Manley v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MICHAEL MANLEY, §
§ No. 344, 2014
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: October 18, 2017
Decided: October 20, 2017
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 20th day of October 2017, it appears to the Court that the judgment of
the Superior Court should be affirmed largely on the basis of and for the reasons
assigned in its decision dated May 29, 2014.1 In particular, we agree with the
Superior Court that the claims in this repetitive Rule 61 petition were procedurally
barred.
In addition, as to the Strickland claims, like the Superior Court, we cannot
conclude that any of the supposedly deficient actions of trial counsel, had they been
done differently, would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome,
1
State v. Manley, 2014 WL 2621317 (Del. Super. May 29, 2014).
whether taken individually or collectively. Although Manley takes issue with
aspects of counsel’s performance, as a general matter, trial counsel had a reasonable
strategy and aggressively tried to create reasonable doubt about the state’s case
against Manley. But, as the Superior Court found, no prejudice within the meaning
of Strickland was shown because the reality was that Manley was captured shortly
after the murder while fleeing a vehicle with the beneficiary of the witness-murder.
Given this evidence and the other evidence in the case, the marginalia Manley now
contends would have been admitted if counsel had acted differently does not, as the
Superior Court found, come close to creating a reasonable probability of a different
outcome. None of that marginalia would have meaningfully changed the mix of
evidence, and most importantly, none of it would have explained how Manley came
to be riding in and fleeing from a vehicle with Stevenson within a short period after
the murder.
The parties and this Court are in agreement that under this Court’s decisions
of Rauf v. State2 and Powell v. State,3 Manley’s death sentence must be vacated and
he must be sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life without
benefit of probation, parole, or any other reduction.4
2
Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).
3
Powell v. State, 2016 WL 7243546 (Del. Dec. 15, 2016).
4
11 Del. C. § 4209(d)(2).
2
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for
resentencing.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
3