Williams v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES E. WILLIAMS, §
§ No. 404, 2021
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below–Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1610009536 (S)
Appellee. §
Submitted: April 11, 2022
Decided: June 9, 2022
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,
Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) James E. Williams filed this appeal from a Superior Court order
sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”). The State has filed a motion
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Williams’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In 2016, Williams, then a nineteen-year-old male, was indicted for six
sex offenses arising out of his physical contact with a thirteen-year-old female. On
April 19, 2017, Williams pleaded guilty to one count of fourth-degree rape and one
count of unlawful sexual contact, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges. After a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Williams
as follows: for fourth-degree rape, to fifteen years of Level V incarceration,
suspended after the successful completion of the Transitions Sex Offender Program
for decreasing levels of supervision; and for unlawful sexual contact, to three years
of Level V incarceration, suspended for two years of Level III probation. Williams
did not appeal his convictions or sentence.
(3) In 2019, the Superior Court found that Williams had violated the terms
of his probation. The Superior Court re-sentenced Williams on the fourth-degree
rape conviction to twelve years and seven months of Level V incarceration,
suspended for six months served in a program chosen by the Department of
Corrections followed by two years of Level III probation with GPS-monitoring. On
the unlawful-sexual-contact conviction, the Superior Court re-imposed the original
sentence of three years of Level V incarceration, suspended for two years of Level
III probation. In April 2021, the Superior Court again found that Williams had
violated the terms of his probation. The Superior Court re-sentenced Williams on
the fourth-degree rape conviction to eleven years and ten months, suspended for nine
months of Level IV work release followed by one year of Level III probation. On
the unlawful-sexual-contact conviction, the Superior Court sentenced Williams to
three years of incarceration, suspended for six months of Level III probation.
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(4) In October 2021, Williams’ probation officer filed a VOP report,
alleging that Williams had violated the terms of his probation by failing to follow
the rules of the work-release center. Specifically, the VOP report alleged that
Williams had violated the work-release center’s rules because he was fired from his
job at a fast-food restaurant because he had been accused of sexually harassing a
fifteen-year-old female. Following his termination, Williams was transferred from
the work-release center to the VOP center where he allegedly also violated the terms
of his probation by resisting a strip search. On October 28, 2021, the Superior Court
found Williams in violation of the terms of his probation for a third time and deferred
sentencing until Williams’ probation officer was available to address the court. On
November 19, 2021, the Superior Court sentenced Williams on the fourth-degree
rape conviction to eleven years and two months of Level V incarceration, suspended
after two years and the successful completion of a Level V program selected by DOC
for one year of Level III probation, and on the unlawful sexual contact conviction,
to three years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III
probation. This appeal followed.
(5) On appeal, Williams contends that (i) contrary to the allegations in the
VOP report, he complied with the strip search at the VOP center and (ii) his sentence
is excessive. Williams’ claims are unavailing.
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(6) To the extent that Williams argues his probation should not have been
revoked based on his failure to comply with DOC’s strip-search request, this Court
has held many times that it is the appellant’s obligation to supply those portions of
the transcript of the proceedings below that are necessary to give the Court a fair and
accurate account of the context in which the alleged errors arose.1 Williams did not
provide the Court with the VOP hearing transcript. Without it, the Court has no
basis to review Williams’ apparent claim that the evidence presented did not support
a VOP. In any event, Williams acknowledges in his opening brief that he was
terminated from his job because he had been accused of sexual harassment.
Probation is an “act of grace,” and the Superior Court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to revoke a defendant’s probation.2 In a VOP hearing, the State is
only required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated
the terms of his probation.3 A preponderance of evidence is “some competent
evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has
not been as good as required by the conditions of probation.”4 Under the
circumstances presented here, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its
discretion when it revoked Williams’ probation.
1
Trioche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987).
2
Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006).
3
Id.4
Id.
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(7) Williams’ argument that his sentence is excessive is also without merit.
“Appellate review of a sentence is limited to whether the sentence falls within the
statutory limits prescribed by the General Assembly and whether it is based on
factual predicates that are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial
vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.”5 When a sentence falls within the statutory
limits, we review it for abuse of discretion.6 We will not find that the Superior Court
abused its discretion unless it is clear that the sentencing judge relied on
impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.7 After finding that a probationer
has violated the terms of his probation, the Superior Court may impose any period
of incarceration up to and including the balance of Level V time remaining on the
original sentence.8 Although Williams faced more than fourteen years in backup
Level V time, the Superior Court only sentenced him to two years of unsuspended
incarceration. The sentence imposed by the Superior Court clearly falls within
statutory limits. And we note that the allegation in the VOP report—that Williams
was fired from his job because he sexually harassed a teenage female—reflects
Williams’ need for continued treatment, as noted by the Superior Court in its
sentencing order. Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.
5
Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).
6
Id.7
Id.8
11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005).
5
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to affirm
be GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice
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