Coppedge v. US Bank National

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES COPPEDGE & KRISHA §
JOHNSON COPPEDGE, §
§
Defendants Below, §
Appellants, § No. 466, 2014
§
v. §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
US Bank National Association, as § of the State of Delaware,
Trustee for BAFC 2007-3 assignee § in and for Kent County,
of Mortgage Electronic Registration § C.A. No. K11L-02-042
System, Inc., as nominee for §
American Home Mortgage, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 29, 2014
Decided: November 5, 2014
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 5th day of October 2014, upon consideration of the appellants’ opening
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm,1 and the record below, it appears to the Court
that:
(1) The appellants, James Coppedge and Krisha Johnson Coppedge (the
“Coppedges”), filed an appeal from the Superior Court’s August 22, 2014 order
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The Court has not considered the Coppedges’ request to respond to the motion affirm, which is
essentially a response to the motion to affirm. Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), a response to a
motion to affirm is not permitted unless it is requested by the Court.
denying their motion to set aside a prior judgment and to stay a sheriff’s sale. The
appellee, US Bank National Association, as Trustee for BAFC 2007-3 assignee of
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., as nominee for American Home
Mortgage (“Bank”), has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the
ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without
merit.2 We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that, in February 2011, the Bank filed a complaint
against the Coppedges seeking to foreclose on their property located at 52 Barkley
Court, Dover, Delaware 19904 (the “Property”), due to their failure to make
mortgage payments. The complaint was filed pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3901(a),
which requires the defendant to file an affidavit setting forth the nature of any
defense with factual specificity. Instead of filing the required affidavit, the
Coppedges filed a document titled “Affidavit of Rebuttal to Complaint by
Counterclaim and Petition for Sanctions” that failed to conform either to the
Superior Court Civil Rules or to the requirements of Section 3901. The Coppedges
also filed additional unintelligible documents.
(3) The Bank moved for summary judgment, requesting that the Superior
Court strike the Coppedges' answer to the complaint, deem the allegations in the
complaint admitted under Section 3901(d), enter judgment in favor of the Bank,
2
Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
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and bar any future frivolous pleadings by the Coppedges. By an order and opinion
dated September 15, 2011, the Superior Court, deeming the allegations in the
complaint to be admitted under Section 3901(d), granted the Bank's motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court.3
(4) The Bank proceeded to a sheriff’s sale, but the sale was stayed after
the Coppedges filed for bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy action was dismissed,
the Bank filed an alias writ of levari facias on June 10, 2014 to reinitiate the sale
process. James Coppedge then filed a document titled “Petition/Motion to Set
Aside Judgment of Sheriff’s Sale Due to Full Settlement of the Accounting and
Stay Proceeding Pending Trial By Jury, Pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)6(1)(2),
11(b), 11(c), Title USC 1933, 18 USCA §§ 1961(5), 1962(c), 18 USC 241, 242.”
The Bank opposed the motion, arguing that the mortgage remained in default and
the Coppedges continued to make unintelligible arguments. Based upon its
September 2011 decision and in the absence of anything significant provided by
the Coppedges since that decision, the Superior Court denied the motion. This
appeal followed.
(5) On appeal, the Coppedges assert a variety of confusing claims that can
be fairly summarized as follows: (i) they were deprived of a jury trial; (ii) the
3
Coppedge v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2011 WL 6393197 (Del. Dec. 19, 2011).
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mortgage debt was discharged by a $465,958.57 money order or personal check;
(iii) the Bank did not respond to various affidavits sent by the Coppedges; (iv) an
artificial entity cannot sue living persons; (v) the Superior Court lacked personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction; (vi) the Bank did not provide the
original, wet ink note; and (vii) the Bank cannot foreclose on the Property. We
review the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment and a motion to stay for
abuse of discretion.4
(6) The Coppedges have not shown they were entitled to a jury trial after
they failed to answer the complaint in compliance with 10 Del. C. § 3901, the
Superior Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and this Court
affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The Coppedges also fail to cite any
relevant authority in support of their contentions that: (i) the Bank was required to
respond to the various affidavits they sent; (ii) the Bank could not sue living
persons; and (iii) the Bank had to produce an original, wet ink note in order to
foreclose on the Property. The record reflects that the Superior Court had
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the Bank’s claim.
(7) The record also reflects that the mortgage debt remained unsatisfied.
The $465,958. 57 money order to be paid from a United States Treasury Account
4
In re Marta, 672 A.2d 984, 987 (Del. 1996) (denial of motion to stay reviewed for abuse of
discretion); Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1977) (denial
of motion to open judgment is within discretion of Superior Court).
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funded by an alleged $465,958.57 payment to the Internal Revenue Service and the
$465,958.57 personal check with the handwritten notations “Certified,” “For
E.F.T. Only,” and “Not For Deposit” were returned to the Coppedges with a
request for payoff by legal U.S. tender. Finally, the record does not support the
Coppedges’ claim that the Bank was unable to foreclose on the Property. Under
these circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in concluding that there was no
basis for setting the aside the prior judgment and in denying the motion to set aside
the prior judgment and to stay the sheriff’s sale.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice
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