Lloyd v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ERIC C. LLOYD, §
§ No. 260, 2021
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1710006739 (N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: July 13, 2022
Decided: September 22, 2022
Before , SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
On this 22nd day of September 2022, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs,
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The Defendant-Below, Appellant, Eric Lloyd, appeals from the Superior
Court’s denial of his Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. A jury found the
defendant guilty of Racketeering, Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering, Conspiracy
in the Second Degree to Deal Cocaine, Money Laundering, Conspiracy to Commit
Money Laundering, and Attempting to Evade or Defeat Tax. The court merged the
Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering conviction into the Racketeering charge. On
the Racketeering and Attempting to Evade or Defeat Tax charges, the defendant was
sentenced to 25 years at Supervision Level V and five years at Supervision Level V,
respectively, with both Level V sentences to be served pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
4204(k). In addition, they are to be served consecutively. The defendant was
sentenced to probation on the other charges. The defendant makes four claims on
appeal. First, he contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by imposing
a sentence that exceeds the presumptive SENTAC sentence without setting forth on
the record its reasons for doing so in violation of 11 Del. C. § 4204(n). Second, he
contends the Superior Court abused its discretion by applying § 4204(k) without
identifying aggravating factors on the record, in the sentencing order, or on the
sentencing worksheet. Third, he contends the Superior Court abused its discretion
by imposing a sentence in excess of the presumptive range based on false
information and information lacking a minimal indicium of reliability. Finally, he
contends that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we reject the defendant’s contentions and
affirm.
(2) The facts are discussed in detail in our opinion denying Lloyd’s direct
appeal. 1 We summarize them here. Lloyd was the leader of a sprawling drug
dealing enterprise in Wilmington. Beginning in 2015, enterprise members sold
large amounts of cocaine and heroin. Lloyd enlisted members to distribute cocaine
1
Lloyd v. State, 249 A.3d 768 (Del. 2021).
2
on a consignment basis. He concealed illegal drug sale proceeds through the
purchase of investment properties, gambling, and sports betting. Lloyd and his co-
defendant, Dwayne White, created LLCs to purchase real estate, only to quickly
transfer the title to a friend or family member.
(3) In 2005 Lloyd was sentenced in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware to 14 years of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, followed by five years of
probation. He was released on May 22, 2015. On March 6, 2017, he received a five
year probationary sentence after pleading guilty in Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas to the manufacture, delivery or possession with intent to manufacturer or
deliver illegal substances. On or about May 4, 2017, he was reincarcerated for
violating his federal probation. At that time, he transferred control of the enterprise
to White. White expanded the enterprise into heroin sales. Lloyd continued to
communicate with members of the enterprise while in prison. At times Lloyd would
discuss enterprise business and the challenges of running a large-scale operation. He
also continued to manage his investments from prison.
(4) On or about October 16, 2017, a New Castle County grand jury returned
a multi-count indictment against Lloyd and thirty-three other defendants in this case.
3
At trial he was convicted of the offenses identified above. At sentencing, the trial
judge’s comments included the following:
I did preside over the trial, so I’m familiar with the facts
in the case, and to use [Lloyd’s counsel’s] words, there are
a lot of blurring of facts and responsibility and
involvement, but the bottom line is that the State prove[d]
there is beyond a reasonable doubt one large sprawling –
I’ll call it dangerous racketeering enterprise. And I say
“dangerous” because so many drugs were involved, and
when we speak of victims, who knows who could ever
guess how many victims there were of either becoming
addicted, of aggravating their addiction, of persons who
were addicted [to] committing crimes. It’s just a great big
tangled kind of web, these drug operations . . . we’re
talking not just about crime, but about the business of
crime.
*****
You made the choice after serving a 14-year Federal
sentence for re-engaging in the drug racketeering business.
And as [the prosecutor] pointed out, it preceded your
going back into prison for a relatively short Violation of
Probation stay.
As the State pointed out in its memorandum, you just tried
to do what you could to facilitate this drug business in and
out of jail.
*****
What’s most concerning to me, and I think concerning to
the State, is after you served a lengthy prison sentence in
– for a drug charge, you came back, and you made the
voluntary decision to reimmerse yourself in the drug
4
world. And I think the State’s emphasis, speaking of
factors, is lack of amenability to lesser sanctions.
*****
Here, a 14-year sentence didn’t get that message to you,
and if one of the functions of a sentence is to keep the
streets of Delaware and elsewhere safe, it’s to put behind
bars and into jail people who might be likely to re-offend
when they get out.
*****
[O]ne of the purposes, not the only, of a sentencing is to
send a message to the community so that persons in the
community may learn that – and find out that this kind of
activity is going to lead to a very significant jail sentence.2
The judge then imposed the above-described sentences.
