DocketNumber: No. 672, 2012
Judges: Jacobs, Ridgely, Steele
Filed Date: 11/21/2013
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/26/2024
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants. In this action, the Plaintiff-Appellants assert various tort claims against Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“AMD”). AMD moved to exclude certain expert testimony under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 — a motion that the Superior Court granted after determining that the evidence was not relevant. Plaintiff-Appellants timely appealed to this Court, which remanded the case to the Superior Court for further findings related to the expert testimony’s admissibility. On remand, the Superior Court found that the expert testimony was unreliable and therefore inadmissible. We conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert testimony unreliable, and affirm its judgment. As a result, we do not reach or address the question of whether the trial court properly concluded that the evidence was not relevant under D.R.E. 702.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant-Appellee AMD, a Delaware corporation headquartered in California, specializes in manufacturing computer processors and other components. Plaintiff-Appellant Wendolyn Tumlinson and Anthony Ontiveros, the father of Plaintiff-Appellant Paris Ontiveros, (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), worked in AMD’s semiconductor manufacturing facilities in San Antonio, Texas and Austin, Texas, respectively.
Ontiveros gave birth to a daughter, Paris, on August 12, 1994. Paris was born with pulmonic stenosis, congenital pulmonary valve atresia, ventricular septal defect, right pulmonary hypoplasia, lower limb reduction defects, and situs inversus with dextrocardia. Like VATER association, these defects also sometimes appear in the general population. Later, Ontive-ros had another child while she was working for AMD. That child was born without any birth defects.
On July 11, 2008, Plaintiffs sued AMD in the Superior Court on claims of negligence, premises liability, strict liability, abnormally dangerous ultra hazardous activity, and willful and wanton misconduct. The Plaintiffs claimed that the birth defects of Jake and Paris resulted from their parents’ exposure to chemicals at AMD’s Texas semiconductor plants.
On December 15, 2010, after the close of discovery, AMD moved in limine to- exclude the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Linda Frazier, claiming that it was unreliable and not relevant under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702. Dr. Frazier, an epidemiologist who has both a medical degree and a master’s degree in public health, was to testify that Plaintiffs’ exposure to chemicals while working at AMD caused Jake’s and Paris’s birth defects. After holding a four-day Daubert hearing
On remand, the trial court engaged in an analysis prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
The case was then returned to this Court, which must now review the Superi- or Court’s determination of the admissibility of Dr. Frazier’s expert testimony. Because that is an issue of procedural law (the admissibility of evidence), we apply Delaware, not Texas, law. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the expert testimony was unreliable. For that reason we do not reach or address whether the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence was also not relevant under D.R.E. 702.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert evidence for abuse of discretion.
III. ANALYSIS
A. D.R.E. 702 and Daubert
Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. The Rule provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and*1269 methods reliably to the facts of the case.18
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 — the nearly identical federal counterpart to D.R.E. 702 — displaced Frye v. United States’s
Daubert describes Rule 702’s “overarching subject [a]s the scientific validity — and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability — of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”
For expert opinion testimony to be relevant under Daubert, it must relate to an “issue in the case”
To determine reliability under Daubert, a trial court must consider a non-exhaustive list of factors. Those factors include: (1) whether the expert opinion testimony “can be (and has been) tested,” (2) “whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) “its known or potential error rate,” and (4) “whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that those factors are not a “definitive checklist.”
If the foundational data underlying opinion testimony are unreliable, an expert will not be permitted to base an opinion on that.data because any opinion drawn from that data is likewise unreliable. Further, an expert’s testimony is unreliable even when the underlying data are sound if the expert draws conclusions from that data based on flawed methodology.34
In this case we previously affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to apply Texas substantive law and Delaware procedural law.
B. The Trial Court’s Application of the Daubert Factors on Reliability
1. The Nature of Dr. Frazier’s Testimony
Dr. Frazier’s expert testimony was based on her analysis of numerous peer-reviewed articles and studies. Plaintiffs contend that the quantum of underlying foundational evidence supports their claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Dr. Frazier’s testimony inadmissible. AMD responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because there are numerous analytical gaps in Dr. Frazier’s methodology that render her opinion unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible.
Because the reliability of the foundational sources was never a central issue,
2. The Superior Court’s Daubert Analysis
One of the DaubeH factors is whether the expert’s hypothesis is testable. Although agreeing it is not necessary to “expose humans to harmful chemicals for a controlled, clinical experiment,”
A second reliability factor contemplated by Daubert is whether the expert’s methods were subject to the rigors of peer review and publication. The trial court recognized that “[Dr. Frazier] ha[d] found reliable foundational studies ” that were subjected to peer review.
Courts also frequently consider, as did the trial court, whether the expert opinion was formed outside of litigation.
To establish reliability an expert may also rely on techniques that have gained widespread acceptance in the scientific community.
The Superior Court concluded that Dr. Frazier did not adequately “articulate her thought process, evaluation methods, and conclusions to establish reliability.” The court based that conclusion on its evaluation of the studies and testimony presented, and their failure to “fit” this case.
C. The Trial Court’s Misapplication of Texas Substantive Law on Reliability
Under D.R.E. 702, a reliability analysis is a flexible one and may encompass many factors, including factors not
The Superior Court — after hearing four days of testimony at a Daubert hearing, after evaluating the voluminous studies contained in the record, after presiding over oral argument on the issue, and after reviewing the various affidavits submitted by Dr. Frazier and her colleagues — did not abuse its discretion as a gatekeeper when it found Dr. Frazier’s expert testimony unreliable. Accordingly, we uphold the final judgment of the Superior Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court to exclude the admission of the expert testimony on the basis that it was unreliable under the factors articulated in Daubert. Jurisdiction is not retained.
