Anderson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KEENAN ANDERSON, §
§ No. 578, 2018
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1705015040 (N)
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: April 5, 2019
Decided: May 14, 2019
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the
State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On January 23, 2018, a Superior Court jury found the appellant, Keenan
Anderson, guilty of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”) and
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (“CCDW”) and not guilty of Possession of
Firearm Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”). After granting the State’s
motion to declare Anderson a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(c), the
Superior Court sentenced Anderson as follows: (i) for PFBPP, fifteen years of Level
V incarceration; (ii) for CCDW, eight years of Level V incarceration.1 This is
Anderson’s direct appeal.
(2) In August 2017, Anderson was charged by indictment with multiple
crimes, including PFBPP, PABPP, and CCDW.2 At trial, Detective Raymond
Mullin of the Wilmington Police Department testified that he arrested Anderson on
May 23, 2017.3 During a pat-down search of Anderson, Detective Mullin found a
gun concealed in Anderson’s pants.
(3) Detective Mullin testified that he removed the magazine from the gun
and turned both over to Detective Alexis Schupp, who tagged them for evidence.
Detective Schupp testified that there were seven bullets in the magazine. He also
testified that Anderson did not have a permit for the gun. Detective Joran Merced
interviewed Anderson who admitted that he had a gun. The State played a redacted
version of the interview at trial.
(4) The parties stipulated that Anderson was prohibited from possessing a
gun. Anderson exercised his right not to testify and did not submit any evidence.
The jury found Anderson guilty of PFBPP and CCDW. The jury found Anderson
not guilty of PABPP. This appeal followed.
1
The Superior Court also sentenced Anderson for violations of probation.
2
The other charges were severed.
3
The parties stipulated that Anderson was lawfully detained.
2
(5) On appeal, Anderson’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and
a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably
appealable issues. Counsel informed Anderson of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and
provided Anderson with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying
brief.
(6) Counsel also informed Anderson of his right to identify any points he
wished this Court to consider on appeal. Anderson has raised points for this Court’s
consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(7) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an
adversary presentation.4 Anderson argues that three jurors should not have served
on the jury because: (i) one juror stated in the jury questionnaire that he knew
someone in law enforcement, but failed (as did several other prospective jurors) to
come forward initially when the Superior Court instructed such people to come
4
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).
3
forward for further questioning; (ii) one juror provided an insufficiently definitive
response regarding whether three relatives in law enforcement would impact his
ability to be impartial; and (iii) one juror’s father was a magistrate judge and knew
two law enforcement officers.
(8) These claims were not raised below so we review for plain error.5 Plain
error “is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record;
which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”6
In addressing juror impartiality, this Court has explained:
Determinations of juror impartiality are the responsibility of the trial
judge who has the opportunity to question the juror, observe his or her
demeanor, and evaluate the ability of the juror to render a fair verdict.
Because the trial court's findings will largely rest on the judge's
personal observation of the voir dire proceedings and on the credibility
of the parties, a reviewing court should give those findings great
deference.7
(9) The Superior Court judge asked each of the three jurors whether they
could be fair and impartial in light of their relation to people who worked in law
enforcement. All three jurors responded that they could be fair and impartial. The
juror who stated “I don’t think so” when asked whether he thought three relatives in
law enforcement would make him unable to be impartial, also stated “I’m a
5
Supr. Ct. R. 8.
6
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
7
DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630, 636 (Del. 1987) (citations omitted).
4
scientist….And I analyze the data before I make a judgment.”8 The Superior Court
was in the best position to evaluate the ability of the three jurors to render a fair
verdict. Anderson has not shown any plain error in the Superior Court’s
determination that these jurors could render a fair verdict.
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
Anderson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine
the record and the law and has properly determined that Anderson could not raise a
meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
8
Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at A28.
5