Coleman v. Stevenson & Dotson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DEVIN COLEMAN, §
§ No. 191, 2018
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ C.A. No. N18C-01-108
MATTHEW STEVENSON and §
RANDALL DOTSON, §
§
Defendants Below, §
Appellees. §
Submitted: July 13, 2018
Decided: September 13, 2018
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Devin Coleman, filed this appeal from a Superior Court
order dismissing his complaint. After careful review of the parties’ briefs and the
record on appeal, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in dismissing the
complaint. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
(2) Coleman has been incarcerated at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
since 2013.1 On December 2, 2017, a prison guard discovered that Coleman
possessed a homemade heating device known as a “stinger” and confiscated the
device. On December 3, 2017, Coleman was served with a disciplinary report
charging him with violations of the Department of Correction rules of conduct,
including possession of dangerous contraband.
(3) On December 4, 2017, Defendant Matthew Stevenson presided over
Coleman’s disciplinary hearing. Coleman admitted to possession of the stinger, but
pled not guilty to possession of dangerous contraband. Stevenson found Coleman
had possessed dangerous contraband in violation of the rules of conduct and imposed
sanctions that included the loss of fifteen days of good time credit. Coleman
unsuccessfully appealed Stevenson’s findings to Defendant Randall Dotson.
(4) On January 12, 2018, Coleman filed a complaint in the Superior Court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Coleman admitted that he was found in possession of a
homemade stinger, but alleged multiple due process violations and that a homemade
stinger did not constitute dangerous contraband. The Superior Court dismissed the
complaint, finding it plainly appeared from the face of the complaint that Coleman
was not entitled to relief. The Superior Court held that the complaint lacked merit
1
The facts stated in this Order are drawn from the allegations of the complaint and are assumed to
be true only for purposes of this appeal from the dismissal of the complaint. Malpiede v. Townson,
780 A.2d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2001).
2
because Coleman’s “admission of guilt to possessing the stinger…was an underlying
basis for a finding of guilty on the possession of dangerous contraband charge.”2
This appeal followed.
(5) We review the Superior Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim de novo.3 Coleman’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as
follows: (i) his homemade stinger was not dangerous contraband; (ii) his due process
rights were violated because he received less than 24 hours’ notice of the disciplinary
hearing, he was not permitted to call a witness at the disciplinary hearing, and
Stevenson failed to provide a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the
reason for the disciplinary action taken; and (iii) the Superior Court erred in
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim before denying his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. These claims are without merit.
(6) The gist of Coleman’s complaint and argument on appeal is that his
homemade stinger could not be dangerous contraband under Rule 1.18 of the
Department of Correction Rules of Conduct. Rule 1.18, which Coleman attached to
his complaint, defines possession of dangerous contraband as:
[u]nauthorized possession of weapons (including fascimiles of these
devices), physical objects that could be used as weapons, explosives,
acids, caustics, materials for incendiary devices, or escape materials;
possession of “critical” tools and material or dangerous tools and
2
Coleman v. Stevenson, C.A. No. N18C-01-108 Order (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2018)
3
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1082.
3
materials. This includes, but is not limited to gasoline, sulfuric acid,
lye, prison-made knives, matches, lighters, and pipe bombs.
Coleman argues that his homemade stinger could not be dangerous contraband
because the Department of Correction Commissary sells immersion heaters, which
perform the same function as stingers—heating water. In making this argument,
Coleman ignores the fact that he did not possess a device sold by the Department of
Correction Commissary. He possessed a jerry-rigged device that could function
improperly and that could be considered a dangerous tool or material under Rule
1.18.4
(7) As to Coleman’s due process claims, the United States Supreme Court
has held that when a prisoner faces a loss of good time credits, he must receive: (i)
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges no less than 24 hours before the
disciplinary hearing; (ii) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense, subject to institutional safety and correctional goals; and
(iii) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons
for the disciplinary action.5 In his complaint, Coleman alleged that he was served
with the disciplinary report charging him with violations of the Department of
Correction rules of conduct on December 3, 2017 and that the disciplinary hearing
4
See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators…should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”).
5
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974).
4
was on December 4, 2017. Although Coleman alleged that he received less than 24
hours’ notice of the hearing, he failed to allege how much notice he received or how
he was prejudiced by receiving less than 24 hours’ notice.
(8) Coleman also failed to provide any description of the desired witness’s
testimony or how that witness’s testimony would be relevant to his defense.6 As to
Stevenson’s finding that Coleman had possessed dangerous contraband, Coleman
alleged that Stevenson’s rationale was based on the December 3, 2017 disciplinary
report. Coleman’s dissatisfaction with Stevenson basing his findings on the
disciplinary report does not state a claim for relief. Coleman admitted that he
possessed a homemade stinger. Under these circumstances, the Superior Court did
not err in dismissing Coleman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Finally,
contrary to Coleman’s contentions, nothing in Delaware’s in forma pauperis statute
precluded the Superior Court from dismissing his complaint for failure to state a
claim and denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
6
For the first time on appeal, Coleman states that this witness would have testified that the stinger
did not work. Coleman did not include this allegation in his complaint. We will not consider it
for the first time on appeal. Supr. Ct. R. 8.
5