Risper v. State of Delaware

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MCARTHUR RISPER, §
§ No. 56, 2020
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ ID No. 1805007714A(S)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: January 27, 2021
Decided: April 6, 2021
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,
Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant McArthur Risper.
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.
TRAYNOR, Justice:
A Superior Court jury found McArthur Risper guilty of murder in the first
degree, conspiracy in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony for his role in the May 2018 shooting death of Corey Bailey.
The Superior Court sentenced Risper to life plus 30 years in prison.
The theory of the prosecution was that Risper intentionally killed Bailey as
revenge for Bailey’s theft of drugs and a firearm belonging to Risper. Risper claims
that the evidence of Bailey’s theft and Risper’s subsequent efforts to recover the
stolen drugs and firearm was prior-misconduct evidence and therefore inadmissible
under our rules of evidence. In this opinion, we conclude that the Superior Court
did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged evidence.
But Risper also claims that he did not receive a fair trial because the State did
not disclose in a timely manner evidence that was favorable to the defense as
required under Brady v. Maryland1 and its progeny. According to Risper, the
State’s belated disclosures—one on the day before trial was to begin and the other
on the fourth day of trial—fundamentally undermined the fairness of his trial. We
agree with Risper and conclude that the State’s failure to produce, until the afternoon
before Risper’s trial was to begin, a recorded interview of an individual who told the
chief investigating officer that another person had confessed to her that he had killed
1
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2
Bailey and showed her the gun used in the shooting was a violation of the State’s
obligations under Brady. And because that violation undermines our confidence in
the outcome of Risper’s trial, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court for a new
trial.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the early evening hours of May 11, 2018, Channell Gray was standing
in front of her car on Mill Park Drive in the Coverdale Crossroads community near
Bridgeville, Delaware, talking with her friend, Corey Bailey. When a black Jeep
pulled up, Bailey anticipated trouble, immediately handing his phone to Gray and
exclaiming, “these MFers got me, . . . go get Dane.”2 Two men, wearing gloves and
masks that only partially covered their faces, leaving their eyes, eyebrows, and noses
exposed, got out of the Jeep and approached Bailey and Gray.
The man who alighted from the Jeep’s front passenger seat walked toward
Bailey, aimed a handgun at him, and fired it several times, killing Bailey. Gray
recognized the shooter as McArthur Risper, a man she had known for over a decade
because he “used to go with [her] cousin.”3 Consequently, Gray identified Risper as
the shooter in a photographic lineup later that evening and again at trial.
2
App. to Answering Br. at B54. Dane is Channell Gray’s husband. See id.3
App. to Opening Br. at A134.
3
To shed light on Bailey’s suspicion that the arrival of the black Jeep foretold
trouble, we must revisit the events of the three weeks preceding Bailey’s fatal
encounter with the masked shooter. As we summarize the evidence, we are mindful
that some of it was admitted over Risper’s objection. To the extent relevant to the
issues Risper raises in this appeal, we reserve for later consideration the Superior
Court’s ruling on those objections.
About three weeks before Bailey’s murder, he and his girlfriend, Staci
Weldon, broke into a trailer on Camellia Drive in Bridgeville, intending to steal a
television. Instead of taking a television, however, they stole an AR15 assault rifle
and two large bags of marijuana, weighing between two and four pounds. At the
time of the burglary Weldon did not know who owned the trailer, but afterwards
Bailey clued her in as evidenced by Weldon’s trial testimony:
Q. Did Corey ever indicate to you that there may be a consequence
for stealing the drugs and marijuana . . . ?
A. Yeah. After we left, he kind of explained what he thought would
happen.
Q. . . . And what did he explain to you?
A. He pretty much told me that there was going to be people after
us for doing what we did.
Q. Did he say which people?
A. Yes.
Q. And which people were they?
A. That would be his cousin and his cousin’s friend.
Q. Do you know who his cousin is?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was it?
4
A. McArthur.4
The stolen marijuana and assault rifle did not make it home with Bailey and
Weldon. Instead, the two stopped at the residence of a friend, O’Shea Waples, where
they left the weapon—“until [Bailey] found a buyer—and some of the weed.”5
Bailey and Weldon “traded” the marijuana that they did not leave with Waples. 6
After leaving the stolen marijuana and assault rifle with Waples, Bailey told Waples
that people were after him because of “what he [(Bailey)] gave [Waples].”7 At the
time, Waples did not know the men seeking revenge, but Bailey later identified them
as “Bug” and “Mike.”8
It does not appear as though Bailey ever returned to retrieve the weapon or
the marijuana. But during the first week of May, Waples received two visits, the
first from a man named “Mike,” later identified as Mike Lewis, and the second from
Lewis and another man who was identified as “Bug.” At trial, Waples identified
“Bug” as Risper. When Lewis arrived alone at Waples’ mobile home, he demanded
the return of the weapon and marijuana Bailey had left with Waples several days
earlier, “[a]nd he pulled out a gun.”9 Lewis left with the weapon but no marijuana.
