Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DONALD R. JOHNSON, §
§ No. 450, 2017
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ C.A. No. N17C-03-206
STATE FARM MUTUAL §
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §
COMPANY, §
§
Defendant Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 2, 2018
Decided: June 27, 2018
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
On this 27th day of June 2018, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and
the record on appeal, it appears that:
(1) Appellant, Donald R. Johnson, appeals from a Superior Court opinion
granting Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, summary
judgment. Johnson makes one claim on appeal. He contends the Superior Court
erred when it found he did not qualify as an “insured” for purposes of an
underinsured motorist claim against a State Farm policy insuring a vehicle which
struck him while he was walking across the street as a pedestrian.
(2) On October 22, 2014, Fredia Brinkley struck Johnson with her vehicle
while Johnson was crossing the street on foot. Johnson struck the hood of the
vehicle and rolled off, landing on the road. At the time of the accident, Brinkley
was insured by State Farm. On September 8, 2015, State Farm paid Johnson the
policy limit for Brinkley’s liability coverage. He also sought underinsured
motorist coverage (“UIM”) on the theory that he was an insured under Brinkley’s
State Farm policy, but such coverage was denied by State Farm. Johnson then filed
suit against State Farm in the Superior Court.
(3) Brinkley’s State Farm policy provides for underinsured coverage for
persons insured under the policy. The policy defines “insured” as: “[the named
insured]”; “resident relatives”; and “any other person while occupying . . . [the name
insured’s] car.”1 The policy goes on to state “[b]oth the use and actual operation of
such vehicle must be within the scope of [the named insured’s] consent.”2 The
policy defines occupying as “in, on, entering, or exiting [the vehicle].”3
(4) On August 17, 2017, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that Johnson does not qualify as an insured under the policy. On October
16, 2017, State Farm was granted summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
1
App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23.
2
App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23 (emphasis added).
3
App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A15.
2
(5) “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of
summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are
no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.=@4 “When interpreting a statute, Delaware courts must ‘ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’”5
(6) Appellant contends the Superior Court erred by finding he was not
entitled to UIM coverage as an “insured” under the language of Brinkley’s State
Farm policy. Under his theory, he qualified as an insured under the plain language
of the State Farm policy because he was occupying Brinkley’s vehicle in the sense
that he was “in, on, entering, or exiting” the vehicle. He considers himself an
occupant by way of the physical contact he made when getting struck by the vehicle
and being on the vehicle’s hood.
(7) Appellant believes the Superior Court erred in applying the
“geographic perimeter” test when it found that he was not “occupying” the vehicle
even though he was touching the vehicle when he was struck. We have fashioned
a two-prong test to determine if a person is an “occupant” of a vehicle. The
claimant must either be “within a reasonable geographic perimeter of an insured
4
Brown v. United Water Del., Inc., 3 A.3d 272, 275 (Del. 2010) (quoting Estate of Rae v. Murphy,
956 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Del. 2008)).
5
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 80 A.3d 628, 632 (Del. 2013) (citations omitted).
3
vehicle or engaged in a task related to the operation of a vehicle at the time injuries
are sustained.”6 To be within a reasonable geographic perimeter, the claimant need
be “in, entering, exiting, touching or within reach of the covered vehicle.”7
(8) The “geographic perimeter” test was never meant to apply to a
pedestrian who is struck by a vehicle.
(9) Even though Appellant may have been “on” or “touching” Brinkley’s
vehicle for a brief second when he was hit, he fails to recognize that we have found
that Delaware’s UIM statute provides that coverage is personal to the insured.8 The
purpose of that statute “is to protect innocent parties injured by the negligence of
unknown tortfeasors or from those who have no means for compensating the injured
persons.”9 Title 18, Section 3902 allows “a risk adverse person to establish a fund
to protect against losses caused by [others].”10
(10) Appellant has cited no case law, or persuasive authority, that warrants
extending UIM insurance to pedestrians. Brinkley carried UIM insurance to
protect herself, her “resident relatives,” and “any other person . . . occupying” her
6
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Fisher, 692 A.2d 892, 896 (Del. 1997).
7
Id. at 897.
8
Frank v. Horizon Assur. Co., 553 A.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Del. 1989); see 18 Del. C. § 3902(a)
(“unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages . . .”).
9
Fisher, 692 A.2d at 896.
10
Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 10, 14 (Del. 1995).
4
vehicle “within the scope of [her] consent” 11 , from harm caused by “unknown
tortfeasors,”12 not pedestrians injured by her own negligence. The mere fact that
Johnson was in physical contact with Brinkley’s vehicle because he was struck by it
does not make him an insured occupant of the vehicle able to claim benefits under
Brinkley’s personal UIM coverage.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
11
App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23.
12
Fisher, 692 A.2d at 896.
5