(5) In his direct appeal to this Court, Lloyd argued, in part, that his sentence
of thirty years of incarceration without the option of early release violated his
constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.3 This Court rejected his arguments and
affirmed his conviction and sentence.4 On May 3, 2021, Lloyd filed a motion
pursuant to Superior Court Rule 35 to correct his sentence averring that his sentence
is illegal due to the imposition of § 4204(k) to his racketeering and tax convictions.5
2
Id. at A86-89.
3
Lloyd, 249 A.3d at 783.
4
Id. at 783-85.
5
App. to Corr. Opening Br. at A51-92.
5
On August 11, 2021, the Superior Court issued an order denying Lloyd’s motion.6
(6) We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence for abuse of
discretion.7 To the extent the claim involves a question of law, we review the
claim de novo.8 However, if a defendant fails to fairly present a claim in the trial
court, it is waived on appeal absent a finding of plain error.9 “Under the plain error
standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”10
(7) Lloyd challenges the legality of his sentence under Superior Court Rule
35(a), which permits the court to correct an illegal sentence “at any time.” “The
narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to
reexamine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition
of sentence.”11 This Court has held that relief under Rule 35(a) is available when
the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits, violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause, “is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is
to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by
statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the
6
Corr. Opening Br. Ex. A [hereinafter Op.].
7
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
8
Id.9
Dickinson v. State, 2022 WL 12099, at *2 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022).
10
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
11
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 430 (1962)).
6
judgment of conviction did not authorize.”12
(8) In the Superior Court, Lloyd presented only one of the claims he presents
here, the second one—that the sentencing court “did not comply with SENTAC
policy by stating the reason of the imposition of sentences pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
4204(k).”13 Therefore, only his second claim will be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. The other three will be reviewed for plain error. However, we will take
the four claims in order.
(9) The first claim is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by imposing
a sentence that exceeds the presumptive SENTAC sentence without setting forth on
the record its reasons for doing so in violation of 11 Del. C. § 4204(n). That
subsection provides that whenever a court imposes a sentence inconsistent with the
presumptive sentences adopted by the Sentencing Accountability Commission
(“SENTAC”), the “court shall set forth on the record its reasons for imposing such
penalty.”14 In this case, the presumptive sentence for Racketeering was two to five
years at Supervision Level V. The statutory minimum and maximum were two to
25 years at Levell V.15 The presumptive sentence for Attempting to Evade or Defeat
Tax was up to 12 months at Level II. The statutory range was zero to five years at
12
Id.
13
App. to Corr. Opening Br. at A38.
14
11 Del. C. § 4204(n).
15
SENTAC Benchbook 2019 at 38.
7
Level V.16 Lloyd argues that the sentencing court “did not follow the directives
imposed by SENTAC and reiterated by this Court as it did not state, with any
particularity, what factors it used to give a sentence that was inconsistent”17 with the
presumptive sentences.
(10) Lloyd’s argument is not persuasive. At sentencing, the court discussed
several factors it considered in making its determination, including that Lloyd was
involved in a particularly large and dangerous racketeering enterprise, not just crime,
but the business of crime, and he re-engaged in a significant drug racketeering
business after a 14 year sentence federal sentence. The 14 year sentence, the court
reasoned, was not sufficient to deter Lloyd from voluntarily reimmersing himself in
the drug racketeering enterprise. We have previously noted that “a trial court must
explain its reasons for [departing from the presumptive sentence], ‘but it is
authorized to exceed SENTAC guidelines without making any factual findings
beyond those reflected in the jury’s verdict.’”18 In this case, the sentencing judge
sufficiently explained on the record his reasons for departing from the SENTAC
guidelines. There is no plain error.
(11) Lloyd’s second claim is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by
failing to identify aggravating factors on the record, in the sentencing order, or in the
16
Id. at 63.
17
Corr. Opening Br. at 8.
18
White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 412 (Del. Dec. 10, 2020) (quoting Benge v. State, 2004 WL
2743431, at *2 (Del. Nov. 12, 2004)).
8
sentencing worksheet, when it applied 11 Del. C. § 4204(k) to his sentence. Section
4204(k) allows the sentencing court to require that a Level V sentence “be served
without benefit of any form of early release, good time, furlough, work release,
supervised custody or any other form of reduction or diminution of sentence.” The
use of § 4204(k) is treated as a departure from the presumptive guidelines, and
SENTAC and this Court have noted that it should be reserved for appropriate cases,
such as ones in which the need for the protection of the public is predominate.19
Because § 4204(k) is treated as a departure from SENTAC, the court must state on
the record its reason for the departure.20
(12) Lloyd argues that the sentencing court erred in applying § 4204(k)
because it failed to identify any aggravating factors on the record, in the sentencing
order, or on the sentencing worksheet. Lloyd lists 18 aggravating factors enumerated
in the SENTAC bench book and argues that because the sentencing court did not
specifically name or list any of these aggravating factors, he is left to guess which
factors accounted for his “exceptional sentence.”21 However, nothing in the
SENTAC guidelines states that a sentencing judge must assert one of these specific
aggravating factors. The guidelines state that these factors “are provided as
examples and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for departure.”22 The court
19
Id. at 413-14; SENTAC Benchbook 2019 at 30.