4
Id. at A202.
5
Id. at A201.
6
Id. at A218.
7
Id. at A238.
8
Id.9
App. to Answering Br. at B314.
5
Lewis returned to Waples’ trailer later that night with Risper; both men were
dressed in black clothes, including black “hoodies” which, in Waples’ eyes, meant
that they were not “coming to play or nothing.”10 Waples could see a “gun butt”11
protruding from Risper’s jacket. Lewis and Risper searched Waples’ car and his
bedroom looking for the stolen marijuana. Finding none, they took some of Waples’
jewelry as payment for the missing marijuana.
The evidence suggests that Bailey was keenly aware that Risper would exact
a price for his theft of the marijuana. Bailey told Weldon as much, and his suspicions
were only confirmed by the home invasion at Waples’ mobile home.
We fast forward to May 11, the day of Bailey’s murder. Bailey spent most of
that day “just riding . . . around”12 with Devean Sheppard. As they rode, Bailey
confided in Sheppard: “I got folks trying to kill me.”13 When Sheppard pressed
Bailey to identify the “folks” he was referring to, “[h]e said, man, my peoples,”14
which Sheppard understood to mean Risper. Later, Sheppard and Bailey saw Laval
Farmer and Risper slowly passing by in a truck. Sheppard described Bailey’s
reaction to this encounter: “And this is when I really knew he was serious when I
10
App. to Opening Br. at A243.
11
Id. at A245.
12
Id. at A281.
13
Id. at A280.
14
Id. at A281.
6
seen him jump in my seat when he seen that truck come by. He was like, oh, there
they go.”15
Other witnesses also saw Risper in a black Jeep on the day of Bailey’s murder.
For example, Hayward Risper—defendant Risper’s cousin—saw Laval Farmer
driving a black Jeep with Risper in the passenger seat on the day of the murder.
Throughout that day, Hayward saw the Jeep drive through the neighborhood over
five times. According to Hayward, it was not normal to see Farmer and Risper
driving through the neighborhood.
Hayward spent most of the day barbequing and drinking a few beers with
Guan Davis. Davis—Risper’s nephew—also saw Farmer and Risper driving around
the neighborhood throughout the day. Later that evening, Hayward and Davis heard
gun shots—Davis initially believed the noise to be fireworks—and then saw the
same Jeep, this time with Risper behind the wheel, speeding away from the shooting.
Hayward attempted to stop Risper as he drove off, but to no avail. Davis testified
that, after hearing the shots, he saw a black truck driven by Farmer pull up to
Farmer’s house. After entering his home, Farmer emerged five minutes later
wearing different clothing. Thus, a conflict exists between Hayward’s and Davis’s
account of who was driving the black SUV after they heard shots. Later that same
15
Id.7
evening, Hayward called Risper to discuss the shooting. During that phone call,
Risper denied any involvement, but asked if Bailey was dead.
Earlier that same day, another witness, Shika Cannon, saw Risper, with whom
she went to school, driving the black Jeep in the vicinity of the murder. In fact,
Cannon was with Bailey and Channell Gray immediately before Bailey was shot.
After talking with Bailey and Gray, Cannon went inside her house with her children
to use the bathroom. Once inside, she heard gunshots. She then ran outside and saw
“a black Jeep pulling off.”16
After the shooting, Risper asked Teara Harris—a close friend—to rent a hotel
room in Salisbury, Maryland for Risper’s long-time girlfriend, Desira Sutton. Harris
believed Sutton wanted the room because “the police was coming there, and she
didn’t want to be there with the kids.”17 According to Sutton, Risper wanted to rent
the hotel room so he could spend time with their children before he turned himself
in to the police. While the couple stayed in the hotel, Sutton was unaware of the
location of the Jeep. Sutton was the owner of the Jeep, but she testified that Risper
was its primary operator.
The day after Bailey’s murder, Risper’s black Jeep appeared at Harris’s house
in Maryland without explanation. Confused and nervous about the car being in front
16
App. to Answering Br. at B310.
17
Id. at B275.
8
of her house, Harris drove the Jeep to a gas station in Maryland. But before she left
the Jeep at the gas station, Harris wiped down all of the areas that she thought she
had touched. Harris then told Sutton the location of the Jeep.
Approximately a week after the shooting, police—with the help of Sutton—
located the Jeep at the gas station in Maryland. Inside the Jeep, police found fifteen
cellphones, an ID belonging to James Harmon, a black cap, and a black ski cap in
the rear of the vehicle. Police also processed the Jeep for fingerprints and DNA.
After processing the Jeep and its contents, police found Risper’s DNA on the
steering wheel, a cellphone, and a black ski mask.
