Flannery v. District of Columbia Department of Health

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
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ERIC J. FLANNERY, et al., )
)
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Plaintiffs, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 22-3108 (ABJ)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al., )
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Defendants. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On October 13, 2022, Eric J. Flannery and the Drane Flannery Restaurant, LLC (“Drane
Flannery” or “the LLC”) filed a complaint against the District of Columbia Department of Health
(“D.C. Health”) and its Director, LaQuandra S. Nesbitt, seeking declaratory relief and damages.
Compl. [Dkt. # 1] at 1. Drane Flannery is an LLC owned by Eric Flannery, and the LLC owns a
restaurant called The Big Board, which Eric Flannery operates. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9. Plaintiffs allege
that the defendants unlawfully levied fines and other penalties against The Big Board for alleged
violations of restrictions imposed by the D.C. government as emergency health measures at the
height of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. Compl. ¶¶ 1–7.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. [Dkt. # 8] (“Mot.”) at 1; Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. [Dkt. # 8] (“Mem.”) at 12. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. to
Mot. [Dkt. # 12] (“Opp.”), and the matter is fully briefed. See Reply in Further Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. [Dkt. # 17] (“Reply”).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2020, District of Columbia Mayor Muriel Bowser issued two emergency
executive orders. Compl. ¶ 23. The first declared that there was a “public emergency” in the
District of Columbia due to the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak. Compl. ¶ 23, citing Mayor’s
Order 2020-045. 1 The second declared the presence of a “public health emergency” due to the
virus. Compl. ¶ 23, citing Mayor’s Order 2020-046. The orders were scheduled to remain in effect
for fifteen days unless rescinded or suspended at an earlier time. Compl. ¶ 23, citing Mayor’s
Order 2020-045; Mayor’s Order 2020-046.
On March 16, 2020, Mayor Bowser issued an order prohibiting “mass gatherings” and
restricting restaurants and taverns from seating customers at tables from that date until April 1.
Compl. ¶ 24, citing Mayor’s Order 2020-048. The next day, the D.C. Council issued an
amendment to the D.C. Code, which authorized the Mayor to extend the initial emergency
executive orders that would have otherwise expired under normal procedures. See Compl. ¶¶ 25–
26. The amendment authorized the mayor to extend those emergency orders for an additional 30
days, Compl. ¶ 26, citing D.C. Code § 7-2306(c-1) (as amended Mar. 17, 2020), and those to come.
See Compl. ¶¶ 21, 26–27 citing D.C. Code § 7-2306(c-1) (as amended Mar. 16, 2022).
1 In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily
consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated
by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.”
Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002), citing EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
2
Throughout the pandemic, the D.C. Council continued to pass emergency legislation
authorizing the mayor to extend emergency executive orders, and, in December of 2021, Mayor
Bowser issued two emergency orders of importance here: one imposing a mask requirement in
public spaces, and one requiring customers in bars and restaurants to show proof of vaccination.
See Compl. ¶ 3, citing Mayor’s Order 2021-147, 68 D.C. Reg. 13954 (Dec. 20, 2021) (imposing
an indoor mask requirement for restaurants and taverns when persons are not actively eating or
drinking); Mayor’s Order 2021-148, 68 D.C. Reg. 14222 (Dec. 22, 2021) (requiring proof of
vaccination for customers to enter restaurants and taverns).
On February 1, 2022, D.C. Health issued a Notice of Infraction and Notice of
Closure/Summary Suspension to Big Board for allegedly “permit[ing] a guest, visitor, or customer
over twelve (12) years old to enter their indoor premises without displaying proof of vaccination
against COVID-19” “[i]n violation of Mayor’s Order 2021-148 § II(1).” Ex. A to Compl.
[Dkt. # 1-1] (“Notice of Infraction”) at 1. The notice additionally alleged that The Big Board was
“[i]n violation of Mayor’s Order 2021-147 §IV(I)” because it “did not require all persons to wear
mask indoors when not actively eating or drinking.” Id.
Plaintiffs challenge the imposition of these fines and the summary suspension of The Big
Board’s license. The complaint includes three causes of action:
• Count I alleges that defendants acted ultra vires by regulating through rolling
emergency and temporary legislation, rather than permanent legislation, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the D.C. Home Rule Act. Compl. ¶¶ 59–65.
