Miller v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TREY M. MILLER, §
§ No. 241, 2018
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ I.D. Nos. 1203015202 (N) and
STATE OF DELAWARE, § 1208012177 (N)
§ (Consolidated)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: February 13, 2019
Decided: April 18, 2019
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
On this 18th day of April 2019, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, oral
argument, and the record of the case, it appears that:
(1) The appellant, Trey M. Miller, appeals the Superior Court’s denial of
his motion to modify a sentence he received for violating the terms of his probation.
On appeal, he contends that the sentence imposed was the result of a closed mind,
judicial vindictiveness, or bias on the part of the sentencing judge. He urges us to
vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
(2) At the violation of probation hearing, the State recommended that
Miller be sentenced to one year at Level V with no probation to follow. In its
answering brief on appeal, the State calculates that the presumptive sentence under
the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission’s sentencing guidelines was
three years and three months at Level V. The sentence imposed by the court,
however, was eight years of unsuspended Level V time, followed by probation.
This sentence significantly exceeded both the State’s recommendation and the
sentencing guidelines. In addition to arguing that the sentence was the result of a
closed mind, judicial vindictiveness, or bias on the part of the judge, Miller contends
that the judge was required, and failed, to (1) consider Miller’s character and the
nature of his probation violations and (2) give a sufficient explanation for imposing
a penalty more severe than the penalty recommended by the State or the guidelines.
(3) Because Miller’s sentence is within the statutory limits and because
Miller fails to point to any evidence of a closed mindedness, judicial vindictiveness,
or bias on the part of the judge, we have concluded that the judgment of the Superior
Court should be affirmed. It was within the Superior Court’s discretion to impose
a sentence within the statutory limits, and the court gave legitimate reasons for
imposing a harsher sentence than the sentence recommended by the State or the
guidelines.
(4) On March 5, 2013, Miller pleaded guilty to Robbery in the Second
Degree, Burglary in the Second Degree, Theft over $1,500, and Conspiracy in the
Second Degree. He was sentenced to five years at Level V, suspended after two
years for two years at Level III on the robbery conviction. For the burglary
2
conviction, he was sentenced to eight years at Level V, suspended after one year for
two years at Level III. For the theft conviction, he was sentenced to two years at
Level V, suspended for twelve months at Level III. And for the conspiracy
conviction, he was sentenced to two years at Level V, suspended for twelve months
at Level III.
(5) On October 14, 2014, the Superior Court reviewed Miller’s sentence,
and he was released from Level V and began serving a period of Level III probation.
Following his release, Miller violated his probation four times and failed to appear
in the Superior Court on several occasions. On January 6, 2015, the Superior Court
sentenced Miller for his first violation of probation to six months of unsuspended
Level V time followed by probation. On April 26, 2016, the court sentenced Miller
for his second violation of probation to a probationary term without any unsuspended
Level V time. As for the other violations, Miller failed to appear at violation of
probation hearings scheduled for September 2016, November 2016, January 2017,
April 2017, August 2017, and February 2018.
(6) On March 6, 2018, at the violation of probation hearing that led to this
appeal, Miller admitted and the Superior Court found that he violated his probation
by absconding from probation and failing to report for appointments at the Treatment
Access Center. At the hearing, the court heard from the State, Miller’s counsel,
and Miller himself. Miller’s probation officer recommended that Miller be
3
sentenced to a total of one year at Level V and that he then be discharged from
probation as unimproved. Miller presented mitigating circumstances for the court
to consider. He explained that during the period of time when some of the
probation violations occurred, he was grieving the loss of his three-month-old
daughter, who had passed away in September 2016, and that he had not received any
counseling to deal with this. Miller also noted that more recently, he had been
working at a mushroom factory and was living with his grandparents, for whom he
helped provide care. He asked the court to take into consideration the technical
nature of his violations, the time he served for the underlying crimes, his drug
addiction, which was compounded by the loss of his child, his employment status,
and his family support and to consider a sentence of six months at Level V.
(7) Following Miller’s remarks, the court made comments and asked Miller
some questions. The court noted that Miller did not appear to take probation or
sentencing seriously and asked for an explanation as to why “[e]very time bail is
posted for him, he does not come back like he’s supposed to do.”1 The court further
commented on his family’s ability to post bail for him in the past and noted that,
when this happened, he did not come back to court as required. The court stated to
Miller, “apparently, you disregard the Court and everything that the Court has to say
1
App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A078.
