Pace v. DSCYF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SHAWN PACE,1 §
§
Respondent Below- § No. 598, 2016
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § File Nos. CN13-06414 and
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR § 16-09-10TN
FAMILIES, § Petition Nos. 15-17758 and
§ 16-28103
Petitioner Below- §
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 9, 2017
Decided: June 12, 2017
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and SEITZ, Justices
ORDER
This 12th day of June 2017, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed
under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the
appellee’s response and motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that:
(1) By order dated November 23, 2016, the Family Court terminated the
parental rights of the appellant, Shawn Pace (“Father”), with respect to his then four-
year-old son (“the Child”). This is Father’s appeal from the termination of his
parental rights.
1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
(2) Father’s appointed counsel on appeal has filed an opening brief and a
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c). Counsel asserts that she has
reviewed the record and has determined that no arguable claim for appeal exists. By
letter, Father’s counsel informed him of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c) and provided
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and accompanying brief. Father did not
respond with any points for the Court’s consideration on appeal. The appellee, the
Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families for the State of
Delaware (“the State”), has filed a response to counsel’s Rule 26.1 brief and has
moved to affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(3) The Child was born on June 24, 2012. The State filed a
dependency/neglect petition in June 2015. At the preliminary protective hearing, at
which both parents appeared, the Family Court found probable cause to believe that
the Child was dependent because both of his parents were incarcerated.2 At Father’s
adjudicatory hearing on July 10, 2015, Father stipulated that the Child continued to
be dependent. At a dispositional hearing on September 3, 2015, the State submitted
a proposed reunification plan, which required Father to complete a substance abuse
program, identify a support network to help him care for the Child, complete a
mental health evaluation and follow any treatment recommendations, find
2
The Child’s mother is not a party to this appeal.
2
employment or other means of income, and work with a parent aide and complete a
parenting class.
(4) The Family Court held review hearings in December 2015 and March
2016. In May 2016, the State filed a motion to change the goal from reunification
to TPR/adoption. At the permanency hearing held on May 26, 2016, the Family
Court found that the State had made reasonable efforts at reunification and granted
the State’s motion to change the goal. The State filed its TPR petition on September
13, 2016.
(5) The TPR hearing was held on October 25, 2016. Both parents appeared
with their counsel. The Family Court heard testimony from multiple witnesses. The
evidence as to Father established that Father had not made significant progress
toward any of the elements of his case plan. He had not completed drug treatment,
completed a mental health evaluation, found a job or a support network, and had not
completed a parenting course. He had spent most of the preceding year and a half
incarcerated and, at the time of the hearing, was in prison awaiting resolution of a
charge of Burglary in the Second Degree. Father had not seen the Child in nearly
two-and-a-half years. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court found clear
and convincing evidence that Father had failed to plan for the Child,3 that the State
3
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(b).
3
had made reasonable efforts at reunification, and that termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.4
(6) On appellate review of a termination of parental rights, this Court is
required to consider the facts and the law as well as the inferences and deductions
made by the Family Court.5 We review legal rulings de novo.6 We conduct a limited
review of the factual findings of the trial court to assure that they are sufficiently
supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.7 If the trial judge has correctly
applied the law, our review is limited to abuse of discretion.8
(7) The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires two
separate inquires.9 First, the court must determine whether the evidence presented
meets one of the statutory grounds for termination. 10 Second, the court must
determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.11
When the statutory basis for termination of parental rights is failure to plan
adequately for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional needs,12 there must be proof
4
Id. § 1103(a).
5
Scott v. DSCYF, 2012 WL 605700 (Feb. 27, 2012) (citing Wilson v. Div. of Fam. Services, 988
A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010)).
6
Wilson v. Div. of Fam. Services, 988 A.2d 435, 440 (Del. 2010).
7
Id.
8
Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).
9
Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
10
Id. at 537. See also 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(1-8) (listing the grounds for termination of parental
rights).
11
13 Del. C. § 722(a)(1)-(8) (listing factors to be considered when determining the best interest of
the child).
12
Id. § 1103(a)(5).
4
of a least one additional statutory factor13 and proof that the State made bona fide
reasonable efforts to reunify the family and preserve the family unit.14 All of these
requirements must be established by clear and convincing evidence.15
(8) In this case, the Family Court found clear and convincing evidence that
the Father’s parental rights should be terminated on the statutory basis of failure to
plan. This Court has carefully reviewed the record. We conclude there is ample
evidence to support the Family Court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. We
find no abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s factual findings, and no error in its
application of the law to the facts.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED on the basis of the Family Court’s well-reasoned decision. The
motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
13
Id. § 1103(a)(5)a (listing additional factors).
14
In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989).
15
Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).
5