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Motion in Limine
The State filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking a determination that
evidence of Risper’s possession of marijuana and a firearm and his attempt, during
the Waples home invasion, to recover those items after they were stolen by Bailey
was admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) (“D.R.E. 404(b)”).
According to the State’s motion,
Mr. Bailey’s act of stealing Mr. Risper’s illegal drugs and weapon set
in motion a series of events that eventually lead [sic] to him being
gunned down. This act served as the impetus for a home invasion of
the Waples’s residence and the murderous actions taken by Mr. Risper
on May 11, 2018. These events and their illegal nature are so
9
intertwined that separation of them would result in an incomplete
understanding of Mr. Bailey’s death.18
The State argued that it would not be offering evidence of Risper’s drug and
weapon possession to show that he was a bad person or had a general criminal
disposition. Rather, the State claimed that the evidence was relevant to Risper’s
motive and state of mind and the absence of mistake during Bailey’s homicide,
which are permitted purposes under D.R.E. 404(b)(2). The State contended that the
evidence tended to show that “Bailey’s murder was not accidental but was instead
the result of a revenge killing.”19 The State recognized, however, that it would be
appropriate for the court to instruct the jury that it should only consider the evidence
for those purposes. Finally, in an addendum to its motion in limine, the State argued
that, to the extent that its proposed presentation of the Rule 404(b) evidence relied
on out-of-court statements, those statements were admissible under exceptions to the
rule against hearsay—specifically, D.R.E. 804(b)(3)’s exception for statements
against penal interest and D.R.E. 807’s residual hearsay exception.
Risper countered with a panoply of objections, claiming, among other things,
that the evidence was not relevant and, even if it were, its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. But the objections most relevant
to this appeal focused on what Risper contended was the inadmissible hearsay that
18
App. to Opening Br. at A22.
19
Id.10
served as the foundation of the proffered evidence and the State’s inability to prove
Risper’s prior crimes by plain, clear, and conclusive evidence as required under our
holding in Getz v. State.20
In a lengthy bench ruling, the Superior Court held that the proffered evidence
was relevant to the issues of the killer’s identity, motive, intent, and the absence of
mistake. The court then conducted a detailed Getz analysis before ruling that the
evidence was admissible. The court noted that it would “of course, give a limiting
instruction regarding the prior incidents and will do so, if requested by the defense,
when the evidence comes in and when the jury instructions are read to the jury.”21
In the event, the defense did not request an instruction when the evidence was
admitted and specifically requested that a “prior bad acts” Getz instruction proposed
by the court not be given before jury deliberations.22
20
538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1998) (holding that to be admissible, evidence of other crimes “must
be proved by evidence which is ‘plain, clear[,] and conclusive’” (quoting Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d
711, 712 (Del. 1974))).
21
Opening Br. Ex. A at 13.
22
The following exchange took place during the pre-deliberation prayer conference:
Defense counsel: We do not request a Getz analysis. So we would like that
removed.
The Court: Well, Getz would be for you. I will hear from the State, but if you
don’t want it, it’s really - - it is what it is . . . . I try to make it as innocuous as
possible, but if you don’t want it, it’s for you, . . . it’s not really for the State.
Defense counsel: We want it out.
Prosecutor: We have no objection.
The Court: Take it out.
App. to Answering Br. at B491.
11
B. The State’s Belated Disclosures
1. “AE’s” Statement
On April 1, 2019, seven and one-half months before Risper’s trial, the police
investigating Bailey’s murder recorded an interview of an individual—identified in
the record as “AE”23—who claimed that a friend confessed in detail to shooting
Bailey and had even showed her the gun used in the shooting.24 In certain respects,
the confession lined up with Channell Gray’s account of the murder; for instance,
AE’s friend told her “that he actually got out of a truck and killed Corey Bailey.”25
AE identified the friend as “Laval” or “Lavelle,”26 but clarified that she was not
referring to Laval Farmer, Risper’s companion around the time Bailey was shot.
AE’s statement suggested that her informant told her that Bailey had stolen from
other drug dealers and that people other than Risper wanted to kill Bailey.
Around the time the police recorded this interview, Risper’s trial was
scheduled to begin in June 2019. On May 23, 2019, defense counsel delivered a
letter to the Court requesting a continuance of the trial:
23
Near the end of the trial, the State identified AE during two sidebar conferences as “Ms. Evans.”
Id. at B391; B430.
24
The details in AE’s statement are sketchy. The record contains neither a transcript of the
statement or the CD containing the recording of the interview. Thus, our understanding of the
substance of AE’s statement is derived exclusively from defense counsel’s description of it to the
court in connection with Risper’s request for a dismissal and, alternatively, a continuance, and
Detective Csapo’s testimony on cross-examination.
25
App. to Answering Br. at B42.