. Because the parties have already litigated several issues in this matter, the facts are drawn from the prior opinions determining those issues. See Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (Tumlinson IV), C.A. No. 08C-07-107 (Del.Super.Oct. 15, 2013); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (Tumlinson III), 2013 WL 4399144 (Del. Aug. 16, 2013) (affirming trial judge’s application of Texas substantive law and Delaware procedural law, but remanding for a reliability assessment of the expert testimony); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (Tumlinson II), 2012 WL 1415777 (Del.Super. Jan. 6, 2012) (granting a motion to exclude expert testimony); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (Tumlinson I), 2010 WL 8250792 (Del.Super. July 23, 2010) (granting motions to apply Texas substantive law and to sever claims for separate trials). At this stage of the litigation, we focus on the procedural history.
. For further discussion of the day-to-day tasks and exposure to chemicals within the plants, see Tumlinson I, 2010 WL 8250792, at *1 and Tumlinson II, 2012 WL 1415777, at *1.
. Tumlinson II, 2012 WL 1415777, at *2.
. Id. at *1.
. Tumlinson I, 2010 WL 8250792, at *1.
. A Daubert hearing refers to a pre-trial hearing in which a trial court determines the admissibility of expert testimony under the relevant rule of evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). For a more detailed discussion of Daubert’s importance under D.R.E. 702, see Part III.A infra.
.The court based its ruling on Metrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.1997), and Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex.2011). In Tumlinson II, the trial court subsumed a reliability analysis, as a matter of Texas substantive law, within its admissibility determination as to the expert testimony’s relevance under D.R.E. 702 — a matter of Delaware procedural law. See Tumlinson II, 2012 WL 1415777.
. Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., C.A. No. 08C-07-106, at 4 (Del.Super. Nov. 29, 2012).
. Tumlinson III, 2013 WL 4399144, at *3 (Del. Aug. 16, 2013).
. Id. at *4. In its first assessment, the Superior Court concluded that the testimony was inadmissible because it was not relevant.
. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
. Tumlinson TV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 16-28 (Del.Super.Oct.15, 2013).
. Id. at 10-15.
. Id. at 31.
. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Grenier, 981 A.2d 531, 536 (Del.2009); M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del.1999).
. Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 930 A.2d 881, 887 (Del.2007) (citing Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 695 (Del.1968)).
. Grenier, 981 A.2d at 536 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)); M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 522 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167).
. D.R.E. 702.
. 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).
. Daubert v. Merrelt Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
. 737 A.2d 513 (Del.1999).
. Id. at 522.
. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (emphasis added).
. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (stating that expert opinion testimony is admissible "only if it is both relevant and reliable”).
. Tumlinson III, 2013 WL 4399144, at *4 (Del. Aug. 16, 2013).
. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
. Id. (citing Fed.R.Evid. 702).
. D.R.E. 702.
. Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Del.2004); Goodridge v. Hyster Co., 845 A.2d 498, 503 (Del.2004).
. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
. Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex.1997).
. Tumlinson III, 2013 WL 4399144, at *3 (Del. Aug. 16, 2013).
. See App. to Opening Br. at A1653; Tumlinson TV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 19 (Del.Super.Oct.15, 2013) ("In summary, as to Dr. Frazier's general causation opinion, she has found reliable foundational studies suggesting an association between working in the semiconductor industry and reproductive problems.”).
. Tumlinson TV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 17.
. Id.
. Id.
. The Plaintiffs worked in AMD plants located in two different cities. Tumlinson "worked as a fab operator in AMD's San Antonio, Texas photolithography department" where she "operated a ‘stepper/aligner’ tool that was cleaned daily with isopropyl alcohol and acetone.” Tumlinson II, 2012 WL 1415777, at *1 (Del.Super. Jan. 6, 2012). "There also were other organic solvents, including xylene and glycol ethers, in the tight quarters where Tumlinson worked.” Id. On-tiveros worked as an "etch operator” in AMD's Austin facility, where he “dipped computer parts into baths containing a sulfuric acid-hydrogen peroxide mixture.” Id. "He then dipped the parts into a hydrofluoric acid and ammonium fluoride bath. Ontiveros refilled the chemical baths two or three times per shift.” Id.
. Tumlinson IV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 18.
. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
. Id.
. App. Opening Supp. Br. at *6.
. Daubert describes the peer review process as the “submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (citations omitted).
. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.1995).
. Opening Supp. Br. at 6.
. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317 ("One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying.”).
. Tumlinson IV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 20 (Del.Super.Oct.15, 2013).
. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
. Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319.
. Tumlinson TV, C.A. No. 08C-07-107, at 22 (citing King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co., 277 Neb. 203, 762 N.W.2d 24, 40 (2009) (citing Reference on Manual on Scientific Evidence 376 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed.2000))).
. Id.
. Id. at 26.
. Id. at 27.
. Id. at 30.
. Id. at 27.
. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
. The trial court consulted Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.1997) and Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex.2011), in its D.R.E. 702 reliability analysis.
. The Garza court considered the reliability of expert testimony while assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on the element of causation. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256. Havner similarly involved the Texas Supreme Court's assessment of whether the plaintiff's evidence of causation was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706. Daubert warned against conflating issues of reliability and admissibility of expert evidence with those of reliability and sufficiency of expert evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-97, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The United States Supreme Court in Daubert suggested that "in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment and likewise to grant summary judgment.” Id. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. "[Rjather than wholesale exclusion,” procedural devices such as summary judgment and directed verdict "are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.” Id. Thus, trial courts must assess the evidence in its proper context to avoid making a premature assessment of its sufficiency when inquiring about its admissibility.
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