine program,” as evidenced by the fact that he satisfactorily completed his first-
year coursework in August 2017. Id., ¶¶ 18, 22.
St. Peter’s trouble began when he requested and was granted his first medical leave of
absence in December 2017. Id., ¶¶ 23, 25. At the time he took this leave, he had “passed all
required [first-year] courses and was not at risk of failing any [second-year] classes.” Id., ¶ 26.
He also had little reason to worry, or so he believed, because Georgetown’s policy at the time of
his enrollment in 2016 allegedly did not require medical students to repeat a course unless
obligated by the Committee on Students. Id., ¶ 19. As a result, he expected to re-enter
Georgetown as a second-year medical student upon his return in Fall 2018. Id., ¶ 27.
Much to his surprise, Associate Dean Kumar informed Plaintiff in January 2018 that he
was wrong and that he would have to repeat his first year of medical school, citing “unspecified
changes in the Georgetown curriculum.” Id., ¶ 28. Besides not explaining why Plaintiff was
required to repeat his first-year classes, Kumar also allegedly failed to point St. Peter to “any
administrative process to appeal.” Id., ¶ 30. She further led him to believe that there were no
exceptions to this curricular change, which was subsequently belied in August by her decision
to credit St. Peter for two of the first-year courses he had already completed. Id., ¶¶ 31, 36. To
top it all off, Plaintiff’s matriculation date of August 2016 was not adjusted, which meant he
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had considerably less room for error given a Georgetown policy that requires medical students
to graduate within seven years of matriculation. Id., ¶¶ 33, 62.
In spite of this series of unfortunate events, St. Peter remained “excited to enter medical
school” after his first leave of absence. Id., ¶ 32. His excitement was not to last, however.
Upon his return in Fall 2018, St. Peter was mocked by faculty members for having to repeat his
first year of medical school and was also discouraged by his fellow students from participating
in lab coursework. Id., ¶¶ 39–40. Worst of all, he was involved in a “pedestrian accident” in
March 2019, which forced him to seek a second medical leave of absence to recover from the
physical injuries he sustained. Id., ¶¶ 41–43.
Like his first, Plaintiff’s second request was granted by the University, and he took his
second leave beginning in April 2019. Id., ¶¶ 43–44. Upon his return in August 2019, he was
once again required to repeat his first-year coursework, but his matriculation date remained
August 2016. Id., ¶¶ 48–50. The tension between this unchanged matriculation date and
Georgetown’s seven-years-to-graduate rule came to a head in July 2020. In a letter from the
Committee on Students, St. Peter was informed that he was being dismissed from the medical
program because he would apparently not be able to graduate in time — although this math is
not clear to the Court. Id., ¶¶ 61–62. He tried to appeal his dismissal through counsel, but
Georgetown allegedly did not respond to his entreaties. Id., ¶¶ 64–65.
These developments alone would be quite a cross to bear, but this was not the end of it,
St. Peter says. From 2018 to 2020, as the events recounted above unfolded, Kumar was also
engaging in behavior that “gave Plaintiff a great deal of discomfort and anxiety.” Id., ¶ 51. She
sent him unsolicited personal communications during “non-business hours,” invited him to
lunches and social events, “repeatedly invited Plaintiff to spend nights at her home on
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weekends,” and encouraged him to do “late-night research for her in her lab.” Id., ¶¶ 51–52, 54,
55. Fearing any reprisal from this authority figure, however — and perhaps expecting
Georgetown to independently rein in its employee, see id., ¶¶ 70–71 — St. Peter did not inform
anyone at the University of her behavior. Id., ¶ 57.
Instead of bringing this action immediately after his dismissal, St. Peter waited until July
17, 2023, to file his Complaint. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint). Defendants moved to dismiss that
initial Complaint, but the Court had no occasion to consider their arguments then because
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint — the operative pleading here — in response. See ECF
Nos. 10 (First Motion to Dismiss) & 12 (Am. Compl.). This Amended Complaint alleges one
count of Rehabilitation Act discrimination against Georgetown (Count I); one count of breach
of contract under D.C. law, also against Georgetown alone (Count II); and one count of
negligence against both the University and Kumar (Count III). Defendants have re-upped their
Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 14 (Motion to Dismiss).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to “state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not
necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotations marks and citation omitted). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court “must treat the
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complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant [the] plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111,
1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979))
(internal citations omitted). It need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation” or an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint.