4
to you[,] and your family is not able to control you.”2 The court also noted that
Miller appeared to be attempting to “manipulate the Court.”3
(8) The court then sentenced Miller as follows. As to his robbery
conviction, he was sentenced to three years at Level V; as to his burglary conviction,
six years at Level V, suspended after three years for one year of Level IV home
confinement, suspended after six months for six months at Level III; as to his theft
conviction, two years at level V, suspended after one year for one year of Level IV
home confinement, suspended after six months for six months at Level III; and as to
his conspiracy conviction, two years at Level V, suspended after one year for one
year of Level IV home confinement, suspended after six months for six months at
Level III. All sentences of confinement were set to run consecutively, thus
resulting in a total of eight years of unsuspended Level V confinement.
(9) On March 19, 2018, Miller filed a motion for sentence reduction in
which he challenged the length of the sentence. Noting its “considerable discretion
over the appropriate grounds for a reduction of sentence” and Miller’s criminal
history, the Superior Court denied Miller’s motion.4 In denying his motion, the
court explained that “his record reflects an inability or unwillingness to follow the
2
Id. at A080.
3
Id.
4
Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. C, at 4 (quoting State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002)
(en banc)).
5
rules of probation” and that “it does not appear as though his family network is able
to get [him] to abide by the rules of probation or appear on Court dates.”5
(10) Appellate review of a sentence is limited to whether the sentence is
within the statutory limits prescribed by the General Assembly and whether it is (1)
based on factual predicates that are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability
or (2) the result of a closed mind or judicial vindictiveness or bias.6 “When the
sentence is within the statutory limits, this Court will not find an abuse of discretion
unless it is clear that the sentencing judge relied on impermissible factors or
exhibited a closed mind.” 7 Put differently, “a defendant has no legal or
constitutional right to appeal a statutorily authorized sentence simply because it does
not conform to the sentencing guidelines established by the Sentencing
Accountability Commission.”8
(11) Miller first argues that the sentence he received was the result of a
closed mind. “A judge sentences with a closed mind when the sentence is based
on a preconceived bias without consideration of the nature of the offense or the
character of the defendant.”9 Apart from pointing out that the sentencing judge
imposed a sentence that was much longer than the one recommended by the State or
5
Id.6
Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 409, 416 (Del. 2010) (en banc).
7
Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).
8
Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992).
9
Weston, 832 A.2d at 746.
6
called for under the guidelines and that the judge did not discuss on the record his
claimed mitigating factors, Miller fails to point to anything indicating that the judge
had a closed mind. Unlike in Osburn v. State, for example, where the sentencing
judge expressly refused to hear mitigating evidence,10 the sentencing judge here
listened to the statements of Miller and his counsel. To the extent Miller’s
argument is that the Superior Court failed to sufficiently articulate its reasons for
departing from the guidelines, it necessarily fails. Because the guidelines provide
“no basis for appeal,” the sentencing court’s failure to articulate its reasons for
imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines cannot amount to reversible error.11
(12) Miller next argues that his sentence was the result of judicial
vindictiveness or bias. He cites Tramill v. State, where this Court reversed
increased sentences following a retrial after a successful appeal from the original
trial because the sentencing court failed to specifically state the reasons for the
increases.12 The holding of Tramill is inapplicable here. That case involved the
distinct context of an increased sentence of someone convicted on retrial after a
successful appellate attack on his original conviction.13 In that situation, United
States Supreme Court precedent imposes a presumption of vindictiveness. 14
10
224 A.2d 52, 53 (Del. 1966).
11
Mayes, 604 A.2d at 846 (quoting Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765, 767 (Del. 1990)).
12
425 A.2d 142, 145-46 (Del. 1980).
13
Id. at 145.
14
E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
7
Because Miller’s sentence was not imposed in that context, there is no presumption
of vindictiveness. Therefore, the strict requirements of Tramill—that the judge’s
reasons for imposing a more severe sentence affirmatively appear in the record and
be based on conduct occurring after the imposition of the original sentence 15—do
not apply. Moreover, in this case the Superior Court did state the reasons for its
sentence: Miller’s apparent disregard for the court’s authority and his inability to
comply with the requirements of his probation.16 These reasons were based on
Miller’s conduct occurring after the imposition of his original sentence. Other than
Tramill, Miller cites to no case supporting his argument that the sentencing judge
acted vindictively or with bias.
(13) In his Reply Brief, Miller argues that the Superior Court was vindictive
because the court inquired as to the “back-up” time for his robbery conviction.
Asking how much unserved Level V time remained on the robbery conviction can
hardly be considered evidence of judicial vindictiveness. The court likely asked
this question to ensure that it would not (as it legally could not) exceed the remaining
Level V time for that sentence.
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
15
425 A.2d at 145.
16
See Cruz, 990 A.2d at 417 (“[G]iven Cruz’s history of violating probation, it was well within
the Superior Court’s discretion to revoke his probation and impose a prison sentence,
notwithstanding the probation officer’s recommendation to the contrary.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
9