• Count II alleges that D.C. Code § 7-2308, a pre-existing provision that authorizes
the suspension of certain judicial review procedures required by the D.C.
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) during a declared emergency, operated to
violate plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 66–71.
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• Count III alleges that D.C. Health exceeded its regulatory authority by suspending
The Big Board’s license in violation of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act.
Compl. ¶¶ 72–75.
• Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Compl.
¶¶ 76–78. See Compl. ¶ 79–80.
Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, or in the alternative nominal damages,
as well as attorneys’ fees and other costs associated with this action. Compl. ¶¶ 82–83.
Plaintiffs also ask the Court for a declaratory judgment holding that “DC Health’s actions
in reliance on the D.C. Council’s emergency legislative amendments and the Mayor’s Orders are
contrary to law,” Compl. ¶ 79; a declaratory judgment holding that “D.C. Code § 7–2308’s bar on
a [D.C. APA] claim challenging DC Health’s actions . . . violates the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution,” Compl. ¶ 80; and a declaratory judgment holding that D.C. Health exceeded
its regulatory authority in violation of the D.C. APA. Compl. ¶ 81.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court must
“treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States,
617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139
(D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Nevertheless,
the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by
facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions.
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Rule 12(b)(6) case); Food & Water
Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Rule 12(b)(1) case).
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Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) ; Shekoyan
v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA,
363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with
an examination of our jurisdiction.”). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as
well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon a federal court.’” Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “is not limited to the allegations of the complaint.”
Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64(1987). Rather, “a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate
to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of
Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis.,
974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,
402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs Have Not Pled a Cause of Action in Count I (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
A. Legal Background
1. The Home Rule Act
Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to
“exercise exclusive Legislation” over the District of Columbia. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In
1973, Congress delegated much of this authority to a popularly-elected D.C. Mayor and thirteen-
member Council by passing the Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified
as amended as D.C. Code § 1–201 et seq.). However, the Home Rule Act did not give the District’s
new government entirely free reign over local affairs.
As relevant here, the Home Rule Act contains two provisions that codify Congress’s
ultimate power to legislate over the District. The first grants Congress the ability to enact
“legislation for the District on any subject . . . including legislation to amend or repeal any law in
force in the District . . . and any act passed by the [District of Columbia] Council.” D.C. Code
§ 1–206.01. The second grants Congress the equivalent of a veto over newly enacted local
legislation, see D.C. Code § 1–233(c)(1), which permits Congress “a layover period of thirty
statutory days to review legislation submitted by the D.C. Council.” Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507,
508 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “If Congress fails to pass a joint resolution of disapproval within that period,
the legislation becomes law.” Id.
2. Section 1983
Section 1983, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
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Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 was passed to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people’s federal rights – to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’” Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). But “it is
only violations of rights, not laws, which give rise to § 1983 actions.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (emphasis in original). As a result, only “an unambiguously conferred
right [may] support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” Id. A statute that creates such a
private right is generally “phrased in terms of the persons benefited,” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979), and must manifest an intent “to create not just a private right but
also a private remedy.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
B. Discussion
Plaintiffs argue that the summary suspension of The Big Board’s license and imposition of
fines “violated federal law governing the District of Columbia’s authority to issue emergency
regulations.” Compl. ¶ 43. According to plaintiffs, the D.C. Council’s legislating through serial,
emergency regulation over a significant period of time permitted “the D.C. executive to escape
Congressional review for years on end,” and therefore ran afoul of the Home Rule Act and the
United States Constitution. 2 Compl. ¶¶ 43–44. Plaintiffs rely on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in
2 Plaintiffs conclude Count I by alleging that “it is contrary to law for DC Health to cite and
penalize The Big Board in reliance of [sic] the Mayor’s ultra vires orders and therefore the
suspension [of The Big Board’s license] itself is ultra vires, null and void.” Compl. ¶ 62. They
add, without further explanation, that the suspension and the imposition of fines violated the Due
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Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1994), to argue that violations of the D.C. Home Rule Act
are cognizable under section 1983. Compl. ¶ 60.