26
Id.12
Please accept this letter as Defendant’s request for a continuance
of the trial, which is currently scheduled to begin on Monday, June 10th,
2019. The reason for the request is on April 22 nd, the State filed a
Motion in Limine seeking to admit evidence of Defendant’s prior bad
acts to prove motive. Defense counsel is aware of information about
people that sought to kill the victim. We, therefore, request additional
time to explore and gather evidence as to others’ motives to kill the
victim and attempts to do so.27
The court granted Risper’s request and rescheduled the trial for mid-November of
2019.
Despite the centrality of the State’s motive evidence and defense counsel’s
expression of interest in identifying other individuals who possessed the motive the
State ascribed to Risper, the State did not produce a copy of the AE interview to
Risper’s counsel. Instead, it held onto it until the afternoon of November 14, 2019—
the day before Risper’s trial was to begin. The State offered no justification for not
producing the statement earlier other than it was an “error within [the Department of
Justice’s] office.”28
On the day following the State’s production of the AE interview, a jury was
selected. That was on Friday, November 15. In an office conference on Monday
morning, November 18, defense counsel alerted the court to the production of AE’s
statement and described its contents as outlined above. Defense counsel noted that
27
May 23, 2019 letter from Tasha Marie Stevens, Esquire to The Honorable E. Scott Bradley,
State v. Risper, 1805007714A (Del. Super. Ct.) (D.I. 57).
28
App. to Answering Br. at B45.
13
her client had been incarcerated pending trial for the preceding 18 months and that
the State’s failure to produce the exculpatory statement prevented the defense from
conducting a thorough investigation. Counsel argued that the State’s withholding of
the statement was a Brady violation and moved for dismissal.
The court denied Risper’s motion on the spot, but offered an alternative
remedy:
Well, you can have their name [sic], but I think ultimately what
I’m going to do is deny your motion and let you play this interview,
even though it’s all hearsay.
I agree you should have had it sooner. You could have done
some due diligence.
. . . [Y]ou never know what you’ll get when you go talk to people.
Would it have been any better than this? I don’t know. But you can
play it and you can ask the detective about it . . . I think that’s a
reasonable remedy. It will all come in, even though it’s hearsay.29
The court recessed and reconvened during the early afternoon. The first order
of business, before opening statements, was reconsideration of the effect of the
State’s belated disclosure of AE’s statement. Pointing to their professional
obligation to fully investigate the ramifications of AE’s statement—an investigation
precluded by the timing of the State’s disclosure—Risper’s counsel now asked for a
continuance of the trial. Throwing grace to the wind, the State opposed the request.
The court denied the continuance request, satisfied that its previously crafted
29
Id.14
remedy—admission of the recorded statement—was adequate and “might even be
better than having a chance to go and talk to the witness.”30 For reasons that the
record does not disclose, Risper did not offer the recorded statement in evidence
during the trial. Risper’s counsel did, however, cross-examine the detective who
interviewed AE about the April 2019 interview. The detective acknowledged that
AE had told him in a recorded interview that someone other than Risper had told her
that “they were involved in the murder of Corey Bailey”31 and had showed her where
the “slide of the gun”32 used in the murder was located. The detective further
admitted that he did not look for the gun part, nor had he followed up by way of
investigation or a police report on the information that AE had provided.
2. Staci Weldon’s and Channell Gray’s Shoplifting Scheme
An unusual twist developed at trial concerning the examination and testimony
of Staci Weldon and Channell Gray. Weldon, it will be recalled, was Bailey’s
girlfriend and accomplice in the Camellia Drive burglary. And Gray was the only
person who witnessed Bailey’s murder by a masked man that she identified as
Risper. During its cross-examination of Gray, the defense sought to impeach her
credibility by highlighting inconsistencies in her testimony and exposing her prior
conviction for theft—a crime of dishonesty.
30
Id. at B47.
31
Id. at B426–27.
32
Id. at B427.
15
Weldon testified two days after Gray. Addressing her activities in the hours
before the May 11 shooting, Weldon disclosed that, as an individual named Marty
was driving her and Bailey around in Coverdale Crossroads, “a woman had stopped
[her] and asked [her] if [she] could get her little boy some clothes from the store, and
how much [she] would charge for them.”33 Weldon admitted that she would “get”
the clothing by shoplifting. She had previously told Detective Csapo about this
shoplifting plan and identified the woman who had solicited her to steal the clothing
as Channell Gray. But in the version of the detective’s report that the State provided
to the defense during discovery, Gray’s name had been redacted.