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986)).
III. Analysis
In seeking dismissal, Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations. They alternatively posit that each cause of action is deficient
on the merits. The Court proceeds count by count.
A. Count I (Rehabilitation Act)
The Rehabilitation Act, like some other federal statutes, provides no limitations period.
In such a circumstance, courts generally “‘borrow’ one from an analogous state cause of action,
provided that the state limitations period is not inconsistent with underlying federal policies.”
Alexander v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 826 F.3d 544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Spiegler v. Dist. of Columbia, 866 F.2d 421, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). The Court must
therefore look to state law — here, D.C. law — to find the “most closely analogous” statute
from which to borrow a limitations period. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995)
(citation omitted).
Courts in this district have been less than consistent in applying this analysis to the
Rehabilitation Act over the years. In the past, some adopted the three-year period for personal-
injury claims found in what is now D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(8), believing that these were the
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most analogous. See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Univ., 732 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1990); Gallion
v. D.C. Dep’t of Human Servs., 1992 WL 44360, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1992). “These courts
. . . reasoned that because the Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985),
that state statute[s] of limitations for personal injury actions apply to Section 1983 and Section
1981 actions, then the personal injury limitations period also applies to Rehabilitation Act
claims.” Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia, 2006 WL 626921, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006). Other
courts, however, charted a different path. See, e.g., Turner v. Dist. of Columbia, 383 F. Supp.
2d 157, 176 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying 300-day limitation period from federal Title VII to
Rehabilitation Act claim).
This practice changed dramatically following the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in
Jaiyeola v. Dist. of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012). The court there held that “a
Rehabilitation Act claim is far more similar to [a D.C. Human Rights Act] claim than it is to an
ordinary personal injury claim.” Id. at 368. Both statutes, the court explained, share a purpose
of ending discrimination, create a private cause of action to bring about this end, and afford
plaintiffs a similar range of compensatory and equitable relief. Id. at 367. And while the
Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA are not identical, the D.C. Court of Appeals insisted that
their differences “pale in comparison” to the recounted similarities, so the DCHRA “must be
deemed the District statute most analogous” to the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 366, 368.
Since Jaiyeola, courts in this district have been nearly unanimous in borrowing the one-
year limitation period found in the DCHRA. See D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a); Abreu v. Howard
Univ., 2021 WL 5081543, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021) (collecting cases); Brickhouse v.
Howard Univ., 2021 WL 3007670, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2021) (“Post-Jaiyeola district court
authority is . . . virtually uniform.”). Beyond adopting the D.C. Court of Appeals’ reasoning as
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their own, these courts have offered a few additional reasons for this conclusion. For instance,
Judge Dabney Friedrich in Arthur v. Dist. of Columbia Housing Auth., 2020 WL 1821111(D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2020), highlighted the fact that the text and wording of both statutes are
“substantially similar.” Id. at *6. Judge Christopher Cooper, taking the via negativa, noted that
the D.C. personal-injury statute is not analogous because it covers too wide a swath of harms,
including “conduct that involves no discrimination whatsoever.” Congress v. Dist. of
Columbia, 324 F. Supp. 3d 164, 172 (D.D.C. 2018).
Undergirding many of these recent decisions is a more foundational principle —
namely, that the D.C. Court of Appeals is owed substantial deference on matters of D.C. law,
such as the correct characterization of the D.C. causes of action held up in comparison to the
Rehabilitation Act. Cf. Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[O]n
questions of District of Columbia law this court defers to the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). Courts
have thus afforded “considerable persuasive weight” to Jaiyeola’s conclusion that “the
[DCHRA] is the more analogous cause of action.” Abreu, 2021 WL 5081543, at *4 (internal
citation omitted); see also Congress, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 173 (“[T]he decision . . . to apply the
one-year statute of limitations is . . . consistent with the deference owed to the D.C. Court of
Appeals on matters of D.C. law.”). All in all, courts here now consistently hold that the
DCHRA is a better fit and that its one-year limitations period governs Rehabilitation Act
claims.
