Hackett v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
VICTOR HACKETT, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 200, 2019
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. N0609019128
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: August 23, 2019
Decided: October 16, 2019
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Victor Hackett, appeals from the Superior Court’s order
sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”). The State has filed a motion
to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face
of Hackett’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that Hackett pleaded guilty on December 4, 2006 to
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine. As part of the plea, Hackett agreed that
he was subject to sentencing as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and
acknowledged that the Superior Court was required to impose no fewer than fifteen
years of imprisonment. In exchange for this plea, the State agreed to drop other
charges. The Superior Court sentenced Hackett to twenty years of imprisonment,
suspended after fifteen years for five years at Level IV halfway house inpatient
substance abuse treatment, suspended after nine months for eighteen months at Level
III probation.
(3) Hackett did not file a direct appeal, but after an appeal from a motion
for correction of illegal sentence,1 on December 4, 2015 the Superior Court
resentenced Hackett to fifteen years of imprisonment, followed by nine months at
Level IV halfway house inpatient substance abuse treatment, followed by eighteen
months at Level III probation. This sentence is the “original” sentence for purposes
of the current appeal. The sentence was effective December 4, 2006, and gave
Hackett credit for thirteen days previously served. As a result, Hackett’s release
date, before accounting for good time or meritorious credit, was November 20, 2021.
(4) On or about March 30, 2019, the Department of Correction (“DOC”)
transferred Hackett to the Level IV Crest substance abuse program. Hackett refused
to participate in the program and was charged with a violation of probation (“VOP”).
At a VOP hearing on April 18, 2019, the Superior Court found Hackett in violation
of his probation and sentenced him to two years and six months of imprisonment,
1
See Hackett v. State, 2015 WL 4463789 (Del. July 21, 2015) (holding that the suspended portion
of the term of imprisonment was in violation of Section 4214(a) and that the sentence was required
to include a transition period under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l)).
2
with credit for eighteen days served, suspended immediately for one year of Level
IV supervision at DOC discretion, followed by eighteen months of Level III
probation.
(5) On appeal from his VOP sentence, Hackett argues that (i) the Superior
Court erred by imposing the VOP sentence because the sentence exceeds the original
sentence, (ii) the court acted contrary to 11 Del. C. § 4204(n) by “fail[ing] to give
its reasons for going past the original habitual sentence,” and (iii) the probationary
period of the sentence should be limited to six months under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l).
(6) After careful consideration, we find no merit to Hackett’s appeal. Our
review of a sentence generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within
the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.2 When sentencing a defendant for
a VOP, the trial court may impose any period of incarceration up to and including
the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on the original sentence.3 In
this case, the Superior Court accounted for the time Hackett had already served and
sentenced Hackett to two years and six months, which was a slightly shorter period
of incarceration than the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on his
original sentence, which was approximately two years and seven months. The court
also suspended that Level V time immediately for a lower level of supervision. This
2
Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992).
3
11 Del. C. § 4334(c).
3
sentence did not exceed the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on
Hackett’s sentence. Similarly, because the term of imprisonment imposed in the
original sentence was mandated by the habitual offender statute and the VOP
sentence did not exceed the original sentence, Hackett’s argument concerning
Section 4204(n) is without merit.
(7) Finally, Hackett’s contention that the probationary period must be
limited to six months under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) is without merit. As we have
previously held, “Section 4204(l) sets a minimum, not a maximum, period of
transition time.”4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
4
Hackett v. State, 2016 WL 4091242, at *2 (Del. July 18, 2016).
4