After Weldon’s cross-examination, during which the defense did not press her
to identify the woman who asked for her help, the State requested a sidebar
conference at which is disclosed that
as cross was going on, we were looking through the discovery that we
sent to defense and noticed that there was a redaction that needs to be
clarified for the defense prior to them redirect or crossing. We actually
ended up redacting out the person she was shoplifting for . . . . [It was]
Channell Gray.34
Because of this late disclosure, the defense was permitted to resume its cross-
examination of Weldon. Although Weldon once again admitted that she intended to
shoplift the clothing, she denied that the as-yet unidentified woman had asked her to
33
Id. at B291.
34
Id. at B298.
16
steal the clothing. And when asked to identify the woman, Weldon said that she did
not remember the woman’s name and went so far as to deny that she had identified
the woman as Channell Gray. Shortly after that, Weldon’s testimony concluded, and
the court recessed for the day.
The following morning, citing the State’s violation of its obligations under
Brady and Giglio v. United States,35 the defense moved “for either dismissal of the
case or a mistrial.”36 The court ruled that neither a dismissal nor a mistrial was
appropriate. After “agree[ing] that this information should have been turned over to
the defense prior to trial,”37 the court explained why it would not order the relief
Risper requested:
In my view, this is an error on the scale of the smaller side of
things. I think at the end of the day the evidence will be in front of the
jury that Channell Gray asked the lady to sell her some clothes, and that
Channell Gray knew that the lady, who was Staci Weldon, was going
to go steal those clothes and sell them to her.
So that certainly touches on her honesty. She will not, unless the
defense wants her brought in and wants to ask her about this, she will
not be in a position to deny knowing that. I’d let that come in, even
though there is really no foundation for how Staci Weldon might know
that Channell Gray knew that Staci Weldon was going to steal the
clothes. But that will come in. That’s how it’s going to be painted in
front of a jury. You folks can use that, you can argue that, and that goes
to her credibility.
35
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
36
App. to Answering Br. at B309.
37
Id. at B308.
17
I do agree with the State that this is, at best, you know, it’s like
many attacks on credibility. It’s not about a material fact in the case,
it’s a tangential thing.38
C. Miscellaneous Procedural Facts
At the outset of the trial, Risper’s counsel chose not to make an opening
statement to the jury. In its case-in-chief, the prosecution called 28 witnesses over
the span of five days. After the State rested, the defense also rested without calling
any witnesses. As previously mentioned, the jury found Risper guilty of murder in
the first degree, conspiracy in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. And after the Superior Court sentenced him to life plus 30
years in prison, Risper appealed.
D. Issues Raised on Appeal
Risper contends that the prosecution’s claim that the marijuana and firearm
Bailey stole during his burglary of the Camellia Street property belonged to Risper
in effect attributed uncharged criminal conduct—unlawful drug possession—to him.
As such, according to Risper, the evidence was subject to the limitations of D.R.E.
404(b) and, in particular, the requirement under that Rule as interpreted in Getz v.
State that the evidence be “plain, clear[,] and conclusive.”39 Risper argues that the
evidence that the pilfered weed belonged to Risper did not meet this standard and
38
Id. at B309.
39
Getz, 538 A.2d at 734.
18
was thus inadmissible under D.R.E. 404(b). Risper then argues that, if the evidence
of Risper’s ownership of the marijuana is eliminated from consideration, the
evidence of his participation in the Waples home invasion has no independent logical
relevance to the shooting of Corey Bailey and is likewise inadmissible under D.R.E.
404(b). Risper also argues that the Superior Court erred when it refused to dismiss
the indictment or grant a continuance in response to the State’s belated disclosure
that someone other than Risper confessed to shooting Bailey and that two important
prosecution witnesses were engaged in a shoplifting scheme at the time of the
shooting.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We will not set aside a trial court’s admission of evidence under D.R.E. 404(b)
unless the trial court has abused its discretion.40 We review questions of law and
constitutional claims, such as claims based on the State’s failure to disclose
exculpatory or impeaching evidence, de novo.41 We review the Superior Court’s
denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion.42
40
Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 78–79 (Del. 1993).
41
Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 982 (Del. 2014).
42
Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d 513, 528 (Del. 2014).
19
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Evidence of Risper’s Possession of Marijuana and Firearm
and Involvement in Home Invasion
Under D.R.E. 404(b),
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake or accident.
In Getz, this Court established six guidelines for the admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence under D.R.E. 404(b):
(1) The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or
ultimate fact in dispute in the case. If the State elects to present such
evidence in its case-in-chief it must demonstrate the existence, or
reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue.
(2) The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for the purpose
sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not inconsistent with
the basic prohibition against evidence of bad character or criminal
disposition.
(3) The other crimes must be proved by evidence which is “plain, clear
and conclusive.” Renzi v. State, Del. Supr., 320 A.2d 711, 712 (1974).
(4) The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the charged
offense.
(5) The Court must balance the probative value of such evidence
against its unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403.