Plaintiff, for his part, urges this Court to go against the flow. He suggests that the
DCHRA is not the most analogous D.C. statute because it is “an all-encompassing act which
attempts to package all discrimination into one act.” ECF No. 15 (Pl. Opp.) at 3. In his view,
the more appropriate analog is the personal-injury statute and its three-year limitations period
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— under which his claim would be timely. Id. at 3–4. There is no doubt that the disability-
based discrimination prohibited by the Rehabilitation Act is just one subset of the forms of
discrimination proscribed by the DCHRA. See Jaiyeola, 40 A.3d at 366 (admitting this). But
the Court’s task is not to find a perfect match, merely the closest analog. To state the obvious,
“[T]he most analogous statute need not be identical.” Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Rds., 1
F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding Virginia disability-discrimination statute most analogous
to Rehabilitation Act). On this score, the DCHRA is undoubtedly a better fit than the D.C.
personal-injury statute because the former at least covers the same forms of discrimination as
the Rehabilitation Act, compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting disability discrimination) with
D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 & 2-1402.01 (same), while the latter does not require a showing of
discrimination at all.
This Court, then, will follow Jaiyeola and its sister courts in concluding that the DCHRA
“provides a more analogous cause of action to the Rehabilitation Act than the general personal
injury statute.” Congress, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 172. It accordingly agrees with Defendants that
Count I is governed by a one-year limitations period. See MTD at 4–5 (citing D.C. Code § 2-
1403.16(a)). As Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act cause of action could have accrued no later than
his dismissal date of July 17, 2020, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 61, 85 — viz., three years before he
filed this action, see ECF No. 1— he is clearly out of luck. In the absence of an argument that
this limitations period was otherwise tolled, the Court will thus dismiss Count I as untimely.
B. D.C. Law Claims
In this scenario, where a complaint is “shorn of its federal claim[],” the Court’s job
might well be done. See, e.g., Solomon v. Dechert LLP, 2023 WL 6065025, at *17 (D.D.C.
Sept. 18, 2023) (declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over D.C.-law claims after dismissing
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all federal claims). As St. Peter adequately pled diversity jurisdiction, however, the Court
proceeds to the remaining D.C.-law causes of action.
1. Count II (Breach of Contract)
In seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s contract claim — ostensibly based on some general
agreement between Georgetown and its students — Defendants once more begin with the
statute of limitations. Yet this time, the dispute does not turn on which statute of limitations
applies, since D.C. law specifies a three-year period for breach-of-contract actions. See D.C.
Code § 12-301(7). Instead, the parties disagree on whether Count II was in fact brought within
three years of the alleged breach.
A breach of contract occurs when a party “fails to perform when performance is due.”
Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1004 (D.C. 2008). The
limitations period, in turn, begins to run “at the time of the breach.” Wright v. Howard Univ.,
60 A.3d 749, 751 (D.C. 2013). From the Amended Complaint — which is no model of clarity
— the Court discerns five possible breaches. Three of them stem from the fact that Georgetown
“forced Plaintiff to repeat his” first year of medical school. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 95–97. But the
latest this could have happened was in August 2019, see id., ¶ 49, almost four years before the
Complaint was filed. This count will thus be dismissed to the extent it is based on these events.
Plaintiff next alleges that Georgetown’s “false statements and/or false statements by
omission” constituted a breach. Id., ¶ 98. It is unclear from the Complaint what these false
statements were or when they were (or were not) made. The most plausible reference is to the
earlier allegation that Kumar “led Plaintiff to believe that no exceptions could be made” to
allow him to re-enter as a second-year student. Id., ¶ 31. This, however, occurred on or around
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January 4, 2018, again more than three years before the date of filing. Id., ¶¶ 28, 31. So
Kumar’s alleged lies provide no surer ground for Count II than the previous candidates.
St. Peter last claims that Georgetown breached the contract by “fail[ing] to provide
Plaintiff with due process.” Id., ¶ 94. What this actually means, again, is anybody’s guess. It
most likely refers to St. Peter’s contention that Kumar “did not make Plaintiff aware of any
administrative process to appeal” the school’s August 2018 decision to make him repeat his
first-year classes. Id., ¶ 30. If that is the case, then Count II was brought about two years too
late.
One final possibility, however, is worth considering: the fifth alleged breach could
instead be Georgetown’s failure to respond when Plaintiff tried to appeal his dismissal back in
July 2020. Id., ¶¶ 64–65. This is a generous construction and not one that leaps off the pages of
the Complaint, but Plaintiff would be within the three-year limitations period if this is what he
meant. His dismissal occurred exactly three years before he filed this suit, so the attempted
appeal of said dismissal must have occurred less than three years ago. See id., ¶¶ 61, 65. This
reading, it would seem, would save St. Peter’s contract claim.