In Bliley, four congressmen brought suit under section 1983 to challenge a series of gun
control measures passed by the D.C. Council in a complex interplay of emergency, temporary, and
permanent legislation. See id. at 509–10. The case concerned whether the congressional review
period for a permanent act passed by the D.C. Council, as called for by the Home Rule Act, had
been suspended when the D.C. Council later passed emergency and temporary measures that
would have repealed the permanent act. See id. at 508. In December 1990, the D.C. Council
enacted gun control legislation, which was presented to Congress for its review in January 1991.
Id. Before the thirty-day review period under the Home Rule Act had elapsed, the Council initiated
repeal measures, but those measures were ultimately frustrated by a referendum vote resulting in
the legislation taking effect. Id. The congressmen believed that the initial, permanent act should
have been resubmitted for review after the later measures were enacted. See id. at 510. And
because resubmission had not occurred after the Council introduced emergency and temporary
measures to repeal the legislation, the congressmen argued that the initial, the enacted legislation
was null and void. Id.The District of Columbia sought to defend itself much in the same way the government
does here: by arguing that violations of the Home Rule Act are not cognizable under section 1983.
See Bliley, 23 F.3d at 510–11; Mot. at 15–19. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). Bliley, 23 F.3d
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Compl. ¶ 65, and they pursue the due process theory
directly in Count II.
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at 510–11. According to the Circuit, under Wilder, the burden was on the District “‘to show by
express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to
foreclose’ resort to enforcement under section 1983.” Id. at 510, quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520–
21. But the District could not meet its burden in that case because the Home Rule Act’s “statutory
scheme confers a right of participation on Congress that is not beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce.” Id. at 510–11. The Circuit therefore held that section 1983 was a proper
vehicle for the congressmen to vindicate their alleged rights. Id.
Plaintiffs cite Bliley to argue broadly that “[v]iolations of the D.C. Home Rule Act are
cognizable under Section 1983.” Compl. ¶ 60. But Bliley is distinguishable; its core holding –
that the Home Rule Act “confers a right of participation on Congress” enforceable through section
1983, 23 F.3d at 511 – says nothing about whether private citizens like plaintiffs may enforce
Congress’s rights or otherwise possess a comparable right of their own. Moreover, as the
government notes, the Supreme Court has clarified in the years since Bliley that a more demanding
textual analysis is warranted to assess whether a given statute confers an actionable section 1983
claim. Compare Bliley, 23 F.3d at 510, with Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (“We now reject the notion
that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of
action brought under § 1983.”).
Plaintiffs point to no textual evidence to support the conclusory allegation that the right to
enforce “Congress’s reserved constitutional power under” the Home Rule Act falls to members of
the public, as opposed to Congress itself. See Compl. ¶ 61. Indeed, the text and structure of the
Home Rule Act “provide no indication that Congress intend[ed] to create new individual rights”
that would empower D.C. residents like the plaintiffs to enforce Congress’s prerogative of
legislative review. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 286. To the contrary, Congress’s ability to bring suit
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and its retention of the right “to amend or repeal any law in force in the District . . . and any act
passed by the [District of Columbia] Council,” D.C. Code § 1–206.01, diminish the power of local
citizens and their democratically elected representatives in favor of the U.S. Congress.
In short, plaintiffs fail to establish that the Home Rule Act “unambiguously confer[s]” a
right upon them to sue for alleged violations of its provisions. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
Because the “fail[ure] to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” is “jurisdictional,” Bliley,
23 F.3d at 510, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim in Count I is dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
II. Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Pursue Count II (U.S. Const. Art. V, Due
Process)
D.C. Code § 2-509, a provision within the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act, affords
individuals a set of procedural rights when they seek to contest actions by district agencies. See
D.C. Code § 2-509. These rights include, among others, “reasonable notice” of a hearing to
challenge the agency action. Id. These rights may yield to exigent circumstances, though: as
relevant here, D.C. Code § 7-2308 provides that “[n]o action taken pursuant to an emergency
executive order . . . shall be subject to § 2-509, until after the expiration date of the emergency
executive order.” D.C. Code § 7-2308.