20
(6) Because such evidence is admitted for the limited purpose, the jury
should be instructed concerning the purpose for its admission as
required by D.R.E. 105.43
Inherent in this formulation of the Getz guidelines is our recognition that
“evidence of prior misconduct is admissible when it has ‘independent logical
relevance’ and when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.”44
Regarding his possession of marijuana, Risper’s challenge relies exclusively
on the third Getz factor. Because the evidence that the marijuana belonged to Risper
consisted of statements that Risper contends were inadmissible hearsay, he claims
that it is not “plain, clear, and conclusive” as required under Getz. Relying on our
decision in Chavis v. State,45 Risper argues that the hearsay constituted second-hand
knowledge and therefore could not be used to establish that Risper possessed the
marijuana. This reflects a basic misunderstanding of Chavis.
Chavis involved a burglary prosecution in which the State offered evidence,
through a detective’s testimony, of the defendant’s prior convictions for crimes that
bore a resemblance to the crime for which the defendant was being tried. The
detective’s testimony was based entirely on police reports of the prior incidents. On
cross-examination, the detective acknowledged that he had no involvement in the
43
Getz, 538 A.2d at 734 (footnote omitted).
44
Id. at 730 (citing D.R.E. 403 and Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 865 (Del. 1986)).
45
235 A.3d 696 (Del. 2020).
21
prior investigations and that his only knowledge of them was derived from the police
reports that he did not prepare. We determined that “[s]uch secondhand knowledge
does not satisfy Getz’s requirement that proof of other crimes be by evidence which
is ‘plain, clear[,] and conclusive.’”46
Here, by contrast, the Superior Court relied on numerous statements that
Bailey made to others—Yonta Clanton, Deavon Sheppard, O’Shea Waples, and, last
but not least, Staci Weldon, his accomplice in the theft—that he had stolen from
Risper. The court determined that these statements were admissible as self-
inculpatory under D.R.E. 804(b)(3) and through D.R.E. 807’s residual hearsay
exception.47 In Chavis, there was no suggestion that the police reports from which
the detective testified were admissible evidence. Therefore, Risper’s reliance on
Chavis is unavailing.
Risper’s D.R.E. 404(b) argument suffers from another fundamental flaw. If
Risper’s unlawful possession of the stolen marijuana and firearm was central to the
evidence admitted under D.R.E. 404(b), he might have a point. But the State did not
offer proof of Risper’s drug possession for the purpose of showing that he had a
motive to harm Bailey. Instead, it was Bailey’s crimes—the burglary and theft—of
46
Id. at 700 (quoting Renzi, 320 A.2d at 712).
47
Other than a half-hearted complaint with the trial court’s determination that the statements were
reliable, Risper does not mount a meaningful challenge to the court’s rulings on the applicability
of these hearsay exceptions.
22
which Risper was the victim that, under the State’s theory, gave rise to Risper’s
desire to exact revenge. Seen from this angle, the illegality attributable to Risper is
largely incidental. Had Bailey stolen a television, as originally planned, or other
valuable property, instead of marijuana and a firearm, the theft would be equally
relevant to Risper’s motive.48
To sum up, the State proved Risper’s connection to the stolen marijuana
through Bailey’s admissions as recounted by numerous witnesses, including
Bailey’s accomplice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that such proof—especially when considered together with Risper’s attempt to
recover the stolen marijuana—was plain, clear, and conclusive. Moreover, that the
logical relevance of the evidence does not depend on the illegality of Risper’s
unlawful marijuana possession, but on the fact that Bailey stole the marijuana from
him, persuades us that any prejudice Risper might have suffered because of the
introduction of the evidence was marginal in relation to its probative value.
48
We note that, in its Answering Brief, the State landed a glancing blow on this point when it
observed that “the object of the theft was not significant to the State’s theory of the case—the fact
that Bailey stole the items from Risper was.” Answering Br. at 13. And the State made no mention
of the illegal nature of the stolen property in either its opening statement or in its closing argument.
But we also note that, when the State presented its motion in limine to the Superior Court, it seemed
to emphasize that the stolen property was contraband. App. to Opening Br. at A23–24 (“There is
a significant likelihood that a jury . . . would face a large conceptual void if they were not able to
get a full understanding of Mr. Risper’s actions in relation to the theft of his drugs and weapon.
This is integral to understanding the death of Corey Bailey . . . . Understanding Mr. Risper’s
possession of illegal drugs and [a] weapon [] speaks directly to the motivations behind his
intentional acts.”) (emphasis added).
23
Finally, Risper’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence of the Waples
home invasion hinges upon his argument that the court should have excluded the
evidence of Bailey’s theft of Risper’s marijuana and firearm. “Without the
underlying evidence of the theft,” Risper argues, “the State’s purported evidence of
. . . the home invasion merely showed that Risper had a propensity to commit violent
crimes and for carrying a weapon,”49 which is impermissible under D.R.E. 404(b).