Even if this is what he really meant, though, it ultimately gets him nowhere. While there
is no doubt that “there is a contractual relationship between a university and its students,” Bain
v. Howard Univ., 968 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (D.D.C. 2013), St. Peter still has to “allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate . . . the terms of the contract” to survive a motion to dismiss.
Mosby-Nickens v. Howard Univ., 864 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Manago v.
Dist. of Columbia, 934 A.2d 925, 927 (D.C. 2007). As Defendants point out, he has not done
so. See MTD at 11. St. Peter could have pointed to an explicit contractual term, or he could at
least have pointed to school policies or Student Handbook provisions. See, e.g., Doe v.
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American Univ., 2020 WL 5593909, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (holding that student code
of conduct was part of contract between student and university). But Plaintiff has done none of
this, so there is no way of knowing what process Georgetown owed him or whether it satisfied
its amorphous obligation when it met with him prior to his dismissal. See Am. Compl., ¶ 60.
Even such a charitable reading, therefore, does not change the Court’s conclusion that this count
must be dismissed.
2. Count III (Negligence)
Last up is Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. Defendants complete the statute-of-
limitations trifecta, contending that Count III is just as untimely as Counts I and II. See MTD at
11–13. As it does for contract actions, D.C. law specifies a limitations period of three years for
negligence claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8). “In negligence, a cause of action accrues when
the injury results.” Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. KCI Techs., Inc., 922 F.3d 459, 464
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Defendants argue that all, or at least most, of the injuries listed
in the Amended Complaint occurred more than three years before St. Peter initiated this suit.
See MTD at 12–13. They further maintain that any claim that was timely brought is otherwise
inadequately pled and should be dismissed as well. Id. at 13–15. As the Complaint lists a
handful of possible injuries giving rise to Plaintiff’s negligence count, the Court will consider
each in turn.
Start with the allegations specific to Kumar. She allegedly acted caused him injury by
not providing St. Peter “adequate information regarding loss of course credit,” failing to provide
an appeal process following his return from his first leave of absence, offering “improper and
unethical coaching,” and generally maintaining an inappropriate relationship with him. See
Am. Compl., ¶ 103. The perceptive reader will have noticed that all of these events predate St.
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Peter’s dismissal. For example, the alleged failures to provide information and an appeal
process occurred in January 2018. Id., ¶¶ 28, 30–31. The improper coaching, meanwhile, was
provided somewhere around June 2019. Id., ¶¶ 46–47. As Plaintiff’s negligence claim against
Kumar thus accrued more than three years ago, it must be dismissed as untimely.
Turning to the allegations regarding Georgetown, the Complaint names three possible
omissions that caused injury: 1) the University’s failure to “ensure that Plaintiff’s contractual
educational services were being provided” by the terms of the contract, 2) its failure to assist
him after learning of Kumar’s alleged negligence, and 3) its failure to “follow policy and
procedure in dismiss[ing]” St. Peter. Id., ¶¶ 101–02. The second of the three is untimely
because it is dependent on the injuries Kumar caused, harms that occurred too long ago.
The timeliness of the first and third is harder to assess in the absence of specific dates on
which the Complaint alleged that these injuries occurred. Assuming arguendo that they took
place within the limitations period, they nonetheless succumb for an independent reason — viz.,
they are merely reformulations of Plaintiff’s already-dismissed Count II. See Choharis v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1089 (D.C. 2008) (to bring tort claim related to contract
dispute, it “must exist in its own right independent of the contract.”). Indeed, the first of these
explicitly speaks of “the terms of the contract,” Am. Compl., ¶ 102, while the third repeats
Plaintiff’s breach theory based on Georgetown’s failure to furnish due process before
dismissing him. Id., ¶¶ 94, 101. In other words, Count III “do[es] not exist independently of
that contractual relationship.” Amin v. Nyack Sch. of Adult & Distance Educ., 710 F. Supp. 2d
80, 83 (D.D.C. 2010); cf. Mines v. Metagenics, Inc., 2023 WL 6795879, at * 6 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2023) (finding viable fraudulent-inducement tort claim that relied on contractual breach but
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added allegation that promisor never intended to perform). Since D.C. law does not allow for
this kind of double dipping, the Court will dismiss Count III in whole.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. A
separate Order to that effect will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: December 15, 2023
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