Plaintiffs were fined and The Big Board’s license was suspended under regulations passed
pursuant to emergency executive orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See
Notice of Infraction. Therefore, according to plaintiffs, section 7-2308 was in force during the
declared emergency, and the effect of its statutory suspension of section 2-509 procedures rendered
them “without any access to judicial review during the two-year ‘emergency period’” and without
the “ability to challenge the regulations” under which they were fined. Compl. ¶ 69. Plaintiffs
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argue that this claimed suspension of procedures amounts to a denial of the due process guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 67–71.
This claim fails, though, because plaintiffs have not shown that they have standing to bring
it. Standing is a necessary predicate to any exercise of federal jurisdiction; if it is lacking, then the
dispute is not a proper case or controversy under the constitution, and federal courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359, 1361
(D.C. Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim it asserts. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.,
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) that it
has suffered a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury-in-fact; (2) that the injury is
“fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Laidlaw Env’t.
Servs., 528 U.S. at 180-81, citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. The party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
As evidenced by the administrative record in plaintiffs’ case, the full panoply of procedural
rights – including prompt judicial review – was available to plaintiffs when they in fact challenged
the imposition of fines and suspension of The Big Board’s license. 3 Plaintiffs filed an answer to
the Notice of Infraction on March 9, 2022, and they were offered a telephonic evidentiary hearing
3 When assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, “the court must
go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary
to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss.” Fedlman v. FDIC, 879 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
And a court need not accept allegations “insofar as they contradict exhibits to the complaint or
matters subject to judicial notice.” Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 272–73 (D.C. Cir
2018), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22
F.4th 204, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
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less than one month later. See Order Scheduling Telephonic Hr’g, Ex. B to Mot. [Dkt. # 8-2]
(“Hearing Order”) at 1. They appeared at the hearing but declined to call any witnesses or present
any documentary evidence, explaining that they were bringing a “legal, rather than factual
challenge to DC Health’s enforcement action.” Resp. Drane Flannery’s Response to Notice of
Infraction, Ex. C to Mot. [Dkt. # 8-3] at 1. Plaintiffs used the hearing to set a briefing schedule
for their response to the Notice of Infraction, which was completed and followed by several status
conferences. See Order on Summ. Adjudication, Ex. D to Mot. [Dkt. # 8-3] at 2. An administrative
law judge then rendered a decision, finding that the administrative court “d[id] not have the legal
authority to declare the legislation and Mayoral Orders . . . unconstitutional,” as plaintiffs had
requested. Id. at 11. In short, plaintiffs were provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard,
the key components of due process.
Moreover, while plaintiffs make the sweeping assertion that the courthouse doors were
“closed to the regulated persons and entities . . . while the Mayor’s public emergency declaration
remained in effect,” Compl. ¶ 49, this is an unsupported conclusion. See Gulf Coast Mar. Supply,
Inc. v. United States, 867 F.3d 123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (courts do not accept “legal conclusions,
legal contentions couched as factual allegations, and unsupported factual allegations”). More
importantly, they fail to allege any facts to show that they suffered any injury whatsoever due to
any role section 7-2308 may have played during the pandemic.
Plaintiffs have not alleged that section 7-2308 was invoked at all, much less that it served
to abrogate their right to defend against agency action. They have not shown that any judicially
cognizable injury is “fairly traceable” to constitutionally infirm procedures. And they have not
demonstrated how declaring section 7-2308 unconstitutional would redress any such injury.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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III. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claim in
Count III (D.C. Code § 2-510)
Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any civil action in which they
have original jurisdiction, provided that those claims are “so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a district court “may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” when:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts should
consider “judicial economy, convenience[,] and fairness to litigants.” United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). If these considerations are not present, courts should “hesitate
to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” Id.Since the Court has dismissed both of the federal claims on the grounds that it lacks
jurisdiction to hear them, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case.
IV. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Standalone Declaratory
Judgment Act Claim in Count IV (28 U.S.C. § 2201)
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction,” a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
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But the Declaratory Judgment Act “is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.” C&E
Servs., Inc. v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002), quoting Schilling v.
Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). “Rather, the availability of declaratory relief presupposes the
existence of a judicially remediable right.” Id. (internal edits omitted); see also Ali v. Rumsfeld,
649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The Court found that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims, and
it has declined the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. In the absence of any federal jurisdiction,
plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief in Count IV must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. # 8] will be GRANTED.
A separate order will issue.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: December 18, 2023
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