Our conclusion that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the evidence of the theft fatally undermines the premise of this argument.
Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted evidence of Risper’s invasion of the Waples residence, ostensibly to take
back the marijuana that Bailey had stolen from him.
B. The State’s Brady Violations
In criminal proceedings, the prosecution has a constitutional obligation to
disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence within its possession to the defense
when that evidence might be material to the outcome of the case. Because this
obligation was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v.
Maryland,50 it is usually referred to as the Brady rule.51 The Brady rule is “based
49
Opening Br. at 23.
50
373 U.S. 83; see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (holding that impeachment evidence, as well as
exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule).
51
See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) (4th ed. 2020).
24
on the requirement of due process”52 and, as such, is grounded in principles of
fairness—“not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but an avoidance
of an unfair trial of the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly.”53
As this Court observed in Starling v. State, “[t]here are three components of a
Brady violation: (1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is
either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the state; and
(3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.”54
There can be little doubt that AE’s statement was exculpatory and that the
evidence regarding Weldon’s and Gray’s purported shoplifting scheme was at least
potentially impeaching. Yet the State contends that “[t]o the extent [it] made an
untimely disclosure of exculpatory or impeaching evidence, Risper received the
information [in] sufficient time to effectively use it[,] and the Superior Court
fashioned the appropriate remedy for the purported Brady violations.”55 Having
dropped the recording of AE’s interview on defense counsel on the eve of trial—
seven and a half months after it was recorded—the State takes Risper to task for not
52
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
53
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
54
Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-
–82 (1999)).
55
Answering Br. at 17.
25
“sending an investigator out to find AE”56 as the trial progressed. The State argues
further that allowing Risper to cross-examine Detective Csapo about his interview
of AE was a sufficient substitute for AE’s testimony. Thus, according to the State,
“[t]he Superior Court did not err when it denied Risper’s motion to dismiss based on
the State’s untimely production of AE’s recorded statement.”57 And “because of the
strength of the case against Risper,”58 the late disclosure was not material—that is,
a timely disclosure would not have “create[d] a reasonable probability of a different
outcome.”59 We take up the State’s contentions in turn, focusing first on the eve-of-
trial disclosure of AE’s statement.
1. Timeliness
Waiting until the eve of trial before disclosing important exculpatory evidence
is problematic in various respects. Although “it may well be that marginal Brady
material need not always be disclosed prior to trial,”60 it cannot be seriously argued
that evidence that someone other than the defendant committed the crime is marginal
evidence. And, to quote a relevant treatise, “where the prosecution has the statement
of a witness who could present exculpatory testimony and does not intend itself to
call the witness, disclosure before trial would be necessary to ensure that the defense
56
Id.57
Id. at 21. The State does not address the Superior Court’s denial of Risper’s continuance request.
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing Morris v. State, 2019 WL 2123563, at *6–7 (Del. May 13, 2019)).
60
Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 1974).
26
has an opportunity to subpoena that witness for trial.”61 “[A] prosecutor’s timely
disclosure with respect to this type of material cannot be overemphasized if due
process is to be afforded a defendant at . . . trial.”62
The State’s implication that the defense had sufficient time to exploit the
information provided by AE ignores the realities of criminal trial practice. Besides
impairing the defense’s ability to subpoena AE, the State’s late production
effectively precluded any meaningful investigation of AE’s disclosures, including
the discovery of the identity of the person who confessed, the location of the gun,
and the names of the other drug dealers who, according to AE’s informant, had a
motive to harm Bailey.63 Moreover, “[t]he opportunity for use under Brady . . .
[includes] the opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some
degree of calculation and forethought.”64 Here, the State’s belated disclosure
eliminated that opportunity. We therefore reject the State’s suggestion that the
61
LaFave, supra note 51, § 24.3(b).
62
United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 739 (3d Cir. 1978) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring) (involving disclosure of government’s intercession on behalf of a prosecution witness
in a pending state criminal prosecution).
63
See Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The limited Brady material disclosed
to Leka could have led to specific exculpatory information only if the defense undertook further
investigation. When such a disclosure is first made on the eve of trial, or when trial is under way,
the opportunity to use it may be impaired. The defense may be unable to divert resources from
other initiatives and obligations that are or may seem more pressing. And the defense may be
unable to assimilate the information into its case.”).
64
Id. at 103.
27
timing of its disclosure of the AE interview did not impair Risper’s ability to use that
information effectively.
2. The Superior Court’s Remedy
It will be recalled here that the defense initially moved to dismiss the
indictment upon its discovery that the State’s November 14, 2019 supplemental
discovery response included a CD recording of the April 1, 2019 interview of AE.65
The court, after acknowledging that the State should have produced the CD sooner,
denied the motion but, as a “sanction for the State,”66 ruled that the defense could
“play [the CD before the jury] and . . . ask the detective about it.” 67 After a recess
but before opening statements, the defense requested a continuance of the trial so it
could investigate the information consistent with their professional obligations to
Risper. The State opposed, and the court denied, this continuance request. The State
now contends that the allowance of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence of the
contents of AE’s statement was an adequate remedy for its belated disclosure. We
disagree.