20
See White, 243 A.3d at 414.
21
Corr. Opening Br. at 15.
22
SENTAC Benchbook 2019 at 132.
9
did provide factors on the record that led to its decision. As the Superior Court
noted, this Court has already reviewed this sentence on direct appeal, and implicit in
our decision on that appeal is that the explanation given by the sentencing court was
sufficient to allow us to complete our review.23 Moreover, the Superior Court did,
in fact, include several of the enumerated aggravating factors in its sentencing order,
specifically: lack of remorse, undue depreciation of offense, repetitive criminal
conduct, custody status at time of offense, and lack of amenability.24
(13) Lloyd also seems to argue that the imposition of § 4204(k) makes the
sentence “not within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.” 25 Lloyd
argues that because the SENTAC guidelines provide that a Level V offender could
be eligible for release after serving 75% of their sentence, Lloyd’s inability to qualify
for time deduction “means that he will be serving more time than the statutory
maximum contemplated by the legislature.”26 This is an incorrect interpretation.
This Court has stated that the plain language § 4204(k) allows the sentencing court
to “require a sentence to be served day for day.”27 The court is only required to state
the reasons for its imposition of § 4204(k). The court gave sufficient reasoning for
its imposition of Section 4204(k). The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
23
Op. at 5-6.
24
App. to Corr. Opening Br. at A35.
25
Corr. Opening Br. at 15-16.
26
Id. at 16.
27
White, 243 A.3d at 413.
10
or explaining a sentence to be served at 11 Del. C. § 4204(k).
(14) Lloyd’s next argument is that the sentence was based on inaccurate or
unreliable information. Lloyd’s argument here rests on the assumption that the
sentencing court made its decision based on two of the SENTAC enumerated
aggravating factors, Repetitive Criminal Conduct, and Lack of Amenability. Lloyd
essentially argues that these factors were not applicable in this case because his
previous crimes did not meet the definition of “repetitive criminal conduct” provided
by SENTAC and his three years out of jail after release from federal prison with only
one violation shows an amenability to treatment.
(15) It is not necessary for us to determine whether or not the aggravating
factors repetitive criminal conduct and lack of amenability are applicable in this
case. As discussed, the enumerated aggravating factors provided by SENTAC are
merely examples and suggestions. The sentencing court here explained in detail
why it imposed a sentence greater than the presumptive sentence. None of the
reasons given by the court were based on any false information or information
lacking a minimal indicium of reliability. As the sentencing judge noted at the
hearing, he had presided over Lloyd’s trial and was deciding based on the facts
presented at trial and at the hearing. Moreover, Lloyd does not challenge three other
enumerated aggravating factors listed by the judge in the sentencing order: lack of
remorse, undue depreciation of the offense, and custody status at the time of the
11
offense. There is no plain error.
(16) Finally, Lloyd contends that his sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. On direct appeal,
Lloyd argued that “his sentence of thirty years of incarceration without the option of
early release violates his constitutional protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.”28 Applying the proportionality test articulated in Crosby v. State,29
this Court held: “Given the severity of Lloyd’s crimes, a threshold comparison
relative to the sentence imposed does not lead to an inference of gross
disproportionality.”30 Therefore, this Court has already held that Lloyd’s sentence
was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(17) Lloyd attempts a slightly different argument here and contends that he
“will serve more time than what the General Assembly contemplated to be the
maximum penalty of 25 years on the racketeering and the five years on the
attempting to evade or defeat tax charge as those maximums included good time,
early release etc.”31 As previously discussed, however, just because the imposition
of § 4204(k) removes the possibility of an early release, it does not move the
sentence outside of the statutory limits. This Court has consistently held that the
language of § 4204(k) allows the court to mandate that the sentence be served day
28
Lloyd v. State, 249 A.3d 768, 783 (Del. 2021).
29
824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003).
30
Lloyd, 249 A.3d at 758.
31
Corr. Opening Br. at 26.
12
for day.32 The sentencing court is required only to state for the record its reasonings
for departing from the presumptive sentence, which it did here. There is no plain
error.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
32
White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 413 (Del. Dec. 10, 2020).
13