Desmond v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHRISTOPHER R. DESMOND, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 195, 2017
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 91009844DI (N)
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 18, 2017
Decided: July 7, 2017
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
This 7th day of July 2017, upon consideration of the notice to show cause and
the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In November 1992, a Superior Court jury convicted Desmond of ten
counts of Robbery in the First Degree as well as other related offenses. This Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.1 Since that time, Desmond
has filed a number of unsuccessful motions and petitions challenging his 1992
convictions in this Court, the Superior Court, and the United States District Court
1
Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821 (Del. 1994).
for the District of Delaware.2 In February 2015, the Court directed the Clerk of the
Court to refuse any filings from Desmond unless the filing was accompanied by the
required filing fee or a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis with a sworn
affidavit containing the certifications required by 10 Del. C. § 8803(e) and that
motion was granted by the Court.3
(2) On May 9, 2017, Desmond filed a notice of appeal from a Superior
Court order denying his motion to amend his motion to vacate under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61, his amended motion to recuse the Superior Court judge, and his
motion to apply State v. Bridgers4 and State v. Owens5 to his motion to vacate. The
Senior Court Clerk issued a notice directing Desmond to explain the basis for his
certifications, as required by this Court’s February 11, 2015 order, that the claims he
sought to raise had never been raised or disposed of before in any court and that he
had no reason to believe the claims were foreclosed by controlling law. The notice
also directed Desmond to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.
(3) In his response to the notice to show cause, Desmond acknowledges
this is not the first time he has argued his robbery convictions are illegal under
2
See, e.g., Desmond v. State, 2014 WL 3809683, at *1-2 (Del. Aug. 1, 2014) (affirming Superior
Court’s denial of Desmond’s tenth motion for postconviction relief and motion for correction of
illegal sentence); Desmond v. Snyder, 1999 WL 33220036, at *21 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 1999)
(dismissing Desmond’s petition for writ of habeas corpus).
3
Desmond v. Biden, 2015 WL 631582, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2015).
4
988 A.2d 939 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 2009 WL 824536 (Del. Mar. 30, 2009).
5
2010 WL 2892701 (Del. Super. Ct. July 16, 2010).
2
Bridgers and Owens. This Court has previously held that Desmond’s attacks on his
robbery convictions are barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and affirmed
the denial of his motions to recuse the Superior Court judge.6 Desmond’s
certification that the claims he sought to raise had never been raised or disposed of
before in any court and that he had no reason to believe the claim was foreclosed by
controlling law is false. Desmond’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is therefore
denied and this appeal must be dismissed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
6
See, e.g., Desmond v. State, 2014 WL 3809683, at *1 (Del. Aug. 1, 2014) (holding Rule 61 barred
consideration of defendant’s refined and restated claims that his robbery convictions were illegal);
State v. Desmond, 2011 WL 91984, at *13-14 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (denying motion for
recusal and seventh motion for postconviction relief), aff’d, 2011 WL 4553174 (Del. Oct. 3, 2011).
See also Desmond v. Phelps, 2012 L 3518531, at *2 (Del. Aug. 15, 2012) (“None of Desmond’s
filings…demonstrate that he has an indisputable right to have his first degree robbery convictions
reconsidered, as there is nothing to indicate that Owens and Bridgers re-defined or re-interpreted
the elements of a first degree robbery offense and made such re-interpretation retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review.”).
3