Neither the Superior Court when it denied Risper’s motion to dismiss and,
alternatively, his motion for a continuance nor the State when it opposed Risper’s
65
The AE CD was the seventh item listed in a cover letter enclosing 16 separate items including
three CDs, seven DVDs, three supplemental police reports, and notes from trial preparation
meetings with witnesses.
66
App. to Opening Br. at A120.
67
Id. at A117.
28
motions seem to have recognized the ramifications of the State’s belated disclosure.
Focusing solely on the admissibility of AE’s statement, the court did not recognize
the potential hole it left in Risper’s defense. Just as in Leka v. Portuondo, the
belatedly disclosed statement by AE “could have led to specific exculpatory
information only if the defense undertook investigation.”68 But the State, by
opposing Risper’s continuance request, actively stepped in the way of any such
investigation even though its mistake had created the problem. We understand why
the court denied Risper’s motion to dismiss; we cannot say the same for its denial of
Risper’s continuance request. That denial was, in our view, unfair to Risper and an
abuse of discretion.
3. Materiality
Finally, we address the State’s contention that the belatedly produced Brady
material “did not involve possible testimony that was likely, if given, to create a
reasonable probability of a different outcome.”69 The State’s language addressed
the third component of a Brady violation—the materiality prong.
In this Court’s exhaustive discussion of Brady in Wright v. State, then-Justice
Ridgely described the contours of Brady’s materiality prong:
Materiality does not require the defendant to show that the disclosure
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. Nor is
a reviewing court required to order a new trial whenever a combing of
68
Leka, 257 F.3d at 101.
69
Answering Br. at 21 (quoting Morris, 2019 WL 2123563, at *6–7).
29
the prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly
useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict. Rather,
the defendant must show that the State’s evidence creates a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability of a different result occurs where the government’s
evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the
trial.70
The United States Supreme Court’s articulation of the materiality standard in
Kyle v. Whitley is particularly apt in the context of this case: “The question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.”71
In our view, the evidence that an individual other than Risper confessed to AE
that he had killed Bailey is, in the absence of any indication that the confession was
unreliable, material. In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State’s attempt to
skirt the materiality inquiry set forth in Wright and to avoid the consequences of its
error by invoking “the strength of the case against Risper.”72 Although such an
argument might resonate in a case involving the suppression or untimely disclosure
of marginally exculpatory evidence, it rings hollow where, as here, the evidence—
70
Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 988 (Del. 2014) (emphasis in original) (internal footnotes and
quotations omitted).
71
Kyle v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
72
Answering Br. at 21.
30
an admission by someone else that he committed the crime of which the defendant
stands charged—could undermine the very foundation of the prosecution’s case.
Admittedly, the State’s evidence supported the jury’s finding of Risper’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not discount the compelling evidence of Risper’s
motive, the number of witnesses who testified that they saw Risper in a black Jeep
in the vicinity of the shooting both before and after it took place, Channell Gray’s
testimony that she recognized the shooter as Risper, and Risper’s DNA found on the
black mask in the recovered Jeep. But none of this evidence was conclusive of
Risper’s guilt, and some of it was problematic for the prosecution.
For instance, Channell Gray admitted that she could see only a small portion
of the shooter’s face, which she described as “dark skinned”73 when interviewed
during the investigation; when she testified at trial, presumably having seen Risper
in the courtroom, she “remember[ed] his face being light-skinned.”74 The inherent
suspicion associated with finding a black ski-mask in a suspect’s vehicle during the
month of May is mitigated when, as happened here, the mask was found in a pile of
other cold-weather clothing, suggesting that Risper used the mask for legitimate
purposes. And as for Risper’s motive, the opportunity to investigate the very
73
App. to Answering Br. at B404.
74
Id. at B60.
31
evidence that was belatedly produced might very well have produced additional
evidence that others shared Risper’s motive.
To be clear, this is not to say that the prosecution’s case against Risper was a
weak one; rather, it is only to say that we cannot conclude with confidence that its
apparent strength would not have faltered in the face of in-court testimony from AE
and the identification and, possibly, the in-court confrontation of the individual who
confessed to her. Because that is so, we conclude that Risper did not receive a fair
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of our confidence.
Finally, we agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that the State should
have disclosed before Risper’s trial began that the woman who asked Staci Weldon
to provide clothing for her child was Channell Gray. But because we have found
that the belated disclosure of AE’s statement, standing alone, warrants a new trial,
we need not subject this second belated disclosure to a full-fledged Brady analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.
32